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41 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1963–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbstred2 sentences2023The U.S. Supreme Court has said that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, “it [is] incumbent upon the State to prove ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 ). 2009This advice is crucial because there can be no effective waiver of a fundamental constitutional right unless there is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (emphasis added). | 7 | 22 |
Brewer v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2023The U.S. Supreme Court has said that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, “it [is] incumbent upon the State to prove ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 ). 2003“To establish that a person has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, the state must prove ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” J.G.S. v. State, 435 So.2d 942, 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977)). | 4 | 8 |
Barber v. Pagered2 sentences2022Waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Blanton v. State, 978 So. 2d 149, 156 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)). 2015See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (finding that waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment óf a known right or privilege”). | 2 | 4 |
J.G.S. v. Stategreen2 sentences2003"To establish that a person has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, the state must prove `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" J.G.S. v. State, 435 So.2d 942, 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977)). 2003“To establish that a person has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, the state must prove ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” J.G.S. v. State, 435 So.2d 942, 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977)). | 2 | 2 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2023The trial court’s statements call into question Figueroa- Sanabria’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. “[W]aivers of - 39 - counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstanc 1981Edwards v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), reaffirmed the stringent standard of Miranda and subsequent cases which require that a waiver of counsel must not only be "voluntary," but constitute a "knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege ..." (___ U.S. at ___, 101 S.Ct. at 1883 ). [2] The court further elaborated on this standard by holding that "once an accused has invoked the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further pol | 1 | 3 |
Von Moltke v. Gilliesgreen2 sentences2023Additionally, “[t]here must be both the capacity to make an understanding choice and an absence of subverting factors so that the choice is clearly free and responsible.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 729 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion). 1965In De Meerleer v. People of State of Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 , 67 S.Ct. 596 , 91 L.Ed. 584 , one of the elements leading to post-conviction relief was a finding that "at no time was assistance of counsel offered or mentioned to * * * the defendant." In Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 , 68 S.Ct. 316 , 92 L.Ed. 309 , the U.S. Supreme Court placed upon the trial judge the responsibility of informing an accused of his right to counsel as well as the nature of the charges against him. | 1 | 2 |
Boykin v. Alabamared2 sentences1997The Court held that a waiver is valid under the Due Process Clause only if it is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 1996For a waiver to be valid under the due process clause there must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 1712 n. 5, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 280 n. 5 (1969), and cases cited therein. | 1 | 2 |
Tucker v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Nipper, 398 So. 3d at 610 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); see also Tucker v. State, 559 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Don Edward Cashgreen1 sentence2023Thus, on “direct appeal, the government bears the burden of proving the validity of the waiver.” United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088 (11th Cir. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ruizgreen1 sentence2023The trial court’s statements call into question Figueroa- Sanabria’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. “[W]aivers of - 39 - counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstanc | 1 | 1 |
Blanton v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Blanton v. State, 978 So. 2d 149, 156 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Basilieregreen1 sentence2008To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see also State v. Basiliere, 353 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla.1977) (concluding that defendant did not waive *910 his constitutional right of confrontation because, at the time of deposition, the defendant had no idea tha | 1 | 1 |
Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Hitchcockgreen1 sentence2007"The crux of the waiver doctrine rests upon conduct demonstrating an intent to relinquish a known right." Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Hitchcock, 426 So.2d 958, 962 (Fla.1983). | 1 | 1 |
Destín Sav. Bank v. Summerhouse of FWB, Inc.green1 sentence1993Bank v. Summerhouse of FWB, Inc., 579 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
North Carolina v. Butlergreen2 sentences1983See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 [ 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 ] (1979); Brewel v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 [ 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 ] (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 [ 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 ] (1979). 451 U.S. at 482 , 101 S.Ct. at 1883 . 1983See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 [ 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 ] (1979); Brewel v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 [ 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 ] (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 [ 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 ] (1979). 451 U.S. at 482 , 101 S.Ct. at 1883 . | 1 | 1 |
Fare v. Michael C.green2 sentences1983See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 [ 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 ] (1979); Brewel v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 [ 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 ] (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 [ 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 ] (1979). 451 U.S. at 482 , 101 S.Ct. at 1883 . 1983See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 [ 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 ] (1979); Brewel v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 [ 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 ] (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 [ 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 ] (1979). 451 U.S. at 482 , 101 S.Ct. at 1883 . | 1 | 1 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences1983See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 [ 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 ] (1979); Brewel v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 [ 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 ] (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 [ 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 ] (1979). 451 U.S. at 482 , 101 S.Ct. at 1883 . 1983See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 [ 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-1758 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 ] (1979); Brewel v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 [ 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 ] (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 [ 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 ] (1979). 451 U.S. at 482 , 101 S.Ct. at 1883 . | 1 | 1 |
| Carnley v. Cochrangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
green
2 sentences1990Essentially, Ms. Hartwell is now attempting to regain homestead rights through her stepmother that she ceased to have in her own right many years ago. [2] "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Mark Twain, 1897, cable from London to the Associated Press. [3] "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). [4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (fifth amendment rights and sixth amendment right to counsel); 1990Essentially, Ms. Hartwell is now attempting to regain homestead rights through her stepmother that she ceased to have in her own right many years ago. [2] "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Mark Twain, 1897, cable from London to the Associated Press. [3] "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). [4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (fifth amendment rights and sixth amendment right to counsel); | 2 | 1981–1990 |
Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Branco
green
1 sentence2022In the appraisal context, waiver occurs when “the party seeking appraisal actively participates in a 15 lawsuit or engages in conduct inconsistent with the right to appraisal.” See Branco, 148 So. 3d at 493 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Bartelt v. Bartelt
green
1 sentence2012In Destín Savings Bank v. Summerhouse of FWB, Inc., 579 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the court set forth the following principles: Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, or conduct that warrants an inference of the intentional relinquishment of a known right. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Princess Anne Hills Civic League, Inc. v. Susan Constant Real Estate Trust
green
2 sentences2007The Supreme Court of Virginia has defined laches as “the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Estate, 243 Va. 53, 58 , 413 S.E.2d 599 (1992). 2007The Supreme Court of Virginia has defined laches as “the neglect or failure to assert a known right or claim for an unexplained period of time under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Estate, 243 Va. 53, 58 , 413 S.E.2d 599 (1992). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Patterson v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1992In a case arising under the Fifth Amendment, we described this requirement as "a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." [Citing Burbine. ] Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292 , 108 S.Ct. at 2395 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCann
green
2 sentences1990Essentially, Ms. Hartwell is now attempting to regain homestead rights through her stepmother that she ceased to have in her own right many years ago. [2] "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Mark Twain, 1897, cable from London to the Associated Press. [3] "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). [4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (fifth amendment rights and sixth amendment right to counsel); 1990Essentially, Ms. Hartwell is now attempting to regain homestead rights through her stepmother that she ceased to have in her own right many years ago. [2] "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Mark Twain, 1897, cable from London to the Associated Press. [3] "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). [4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (fifth amendment rights and sixth amendment right to counsel); | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1990Essentially, Ms. Hartwell is now attempting to regain homestead rights through her stepmother that she ceased to have in her own right many years ago. [2] "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Mark Twain, 1897, cable from London to the Associated Press. [3] "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). [4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (fifth amendment rights and sixth amendment right to counsel); 1990Essentially, Ms. Hartwell is now attempting to regain homestead rights through her stepmother that she ceased to have in her own right many years ago. [2] "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Mark Twain, 1897, cable from London to the Associated Press. [3] "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). [4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (fifth amendment rights and sixth amendment right to counsel); | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Jose Bueno, Leon Trevino and Victor Alegria, Cross-Appellants v. City of Donna, Cross-Appellees
green
1 sentence1989Meynarez made no “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484 (5th Cir.1983). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Vogel
green
1 sentence1986Starkenstein v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 189 (M.D.Fla. 1983); Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Vogel, 195 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Sentry Insurance Co. v. Brown, 424 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Sentry Ins. v. Brown
green
1 sentence1986Starkenstein v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 189 (M.D.Fla. 1983); Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Vogel, 195 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Sentry Insurance Co. v. Brown, 424 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Starkenstein v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc.
green
1 sentence1986Starkenstein v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 189 (M.D.Fla. 1983); Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Vogel, 195 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Sentry Insurance Co. v. Brown, 424 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Witt v. State
green
1 sentence1980In contrast, we specifically held on Witt's direct appeal that Witt had waived his right to counsel and that "the heavy burden of demonstrating that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived ... his right to counsel ... was met under the circumstances in this case." Witt v. State, 342 So.2d at 500 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Brookhart v. Janis
green
2 sentences1977To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a waiver as `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966)." 1977To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a waiver as `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966)." | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| De Meerleer v. Michigan green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Williams v. State neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Phillips v. State green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.