known right privilege in Oregon

2025S. W., 295 Or App 420, 426 , 434 P3d 481 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 849 (2019) (waiver of right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding is valid if the youth “has made an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right’ ” (quoting In re Gault, 387 US 1, 42 , 87 S Ct 1428 , 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967))). 706 Dept. of Human Services v. J.

2025S. W., 295 Or App 420, 426 , 434 P3d 481 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 849 (2019) (waiver of right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding is valid if the youth “has made an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right’ ” (quoting In re Gault, 387 US 1, 42 , 87 S Ct 1428 , 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967))). 706 Dept. of Human Services v. J.

2024Cite as 334 Or App 529 (2024) 537 “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or aban- donment of a known right or privilege.” Moore, 317 Or at 240 .

2024“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or aban- donment of a known right or privilege.” Moore, 317 Or at 240 .

1982There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings, and on the basis of our review of the record, we agree that the state met its burden to prove “an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458 , 58 S Ct 1019 , 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1938).

1979"The cases that I recall say certainly he has — a defendant has a right to remain silent but he also has a right to change his mind in respect to that. *1063 "The evidence here convinces me certainly by a preponderance and by a great preponderance of the evidence that, number one, Mr. Singleton was aware of his constitutional rights; secondly, with knowledge of those that he voluntarily made the statement * * *." In allowing defendant's petition for review, this court asked counsel to address the following questions in oral argument: (1) With reference to the language of Brewer v. Williams, 43

2025S. W., 295 Or App 420, 426 , 434 P3d 481 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 849 (2019) (waiver of right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding is valid if the youth “has made an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right’ ” (quoting In re Gault, 387 US 1, 42 , 87 S Ct 1428 , 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967))). 706 Dept. of Human Services v. J.

2025S. W., 295 Or App 420, 426 , 434 P3d 481 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 849 (2019) (waiver of right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding is valid if the youth “has made an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right’ ” (quoting In re Gault, 387 US 1, 42 , 87 S Ct 1428 , 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967))). 706 Dept. of Human Services v. J.

2025S. W., 295 Or App 420, 426 , 434 P3d 481 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 849 (2019) (waiver of right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding is valid if the youth “has made an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right’ ” (quoting In re Gault, 387 US 1, 42 , 87 S Ct 1428 , 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967))). 706 Dept. of Human Services v. J.

2025S. W., 295 Or App 420, 426 , 434 P3d 481 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 849 (2019) (waiver of right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding is valid if the youth “has made an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right’ ” (quoting In re Gault, 387 US 1, 42 , 87 S Ct 1428 , 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967))). 706 Dept. of Human Services v. J.

2013“As with contractual waiver, the waiver of a statutory right is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id.

2006Cf. McMillan v. Follansbee, 194 Or App 145, 154 , 93 P3d 809 (2004) (waiver of a statutory right requires an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege).

2011In State v. Heilman, 339 Or 661, 669 , 125 P3d 728 (2005), the court stated: “To be valid, a waiver of a jury trial must show ‘ “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” ’ State v. Harris, 339 Or 157, 173 , 118 P3d 236 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 , 58 S Ct 1019 , 82 L Ed 1461 (1938)).

2011In State v. Heilman, 339 Or 661, 669 , 125 P3d 728 (2005), the court stated: “To be valid, a waiver of a jury trial must show ‘ “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” ’ State v. Harris, 339 Or 157, 173 , 118 P3d 236 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 , 58 S Ct 1019 , 82 L Ed 1461 (1938)).

2026“A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 132 , 831 P2d 666 (1992). “[T]he ‘known right’ component of a waiver ‘refers to the defendant’s knowledge and under- standing of the right[.]’ ” State v. Jacobson, 296 Or App 87, 94 , 437 P3d 243 (2019) (quoting Meyrick, 313 Or at 132 n 8).

2026“A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandon- ment of a known right or privilege.” State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 132 , 831 P2d 666 (1992). “[T]he ‘known right’ component of a waiver ‘refers to the defendant’s knowledge and under- standing of the right[.]’ ” State v. Jacobson, 296 Or App 87, 94 , 437 P3d 243 (2019) (quoting Meyrick, 313 Or at 132 n 8).

2024Cite as 334 Or App 529 (2024) 537 “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or aban- donment of a known right or privilege.” Moore, 317 Or at 240 .

2022“Waiver must be plainly and unequivocally manifested, either ‘in terms or by such conduct as clearly indicates an intention to renounce a known privilege or power.’ ” Wright Schuchart Harbor v. Johnson, 133 Or App 680, 685-86 , 893 P2d 560 (1995) (quot- ing Great American Ins. v. General Ins., 257 Or 62, 72 , 475 P2d 415 (1970)).

2022“Waiver must be plainly and unequivocally manifested, either ‘in terms or by such conduct as clearly indicates an intention to renounce a known privilege or power.’ ” Wright Schuchart Harbor v. Johnson, 133 Or App 680, 685-86 , 893 P2d 560 (1995) (quot- ing Great American Ins. v. General Ins., 257 Or 62, 72 , 475 P2d 415 (1970)).

2022“Waiver must be plainly and unequivocally manifested, either ‘in terms or by such conduct as clearly indicates an intention to renounce a known privilege or power.’ ” Wright Schuchart Harbor v. Johnson, 133 Or App 680, 685-86 , 893 P2d 560 (1995) (quot- ing Great American Ins. v. General Ins., 257 Or 62, 72 , 475 P2d 415 (1970)).

2022“Waiver must be plainly and unequivocally manifested, either ‘in terms or by such conduct as clearly indicates an intention to renounce a known privilege or power.’ ” Wright Schuchart Harbor v. Johnson, 133 Or App 680, 685-86 , 893 P2d 560 (1995) (quot- ing Great American Ins. v. General Ins., 257 Or 62, 72 , 475 P2d 415 (1970)).

2022Indeed, a defendant’s waiver is likely to be unconstitutional if the court’s warnings of the pitfalls of self-representation were “cursory in nature and lacking in detail.” State v. Lasarte, 203 Or App 222, 229 , 125 P3d 33 (2005); see also Meyrick, 313 Or at 133 (“The more relevant information that a trial court provides to a defendant * * * about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the more likely it will be that a defendant’s decision to waive counsel is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]”); Groff, 306 Or App at 48 (concluding tha

2022Indeed, a defendant’s waiver is likely to be unconstitutional if the court’s warnings of the pitfalls of self-representation were “cursory in nature and lacking in detail.” State v. Lasarte, 203 Or App 222, 229 , 125 P3d 33 (2005); see also Meyrick, 313 Or at 133 (“The more relevant information that a trial court provides to a defendant * * * about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the more likely it will be that a defendant’s decision to waive counsel is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]”); Groff, 306 Or App at 48 (concluding tha

2020The waiver of a statutory right requires an “inten- tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Assn. of Oregon Corrections Emp. v. State of Oregon, 353 Or 170, 183 , 295 P3d 38 (2013), which, in turn, requires “a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of the party showing such a purpose[.]” Id.

2020The waiver of a statutory right requires an “inten- tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Assn. of Oregon Corrections Emp. v. State of Oregon, 353 Or 170, 183 , 295 P3d 38 (2013), which, in turn, requires “a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of the party showing such a purpose[.]” Id.

2017Second, as we explain above in our discussion of whether defendant understood his right to counsel, the warnings defendant received, in combination with the totality of the circumstances, resulted in a “knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 482 , 101 S Ct 1880 , 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981) (knowing and intelligent waiver “depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 ,

2017Second, as we explain above in our discussion of whether defendant understood his right to counsel, the warnings defendant received, in combination with the totality of the circumstances, resulted in a “knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 482 , 101 S Ct 1880 , 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981) (knowing and intelligent waiver “depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 ,

2015However, “Article I, section 11, does not require a catechism by the trial court,” id. at 134 , and, “[w]here the preferred colloquy did not occur on the record or, alternatively, was insufficient to explain the risks of self-representation to the defendant, the court may nevertheless infer, if the totality of circumstances so demonstrate, that the defendant knew the risks of self-representation,” , 172 Or App 546, 553-54 , 19 P3d 369 , rev den, 332 Or 305 (2001).

2015However, “Article I, section 11, does not require a catechism by the trial court,” id. at 134 , and, “[w]here the preferred colloquy did not occur on the record or, alternatively, was insufficient to explain the risks of self-representation to the defendant, the court may nevertheless infer, if the totality of circumstances so demonstrate, that the defendant knew the risks of self-representation,” , 172 Or App 546, 553-54 , 19 P3d 369 , rev den, 332 Or 305 (2001).

2013However, Article I, section 11, “does not require a catechism by the trial court *** before the right to counsel may be validly waived by a defendant.” Id. at 134 . “[A] defendant demonstrates prima facie error by showing that the trial court allowed him or her to proceed at a critical stage without an attorney and did not determine that that he or she was aware of the risks of self-representation.” Gaino, 210 Or App at 114 ; see also Meyrick, 313 Or at 133 (“[A] trial court may accept a defendant’s proffered waiver of counsel only if it finds that the defendant knows of his or her right to co