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39 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2024We explained that “waiver . . . is ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. at 1151 n.11 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 2024We explained that “waiver . . . is ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. at 1151 n.11 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). | 10 | 32 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2013Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2260 (quoting Mor an v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]”). 2013Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2260 (quoting Mor an v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]”). | 2 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2010See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]"). [14] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . [15] Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2262 . [16] Id. at 2264 (emphasis added). [17] 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). [18] Id. at 103-04 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). [19] Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [20] 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 188 2010See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]"). [14] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . [15] Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2262 . [16] Id. at 2264 (emphasis added). [17] 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). [18] Id. at 103-04 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). [19] Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [20] 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 188 | 2 | 3 |
Boyd v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003“A personal and fundamental right will be deemed waived only if there is record evidence demonstrating ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Id. at 674-75 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 1998The Boyd Inquiry In Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 674-75 (D.C.1991), we held for the first time 6 that a defendant’s right to testify in a criminal trial “is a fundamental and personal right which can only be waived by the defendant,” and that such a waiver must be “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Alexandergreen2 sentences1982United States v. Alexander, supra at 52. 1982Wilson v. United States, supra at 30; United States v. Alexander, supra at 52. | 2 | 2 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Brooks v. United States, 39 A.3d 873, 880 (D.C. 2012) (discussing the strong presumption against waiver of a constitutional right and the government’s burden of showing “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (citation omitted)); Welch v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 840 (D.C.1983) (requiring a “knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970))). 2015See Brooks v. United States, 39 A.3d 873, 880 (D.C. 2012) (discussing the strong presumption against waiver of a constitutional right and the government’s burden of showing “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (citation omitted)); Welch v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 840 (D.C.1983) (requiring a “knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970))). | 1 | 2 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2010See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]"). [14] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . [15] Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2262 . [16] Id. at 2264 (emphasis added). [17] 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). [18] Id. at 103-04 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). [19] Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [20] 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 188 2010See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]"). [14] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . [15] Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2262 . [16] Id. at 2264 (emphasis added). [17] 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). [18] Id. at 103-04 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). [19] Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [20] 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 188 | 1 | 2 |
Brewer v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1986Whether an accused has effected a valid Sixth Amendment waiver requires a showing of both “comprehension and relinquishment.” Brewer, supra, 430 U.S. at 404 , 97 S.Ct. at 1242 . 1986Whether an accused has effected a valid Sixth Amendment waiver requires a showing of both “comprehension and relinquishment.” Brewer, supra, 430 U.S. at 404 , 97 S.Ct. at 1242 . | 1 | 2 |
Wilson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at 100 , 96 S.Ct. at 324 (procedures established by Miranda must be followed or “any statements given by the person in custody cannot be admitted over his objection in evidence against him as a defendant at trial, even though the statement may in fact be wholly voluntary”); Wilson, supra, 444 A.2d at 30 ; Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 52. 20 2. 1982Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Miranda waivers not only must be “voluntary” but also must conform to the rigid constitutional standard in Johnson, supra, of “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (right to counsel); see Wilson v. United States, D.C.App., 444 A.2d 25 (1982) (right to silence). . | 1 | 2 |
Nortel Networks, Inc. v. Gold & Appel Transfer, S.A.green2 sentences2019Cir. 1936) (citation omitted); accord Nortel Networks, Inc. v. Gold & Appel Transfer, S.A. , 298 F.Supp.2d 81 , 88 (D.D.C. 2004) ("Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2019Nortel Networks , 298 F.Supp.2d at 88 . | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015In the end, the extent to which additional details about the North Carolina (…continued) by allowing opposing counsel to cross-examine the witness on the nature of the violation, rather than by excluding that witness‟s testimony). 3 “In arguable cases, the prosecutor should provide the potentially exculpatory information to the defense or, at the very least, make it available to the trial court for in camera inspection.” Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.C. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Welch v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Brooks v. United States, 39 A.3d 873, 880 (D.C. 2012) (discussing the strong presumption against waiver of a constitutional right and the government‟s burden of showing “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (citation omitted)); Welch v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 840 (D.C. 1983) (requiring a “knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970))). 2015See Brooks v. United States, 39 A.3d 873, 880 (D.C. 2012) (discussing the strong presumption against waiver of a constitutional right and the government’s burden of showing “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (citation omitted)); Welch v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 840 (D.C.1983) (requiring a “knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970))). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Brooks v. United States, 39 A.3d 873, 880 (D.C. 2012) (discussing the strong presumption against waiver of a constitutional right and the government‟s burden of showing “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (citation omitted)); Welch v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 840 (D.C. 1983) (requiring a “knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970))). 2015See Brooks v. United States, 39 A.3d 873, 880 (D.C. 2012) (discussing the strong presumption against waiver of a constitutional right and the government’s burden of showing “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (citation omitted)); Welch v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 840 (D.C.1983) (requiring a “knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970))). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012For a waiver to be valid, the government must prove “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 19 (D.C.2006) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Shatzergreen2 sentences2010See also, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (explaining that under Edwards, "if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked."). [25] Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [26] Maryland v. Shatzer, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and cit 2010See also, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (explaining that under Edwards, "if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked."). [25] Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [26] Maryland v. Shatzer, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and cit | 1 | 1 |
McNeil v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2010See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]"). [14] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . [15] Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2262 . [16] Id. at 2264 (emphasis added). [17] 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). [18] Id. at 103-04 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). [19] Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [20] 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 188 2010See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]"). [14] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . [15] Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2262 . [16] Id. at 2264 (emphasis added). [17] 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). [18] Id. at 103-04 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). [19] Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [20] 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 188 | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2010See also, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (explaining that under Edwards, "if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked."). [25] Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [26] Maryland v. Shatzer, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and cit 2010See also, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (explaining that under Edwards, "if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked."). [25] Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). [26] Maryland v. Shatzer, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and cit | 1 | 1 |
Barber v. Pagegreen2 sentences2006We see no objection in principle to resolving the question of waiver prior to trial; it is not burdensome for a defendant represented by counsel to have to state, when asked, whether he waives his rights or not. 24 For the waiver to be valid, however, it must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (waiver of Sixth Amendment right to confrontation). 2006We see no objection in principle to resolving the question of waiver prior to trial; it is not burdensome for a defendant represented by counsel to have to state, when asked, whether he waives his rights or not. 24 For the waiver to be valid, however, it must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (waiver of Sixth Amendment right to confrontation). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. George Martin Golaygreen2 sentences1985See id. 560 F.2d at 870-71 . [11] In contrast to a waiver, which is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), "a defendant can forfeit his defenses without ever having made a deliberate, informed decision to relinquish them. . . . 1985See id. 560 F.2d at 870-71 . [11] In contrast to a waiver, which is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), "a defendant can forfeit his defenses without ever having made a deliberate, informed decision to relinquish them. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Bliss v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982This means, first, that whatever category or level of waiver is at issue, the “relinquishment of the privilege” must be “voluntary.” Miranda, supra 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. at 1629 . 1 Second, “a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege.” Id. at 475 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . 2 The government’s burden is eased, however, by the Supreme Court’s ruling that a waiver need not be express; it can be found in “ ‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of t | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Floyd W. McNeilgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burke v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Barthelmio Dalli and Thomas Pytelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Theron Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allen v. United States
green
2 sentences2024We explained that “waiver . . . is ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. at 1151 n.11 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 2024We explained that “waiver . . . is ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. at 1151 n.11 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). | 5 | 2024–2024 |
Taylor v. United States
green
2 sentences1987Before appellant’s absence may be construed as voluntary, it must be shown he made “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 , 94 S.Ct. 194, 195 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (quoting Johnson v. *324 Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 1987Before appellant’s absence may be construed as voluntary, it must be shown he made “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 , 94 S.Ct. 194, 195 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (quoting Johnson v. *324 Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 2 | 1986–1987 |
Moran v. Burbine
green
2 sentences2013Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2260 (quoting Mor an v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]”). 2013Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2260 (quoting Mor an v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]”). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Rorie
green
1 sentence2000Rorie, 518 A.2d at 413 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
McCarthy v. United States
green
2 sentences1986Put another way, because the plea represents “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), the plea must be “equally voluntary and knowing.” McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 , 89 S.Ct. at 1171 . 1986Put another way, because the plea represents “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), the plea must be “equally voluntary and knowing.” McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 , 89 S.Ct. at 1171 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Peoples v. United States
green
1 sentence1982Cf. Calaway v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 1220 (1979) (suspect continued to speak despite consistent warnings by the police); Peoples v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 41 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 , 99 S.Ct. 2826 , 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979) (suspect signed a confession six hours after a previous interrogation and after he had been taken before a judicial officer who, along with the detective who took the statement, gave him fresh Miranda warnings). *30 Since we so find, we also conclude that the appellant's statement did not amount to an intentional relinquishment or abandonment | 1 | 1982–1982 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences1982This means, first, that whatever category or level of waiver is at issue, the "relinquishment of the privilege" must be "voluntary." Miranda, supra 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. at 1629 . [1] Second, "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege." Id. at 475 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . [2] The government's burden is eased, however, by the Supreme Court's ruling that a waiver need not be express; it can be found in "`the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct o 1982This means, first, that whatever category or level of waiver is at issue, the "relinquishment of the privilege" must be "voluntary." Miranda, supra 384 U.S. at 476 , 86 S.Ct. at 1629 . [1] Second, "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege." Id. at 475 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . [2] The government's burden is eased, however, by the Supreme Court's ruling that a waiver need not be express; it can be found in "`the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct o | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Calaway v. United States
green
1 sentence1982Cf. Calaway v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 1220 (1979) (suspect continued to speak despite consistent warnings by the police); Peoples v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 41 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 , 99 S.Ct. 2826 , 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979) (suspect signed a confession six hours after a previous interrogation and after he had been taken before a judicial officer who, along with the detective who took the statement, gave him fresh Miranda warnings). *30 Since we so find, we also conclude that the appellant's statement did not amount to an intentional relinquishment or abandonment | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Thomas v. Stone
green
1 sentence1982Cf. Calaway v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 1220 (1979) (suspect continued to speak despite consistent warnings by the police); Peoples v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 41 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 , 99 S.Ct. 2826 , 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979) (suspect signed a confession six hours after a previous interrogation and after he had been taken before a judicial officer who, along with the detective who took the statement, gave him fresh Miranda warnings). *30 Since we so find, we also conclude that the appellant's statement did not amount to an intentional relinquishment or abandonment | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Peoples v. United States
green
1 sentence1982Cf. Calaway v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 1220 (1979) (suspect continued to speak despite consistent warnings by the police); Peoples v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 41 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 , 99 S.Ct. 2826 , 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979) (suspect signed a confession six hours after a previous interrogation and after he had been taken before a judicial officer who, along with the detective who took the statement, gave him fresh Miranda warnings). *30 Since we so find, we also conclude that the appellant's statement did not amount to an intentional relinquishment or abandonment | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Mauro green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| United States v. John Mauro and John Fusco green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Gray v. Benson green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Monday v. United States green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Detroit Vital Foods, Inc. v. United States green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Jackman v. Bodine green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.