Status analogous to contractual relation could not be impaired by subsequent provisions.

- The approval of school bonds by the electors and their validation according to statute created a status analogous to a contractual relation between such electors and the state, which could not be destroyed or impaired by a subsequent statute or constitutional provision. Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).

Contract between state and individual is protected by this constitutional prohibition. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819 (1935).

No bar to tax legislation effective upon business or occupation in year in which enacted.

- It is competent for the legislature to enact that a person entering upon the business or occupation upon which the tax provided in an ordinance has been imposed, by the terms thereof, should pay the amount of the tax named for the year, or for any period of time within the year, during which the person should choose to apply for a license. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968).

Statute made no irrevocable grant of right of taxation.

- Former Code 1933, § 56-1310, (see now O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8) was not unconstitutional because it neither made any irrevocable grant of special privileges and immunities nor did it irrevocably give, grant, limit, or restrain the state's sovereign right of taxation as proscribed by this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Statute regulating coin operated amusement machines.

- In a suit for tortious interference with contractual relations, the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment against the owners of coin-operated amusement machines because O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70 et seq. did not void preexisting contracts and it was error to interpret the statute otherwise. All Star, Inc. v. Ga. Atlanta Amusements, LLC, 332 Ga. App. 1, 770 S.E.2d 22 (2015).

Constitutional issue on zoning ordinance.

- Trial court erred by failing to address whether a 1993 county zoning ordinance was constitutional because the record established that the landfill permit applicant raised a constitutional challenge to the zoning ordinance before the trial court in its response to the challengers' motion for partial summary judgment and, in fact, in its transfer order to the appellate court, the trial court specifically stated that the court did not rule on the applicant's constitutional argument. Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 878, 769 S.E.2d 823 (2015).

Application of amendments to criminal history record information statute.

- Recent amendments to Georgia's criminal history record information statute, O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37, are to be applied to information regarding arrests occurring prior to the amendments' effective date as the statute itself made clear that the statute does apply to information regarding arrests pre-dating the amendments, and such application presents no constitutional problem. Mosley v. Lowe, 298 Ga. 363, 782 S.E.2d 43 (2016).

Expert affidavit requirement in medical malpractice cases did not extend special privileges and immunities.

- O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)(2)(A), governing expert qualifications in medical malpractice cases, was not unconstitutionally vague, did not violate equal protection, separation of powers, or the right to jury trial, did not make irrevocable grants of special privileges and immunities, and was not a special law; however, the trial court erred in rejecting an expert simply because the expert had not performed the specific procedure at issue. The proper consideration was the expert's level of knowledge. Zarate-Martinez v. Echemendia, 299 Ga. 301, 788 S.E.2d 405 (2016).

County's resolution deciding not to commercialize airport was not state legislative action.

- Contractor who argued that a county violated the Contracts Clause of the federal and state constitutions when the county passed a resolution withdrawing the county's consent to an FAA application to expand the county's airport failed to allege any state legislative action and, thus, there could be no violation of the Contracts Clause. Avery v. Paulding County Airport Auth., 343 Ga. App. 832, 808 S.E.2d 15 (2017).

Cited in Cochran v. City of Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 146 S.E.2d 462 (1928); State Hwy. Bd. v. Willcox, 168 Ga. 883, 149 S.E. 182 (1929); Camp v. State, 171 Ga. 25, 154 S.E. 436 (1930); Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Saye & Davis Transf. Co., 170 Ga. 873, 154 S.E. 439 (1930); Meyers v. Whittle, 171 Ga. 509, 156 S.E. 120 (1930); Manley v. Mobley, 174 Ga. 228, 162 S.E. 536 (1932); Slater v. Davis, 174 Ga. 633, 163 S.E. 704 (1932); Perkins v. Mayor of Madison, 175 Ga. 714, 165 S.E. 811 (1932); State Bd. of Barber Exmrs. v. Blocker, 176 Ga. 125, 167 S.E. 298 (1932); Hutchinson v. Brown, 47 Ga. App. 82, 169 S.E. 848 (1933); Gormley v. Searcy, 179 Ga. 389, 175 S.E. 913 (1934); West v. Frick Co., 55 Ga. App. 854, 192 S.E. 55 (1937); Walker County Fertilizer Co. v. Napier, 184 Ga. 861, 193 S.E. 770 (1937); Wright v. Cannon, 185 Ga. 363, 195 S.E. 168 (1938); Bowers v. Keller, 185 Ga. 435, 195 S.E. 447 (1938); West v. Trotzier, 185 Ga. 794, 196 S.E. 902 (1938); Benton v. State, 187 Ga. 149, 199 S.E. 749 (1938); Morris v. Stanford, 58 Ga. App. 726, 199 S.E. 773 (1938); West v. Anderson, 187 Ga. 587, 1 S.E.2d 671 (1939); Green & Milam v. State Revenue Comm'n, 188 Ga. 442, 4 S.E.2d 144 (1939); Salter v. Bank of Commerce, 189 Ga. 328, 6 S.E.2d 290 (1939); Barnett v. D.O. Martin Co., 191 Ga. 11, 11 S.E.2d 210 (1940); Town of McIntyre v. Scott, 191 Ga. 473, 12 S.E.2d 883 (1940); National Sur. Corp. v. Gatlin, 192 Ga. 293, 15 S.E.2d 180 (1941); Renfroe v. Butts, 192 Ga. 720, 16 S.E.2d 551 (1941); McCook v. Long, 193 Ga. 299, 18 S.E.2d 488 (1942); FDIC v. Beasley, 193 Ga. 727, 20 S.E.2d 23 (1942); Thacker v. Morris, 196 Ga. 167, 26 S.E.2d 329 (1943); Steward v. Peerless Furn. Co., 70 Ga. App. 236, 28 S.E.2d 396 (1943); Kelley v. Newton County, 198 Ga. 483, 32 S.E.2d 99 (1944); Williams v. Ragsdale, 205 Ga. 274, 53 S.E.2d 339 (1949); South W.R.R. v. Benton, 206 Ga. 770, 58 S.E.2d 905 (1950); Ivy v. Ferguson, 82 Ga. App. 600, 62 S.E.2d 191 (1950); City of Atlanta v. Anglin, 209 Ga. 170, 71 S.E.2d 419 (1952); McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 282, 71 S.E.2d 548 (1952); Biddle v. Moore, 87 Ga. App. 524, 74 S.E.2d 552 (1953); MacNeill v. Fulton County, 210 Ga. 119, 78 S.E.2d 40 (1953); Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 198, 78 S.E.2d 612 (1953); Stewart v. Davis, 210 Ga. 278, 79 S.E.2d 535 (1954); Crawford v. Irwin, 211 Ga. 241, 85 S.E.2d 8 (1954); Harper v. City Council, 212 Ga. 605, 94 S.E.2d 690 (1956); Murphey v. Murphey, 215 Ga. 19, 108 S.E.2d 872 (1959); Schaffer v. Oxford, 102 Ga. App. 710, 117 S.E.2d 637 (1960); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354, 127 S.E.2d 909 (1962); Stephenson v. State, 219 Ga. 652, 135 S.E.2d 380 (1964); Bolton v. State, 220 Ga. 632, 140 S.E.2d 866 (1965); Sanders v. Harper, 220 Ga. 649, 141 S.E.2d 156 (1965); Brown v. City of Marietta, 220 Ga. 826, 142 S.E.2d 235 (1965); Webb v. Whitley, 221 Ga. 618, 146 S.E.2d 722 (1966); Veal v. Smith, 221 Ga. 712, 146 S.E.2d 751 (1966); National Factor & Inv. Corp. v. State Bank, 224 Ga. 535, 163 S.E.2d 817 (1968); Bugden v. Bugden, 225 Ga. 413, 169 S.E.2d 337 (1969); Stith v. Hudson, 226 Ga. 364, 174 S.E.2d 892 (1970); Hawes v. National Serv. Indus., Inc., 121 Ga. App. 775, 175 S.E.2d 34 (1970); Whitley v. Whitley Constr. Co., 121 Ga. App. 696, 175 S.E.2d 128 (1970); Smith v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 226 Ga. 715, 177 S.E.2d 249 (1970); Southern Land, Timber & Pulp Corp. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Carter v. Haynes, 228 Ga. 462, 186 S.E.2d 115 (1971); Chatham County Hosp. Auth. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 325 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Ga. 1971); Montaquila v. Cranford, 230 Ga. 442, 197 S.E.2d 357 (1973); Stith v. Hudson, 231 Ga. 520, 202 S.E.2d 392 (1973); House v. James, 232 Ga. 443, 207 S.E.2d 201 (1974); Spalding County v. East Enters., Inc., 232 Ga. 887, 209 S.E.2d 215 (1974); Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Johnson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 67, 213 S.E.2d 170 (1975); Town of Lyerly v. Short, 234 Ga. 877, 218 S.E.2d 588 (1975); Thompson v. Hornsby, 235 Ga. 561, 221 S.E.2d 192 (1975); Busbee v. Georgia Conference, Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 235 Ga. 752, 221 S.E.2d 437 (1975); Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975); Bell v. Bell, 237 Ga. 464, 228 S.E.2d 850 (1976); Nelson v. Bloodworth, 238 Ga. 264, 232 S.E.2d 547 (1977); Stith v. Morris, 241 Ga. 247, 244 S.E.2d 817 (1978); Savage v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 671, 251 S.E.2d 268 (1978); Bryan v. Bryan, 242 Ga. 826, 251 S.E.2d 566 (1979); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Henson, 150 Ga. App. 788, 258 S.E.2d 706 (1979); Hollowell v. Jove, 628 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1980); Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738 (1981); State v. Hasty, 158 Ga. App. 464, 280 S.E.2d 873 (1981); Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981); Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 831, 289 S.E.2d 544 (1982); DOT v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 162 Ga. App. 252, 291 S.E.2d 104 (1982); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 542 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Clark & Stephenson v. State Personnel Bd., 252 Ga. 548, 314 S.E.2d 658 (1984); Eig v. Savage, 177 Ga. App. 514, 339 S.E.2d 752 (1986); Stinchcomb v. Clayton County Water Auth., 177 Ga. App. 558, 340 S.E.2d 217 (1986); Stegall v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 765, 353 S.E.2d 484 (1987); Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27, 354 S.E.2d 140 (1987); Horton v. State Employee Retirement Sys., 262 Ga. 458, 421 S.E.2d 703 (1992); Bieling v. Battle, 209 Ga. App. 874, 434 S.E.2d 719 (1993); Chandler v. State, 281 Ga. 712, 642 S.E.2d 646 (2007).

Removal of county commissioner from office.

- Local act, which had the effect of removing a county commissioner from office before the end of the two-year term to which the commissioner had been appointed to fill a vacancy left by a deceased commissioner, was a bill of attainder prohibited by both the Georgia and United States Constitutions. Fulton v. Baker, 261 Ga. 710, 410 S.E.2d 735 (1991).

Discovery.

- The amended discovery procedure of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 et seq. is not a bill of attainder, which refers to legislative imposition of punishment on specific persons or on a class of persons without any judicial proceeding. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007).

Local deannexation statute that included the area of the city in which the mayor resided, making the mayor ineligible to hold office, was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder because it neither singled out the mayor nor punished the mayor as an officeholder. Lee v. City of Villa Rica, 264 Ga. 606, 449 S.E.2d 295 (1994).

Local act providing for selection of chair of board of education was unconstitutional bill of attainder.

- H.B. 563 was an unconstitutional bill of attainder under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X, as applied to the chairperson of the Randolph County Board of Education because prior to the passage of the bill, the chairperson's term was not set to expire until December 31, 2010, but the bill operated to cut short the chairperson's four-year term that had previously been established by O.C.G.A. § 20-2-57(a) and local board policy. Cook v. Smith, 288 Ga. 409, 705 S.E.2d 847 (2010).

General aspects of ex post facto laws.

- A statute cannot be an ex post facto law if it is apparent that the legislature in enacting the statute involved did not make that a criminal act which was innocent when done; did not aggravate an offense or change the punishment and make it greater than when it was committed; did not alter the rules of evidence and require less or different evidence than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; and did not deprive the accused of any substantial right or immunity possessed by the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, answer conformed to, 125 Ga. App. 841, 189 S.E.2d 696 (1972).

As a general rule, any law is ex post facto which is enacted after the offense was committed, and which, in relation to it or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to the accused's disadvantage. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, answer conformed to, 125 Ga. App. 841, 189 S.E.2d 696 (1972).

Construction of ex post facto prohibitions.

- The ex post facto laws prohibited by the state and federal Constitutions refer only to laws which aggravate the crime, increase the punishment, or allow conviction on a less or different weight of evidence, and not to those which reduce or mollify the penalty. Barton v. State, 81 Ga. App. 810, 60 S.E.2d 173 (1950).

Term ex post facto refers to criminal statutes. Williams v. State, 213 Ga. 221, 98 S.E.2d 373 (1957); Goolsby v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 141 Ga. App. 605, 234 S.E.2d 165 (1977).

The taking of a urine sample from a fireman by a city was not a legislative enactment and therefore did not violate the ex post facto clause. Smith v. City of E. Point, 189 Ga. App. 454, 376 S.E.2d 215 (1988), cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 376 S.E.2d 215 (1989).

Ex post facto law relates to criminal cases only and is a law that alters the situation of the accused to the accused's disadvantage. Bailey v. State, 210 Ga. 52, 77 S.E.2d 511 (1953).

Prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to substantive, not procedural, rights. Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980).

Act which is procedural in nature does not violate ex post facto rule when applied to previously committed offense unless it results in the infliction of greater punishment for the crime or alters the situation of the accused to the accused's disadvantage. Walker v. State, 132 Ga. App. 274, 208 S.E.2d 5 (1974).

Statute that only regulates procedure is outside constitutional prohibitions.

- While it is the rule that no one has a vested right in a mere mode of procedure, so that a statute merely regulating procedure, and leaving untouched "all the substantial protections with which existing law surrounds the person accused of crime," is not within the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto laws, yet a statute is void and ineffective as related to previous offenses, if it takes from the accused a substantial right given to the accused by the law in force at the time to which the accused's guilt relates, and such a statute "cannot be sustained simply because, in a general sense, it may be said to regulate procedure." Winston v. State, 186 Ga. 573, 198 S.E. 667 (1938), commented on in 1 Ga. B.J. 46 (1939); Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, answer conformed to, 125 Ga. App. 841, 189 S.E.2d 696 (1972).

In order for statute to violate prohibition against ex post facto laws it must affect substantive right of accused and an accused does not have a vested right in a mere mode of procedure. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E.2d 791 (1974).

Upon the defendant's constitutional challenge to the retrospective application of three provisions of the Criminal Justice Act, Ga. L. 2005, p. 20, no reversible error resulted from challenges to the closing arguments and admission of character evidence, as: (1) the former was not distinctly ruled upon by the lower court; and (2) the lower court sustained objections to the admissibility of character evidence, and thus, the state could not introduce character evidence regarding the defendant's prior criminal convictions; moreover, a change in the number of the defendant's peremptory challenges by the Act did not affect any protected right by the application of the amended version of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-165, as strikes were procedural and not substantive in nature. Madison v. State, 281 Ga. 640, 641 S.E.2d 789 (2007).

Jury determination of sentence is not a substantive right so as to come within the proscriptions of "ex post facto laws". Adkins v. State, 134 Ga. App. 507, 215 S.E.2d 270 (1975); Mealor v. State, 134 Ga. App. 564, 215 S.E.2d 272 (1975).

Changes deemed necessary for orderly and just conduct of criminal trials is outside ex post facto prohibitions.

- When the changes effected by the enactment of a law constitute merely an alteration in the conditions deemed necessary for the orderly and just conduct of criminal trials, they do not deprive the defendant of any substantial personal right within the meaning of the constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831, answer conformed to, 125 Ga. App. 841, 189 S.E.2d 696 (1972).

Statute may use conviction as element of future offense.

- Even though a statute, passed after a conviction, uses the conviction as an element of a future offense, this is not an ex post facto law, because the defendant's punishment for an earlier conviction is not increased, because the statute punishes only for a future offense, and because punishment is rationally enhanced by the prior conviction. State v. Dean, 235 Ga. App. 847, 510 S.E.2d 605 (1998).

Prior conviction as an element of a future offense.

- Even though O.C.G.A. § 42-1-13 was passed after a sex offender's statutory rape conviction, and used the prior conviction as an element of a future offense, it was not an ex post facto law since it only punished a future offense, which punishment was enhanced by the prior conviction, and the sex offender could only have been punished under § 42-1-13 if the offender prospectively chose to violate it by continuing to live at the offender's current home; the fact that the prior conviction subjected the sex offender to possible punishment under § 42-1-13 did not make the statute into an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Denson v. State of Ga., 267 Ga. App. 528, 600 S.E.2d 645 (2004).

Habitual violator statute is not ex post facto.

- A habitual violator statute allowing consideration of offenses which occurred before enactment of the statute is not ex post facto. The repetition of the criminal conduct aggravates the offender's guilt and justifies heavier penalties when the offender is again convicted, and the penalty is imposed for a new crime only but is heavier if the offender is a habitual violator. Cofer v. Crowell, 146 Ga. App. 639, 247 S.E.2d 152 (1978).

Statute allowing the use of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a trial is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law since it does not affect the manner and degree of punishment nor alter any substantive rights of the defendant. Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994).

Sex offender registration.

- A defendant who entered an Alford plea in 2000 to sex offenses as a first offender was properly required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the 2005 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12; that section applies to first offenders convicted before July 1, 2004, and it is not an ex post facto law because if a defendant fails to register, the defendant will be guilty of a felony distinct from those crimes of which the defendant has been previously convicted. Watson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 635, 642 S.E.2d 328 (2007).

Amendment of forcible rape statute meant indictment within statute of limitations.

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for forcible rape of the defendant's child during the time the child was 13 through 15 years of age, the trial court correctly concluded that the state had 15 years from the victim's 16th birthday on January 12, 1995, or until January 12, 2010, to prosecute the case noting the extension of the statute of limitation to 15 years as to forcible rape by the 1996 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1; therefore, no ex post facto violation occurred since the indictment was filed on January 8, 2008. Duke v. State, 298 Ga. App. 719, 681 S.E.2d 174 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1866, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 31 (Ga. 2010).

Amendment changing retroactive effect of prior amendment.

- An amendment which changed the retroactive effect of an earlier amendment to O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1, the implied consent warning law, so that it applied only to stops made after the effective date of the earlier amendment, rather than to cases pending on such date, did not violate federal or state ex post facto constitutional provisions. State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 466 S.E.2d 216 (1996).

Imposition of special conditions of parole that were not part of the state's parole regimen at the time of defendant's convictions did not violate the ex post facto clause of the state constitution. Hamm v. Ray, 272 Ga. 659, 531 S.E.2d 91 (2000).

Use of the amended version of O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34.1 when an appellant's probation was revoked due, in part, to the appellant's failure to abide by a special condition of the probation, did not implicate ex post facto concerns inasmuch as the imposition of a probated sentence is within the discretion of the sentencing court, and the appellant did not have a substantial right to receive probation, much less to receive probation that could not be revoked in its entirety upon violation of a special condition of probation. Walker v. Brown, 281 Ga. 468, 639 S.E.2d 470 (2007).

Amendment to firearms possession statute.

- Amendment adding the phrase "or within arm's reach" after the phrase "on his person" to a criminal firearms possession statute was a substantive change and therefore subject to the prohibition against ex post facto laws. McIntosh v. State, 185 Ga. App. 612, 365 S.E.2d 454, cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 910, 365 S.E.2d 454 (1988).

Amendment to drug trafficking statute.

- When, at the time of the offense, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) defined two methods of committing the crime of trafficking in cocaine, one dealing with pure cocaine and the other with mixtures containing cocaine, by amending the trafficking statute in 1985 to define the crime as "actual possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine," the legislature demonstrated an intent to repeal that portion of the trafficking statute which defined the crime as "actual possession of 28 grams or more . . . of any mixture containing cocaine . . .," and a defendant convicted thereafter of trafficking in a mixture is being held under an illegal sentence and must be discharged in a habeas corpus proceeding. Bassett v. Lemacks, 258 Ga. 367, 370 S.E.2d 146 (1988).

Manufacturing methamphetamine charge in a complaint did not violate ex post facto protections under U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X since the defendant was not charged under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f)(1), which was not effective at the time of the defendant's conduct; at the time of the offense, the defendant's alleged conduct was prohibited by former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e). Gentry v. State, 281 Ga. App. 315, 635 S.E.2d 782 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0117, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 78 (Ga. 2007).

Probation revocation ex-post facto inquiry.

- To determine if an ex post facto violation resulted from use of the applied law in a probation revocation matter, the law in effect at the time of the probation revocation must be measured against the law in effect at the time of the initial offense, not the law in effect at the time of the act that resulted in probation revocation. Walker v. Brown, 281 Ga. 468, 639 S.E.2d 470 (2007).

Definition of retroactive laws.

- An Act of the General Assembly which creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty in respect to transactions or considerations already past is retroactive in character, and in violation of this paragraph. Ross v. Lettice, 134 Ga. 866, 68 S.E. 734 (1910); Wilkins v. Mayor of Savannah, 152 Ga. 638, 111 S.E. 42 (1922); Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 304 S.E.2d 557 (1983).

Term "retroactive law" applies exclusively to constitutional challenges to civil statutes. Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312, 314 S.E.2d 421, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S. Ct. 106, 83 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1984).

That no retroactive law shall be passed is unconditional mandate of the people; it is too positive and too certain in meaning to be misunderstood by anyone, lawyer, judge, or layman. Grimes v. Lindsey, 219 Ga. 779, 135 S.E.2d 860 (1964).

General aspects of retrospective laws.

- Upon principle, every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Pittman, 69 Ga. App. 146, 25 S.E.2d 60 (1943); Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803 (1959); Davis v. Hunt, 218 Ga. 630, 129 S.E.2d 778 (1963).

A statute is retroactive in its legal sense, which creates a new obligation on transactions or considerations already past, or destroys or impairs vested rights. A statute does not operate retrospectively because it relates to antecedent facts, but if it is intended to affect transactions which occurred or rights which accrued before it became operative as such, and which ascribe to them essentially different effects, in view of the law at the time of their occurrence, it is retroactive in character. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Pittman, 69 Ga. App. 146, 25 S.E.2d 60 (1943); Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803 (1959); Adams v. Adams, 219 Ga. 633, 135 S.E.2d 428 (1964); Woodruff v. Trust Co., 233 Ga. 135, 210 S.E.2d 321 (1974).

Retrospective statutes are forbidden by first principles of justice, and an Act of the General Assembly which affects detrimentally some substantial right of a party, or imposes a new duty in respect to transactions or considerations already past, or places an additional burden on a pending action, is retroactive and violates the Constitution. Bank of Norman Park v. Colquitt County, 169 Ga. 534, 150 S.E. 841 (1929); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Pittman, 69 Ga. App. 146, 25 S.E.2d 60 (1943).

General rule regarding operation of laws.

- This paragraph expressly prohibited the passage of retroactive laws, and the general rule laid down by former Code 1933, § 102-104 (see now O.C.G.A. § 1-3-5) was that laws prescribe only for the future; it was also a general rule applicable to amending statutes that they are to be construed as intended to have operation on future transactions only, and as having no retroactive purpose not plainly expressed. Layton v. Liberty Loans, 152 Ga. App. 504, 263 S.E.2d 167 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Finance Am. Corp. v. Drake, 154 Ga. App. 811, 270 S.E.2d 449 (1980).

Because a retroactive application of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 would have impaired the offeror's rights to recover attorney's fees and costs, the trial court did not err in applying the statute in effect at the time the offeror's offer was made. Kromer v. Bechtel, 289 Ga. App. 306, 656 S.E.2d 910 (2008).

Laws prescribe only for the future, and generally have no retroactive operation, and the settled rule for the construction of statutes is not to give them a retrospective operation, unless the language imperatively requires such construction. Bank of Norman Park v. Colquitt County, 169 Ga. 534, 150 S.E. 841 (1929); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Pittman, 69 Ga. App. 146, 25 S.E.2d 60 (1943).

Retroactive application of statute only when expressed or by necessary implication.

- Unless a statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, shows that the General Assembly intended it to operate retroactively, it will be given only prospective application. Anthony v. Penn, 212 Ga. 292, 92 S.E.2d 14 (1956); Robert & Co. Assocs. v. Pinkerton & Laws Co., 124 Ga. App. 309, 183 S.E.2d 628 (1971); Southern Ry. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 228 Ga. 23, 183 S.E.2d 912 (1971).

Not all retrospective statutes prohibited by Constitution.

- A statute which may be retrospective in its operation is not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution or by any principle of justice. Bullard v. Holman, 184 Ga. 788, 193 S.E. 586 (1937).

Retroactive laws which do not injuriously affect any right of citizen may be passed. State Hwy. Dep't v. Bass, 197 Ga. 356, 29 S.E.2d 161 (1944).

Passage of only those retroactive, or rather retrospective, laws which injuriously affect vested rights of citizens is forbidden. Bullard v. Holman, 184 Ga. 788, 193 S.E. 586 (1937); Darby v. Cook, 201 Ga. 309, 39 S.E.2d 665 (1946).

The general rule throughout the United States is that a state legislature may constitutionally repeal, alter, or modify state laws enacted under the police power for the protection of the public, without violating any express or implied constitutional prohibition against retroactive statutes. Fortson v. Weeks, 232 Ga. 472, 208 S.E.2d 68 (1974).

The constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws applies only to those laws which affect or impair vested rights. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 158 Ga. App. 739, 282 S.E.2d 198 (1981); Cole v. Roberts, 648 F. Supp. 415 (M.D. Ga. 1986).

This paragraph strikes at such retrospective legislation as injuriously affects some substantial right of citizen. Bacon v. Mayor of Savannah, 105 Ga. 62, 31 S.E. 127 (1898); Mills v. Geer, 111 Ga. 275, 36 S.E. 673, 52 L.R.A. 504 (1900).

Some laws have valid retrospective application.

- While new laws passed by the legislature are normally only prospective in application, a statute determining who may be proper parties to actions, especially when the actions are of a remedial nature, will be applied to actions accrued or pending at the time of its passage. Motor Fin. Co. v. Harris, 150 Ga. App. 762, 258 S.E.2d 628 (1979).

Retroactive remedial laws are valid.

- To apply the constitutional provision against "retroactive laws," as meaning any retroactive law, rather than those which "injuriously affect the right of citizens," would be contrary to the many decisions of this court holding that remedial laws, even though retroactive, are valid, as the reason for holding these laws to be constitutional is based on the fact that there is no vested right of the citizen involved. State Hwy. Dep't v. Bass, 197 Ga. 356, 29 S.E.2d 161 (1944).

Even though a statute may not be effective in a certain situation for retroactively affecting vested rights, the statute is not otherwise invalid per se. Mead Corp. v. Collins, 258 Ga. 239, 367 S.E.2d 790 (1988).

Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X does not apply to remedial or procedural statutes. Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).

Retroactive application of statute of limitations held constitutional.

- The legislature may revive a workers' compensation claim which would have been barred by a previous limitation period by enacting a new statute of limitation without violating Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Canton Textile Mills, Inc. v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102, 317 S.E.2d 189, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S. Ct. 296, 83 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984).

Administrator's fraudulent conveyance claims against group one were time-barred under O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-74(a)(1) and18-2-79(1), even though the claim was not time-barred under the limitations period in effect when the claim accrued, as application of O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79, a procedural law in effect at the time the suit was filed, did not violate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X; the administrator also failed to avail the administrator of the one-year statute of limitation effective upon discovery of the alleged fraud. Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 726 S.E.2d 730 (2012).

There is no violation of the state's constitutional prohibition against the retroactive application of a procedural statute because one has no vested rights in any course of procedure, and the presumption against a retrospective statutory construction does not apply to statutory enactments which affect only court procedure and practice, even when the alteration from the statutory change results in a disadvantage to a party. Murphy v. Murphy, 295 Ga. 376, 761 S.E.2d 53 (2014).

Legislature cannot revive a right of action which is barred by the statute of limitations in existence prior to the passage of the reviving Act. Such an Act is unconstitutional and void for the reason that it violates this paragraph which provides that no retroactive law shall be passed. Bussey v. Bishop, 169 Ga. 251, 150 S.E. 78 (1929).

State has sovereign right to legislate for general welfare despite effect on existing contracts.

- Constitutional restraints upon the impairment of the obligation of contracts do not prevent the state from exercising such powers as are necessary in the exercise of its sovereign right to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. Moore v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 Ga. 182, 249 S.E.2d 549 (1978).

Arbitration Code.

- The application of the Georgia Arbitration Code, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq., to a dispute arising after its effective date regarding contracts entered into at an earlier date was contemplated in its enactment; the law does not provide a new remedy or repair any obligation under the contract and its application to such a dispute does not violate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws. Weyant v. MacIntyre, 211 Ga. App. 281, 438 S.E.2d 640 (1993).

Legislative enactments modifying state laws under police power not prohibited.

- A state legislature may constitutionally repeal, alter, or modify state laws enacted under the police power for the protection of the public, without violating any express or implied constitutional provision against retroactive statutes. Keenan v. Hardison, 245 Ga. 599, 266 S.E.2d 205 (1980).

Legislature was not precluded from subsequently modifying express and implied powers given to city authorities to prohibit livestock from running loose by the prohibition against retroactive laws. Pierce v. Powell, 188 Ga. 481, 4 S.E.2d 192 (1939).

Right of state may be impaired by retrospective laws.

- There is authority to the effect that the right of the state, as distinguished from the right of a citizen, may be impaired by retrospective laws. State Hwy. Dep't v. Bass, 197 Ga. 356, 29 S.E.2d 161 (1944).

Repealing act will not be given retroactive operation, so as to divest previously acquired rights, or to impair the obligation of a contract lawfully made by virtue of and pending the existence of the law repealed. Bank of Norman Park v. Colquitt County, 169 Ga. 534, 150 S.E. 841 (1929).

Subsequent adoption of pending zoning ordinance was not ex post facto or retroactive law.

- When the plaintiff, while proceeding to zone property was pending, filed application to authorize building of a filling station, and an ordinance was later adopted zoning plaintiff's property for residential purposes, such ordinance was not in violation of the federal and state Constitutions as an ex post facto or retroactive law. Gay v. Mayor of Lyons, 212 Ga. 438, 93 S.E.2d 352 (1956).

Statute on covenants restricting land use not intended to operate retrospectively.

- Former Code 1933, § 29-301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60), declaring that "covenants restricting lands to certain uses shall not run for more than 20 years in municipalities which have adopted zoning laws", properly construed, was not intended to operate retrospectively, and would not have the effect of terminating a covenant that was already in existence as a valid and binding contract between the parties. Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S.E.2d 522 (1945).

Asbestos claim statute.

- Superior and state courts did not err in entering nearly identical orders which held that because O.C.G.A. § 51-14-1 et seq. required asbestos plaintiffs to provide proof that exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor in their medical condition, it unconstitutionally affected an employee's substantive rights by establishing a new element which did not exist when the original cause of action accrued, and hence, could not be applied retrospectively; moreover, because these requirements and limitations were the heart of the statute, their severance would result in a statute that failed to correspond to the main legislative purpose, or give effect to that purpose. DaimlerChrysler v. Ferrante, 281 Ga. 273, 637 S.E.2d 659 (2006).

Board zoning action changing use classification of property not prohibited.

- In the passage of a comprehensive zoning plan and amending it, the board of county commissioners did so under the police power, and the action of the board in changing the use classification of the defendants' property from an agricultural use to that of apartment use does not deny the plaintiffs the equal protection of law, nor operate retroactively in violation of the federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting the passage of ex post facto laws. Morgan v. Thomas, 207 Ga. 660, 63 S.E.2d 659 (1951).

Attempt by legislature to make amendment retroactive fails.

- A party in an alimony action in which a final judgment was entered prior to the 1977 amendment to Ga. L. 1964, p. 713, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19) had a vested right in the judgment not being subject to modification because of a change in the income of the wife, since the law in effect at the time of the judgment did not permit a modification on such change. Accordingly, the attempt by the legislature in Ga. L. 1978, p. 2204, § 1 and Ga. L. 1957, p. 94, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-23 and19-6-24), to make the 1977 amendment to Ga. L. 1964, p. 713, § 1 retroactive is unconstitutional under this paragraph. McClain v. McClain, 241 Ga. 422, 246 S.E.2d 187 (1978).

Retroactive application of provisions regarding insanity verdict not unconstitutional.

- The provisions of former Code 1933, § 27-1503 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131), that, in the event of an acquittal of a person accused of crime by reason of insanity, the jury shall so state in their verdict, and the accused shall thereafter be confined in the state hospital for the insane, would not be unconstitutional, as being retroactive or ex post facto, when applied to the trial of a person charged with a crime committed prior to the date of the passage of the act. Bailey v. State, 210 Ga. 52, 77 S.E.2d 511 (1953).

Applying guilty but mentally ill provision retrospectively.

- When crimes were committed before July 1, 1982, and a verdict of guilt is authorized by the evidence, the application of the "guilty but mentally ill" provision, O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131, is procedural, not substantive; it leaves untouched the substantive right to the insanity plea as an absolute defense, and the accused is given an additional advantage when the "guilty but mentally ill" statute is applied. Such a verdict is not an unconstitutional application of an ex post facto law. Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983).

Statute inapplicable to commercial paper executed prior to its enactment.

- Ga. L. 1935, p. 381, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161) relating to confirmation of sales under foreclosure proceedings on real estate, to limit and abate deficiency judgments in suit and foreclosure proceedings on debts secured by mortgages, security deeds, and other lien contracts on real estate, is not applicable to a note and security deed executed prior to its enactment. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Laird, 181 Ga. 416, 182 S.E. 617 (1935).

Adverse possession of mineral rights constitutional.

- The protection against retroactive (or retrospective) laws prohibits the impairment of vested rights. Although owners of mineral interests may be said to have "vested rights," that property is held subject to the proper exercise of the police power by legislative bodies. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-168 (adverse possession of mineral rights) does not divest the mineral owner of the owner's rights; it conditions the retention of those rights upon the requirements of either using them or paying taxes upon them for the public benefit. Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580, 308 S.E.2d 170 (1983).

No retroactive application of change in "guest passenger" rule.

- A trial court does not err in refusing to apply O.C.G.A. § 51-1-36, changing the "guest passenger" rule as to the duty owed by an automobile operator to passengers to ordinary care, to a case involving a 1981 accident, since, although a statute is "remedial" and affects only the procedure and practice of the courts and thus may be retroactive in application, the "guest passenger" rule established the duty owed by an automobile owner or operator to a nonpaying guest passenger, and there is nothing in the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-36 which discloses a legislative intent to apply the terms thereof retroactively. Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 304 S.E.2d 557 (1983).

No retroactive application of former bank share tax statute.

- Although the former bank share tax statute, Ga. L. 1975, pp. 147-153, was passed in March 1975 and stated that it did "apply to all taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1975," this could not retroactively impose a tax on property held by a bank before the statute was enacted, in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Roberts v. Gunter, 251 Ga. 276, 304 S.E.2d 369 (1983).

Wrongful death act amendment not applied retroactively.

- The 1985 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2, conferring exclusive standing upon the surviving spouse to bring a wrongful death action, could not be applied retroactively to bar a son's suit on a claim which arose prior to the effective date of the amendment. Cole v. Roberts, 648 F. Supp. 415 (M.D. Ga. 1986).

Notice and service provisions of the Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., were procedural laws that could be applied retroactively to authorize dismissal of a claim against the Department of Transportation when the plaintiff did not serve the Director of the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services or mail a copy of the complaint to the Attorney General. Henderson v. DOT, 267 Ga. 90, 475 S.E.2d 614 (1996).

Retirement benefits.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X precludes the application of an amendatory statute or ordinance in the calculation of the employee's retirement benefits if the effect of the amendment is to reduce rather than increase the benefits payable. City of Athens v. McGahee, 178 Ga. App. 76, 341 S.E.2d 855 (1986).

Application to interest from child support statute.

- The amended version of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12.1 applies to all civil actions that were filed when the former version of the statute was effective but were still pending on or after January 1, 2007; the amended version of § 7-4-12.1 makes changes related to interest on child support arrearage that are remedial rather than substantive, and therefore retroactive application does not impair vested substantive rights. Gowins v. Gary, 284 Ga. App. 370, 643 S.E.2d 836 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 283 Ga. 433, 658 S.E.2d 575 (2008).

Application to attorney fee statute.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(1) does not merely prescribe the methods of enforcing rights and obligations, but rather affects the rights of parties by imposing an additional duty and obligation to pay an opposing party's attorney fees when a final judgment does not meet a certain amount or is one of no liability; by creating this new obligation, the statute operates as a substantive law, which is unconstitutional under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X, given its retroactive effect to pending cases. Fowler Props. v. Dowland, 282 Ga. 76, 646 S.E.2d 197 (2007).

Authorization for direct action against insurer of common carrier.

- Prohibition in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X against retroactive laws applied only to those laws which affected substantive rights under prior law that had vested at the time the subsequent law took effect; the amendments to former O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12(c), effective July 1, 2000, providing for a direct action against the insurer of a common carrier, did not affect substantive rights and were given retroactive effect. Devore v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Ga. App. 7, 570 S.E.2d 87 (2002).

No retroactive application of amendment to voluntary dismissal law.

- When plaintiff's first complaint was filed before July 1, 2003, the effective date of the amendment to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)(3), and the second and third complaints were filed after July 1, 2003, the 2003 amendment did not apply retroactively to make the voluntary dismissal of the second complaint act an adjudication on the merits. Davis v. Lugenbeel, 283 Ga. App. 642, 642 S.E.2d 337 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 518 (Ga. 2007).

Provision permitting contracts in partial restraint of trade.

- Retroactive application of O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1, permitting contracts in partial restraint of trade, did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).

Retroactive extinguishment of right to trial by jury unconstitutional.

- Retroactive application of the 1977 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-40, which extinguished the right to a jury trial in a paternity suit, was unconstitutional. Hargis v. Department of Human Resources, 272 Ga. 617, 533 S.E.2d 712 (2000).

No retroactive application of tolling statute by injured passenger.

- As a vehicle passenger's claim was only two months old when the tolling provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 became effective, and the passenger had not yet filed suit, § 9-3-99 was applicable to the action and there was no merit to a claim that it was retroactively applied in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Beneke v. Parker, 293 Ga. App. 186, 667 S.E.2d 97 (2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 285 Ga. 733, 684 S.E.2d 243 (2009).

This paragraph forbids passage of laws which impair vested rights.

- The test is whether there was a vested right. If so, no subsequent legislative act could impair it; but if not, there is no bar to a change or abolition of it at any time before it becomes fixed by a judgment. Spengler v. Employers Com. Union Ins. Co., 131 Ga. App. 443, 206 S.E.2d 693 (1974); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Windsor, 133 Ga. App. 159, 210 S.E.2d 373 (1974); Goolsby v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 141 Ga. App. 605, 234 S.E.2d 165 (1977).

Decision to award a limited liability company fee simple title in real property did not violate the contract impairment clauses in U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X as a corporation's rights to the property pursuant to a 1984 tax deed had not vested prior to the effective date of a 1989 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48, which operated retrospectively. BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC, 285 Ga. 5, 673 S.E.2d 205 (2009).

Statutes which impair contracts are void.

- The remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract is made and is to be performed is a part of its obligation, and any subsequent law of the state which so affects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is forbidden by the Constitution, and is, therefore, void. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15 (1935).

Even remedial statute may impair obligation of contract, and in such event the act is unconstitutional. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15 (1935).

Specific remedies constitute part of contract.

- A specific remedy, provided by the contract itself, cannot be changed by legislation, because it constitutes a part of the contract. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15 (1935).

Permissible to modify remedies existing by law but not remedies expressly part of contract.

- The remedies existing by law at the time of the execution of a contract may be modified by the legislature without impairing the obligation, provided an efficient remedy is left for its enforcement; however, the rule is different as to a remedy which the parties have expressly made a part of the contract, because in such case the remedy is integrated as a part of the obligation, and a subsequent statute which affects the remedy impairs the obligation and is unconstitutional. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E.2d 15 (1935).

This paragraph does not prohibit passage of laws curing defects in remedy, or confirming rights already existing, or adding to the means of securing and enforcing those rights. Pritchard v. Savannah St. & Rural Resort R.R., 87 Ga. 294, 13 S.E. 493, 14 L.R.A. 721 (1891); Mills v. Geer, 111 Ga. 275, 36 S.E. 673, 52 L.R.A. 504 (1900).

Legislation lessening efficacy of contract enforcement impairs obligation.

- The obligation of a contract, in the constitutional sense, is the means provided by law by which it can be enforced, by which the parties can be obliged to perform it, and whatever legislation lessens the efficacy of these means impairs the obligation. Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 182 S.E. 15 (1935).

Laws are construed in future so as not to impair obligation of contracts. Jones v. Oemler, 110 Ga. 202, 35 S.E. 375 (1900); Dennington v. Mayor of Roberta, 130 Ga. 494, 61 S.E. 20 (1908); Chason v. O'Neal, 158 Ga. 725, 124 S.E. 519 (1924).

Obligation of contract is not impaired by later taxing statute, which taxes the proceeds of the contract, if it does not prevent receipt of the proceeds under the contract. Airways Parking Co. v. City of Atlanta, 229 Ga. 70, 189 S.E.2d 405 (1972).

Constitution precludes application of amendatory statute or ordinance in calculation of employee's retirement benefits if the effect of the amendment is to reduce rather than increase the benefits payable. Withers v. Register, 246 Ga. 158, 269 S.E.2d 431 (1980).

This paragraph does not forbid the equitable modification of contract. Selby v. Gilmer, 240 Ga. 241, 240 S.E.2d 80 (1977).

Impairment clause does not preclude reformation of contracts. Withers v. Register, 246 Ga. 158, 269 S.E.2d 431 (1980).

Reformation of written agreement by court not impairment of contract.

- Parties to a contract cannot claim unconstitutional impairment of their contractual rights simply because a court of equity has reformed their written agreement to speak the true intentions of the parties. Withers v. Register, 246 Ga. 158, 269 S.E.2d 431 (1980).

Constitutional Act of legislature is equivalent to contract, and when performed, is a contract executed; and whatever rights are thereby created, a subsequent legislature cannot impair. Davis v. Hunt, 218 Ga. 630, 129 S.E.2d 778 (1963); Spengler v. Employers Com. Union Ins. Co., 131 Ga. App. 443, 206 S.E.2d 693 (1974).

This constitutional inhibition on any state law impairing obligation of contracts is not limitation on power of eminent domain.

- The obligation of a contract is not impaired when it is appropriated to a public use and compensation made therefor. Such an exertion of power is a taking, and not an impairment of its obligation. City of Atlanta v. Airways Parking Co., 225 Ga. 173, 167 S.E.2d 145 (1969).

The condemnation of a portion of the rights of a condemnee under its contract with a city does not violate the provisions of this paragraph prohibiting the passage of a law impairing the obligation of contracts. City of Atlanta v. Airways Parking Co., 225 Ga. 173, 167 S.E.2d 145 (1969).

No impairment of obligation when changes in salary expressly linked to appropriations.

- If a contractual salary obligation itself is expressly conditioned upon changes in state appropriations, then such changes requiring readjustments of salaries do not impair the obligations of contracts. Austin v. Benefield, 140 Ga. App. 96, 230 S.E.2d 16 (1976).

Amendment to statute given no retroactive effect.

- While the Act of the General Assembly, Ga. L. 1949, p. 455, amending former Code 1933, § 3-108 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20), was apparently enacted to permit a beneficiary under a contract between other parties to recover, it could be given no retroactive effect, as to do so would violate U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 and this paragraph, as to impairing the obligations of contracts, by creating a right for one to recover under an existing contract when one previously had no such right and subjecting a party to an existing contract to liability to a third person who previously had no right under the contract. Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga. 239, 56 S.E.2d 247 (1949).

Statute subsequent to execution of contract inapplicable thereto.

- A contract made and indebtedness incurred by the County Superintendent of Schools in 1918, on behalf of the county board of education, for school supplies and furnishings was prior to the enactment of former Code 1933, § 32-928 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-504), and therefore is not void under such provisions, the statute not being construed as being applicable to contracts made before its passage. Board of Educ. v. Southern Mich. Nat'l Bank, 184 Ga. 641, 192 S.E. 382 (1937).

No prohibition against ordinance limiting power to make certain contracts.

- Ordinance prohibiting the owning, maintaining, and operating of pinball machines and the like was not violative of the provisions of the federal and state Constitutions inhibiting the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts, in that it impaired the contractual powers of petitioner, and imposed a limitation upon the petitioner's power to make contracts. Woodward v. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11 S.E.2d 476 (1940).

Impairment of contracts with authority's bond owners proscribed by statute and Constitution.

- Ga. L. 1975, p. 107, § 30 (see now O.C.G.A. § 46-3-146), limiting the power of the state to adversely affect the interests of the owners of the municipal electric authority's bonds and notes, does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers in violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I), because it does not limit the right of the General Assembly to legislate except to prevent legislation which will impair the contracts with the bond owners, and this is consistent with the Constitution. Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).

Statutory provisions impairing existing contractual obligations are unconstitutional.

- Georgia Laws 1979, pp. 1625, 1627 (formerly Code 1933, § 84-6610(a-c)) were declared unconstitutional, null, and void because each and all of those sections improperly and unlawfully impaired existing contractual obligations between manufacturers and dealers in violation of this paragraph. Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979).

Imposition of conditions not in existence at time of contract execution impaired obligation.

- Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 313, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80), providing that title to real property conveyed to secure debt should revert to the grantor when the debt became 20 years past due, unless the debt was extended or renewed and such renewal recorded, or an affidavit setting out the facts of the renewal was recorded with the conveyance, imposed conditions upon grantee not in existence at the time of the execution of the contract, divested the grantee of a vested right to the property, and impaired the obligation of the grantee's contract and as applied to such deed, which was executed prior to the passage and effective date of the Act, is unconstitutional, because it is in violation of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X, cl. 1 and of this paragraph, which prohibit this state from passing any retroactive law or any law impairing the obligations of contracts. Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803 (1959).

No impairment to require performance by one county of obligations of merged county.

- The legislature can impose upon the county into which another county is merged the burden of performing the contracts and paying the debts of the merged county; an Act so providing for the performance of the contracts and payment of the debts of the merged county does not in any way impair the obligation of the contracts of the merged county in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States. Hines v. Etheridge, 173 Ga. 870, 162 S.E. 113 (1931).

This paragraph was not violated by merger of City of Atlanta and Town of Kirkwood. Davidson v. Town of Kirkwood, 152 Ga. 357, 110 S.E. 154 (1921).

Municipal ordinance requiring deposits by consumers of light and water, was not invalid under this paragraph as impairing the obligation of contract. Young v. City of Moultrie, 163 Ga. 829, 137 S.E. 257 (1927).

Statute invalid when it undertook to affect existing contractual obligations.

- Former Code 1933, § 30-209 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5), insofar as it undertook to affect the obligations of a valid contract in existence at the time of its passage so as to provide for the duration of alimony was null and void as violative of this paragraph and U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. X, Cl. 1. Candler v. Wilkerson, 223 Ga. 520, 156 S.E.2d 358 (1967).

Provisions for revisions in alimony and support judgments not unconstitutional.

- Ga. L. 1955, p. 630, §§ 1-4 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-18 and19-6-19), which conferred jurisdiction and power on the courts of this state to revise judgments fixing permanent alimony or support for minor children, do not offend those constitutional provisions of this state and of the United States which provide that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted, and this is true even though the amount of alimony or support so awarded by the judgment, as well as the time during which it was to be paid, was agreed to in writing by the parties. Nelson v. Roberts, 216 Ga. 741, 119 S.E.2d 545 (1961).

Modification of a judgment incorporating a contract between husband and wife governing property and alimony rights between them pursuant to Ga. L. 1955, p. 630, §§ 1-4 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-18 and19-6-19) is not an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts in violation of this paragraph. This is so because, technically, what is being modified is a judgment of the court and not a contract. Kitfield v. Kitfield, 237 Ga. 184, 227 S.E.2d 9 (1976).

Adverse possession of mineral rights constitutional.

- Application of O.C.G.A. § 44-5-168 (adverse possession of mineral rights) does not violate the state constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts. The preservation of the mineral owner's claim under § 44-5-168 depends only upon the owner's use of the minerals or upon returning them for taxes, which is a minimal burden that does not impair contractual obligations. Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580, 308 S.E.2d 170 (1983).

Municipal employee cannot be barred from recovering pay for services performed.

- To bar a municipal employee from recovering pay for services the employee performed by allowing the municipality to claim statutory immunity would violate the prohibition against the impairment of a contract which is found in both the state and federal Constitutions. Smith v. City of Atlanta, 167 Ga. App. 458, 306 S.E.2d 720 (1983).

Retirement benefits as part of employment contract.

- When a statute or ordinance establishes a retirement plan for government employees, and the employee contributes toward the benefits the employee is to receive and performs services while the ordinance or statute is in effect, the ordinance or statute becomes part of the contract of employment and is a part of the compensation for the services rendered so that an attempt to amend the statute or ordinance to reduce or eliminate the retirement benefits the employee is to receive violates the impairment clause of the state constitution. Swann v. Board of Trustees, 257 Ga. 450, 360 S.E.2d 395 (1987).

Reduction in non-vested future retirement benefits not impairment of obligation of contract.

- Since there is no vested right to benefits one was never entitled to receive, the reduction in future benefits to retiree did not violate the retiree's constitutional right to protection against impairment of contract. Tate v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 257 Ga. 365, 359 S.E.2d 649 (1987).

County's rescission of county's pension plan and termination of a member's right to benefits under the plan violated the constitutional guarantee against impairment of contracts and was void. Malcom v. Newton County, 244 Ga. App. 464, 535 S.E.2d 824 (2000).

City ordinance increasing pension plan contribution rate.

- Trial court properly granted the city defendants summary judgment on the city employees' claims of breach of contract and unconstitutional impairment of contract regarding an ordinance increasing their pension plan contribution rate because the Georgia General Assembly expressly contemplated that a municipal corporation's provision for employee retirement or pension benefits would be subject to being supplemented by local law. Borders v. City of Atlanta, 298 Ga. 188, 779 S.E.2d 279 (2015).

Impairment of teachers' right to notice before reducing pension funding.

- In a suit by teachers against the county school district and board alleging breach of contract, summary judgment for the defendants was error because by adopting a promise to give two years' notice before reducing funding of a retirement plan as board policy, the notice provision became part of the teachers' contracts, protected by the prohibition on impairment of contracts, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Gold v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 346 Ga. App. 108, 815 S.E.2d 259 (2018).

Law regulating insurance.

- Provision of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3 that motor vehicle insurance policies issued by insurers authorized to transact business in the state are deemed to provide the minimum coverage required by Georgia law when the insured is involved in an accident in Georgia does not retroactively impair obligations under the contract in violation of the Georgia Constitution. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 267 Ga. 134, 475 S.E.2d 619 (1996).

Prohibition against interference with vested rights and vested defenses.

- The same rule which forbids interference with vested rights prevents the disturbance of vested defenses; there is no distinction between a vested right of action and a vested right of defense. Bullard v. Holman, 184 Ga. 788, 193 S.E. 586 (1937).

Requiring the Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County retirees to elect the health maintenance organization option if they wished to receive cost-free coverage did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X, since they never had a vested right to maintain in retirement the precise health-care delivery system by which they received their coverage while employed; the precise source of the retirees' cost-free medical coverage was not guaranteed, instead, they were only entitled to cost-free coverage to the same extent that their medical expenses were covered at the time of their retirement, and cost-free coverage was provided by the Unified Government only under the health maintenance organization option. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County v. McCrary, 280 Ga. 901, 635 S.E.2d 150 (2006).

Rights of the decedent's surviving spouse were already vested when the Revised Georgia Trust Code of 2010 (Revised Code), O.C.G.A. § 53-12-1 et seq., was enacted because under the terms of the amended trust agreement, the surviving spouse's rights to the trust assets took effect upon the decedent's death before the Revised Code took effect. Accordingly, any new obligation imposed by the Revised Code that would have impaired the surviving spouse's right to possession could not be applied retroactively. Rose v. Waldrip, 316 Ga. App. 812, 730 S.E.2d 529 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1888, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 981 (Ga. 2012).

No protection for technical defenses involving no substantial equities.

- A vested ground of defense is as fully protected from being cut off or destroyed by an Act of the legislature as is a vested cause of action; the legislature may, however, deprive a party of technical defenses involving no substantial equities. Bullard v. Holman, 184 Ga. 788, 193 S.E. 586 (1937).

Party has no vested right in defense based upon mere informality not affecting the party's substantial equities. Bullard v. Holman, 184 Ga. 788, 193 S.E. 586 (1937); Walker v. State, 132 Ga. App. 274, 208 S.E.2d 5 (1974).

No one has a vested right to a defense based on mere informalities especially when such informalities consist of matters which originally could have been dispensed with by the legislature; but the legislature has no power, by a subsequent curative statute, to remedy a jurisdictional defect, or one which obviously goes to the substance of a vested right. Bullard v. Holman, 184 Ga. 788, 193 S.E. 586 (1937).

There is no such thing as a vested right to do wrong. Bullard v. Holman, 184 Ga. 788, 193 S.E. 586 (1937); Walker v. State, 132 Ga. App. 274, 208 S.E.2d 5 (1974).

Accused has no vested right in procedural matters. Walker v. State, 132 Ga. App. 274, 208 S.E.2d 5 (1974).

No one has vested right in statutory privileges and exemptions, and until final judgment on a pending action, the repeal of the statute, which gives the right of action, or upon which the suit is predicated, destroys it. Winston v. State, 186 Ga. 573, 198 S.E. 667 (1938), commented on in 1 Ga. B.J. 46 (1939).

Vested rights under contract come under protection of this paragraph. Bender v. Anglin, 207 Ga. 108, 60 S.E.2d 756, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 878, 71 S. Ct. 125, 95 L. Ed. 638 (1950).

Statute which changes or affects remedy only and does not destroy or impair vested rights is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of a contract, although it may be retroactive and in changing or modifying the remedy, the rights of the parties may be incidentally affected. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819 (1935).

No impairment of obligation when contract provides for modification.

- County board of education was not precluded from terminating the employer matching portion of a retirement savings plan since the plan itself provided that its terms could be modified or changed in the future and participating employees never acquired a property right in unchanged benefits. Murray County Sch. Dist. v. Adams, 218 Ga. App. 220, 461 S.E.2d 228 (1995).

Vesting of rights in companies.

- Void county sign ordinance could not be used as the basis for the denial of sign companies' applications for permits to construct billboards, and the invalidity of the ordinance resulted in there being no valid restriction on the construction of billboards in the county. Accordingly, the sign companies obtained vested rights in the issuance of the permits which the companies sought and the subsequent creation of new cities within unincorporated county land and the annexation of property into one city did not divest the sign companies of the companies' vested rights. Fulton County v. Action Outdoor Adver., JV, LLC, 289 Ga. 347, 711 S.E.2d 682 (2011).

Lien once acquired under existing law is regarded as vested property right which may not be impaired by subsequent legislation. Morris v. Interstate Bond Co., 180 Ga. 689, 180 S.E. 819 (1935).

Any subrogation rights are vested and therefore cannot be abrogated by later statute. Blaylock v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 239 Ga. 462, 238 S.E.2d 105 (1977).

A city cannot legally divest or restrict vested right by enactment of regulations, even if the enactment is valid and the regulations reasonable and constitutional. Craig v. City of Lilburn, 226 Ga. 679, 177 S.E.2d 75 (1970).

Office of incumbent official not vested.

- An incumbent in a public office has no vested right as will entitle the incumbent to complain of legislation affecting the office upon the ground that it is retrospective when no other right under the Constitution is violated. Copland v. Wohlwender, 197 Ga. 782, 30 S.E.2d 462 (1944).

An Act of the General Assembly revoking a city charter, thus abolishing municipal offices, is not a law in impairment of contract since the right of an incumbent to an office is not vested, but may be revoked if the law the incumbent holds office under is capable of being repealed. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 902, 99 S. Ct. 1205, 59 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1979).

Prohibiting involuntary separation benefits to state employees.

- An amendment to the Georgia Constitution prohibiting the grant of involuntary separation retirement benefits to state employees who are by law currently entitled to coverage under the involuntary separation benefits section of the Employees' Retirement System Act would, in all probability, be unconstitutional under the federal Impairment Clause contained in U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-72.

Forfeiture of public retirement system benefits.

- General Assembly has the authority to enact a statute which proposes the forfeiture of earned retirement benefits of future public employees due to the conviction of a crime; however, an amendment to the Georgia Constitution proposing such a forfeiture by employees who are currently by law vested with rights under the public retirement system would, in all probability, be unconstitutional under the federal Impairment Clause contained in U.S. Const., art. I, sec. X. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-3.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 716 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 645 et seq., 696 et seq.

ALR.

- Grant of perpetual franchise to public service corporation, 2 A.L.R. 1105.

Constitutionality of discrimination as regards degree of penalty or punishment for violation of Sunday law, 8 A.L.R. 566.

Constitutionality of statute which extinguishes or impairs lien of special assessments on sale of property for taxes, 53 A.L.R. 1140.

Effect of statutory change of penalty or punishment after conviction, 55 A.L.R. 443.

Constitutionality of retroactive statute curing defect in private instrument purporting to convey title or create interest in property or as to filing or recording thereof, 57 A.L.R. 1197.

Constitutionality of legislation which varies punishment for same offense according to the county or district within state in which the offense is committed, 59 A.L.R. 433.

Construction of statutes of limitation as regards their retrospective application to causes of action already barred, 67 A.L.R. 297.

Validity of stipulation in contract of employment against connection with labor union or employers' association, and power of legislature to prohibit such contract, 68 A.L.R. 1267.

Duration of street franchise without fixed term, beyond the life of the grantee, 71 A.L.R. 121.

Constitutionality, construction, and applicability of statute making refusal to pay for commodities a criminal offense, 76 A.L.R. 1338.

Retroactive effect of statutes regarding provisions with reference to avoidance of fire insurance policies, 78 A.L.R. 617.

Constitutionality and construction of statute enhancing penalty for second or subsequent offense, 82 A.L.R. 345; 116 A.L.R. 209; 132 A.L.R. 91; 139 A.L.R. 673.

Constitutional provision against impairing obligation of contract as applicable to statutes affecting rights or remedies of holders or owners of improvement bonds or liens, 85 A.L.R. 244; 97 A.L.R. 911.

Blue Sky Laws, 87 A.L.R. 42.

Raising maximum limit of permissible municipal indebtedness as impairing obligation of existing municipal contracts, 90 A.L.R. 859.

Debtor's exemption statutes as impairing obligations of existing contracts, 93 A.L.R. 177.

Retrospective operation of statutes relating to alimony or suit money in divorce, 97 A.L.R. 1188.

Constitutionality of statutes providing for refund of taxes illegally or erroneously exacted, 98 A.L.R. 284.

Constitutional provision against impairing obligation of contracts as applied to rights or remedies of owners of property subject to assessment for local improvements, 100 A.L.R. 164.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute permitting release of part of property subject to tax liens or special assessments, 100 A.L.R. 418.

Statute affecting mortgagee's rights and remedies in respect of deficiency as unconstitutional impairment of obligation of contract, 108 A.L.R. 891; 115 A.L.R. 435; 130 A.L.R. 1482; 133 A.L.R. 1473.

Tax exemption as unconstitutionally impairing public obligations antedating the exemption, 109 A.L.R. 817.

Constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws as applicable to statutes relating to joinder of offenses or defendants, 110 A.L.R. 1308.

Constitutionality of crop insurance statutes, 113 A.L.R. 739.

Character of defenses that may be cut off by retrospective legislation, 113 A.L.R. 768.

Competition by grantor of nonexclusive franchise, or provision therefor, as violation of constitutional rights of franchise holder, 114 A.L.R. 192.

Constitutional provisions against impairment of obligations of contract as applied to sinking funds for retirement of municipal or other public bonds, 115 A.L.R. 220.

Power of legislature to revive a right of action barred by limitation or to revive an action which has abated by lapse of time, 133 A.L.R. 384.

Validity and effect, as to previously recorded instrument, of statute which places or changes time limit on effectiveness of record of mortgages or other instruments, 133 A.L.R. 1325.

Constitutionality of statute changing rights of withdrawing members of building and loan association, 133 A.L.R. 1493.

Constitutionality of statute which in effect limits judgment after crediting thereon fair market value of property purchased by him at execution sale, 144 A.L.R. 858.

Validity and construction of war legislation in nature of moratory statute, 144 A.L.R. 1508.

Constitutionality of retroactive statute imposing excise, license, or privilege tax, 146 A.L.R. 1011.

Constitutionality of retrospective statutes as regards chattel mortgages, 146 A.L.R. 1100.

Constitutionality and construction of repeal or modification by legislative action of teachers' tenure statute, as regards retrospective operation, 147 A.L.R. 293.

Retroactive application, to previous sales, of statutes reducing period of redemption from tax sales, as unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations, 147 A.L.R. 1123.

Price ceiling, adopted as a war measure, as affecting preexisting contracts, 147 A.L.R. 1286; 149 A.L.R. 1451; 151 A.L.R. 1450.

Retrospective statute subjecting interests of trust beneficiaries to claims of creditors, 151 A.L.R. 1417.

Rights of parties to contract the performance of which is interfered with or prevented by war conditions or acts of government in prosecution of war, 151 A.L.R. 1447; 152 A.L.R. 1447; 153 A.L.R. 1417; 154 A.L.R. 1445; 155 A.L.R. 1447; 156 A.L.R. 1446; 157 A.L.R. 1446; 158 A.L.R. 1446.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute or contract regarding deduction from, or adjustment of, wages in respect of defective workmanship, 153 A.L.R. 866.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes affecting the rights or remedies of purchasers under antecedent executory contracts for purchase of real property, 153 A.L.R. 1209.

Retroactive application of statutes regarding enforcement of awards under workmen's compensation acts, 155 A.L.R. 558.

Constitutionality of retroactive statute limiting time for duration or enforcement of existing mortgage, or other real estate lien, or ground rent, 158 A.L.R. 1043.

Statute providing for apportionment between lessor and lessee of a tax imposed upon the producer of oil, gas, or other natural production as violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of the obligation of contracts, 160 A.L.R. 980.

Effect, as to prior offenses, of amendment increasing punishment for crime, 167 A.L.R. 845.

Immunity from suit of government liquor control agency, 9 A.L.R.2d 1292.

Retrospective operation of legislation affecting estates by the entireties, 27 A.L.R.2d 868.

Retroactive effect of statute fixing minimum value of corporate stock shares or otherwise affecting power of corporation to change par value of existing shares, 54 A.L.R.2d 1289.

Retroactive effect of statute changing manner and method of distribution of recovery or settlement for wrongful death, 66 A.L.R.2d 1444.

Effect of simultaneous repeal and re-enactment of all, or part, of legislative act, 77 A.L.R.2d 336.

Retroactive effect of statute which imposes, removes, or changes a monetary limitation of recovery for personal injury or death, 98 A.L.R.2d 1105.

Retrospective application of state statute substituting rule of comparative negligence for that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d 1438.

Retroactive effect of zoning regulation, in absence of saving clause, on validly issued building permit, 49 A.L.R.3d 13.

Zoning provisions protecting land owners who applied for or received building permit prior to change in zoning, 49 A.L.R.3d 1150.

Validity of statute establishing or authorizing minimum price schedules for barbers, 54 A.L.R.3d 916.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 A.L.R.3d 486.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

Mandatory retirement of public officer or employee based on age, 81 A.L.R.3d 811.

Validity of imposition, by state regulation, of natural gas use priorities, 84 A.L.R.3d 541.

Zoning: building in course of construction as establishing valid nonconforming use or vested right to complete construction for intended use, 89 A.L.R.3d 1051.

"Guilty but mentally ill" statutes: validity and construction, 71 A.L.R.4th 702.

Construction and application of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, proscribing federal bills of attainder, 62 A.L.R. 6th 517.

Construction and application of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and state constitutional provisions proscribing state bills of attainder, 63 A.L.R. 6th 1.