41 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hoaggreen2 sentences2023In other words, counsel’s performance must meet an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52 . -5- Under the second prong of the test, a defendant must also show “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Hoag, 460 Mich at 5 (citation omitted). 2022Therefore, under the second prong of the test, a defendant must also show “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Hoag, 460 Mich at 5 . | 1 | 2 |
People v. Derochegreen2 sentences2020Deroche, 299 Mich App at 310 . 2014Deroche, 299 Mich App at 307-308 (intoxicated individuals pose a serious danger to society if permitted to possess a firearm, because those individuals will have difficulty exercising self-control). 5 The extreme danger posed by a drunken person with a gun is real and cannot be over emphasized. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences1988The second prong requires that defense counsel avoid mistakes so serious that "but for this mistake defendant would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal.” Garcia, supra, p 266 . 1983People v Garcia, supra, p 266. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Bryantgreen2 sentences2025Our Supreme Court held in Bryant that when considering the second prong of the test, concerning whether representation of the allegedly excluded distinctive group is fair and reasonable, courts “must examine the composition of jury pools and venires over time using the most reliable data.” Id. at 599-600 . 2025Moreover, contrary to defendant’s argument, courts must “evaluate the composition of venires over a significant time period rather than just the defendant’s individual venire.” Id. at 600 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
People of Michigan v. Elamin Muhammadgreen1 sentence2022With respect to the second prong of the test, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Muhammad, 326 Mich App at 63 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Ronald Loesel v. City of Frankenmuthgreen2 sentences2015See Loesel, 692 F3d at 462 (CA 6 2012). 2015The second prong of the test, i.e., a rational basis inquiry, is demonstrated by “either by negativing every conceivable reason for the government’s actions or by demonstrating that the actions were motivated by animus or ill-will.” Loesel, 692 F3d at 462, 465 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Monat v. State Farm Insurancegreen1 sentence2014Finally, the mutuality prong is satisfied if the party “taking advantage of the earlier adjudication would have been bound by it, had it gone against him.” Monat, 469 Mich at 684-685 (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan Federation of Teachers & School Related Personnel v. University of Michigangreen1 sentence2010Mich Federation of Teachers, supra at 675. | 1 | 1 |
| Stenke v. Masland Development Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2019Thus, the second prong of the analysis in Strickland, 466 US at 694 , also fails. 2019Additionally, defense counsel’s decisions with respect to the scope of 5 The second prong of the analysis in Strickland, 466 US at 694 , also would not be fulfilled for this issue, because the relevance of the evidence was the content of the text messages, not the location from where they were sent. | 5 | 2012–2023 |
People v. Randolph
green
2 sentences2023“In attempting to persuade a reviewing court that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also . . . establish ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.’ ” Id. at 6 (citation omitted). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9 ; 917 NW2d 249 (2018), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 694 . “[A]n attorney’s decisions relating to the selection of jurors generally involve matters of trial strategy . . . .” Johnson, 245 Mich App at 259 . 2023“In attempting to persuade a reviewing court that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also . . . establish ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.’ ” Id. at 6 (citation omitted). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9 ; 917 NW2d 249 (2018), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 694 . “[A]n attorney’s decisions relating to the selection of jurors generally involve matters of trial strategy . . . .” Johnson, 245 Mich App at 259 . | 2 | 2022–2023 |
People v. Trakhtenberg
green
2 sentences2023In other words, counsel’s performance must meet an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52 . -5- Under the second prong of the test, a defendant must also show “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Hoag, 460 Mich at 5 (citation omitted). 2018Id. | 2 | 2018–2023 |
Lafler v. Cooper
green
2 sentences2017In demonstrating the second prong of the standard, “the ‘defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice.’ ” Douglas, 496 Mich at 592 , quoting Lafler, 566 US at 163 . 2017In demonstrating the second prong of the standard, “the ‘defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice.’ ” Douglas, 496 Mich at 592 , quoting Lafler, 566 US at 163 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Douglas
green
2 sentences2017In demonstrating the second prong of the standard, “the ‘defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice.’ ” Douglas, 496 Mich at 592 , quoting Lafler, 566 US at 163 . 2017In demonstrating the second prong of the standard, “the ‘defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice.’ ” Douglas, 496 Mich at 592 , quoting Lafler, 566 US at 163 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Bush v. Shabahang
green
2 sentences2010Thus, only when a plaintiff has not made a good-faith attempt to comply with [MCL 600.2912b(4)] should a trial court consider dismissal of an action without prejudice. [Bush, 484 Mich at 177-178 .] In my dissent in Bush , I observed that the majority had provided no guidance for the application of its new test, id. at 199 n 10, and such guidance has still not been provided. 2010Thus, only when a plaintiff has not made a good-faith attempt to comply with [MCL 600.2912b(4)] should a trial court consider dismissal of an action without prejudice. [Bush, 484 Mich at 177-178 .] In my dissent in Bush , I observed that the majority had provided no guidance for the application of its new test, id. at 199 n 10, and such guidance has still not been provided. | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Allstate Insurance v. Freeman
green
2 sentences2004Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 688 ; 443 NW2d 734 (1989) (opinion by Riley, J.). 2004Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 688 ; 443 NW2d 734 (1989) (opinion by Riley, J.). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Thomas v. Tomczyk
green
2 sentences2025In Thomas v Tomczyk, 142 Mich App 237, 239 ; 369 NW2d 219 (1985), a pre-Farmers Ins Exch case, a college student paid a friend for transportation to and from school. 2025In Thomas v Tomczyk, 142 Mich App 237, 239 ; 369 NW2d 219 (1985), a pre-Farmers Ins Exch case, a college student paid a friend for transportation to and from school. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Carr v. City of Lansing
green
2 sentences2025All of the aforementioned cases can reach the same outcome if only the first factor of the two-factor analysis is considered.3 2 “Although MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides that unpublished opinions are not binding under the rule of stare decisis, a court may nonetheless consider such opinions for their instructive or persuasive value.” Kennard v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 341 Mich App 47 , 53 n 2; 988 NW2d 797 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 There are cases from this Court that have decided the primary purpose of the vehicle in question was to transport passengers, but because the primary pu 2025All of the aforementioned cases can reach the same outcome if only the first factor of the two-factor analysis is considered.3 2 “Although MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides that unpublished opinions are not binding under the rule of stare decisis, a court may nonetheless consider such opinions for their instructive or persuasive value.” Kennard v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 341 Mich App 47 , 53 n 2; 988 NW2d 797 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 There are cases from this Court that have decided the primary purpose of the vehicle in question was to transport passengers, but because the primary pu | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2023“In attempting to persuade a reviewing court that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also . . . establish ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.’ ” Id. at 6 (citation omitted). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9 ; 917 NW2d 249 (2018), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 694 . “[A]n attorney’s decisions relating to the selection of jurors generally involve matters of trial strategy . . . .” Johnson, 245 Mich App at 259 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Missouri v. Frye
green
1 sentence2022“In attempting to persuade a reviewing court that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also . . . establish ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.’ ” Id. at 6 , quoting People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124 ; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9 ; 917 NW2d 249 (2018), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 694 . “[C]riminal defendants require effective counsel during plea negotiations.” Frye, 566 US at 144 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Grant
green
1 sentence2022Grant, 470 Mich at 493 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Carbin
green
1 sentence2022With respect to the second prong of the test, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v Johnson
green
2 sentences2022“In attempting to persuade a reviewing court that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also . . . establish ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.’ ” Id. at 6 , quoting People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124 ; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9 ; 917 NW2d 249 (2018), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 694 . “[C]riminal defendants require effective counsel during plea negotiations.” Frye, 566 US at 144 . 2022“In attempting to persuade a reviewing court that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also . . . establish ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.’ ” Id. at 6 , quoting People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124 ; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9 ; 917 NW2d 249 (2018), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 694 . “[C]riminal defendants require effective counsel during plea negotiations.” Frye, 566 US at 144 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Hubbard
green
1 sentence2019Hubbard, supra at 481 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Collins v. City of Harker Heights
green
2 sentences2018Collins v. Harker Hts, Texas , 503 U.S. 115 , 121-122, 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed. 2d 261 (1992) (holding that whether a legal violation occurred and whether a municipality might be liable for that violation are separate legal inquiries). 2018Collins v. Harker Hts, Texas , 503 U.S. 115 , 121-122, 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed. 2d 261 (1992) (holding that whether a legal violation occurred and whether a municipality might be liable for that violation are separate legal inquiries). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
McCORMICK v. CARRIER
green
1 sentence2017While defendant contends that much of these issues resolved in the time following the accident, the record reflects that within six months of defendant moving for summary disposition with regard to the tort threshold of MCL 500.3135(1), plaintiff was still grappling with a hypersympathetic vascular constrictive disorder, which according to Dr. Martinez, resulted from the motor vehicle accident.5 Moreover, the record evidence, by way of Dr. Georgiadis’s notes, also confirms that as of December 3, 2015, plaintiff experienced post traumatic arthritis, in his “left hip after a left hip dislocation | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Woolfolk
green
1 sentence2016And defendant has not satisfied the second prong of the test because he failed to prove that, if counsel did make a serious error, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different.1 Finally, as this Court has held in both Musser, 259 Mich App at 221 , and Woolfolk, 304 Mich App at 457 , defendant’s failure to establish actual and substantial prejudice means that defendant’s delay-in-arrest claim is meritless. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Musser
green
1 sentence2016And defendant has not satisfied the second prong of the test because he failed to prove that, if counsel did make a serious error, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different.1 Finally, as this Court has held in both Musser, 259 Mich App at 221 , and Woolfolk, 304 Mich App at 457 , defendant’s failure to establish actual and substantial prejudice means that defendant’s delay-in-arrest claim is meritless. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Heft
green
1 sentence2015Heft, 299 Mich App at 80-81 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Calhoun County v. Blue Cross Blue Shield
green
1 sentence2015Nevertheless, even if we assume that this difference was not material, and that the affidavit prepared by plaintiff’s attorney, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, see Calhoun Co, 297 Mich App at 11-12 , established a genuine issue of material regarding whether the properties were similarly situated in all material aspects, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the second prong of the test. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Michigan
green
1 sentence2012Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 518 n 26. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Budzyn green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Mankin green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, Inc green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Graham v. Kochville Township green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. James Williams green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Jamieson green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Capitol City Lodge No. 141 v. Ingham County Board of Commissioners neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| California v. Greenwood green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| King v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Kangas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. White neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.