second prong test in Connecticut

2024To vindicate the right of immunity from suit—as distinguished from a right to immunity from liability—the denial of a motion to dismiss that raises a colorable claim of absolute immunity is immediately appealable under the second prong of the test set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31 , 463 A.2d 566 (1983).

2024To vindicate the right of immunity from suit—as distinguished from a right to immunity from liability—the denial of a motion to dismiss that raises a colorable claim of absolute immunity is immediately appealable under the second prong of the test set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31 , 463 A.2d 566 (1983).

2013Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 205 , 982 A.2d 620 (2009).

2013Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 205 , 982 A.2d 620 (2009).

2022B We next address the petitioner’s argument that the habeas court erred in concluding that, despite its initial assessment that his trial counsel’s representation of him at sentencing was so deficient as to be tantamount to having no counsel at all, the petitioner was not enti- tled to a presumption that he was prejudiced by coun- sel’s performance under United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. 648 , but, instead, was required to prove that he had been prejudiced by that deficient performance under the second prong of the test set forth in Strick- land v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668 .

2018With respect to the second prong of the test, prejudice, the court in Strickland observed that "[a]ttorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial." Id., at 693 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2018"Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice ... under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coward , 292 Conn. 296 , 307, 972 A.2d 691 (2009).

2018"Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice ... under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coward , 292 Conn. 296 , 307, 972 A.2d 691 (2009).

2026Only if both prongs of the analy- sis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sydnei V., 168 Conn. App. 538 , 562–64, 147 A.3d 147 , cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903 , 151 A.3d 1289 (2016).

2026Only if both prongs of the analy- sis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sydnei V., 168 Conn. App. 538 , 562–64, 147 A.3d 147 , cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903 , 151 A.3d 1289 (2016).

2026Only if both prongs of the analy- sis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sydnei V., 168 Conn. App. 538 , 562–64, 147 A.3d 147 , cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903 , 151 A.3d 1289 (2016).

2026Only if both prongs of the analy- sis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sydnei V., 168 Conn. App. 538 , 562–64, 147 A.3d 147 , cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903 , 151 A.3d 1289 (2016).

2024The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his right to due process was violated by the lack of a rule of practice that the state disclose the substance of any expert opinion on which it intended to rely at trial; the defendant’s claim essentially was alleging a constitu- tional right to discovery, and, because a criminal defendant has no general constitutional right to discovery, the defendant’s claim was not of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right, and, accordingly, failed under the second prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding (

2023The defendant’s unpreserved claim that his right to due process was violated by virtue of the admission of S’s testimony, insofar as the state’s notice of the sexual misconduct involving S that it planned to offer was inadequate and failed to conform to the evidence elicited at trial, was not of constitutional magnitude and, therefore, failed under the second prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding ( 213 Conn. 233 ): In State v. O’Brien-Veader ( 318 Conn. 514 ), this court concluded that criminal defendants have no constitutional right to the prior disclosure of evidence of uncharged m

2019Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice ... under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clougherty v. Clougherty , 131 Conn. App. 270 , 273-74, 26 A.3d 704 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 948 , 31 A.3d 383 (2011).

2019Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice ... under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clougherty v. Clougherty , 131 Conn. App. 270 , 273-74, 26 A.3d 704 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 948 , 31 A.3d 383 (2011).

2019Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice ... under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clougherty v. Clougherty , 131 Conn. App. 270 , 273-74, 26 A.3d 704 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 948 , 31 A.3d 383 (2011).

2014Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice . . . under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the conse- quences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamen- tally unfair or manifestly unjust.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clougherty v. Clougherty, 131 Conn. App. 270 , 273–74, 26 A.3d 704 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 948 , 31 A.3d 383 (2011).

2021Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeChellis v. DeChellis, 190 Conn. App. 853 , 864–66, 213 A.3d 1 , cert. denied, 333 Conn. 913 , 215 A.3d 1210 (2019).

2021Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeChellis v. DeChellis, 190 Conn. App. 853 , 864–66, 213 A.3d 1 , cert. denied, 333 Conn. 913 , 215 A.3d 1210 (2019).

2019Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice ... under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clougherty v. Clougherty , 131 Conn. App. 270 , 273-74, 26 A.3d 704 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 948 , 31 A.3d 383 (2011).

2014Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice . . . under the second prong of the analysis we must determine whether the conse- quences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamen- tally unfair or manifestly unjust.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clougherty v. Clougherty, 131 Conn. App. 270 , 273–74, 26 A.3d 704 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 948 , 31 A.3d 383 (2011).

2001The test for determining whether two charged offenses constitute the same offense for double jeopardy was set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

2001The test for determining whether two charged offenses constitute the same offense for double jeopardy was set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

2000Although it perhaps went too far in ruling the second prong of that test was met, it certainly had no trouble in concluding, that where the Dillon test was otherwise met, a bystander claim can be brought under Pennsylvania law in the medical malpractice context, cf. Bloom v. Dubois Regional Medical Center , 597 A.2d 671 , 683 et seq.

2000Although it perhaps went too far in ruling the second prong of that test was met, it certainly had no trouble in concluding, that where the Dillon test was otherwise met, a bystander claim can be brought under Pennsylvania law in the medical malpractice context, cf. Bloom v. Dubois Regional Medical Center , 597 A.2d 671 , 683 et seq (Pa., 1991).

2026Only if the moving party has made that initial showing does the court consider the second prong of analysis which is whether or not the opposing party (in this case the plaintiffs) has demonstrated that there is probable cause that they will prevail on the merits of the complaint.” See General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (3);8 see also Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781 , 787–88, 326 A.3d 251 , cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926 , 326 A.3d 248 (2024).

2024See Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928 , 941, 293 A.3d 851 (2023); Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 785 , 865 A.2d 1163 (2005).

2024See Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928 , 941, 293 A.3d 851 (2023); Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 785 , 865 A.2d 1163 (2005).

2023That is to say, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the [challenged] tax must be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer’s activi- ties in [the taxing state].’’ (Citation omitted.) Barringer v. Griffes, 1 F.3d 1331, 1335 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1072 , 114 S. Ct. 879 , 127 L.

2023That is to say, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the [challenged] tax must be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer’s activi- ties in [the taxing state].’’ (Citation omitted.) Barringer v. Griffes, 1 F.3d 1331, 1335 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1072 , 114 S. Ct. 879 , 127 L.

2023In further support of his argument, the plaintiff cites to two cases decided by this court subsequent to Bender.5 In Czarzasty v. Czarzasty, 101 Conn. App. 583 , 584–86, 922 A.2d 272 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 902 , 931 A.2d 262 (2007), this court was required to deter- mine whether the defendant’s unvested interest in his employer’s performance based deferred compensation plan, which provided for an award in the amount of $100,000 at the conclusion of ten years of employment as long as a specific production goal was met, consti- tuted property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81.

2023In further support of his argument, the plaintiff cites to two cases decided by this court subsequent to Bender.5 In Czarzasty v. Czarzasty, 101 Conn. App. 583 , 584–86, 922 A.2d 272 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 902 , 931 A.2d 262 (2007), this court was required to deter- mine whether the defendant’s unvested interest in his employer’s performance based deferred compensation plan, which provided for an award in the amount of $100,000 at the conclusion of ten years of employment as long as a specific production goal was met, consti- tuted property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81.

2023In further support of his argument, the plaintiff cites to two cases decided by this court subsequent to Bender.5 In Czarzasty v. Czarzasty, 101 Conn. App. 583 , 584–86, 922 A.2d 272 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 902 , 931 A.2d 262 (2007), this court was required to deter- mine whether the defendant’s unvested interest in his employer’s performance based deferred compensation plan, which provided for an award in the amount of $100,000 at the conclusion of ten years of employment as long as a specific production goal was met, consti- tuted property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81.

2023In further support of his argument, the plaintiff cites to two cases decided by this court subsequent to Bender.5 In Czarzasty v. Czarzasty, 101 Conn. App. 583 , 584–86, 922 A.2d 272 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 902 , 931 A.2d 262 (2007), this court was required to deter- mine whether the defendant’s unvested interest in his employer’s performance based deferred compensation plan, which provided for an award in the amount of $100,000 at the conclusion of ten years of employment as long as a specific production goal was met, consti- tuted property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81.

2022B We next address the petitioner’s argument that the habeas court erred in concluding that, despite its initial assessment that his trial counsel’s representation of him at sentencing was so deficient as to be tantamount to having no counsel at all, the petitioner was not enti- tled to a presumption that he was prejudiced by coun- sel’s performance under United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. 648 , but, instead, was required to prove that he had been prejudiced by that deficient performance under the second prong of the test set forth in Strick- land v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668 .

2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus

2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus

2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus

2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus

2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus

2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus

2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus

2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus