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12 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Anthony Knight, Willie J. Newton Jr., and Troy C. Williamsgreen1 sentence2021Va. 20 , 650 S.E.2d 119 (2007) (citations omitted). 17 17 The State attempts to expand the second prong of this test by referring to a footnote in which the Court stated that “‘[w]e will note that evidence is considered suppressed when ‘the existence of the evidence was known, or reasonably should have been known, to the government, the evidence was not otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and the government either willfully or inadvertently withheld the evidence until it was too late for the defense to make use of it.’ United States v. Knight, 342 | 1 | 1 |
Central Realty Co. v. Martingreen2 sentences2005Likewise, 110 C.S.R. § 3-19.1 requires merely that "in order for the property to be exempt, the primary and immediate use of the property must be for one or more exempt purposes." [8] In its order, the Tax Commissioner stated "[w]e do not make any opinion as to whether [AEMS] is a charitable organization." The circuit court also made no finding on AEMS' charitable status. [9] In the hearing before the circuit court, TSN's CEO, Dennis Nurkiewicz, testified that TSN assists county-level emergency services organizations by providing personnel training, certification and licensure; ambulance inspe 2005Likewise, 110 C.S.R. § 3-19.1 requires merely that "in order for the property to be exempt, the primary and immediate use of the property must be for one or more exempt purposes." [8] In its order, the Tax Commissioner stated "[w]e do not make any opinion as to whether [AEMS] is a charitable organization." The circuit court also made no finding on AEMS' charitable status. [9] In the hearing before the circuit court, TSN's CEO, Dennis Nurkiewicz, testified that TSN assists county-level emergency services organizations by providing personnel training, certification and licensure; ambulance inspe | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. MacLAREN SCHOOL, CHILDREN'S SERVICE DIV.green2 sentences2003Id. at 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ; see also Morgan v. MacLaren School, Children’s Services Div., 23 Or.App. 546 , 543 P.2d 304, 307 (1975). 2003Id. at 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ; see also Morgan v. MacLaren School, Children’s Services Div., 23 Or.App. 546 , 543 P.2d 304, 307 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2025Even if the petitioner had met the first prong of the Strickland/Miller test, he cannot establish the second prong of that test that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Miller, 194 W. 2019To prevail under the second prong of this test, a defendant must "demonstrate prejudice" and "prove there is a 'reasonable probability' that, absent the errors, the [proceedings] would have reached a different result." Id. at 15 , 459 S.E.2d at 126 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 ). | 3 | 1999–2025 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2019To prevail under the second prong of this test, a defendant must "demonstrate prejudice" and "prove there is a 'reasonable probability' that, absent the errors, the [proceedings] would have reached a different result." Id. at 15 , 459 S.E.2d at 126 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 ). 2019To prevail under the second prong of this test, a defendant must "demonstrate prejudice" and "prove there is a 'reasonable probability' that, absent the errors, the [proceedings] would have reached a different result." Id. at 15 , 459 S.E.2d at 126 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 ). | 2 | 1997–2019 |
In Re Cesar L.
green
1 sentence2025Va 249, 654 S.E.2d 373 (2007). 7 Having determined that there was a material change in circumstances, we turn to the second prong of the analysis: whether modification was in the best interests of R.B. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Youngblood
green
1 sentence2021Va. 20 , 650 S.E.2d 119 (2007) (citations omitted). 17 17 The State attempts to expand the second prong of this test by referring to a footnote in which the Court stated that “‘[w]e will note that evidence is considered suppressed when ‘the existence of the evidence was known, or reasonably should have been known, to the government, the evidence was not otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and the government either willfully or inadvertently withheld the evidence until it was too late for the defense to make use of it.’ United States v. Knight, 342 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County Commission
green
2 sentences2005The second prong of the test this Court set forth in Wellsburg Unity Apts., Inc. v. County Com'n of Brooke Co., 202 W.Va. 283 , 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998) requires simply that the property at issue is used exclusively for charitable purposes, not that the Taxpayer must use the property directly for a charitable purpose. 2005The second prong of the test this Court set forth in Wellsburg Unity Apts., Inc. v. County Com'n of Brooke Co., 202 W.Va. 283 , 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998) requires simply that the property at issue is used exclusively for charitable purposes, not that the Taxpayer must use the property directly for a charitable purpose. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ; see also Morgan v. MacLaren School, Children’s Services Div., 23 Or.App. 546 , 543 P.2d 304, 307 (1975). 2003Id. at 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ; see also Morgan v. MacLaren School, Children’s Services Div., 23 Or.App. 546 , 543 P.2d 304, 307 (1975). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Abbott v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
red
2 sentences2000Under step one of the two-step analysis articulated in Syllabus point 5 of Abbott, 191 W.Va. 198 , 444 S.E.2d 285 , the plaintiffs were required to establish that the actions of Buckeye satisfied W. 2000Under step one of the two-step analysis articulated in Syllabus point 5 of Abbott, 191 W.Va. 198 , 444 S.E.2d 285 , the plaintiffs were required to establish that the actions of Buckeye satisfied W. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
cluster 744871
green
2 sentences1999Federal courts have acknowledged that federal Rule 701, like our rule 701, “specifically permits lay opinion testimony if those opinions are rationally based on the perception of the witness[.]” Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997 , 1005 (11th Cir.1997). 1999Federal courts have acknowledged that federal Rule 701, like our rule 701, "specifically permits lay opinion testimony if those opinions are rationally based on the perception of the witness[.]" Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997 , 1005 (11th Cir.1997). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co.
green
2 sentences1996Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10 , 100 S.Ct. at 1466 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 12-13 . 1996Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10 , 100 S.Ct. at 1466 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 12-13 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters
green
2 sentences1991The Court concluded, however, that this fact alone was not sufficient to warrant preemption of state court jurisdiction in all cases: "The primary-jurisdiction rationale justifies pre-emption only in situations in which an aggrieved party has a reasonable opportunity either to invoke the Board's jurisdiction himself or else to induce his adversary to do so." 436 U.S. at 201 , 98 S.Ct. at 1759, 56 L.Ed.2d at 228 . 1991The Court concluded, however, that this fact alone was not sufficient to warrant preemption of state court jurisdiction in all cases: "The primary-jurisdiction rationale justifies pre-emption only in situations in which an aggrieved party has a reasonable opportunity either to invoke the Board's jurisdiction himself or else to induce his adversary to do so." 436 U.S. at 201 , 98 S.Ct. at 1759, 56 L.Ed.2d at 228 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.