second prong test in Minnesota

2013Whether Piercing the Corporate Veil was Necessary to Avoid Injustice or Fundamental Unfairness “The second prong of the test examines the relationship of the plaintiff to the corporation.... [P]roof of strict common law fraud is not required, but, rather, evidence that the corporate entity has been operated as a constructive fraud or in an unjust manner must be presented.” White, 322 N.W.2d at 608 (quotation omitted).

1986Although proof of “strict common law fraud” is not required to prove the second prong of the test, there must be proof that the corporation was operated “as a constructive fraud or in an unjust manner.” White v. Jorgenson, 322 N.W.2d 607, 608 (Minn.1982).

2015Manson, 432 U.S. at 116 , 97 S. Ct. at 2253-54 ; State v. Bellcourt, [ 312 Minn. 263, 265 ,] 251 N.W.2d 631, 633 (1977).

2015Manson, 432 U.S. at 116 , 97 S. Ct. at 2253-54 ; State v. Bellcourt, [ 312 Minn. 263, 265 ,] 251 N.W.2d 631, 633 (1977).

1995See Bowles at 530-31 ; United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 574 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 925 , 112 S.Ct. 340 , 116 L.Ed.2d 280 (1991); Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1364-65 .

1995United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 574 (3d Cir.1991); Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1025 ; Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1363 .

2015See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697 , 104 S. Ct. at 2069 (noting that an appellate court need not reach the second prong of the test if the first prong is determinative).

2015See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697 , 104 S. Ct. at 2069 (noting that an appellate court need not reach the second prong of the test if the first prong is determinative).

2015But under the second prong of the test, even unnecessarily suggestive show-up evidence is reliable if “the totality of the circumstances shows the witness’ identification has adequate independent origin.” State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995).

2003Id. .

2025The key factor is “whether the defendant was unfairly singled out for identification.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[U]nder the second prong of the test, the identification evidence, even if suggestive, may be admissible if the totality of the circumstances establishes that the evidence was Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 263-64 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The empirical evidence demonstrates that eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.”).

2024“A district court’s exercise of its equitable powers is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Cole, 766 N.W.2d at 339 ; see also Nadeau v. Ramsey Cnty., 277 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Minn. 1979) (“Granting equitable relief is within the sound discretion of the [district] court.

2017Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997).

2014See Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318 (“That a defendant sought a continuance can be weighed under the second prong of the test . . . .”).

2014Prtine, 784 N.W.2d at 318 . “[E]ven implied concessions require client consent.” Dukes v. State, 660 N.W.2d 804, 812 (Minn. 2003).

2013We now articulate that which is implied by our legal standard for deciding whether a voluntary intoxication jury instruction is warranted — the second prong of this standard must be evaluated by considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant. 5 See City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 472 , 238 N.W.2d 851, 858 (1976) (considering the “[djefen-dant’s evidence” when deciding whether the defendant introduced enough evidence to raise an involuntary intoxication defense).

2013We now articulate that which is implied by our legal standard for deciding whether a voluntary intoxication jury instruction is warranted — the second prong of this standard must be evaluated by considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant. 5 See City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 472 , 238 N.W.2d 851, 858 (1976) (considering the “[djefen-dant’s evidence” when deciding whether the defendant introduced enough evidence to raise an involuntary intoxication defense).

2010Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn.2004).

2010Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn.2004).

2009Victoria Elevator, 283 N.W.2d at 512 . “[PJroof of strict common law fraud is not required, but ... evidence that the corporate entity has been operated as a constructive fraud or in an unjust manner must be presented.” Groves v. Dakota Printing Servs., Inc., 371 N.W.2d 59, 62-63 (Minn.App.1985).

2006See Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 866 (“Hill-Murray ... [has] not established that [the state’s action] excessively burdens their religious beliefs.”).