19 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
James Ingerson v. Andrew Pallito, Commissioner, Vermont Department of Corrections and Leanne Sallsgreen2 sentences2020If the challenged action “involves negligence unrelated to any plausible policy objectives, then the second prong of the test is not satisfied, and the discretionary function exception does not apply.” Ingerson, 2019 VT 40, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted). ¶ 43. 2019If the challenged action “involves negligence unrelated to any plausible policy objectives, then the second prong of the test is not satisfied, and the discretionary function exception does not apply.” Ingerson, 2019 VT 40, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted). ¶ 45. | 3 | 3 |
Andrew C. & Margaret R. Sigler Foundation v. Town of Norwichgreen2 sentences2014We expanded upon the second prong of the analysis in Sigler Foundation v. Town of Norwich, examining the criteria to determine whether a given use of land conferred “a private, as opposed to [a] general, or indefinite benefit.” 174 Vt. 129, 134 , 807 A.2d 442, 446 (2002). 2014We expanded upon the second prong of the analysis in Sigler Foundation v. Town of Norwich, examining the criteria to determine whether a given use of land conferred “a private, as opposed to [a] general, or indefinite benefit.” 174 Vt. 129, 134 , 807 A.2d 442, 446 (2002). | 2 | 2 |
In Re SRgreen2 sentences1994See In re S.R., 157 Vt. at 421 , 599 A.2d at 367 . 1994See In re S.R., 157 Vt. at 421 , 599 A.2d at 367 . | 2 | 2 |
In re S.R.green2 sentences1994See In re S.R., 157 Vt. at 421 , 599 A.2d at 367 . 1994See In re S.R., 157 Vt. at 421 , 599 A.2d at 367 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re Dunbargreen2 sentences2012“The second prong of the test evaluates whether, if counsel’s performance did fall below the objective standard, such failure created a ‘reasonable probability’ that effective counsel would have produced a different outcome.” Id. (quoting In re Dunbar, 162 Vt. 209, 212 (1994)). 2010Id. at 212 , 647 A.2d at 319 . | 1 | 2 |
Dorrell R. Coulthurst v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019Coulthurst v. United States, 214 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Kennery, 2011 VT 121, ¶ 36 (holding that state troopers’ welfare check at wrong address was not covered by discretionary function exception because “[t]he discretionary activity at issue was to apply the information given the officers to search the right house” and there was “no public policy analysis in this activity”). ¶ 15. | 1 | 1 |
Kennery v. State of Vermont, Valcourt, LaBombard and Other Members of the Dept. of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2019Coulthurst v. United States, 214 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Kennery, 2011 VT 121, ¶ 36 (holding that state troopers’ welfare check at wrong address was not covered by discretionary function exception because “[t]he discretionary activity at issue was to apply the information given the officers to search the right house” and there was “no public policy analysis in this activity”). ¶ 15. 2019Kennery, 2011 VT 121, ¶ 32 . | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2012The court begins with the first prong of the test, noting that defense counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and to have made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Russogreen2 sentences2012“The second prong of the test evaluates whether, if counsel’s performance did fall below the objective standard, such failure created a reasonable probability that effective counsel would have produced a different outcome.” Russo, 2010 VT 16, ¶ 16 (quotations and citations omitted). 2012“A PCR court making this inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.” Id. (quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginiagreen2 sentences1988We stated in Tallman , "[t]he presumption of openness has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial. `[I]t gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.'" Id. at 471 , 537 A.2d at 425 -26 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 , 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2823 , 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980)). 1988We stated in Tallman , “[t]he presumption of openness has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial. ‘[I]t gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.’ ” Id. at 471 , 537 A.2d at 425 -26 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Pernicka
green
2 sentences2024“The second prong of the test evaluates whether, if counsel’s performance did fall below the objective standard, such failure created a ‘reasonable probability’ that effective counsel would have produced a different outcome.” Id. 2012“The second prong of the test evaluates whether, if counsel’s performance did fall below the objective standard, such failure created a ‘reasonable probability’ that effective counsel would have produced a different outcome.” Id. (quoting In re Dunbar, 162 Vt. 209, 212 (1994)). | 2 | 2012–2024 |
Estate of Gage v. State
green
2 sentences2021If the act is “discretionary in nature,” the second prong of the test requires the court to determine “whether that judgment involved considerations of public policy which the discretionary function exception was designed to protect.” Estate of Gage v. State, 2005 VT 78, ¶ 5 , 178 Vt. 212 , 882 A.2d 1157 (quotation omitted). 2021If the act is “discretionary in nature,” the second prong of the test requires the court to determine “whether that judgment involved considerations of public policy which the discretionary function exception was designed to protect.” Estate of Gage v. State, 2005 VT 78, ¶ 5 , 178 Vt. 212 , 882 A.2d 1157 (quotation omitted). | 2 | 2017–2021 |
United States v. Gaubert
green
2 sentences2020Here, the first prong of the Gaubert test—that the challenged acts or omissions involved discretionary decisions—is not met. 499 U.S. at 325 . 2019Here, the first prong of the Gaubert test—that the challenged acts or omissions involved discretionary decisions—is not met. 499 U.S. at 325 . | 2 | 2019–2020 |
In Re Rinkers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024If so, the Court moves to the second prong of the analysis, which requires a determination of whether the impact will be “undue.” Id. 22 When determining whether a project will have an adverse impact, the Court looks at how the project fits within the context of its area in terms of size, scale, nature of use and various off-site impacts, here with respect to aesthetics and noise. 2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Hemond
green
2 sentences2017State v. Hemond , 2005 VT 12 , ¶ 12, 178 Vt. 470 , 868 A.2d 734 (mem.) (citations omitted). 2017State v. Hemond , 2005 VT 12 , ¶ 12, 178 Vt. 470 , 868 A.2d 734 (mem.) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In re Labounty
green
1 sentence2006Accordingly, the court determined only whether appellant’s defense was prejudiced, that is, whether ‘“counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Gundlah Ex Rel. Smallheer
green
2 sentences2005Id.) Gundlah, 160 Vt. at 196 , 624 A.2d at 370 . 2005Id.) Gundlah, 160 Vt. at 196 , 624 A.2d at 370 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
New York Institute for Education of the Blind v. Town of Wolcott
green
2 sentences2002In reaching this conclusion the court applied the definition of definite classes of persons laid out in New York Institute, 128 Vt. at 286 , 262 A.2d at 455 , and determined that the above beneficiaries are “definite” classes because they are groups determined by a process of choice or selection involving voluntary action or judgment on their part. 2002In reaching this conclusion the court applied the definition of definite classes of persons laid out in New York Institute, 128 Vt. at 286 , 262 A.2d at 455 , and determined that the above beneficiaries are “definite” classes because they are groups determined by a process of choice or selection involving voluntary action or judgment on their part. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Tallman
green
2 sentences1988We stated in Tallman , “[t]he presumption of openness has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial. ‘[I]t gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.’ ” Id. at 471 , 537 A.2d at 425 -26 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)). 1988We stated in Tallman , “[t]he presumption of openness has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial. ‘[I]t gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.’ ” Id. at 471 , 537 A.2d at 425 -26 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.