second prong test in Tennessee

2022Additionally, establishing that he has pursued his rights diligently “does not require a [petitioner] to undertake repeated exercises in futility or to exhaust every imaginable option, but rather to make reasonable efforts[.] Moreover, the due diligence inquiry is an individualized one that must take into account the conditions of confinement and the reality of the prison system.” Id. (citing Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2022Additionally, establishing that he has pursued his rights diligently “does not require a [petitioner] to undertake repeated exercises in futility or to exhaust every imaginable option, but rather to make reasonable efforts[.] Moreover, the due diligence inquiry is an individualized one that must take into account the conditions of confinement and the reality of the prison system.” Id. (citing Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2007The second prong of the test for mental retardation under our statute requires “deficits in adaptive behavior” which has been defined as “the inability of an individual to behave so as to adapt to surrounding circumstances.” State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 918 (Tenn.1995).

2006The second prong of the test for mental retardation under our statute requires “deficits in adaptive behavior” which has been defined as “the inability of an individual to behave so as to adapt to surrounding circumstances.” State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 918 (Tenn. 1995).

2013This prong requires the petitioner to prove "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 .

2011This prong requires the petitioner to prove “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2024Id. (citing Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 305 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that this argument “confuses the threshold question of whether the SLAPP statute applies with the question” under the second prong of the analysis)); see also Seltzer, 182 Cal. App. 4th at 961 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296 (noting that the California anti-SLAPP statute establishes a two-part test wherein first the defendant demonstrates that the act is applicable and second the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits).25 We likewise conc

2024Id. (citing Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 305 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that this argument “confuses the threshold question of whether the SLAPP statute applies with the question” under the second prong of the analysis)); see also Seltzer, 182 Cal. App. 4th at 961 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296 (noting that the California anti-SLAPP statute establishes a two-part test wherein first the defendant demonstrates that the act is applicable and second the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits).25 We likewise conc

2024Id. (citing Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 305 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that this argument “confuses the threshold question of whether the SLAPP statute applies with the question” under the second prong of the analysis)); see also Seltzer, 182 Cal. App. 4th at 961 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296 (noting that the California anti-SLAPP statute establishes a two-part test wherein first the defendant demonstrates that the act is applicable and second the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits).25 We likewise conc

2024Id. (citing Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 305 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that this argument “confuses the threshold question of whether the SLAPP statute applies with the question” under the second prong of the analysis)); see also Seltzer, 182 Cal. App. 4th at 961 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296 (noting that the California anti-SLAPP statute establishes a two-part test wherein first the defendant demonstrates that the act is applicable and second the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits).25 We likewise conc

2019“A contract will not be deemed to violate public policy unless it tends to harm the public good or conflict with Tennessee’s constitution, laws or judicial decisions.” Vintage Health Res., 309 S.W.3d at 465 (citing Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1991)); see also Holt v. Holt, 751 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

2019“A contract will not be deemed to violate public policy unless it tends to harm the public good or conflict with Tennessee’s constitution, laws or judicial decisions.” Vintage Health Res., 309 S.W.3d at 465 (citing Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1991)); see also Holt v. Holt, 751 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

2019Moro Aircraft Leasing, Inc. v. Int’l Aviation Mktg., Inc., 206 So.3d 814, 817 (Fla. Dist.

2018See id. at 115 .

2017In other words, “the affiant must provide some concrete reason why the magistrate should believe the informant,” although the “requisite volume or detail of information needed to establish the informants credibility is not particularly great.” State v. Lowe, 949 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tenn. Crim.

2016“A trial judge should grant a recusal motion when „a person of ordinary prudence in the judge‟s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge‟s impartiality.‟” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 73 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Bean, 280 S.W.3d at 805 ); see also Cotham v. Cotham, No. W2015-00521- COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 1517785 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015). “[P]reservation of the public‟s confidence in judicial neutrality requires not only that the judge be impartial in fact, but also that the judge be perceived to be impartial.” Kin

2016“A trial judge should grant a recusal motion when „a person of ordinary prudence in the judge‟s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge‟s impartiality.‟” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 73 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Bean, 280 S.W.3d at 805 ); see also Cotham v. Cotham, No. W2015-00521- COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 1517785 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015). “[P]reservation of the public‟s confidence in judicial neutrality requires not only that the judge be impartial in fact, but also that the judge be perceived to be impartial.” Kin

2011The second prong of our analysis is whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime. “[O]nly an extreme disparity between crime and sentence offends the Eighth Amendment.” United States v. Marks, 209 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2000).

2002The relevant inquiry on this issue is whether “the totality of the process leading up to the Board’s ‘professional review action’ ... evidenced a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter.” See Mathews v. Lancaster General Hospital, 87 F.3d 624, 687 (3d Cir.1996).