second prong test in Rhode Island

2014See id.

1999See Firth, 708 A.2d at 532 ; see also Hernandez, 641 A.2d at 72 .

2003If the trial justice concludes that the police used unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, he or she must turn to the second prong of the analysis, and “determine whether the identification lacks ‘independent reliability’ despite the nature of the identification procedure.” Mastracchio, 612 A.2d at 704 (quoting State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 298 (R.I.1990)).

1992“The factors to be considered when determining if an identification is independently reliable include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal, the witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.” State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249, 1253 (R.I.1992)(quoting State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 294 (R.I.1990)).

2010Indeed, a court must indulge "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland , *Page 13 466 U.S. at 689 ; Hazard v. State , 968 A.2d 886 , 892 (R.I. 2009). "[E]very effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. 7 Under the second prong of the test, to prove prejudice to his or her case, the "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

2010Indeed, a court must indulge "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland , *Page 13 466 U.S. at 689 ; Hazard v. State , 968 A.2d 886 , 892 (R.I. 2009). "[E]very effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. 7 Under the second prong of the test, to prove prejudice to his or her case, the "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

2016We first examine, with great deference, “the trial justice’s findings regarding the historical facts relevant to the voluntariness of the challenged confession.” Id, If we accept the findings, we then proceed to the second prong of our analysis, in which “we apply those historical facts and review the trial justice’s determination as to the voluntariness of the challenged confession de novo.” Id, A statement is voluntary if “it is ‘the product of [the defendant’s] free and rational choice’” and not “extracted from the defendant by coercion or improper inducement, including threats, violence, o

2016In making such a determination, we assess “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged statement.” Id.

2008The Rhode Island Supreme Court has found that an injunction is appropriate relief to prevent the irreparable harm that results from "continuing and repeated trespasses." See Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. Garabedian , 113 R.I. 134 , 137 , 318 A.2d 469 , 471 (1974) (citing Newport Yacht Club, Inc. v. Deomatares , 93 R.I. 60 , 64 , 171 A.2d 78 , 80 (1961)); Raposa v. Guay , 84 R.I. 436 , 444 , 125 A.2d 113 , 117 (1956)); see also Rhode Island Turnpike Bridge Auth. v. Cohen , 433 A.2d 179 , 182 (R.I. 1981) ("One of the most common illustrations [of irreparable harm] is that of a continuing trespass

2008The Rhode Island Supreme Court has found that an injunction is appropriate relief to prevent the irreparable harm that results from "continuing and repeated trespasses." See Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. Garabedian , 113 R.I. 134 , 137 , 318 A.2d 469 , 471 (1974) (citing Newport Yacht Club, Inc. v. Deomatares , 93 R.I. 60 , 64 , 171 A.2d 78 , 80 (1961)); Raposa v. Guay , 84 R.I. 436 , 444 , 125 A.2d 113 , 117 (1956)); see also Rhode Island Turnpike Bridge Auth. v. Cohen , 433 A.2d 179 , 182 (R.I. 1981) ("One of the most common illustrations [of irreparable harm] is that of a continuing trespass

2008See 330 U.S. at 508 -509 .

2008The Rhode Island Supreme Court has found that an injunction is appropriate relief to prevent the irreparable harm that results from "continuing and repeated trespasses." See Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. Garabedian , 113 R.I. 134 , 137 , 318 A.2d 469 , 471 (1974) (citing Newport Yacht Club, Inc. v. Deomatares , 93 R.I. 60 , 64 , 171 A.2d 78 , 80 (1961)); Raposa v. Guay , 84 R.I. 436 , 444 , 125 A.2d 113 , 117 (1956)); see also Rhode Island Turnpike Bridge Auth. v. Cohen , 433 A.2d 179 , 182 (R.I. 1981) ("One of the most common illustrations [of irreparable harm] is that of a continuing trespass

2008The Rhode Island Supreme Court has found that an injunction is appropriate relief to prevent the irreparable harm that results from "continuing and repeated trespasses." See Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. Garabedian , 113 R.I. 134 , 137 , 318 A.2d 469 , 471 (1974) (citing Newport Yacht Club, Inc. v. Deomatares , 93 R.I. 60 , 64 , 171 A.2d 78 , 80 (1961)); Raposa v. Guay , 84 R.I. 436 , 444 , 125 A.2d 113 , 117 (1956)); see also Rhode Island Turnpike Bridge Auth. v. Cohen , 433 A.2d 179 , 182 (R.I. 1981) ("One of the most common illustrations [of irreparable harm] is that of a continuing trespass

2008The Rhode Island Supreme Court has found that an injunction is appropriate relief to prevent the irreparable harm that results from "continuing and repeated trespasses." See Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. Garabedian , 113 R.I. 134 , 137 , 318 A.2d 469 , 471 (1974) (citing Newport Yacht Club, Inc. v. Deomatares , 93 R.I. 60 , 64 , 171 A.2d 78 , 80 (1961)); Raposa v. Guay , 84 R.I. 436 , 444 , 125 A.2d 113 , 117 (1956)); see also Rhode Island Turnpike Bridge Auth. v. Cohen , 433 A.2d 179 , 182 (R.I. 1981) ("One of the most common illustrations [of irreparable harm] is that of a continuing trespass

2008Moving to the second prong of the test for a preliminary injunction, Aza must establish "some irreparable harm that is presently threatened or imminent and for which no adequate legal remedy exists to restore [it] to its rightful position." Fund for Community Progress , 695 A.2d at 521 (citations omitted).

2004See Garcia, 643 A.2d at 185 .

1999See Firth, 708 A.2d at 532 ; see also Hernandez, 641 A.2d at 72 .

1998In order for contraband to be “immediately apparent,” the officer must “believe that [the] object * * * is contraband without conducting some further search of the object.” Id. at 375 , 113 S.Ct. at 2137 , 124 L.Ed.2d at 345 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 123 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)).

1998In order for contraband to be “immediately apparent,” the officer must “believe that [the] object * * * is contraband without conducting some further search of the object.” Id. at 375 , 113 S.Ct. at 2137 , 124 L.Ed.2d at 345 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 123 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)).

1998See State v. Tavarez, 572 A.2d 276, 278 (R.I.1990). 2 *831 If the officer is justified in conducting a patdown search for weapons, then the hearing justice should move to the second prong of the analysis: whether upon feeling an object within defendant’s clothing, the object’s “contour or mass [made] its identity [as contraband] immediately apparent” to the officer, Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 , 113 S.Ct. at 2137 , 124 L.Ed.2d at 346 , before or contemporaneous with the officer’s determination that it was not an obvious weapon.

1992“The factors to be considered when determining if an identification is independently reliable include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal, the witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.” State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249, 1253 (R.I.1992)(quoting State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 294 (R.I.1990)).

1984In State v. DeBarros, R.I., 441 A.2d 549 (1982), we adopted the second prong of the standard of review announced in Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 856 (D.C.App.1978), to be applied in analyzing cases involving a restriction of a requested line of bias cross-examination.

1984Only if we believe that the effect of such restriction was harmless to a defendant will we not find a constitutional violation. ‘"To hold harmless such error in curtailing constitutionally-protected cross-examination, it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt "(1) that the defendant would have been convicted without the witness' testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness' testimony.’” Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d at 856 .” State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d at 552 .