second prong test in Illinois

2026This second prong of the rule is often referred to as “the substantial rights prong,” as it “guards against 6 errors that erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant’s trial.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186 (2005).

2025Plain-error review is “a narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule, whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.” (Internal quotation marks omitted) (Internal citations omitted) Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 . ¶ 39 Defendant argues here that his arguments fall under the second prong of the doctrine, which allows for review in spite of forfeiture where “the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial.” Id. at 179 .

2006Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; People, 104 Ill.2d 504 , 85 Ill.Dec. 441 , 473 N.E.2d 1246 .

2006Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; People, 104 Ill.2d 504 , 85 Ill.Dec. 441 , 473 N.E.2d 1246 .

2002People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 494 (2000).

2002People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 494 (2000).

2024If a clear or obvious error occurred at sentencing, “an error is reversible under the second prong where that error ‘was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010)). ¶ 61 Under section 24-1.1(e) of the Code, UPWF is generally a Class 3 felony. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e) (West 2020).

2022In the context of sentencing, an error is reversible under the second prong where that error “was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Id. ¶ 12 Defendant was charged with DWLR under section 6-303(d-2) of the Code, which required that the State prove a “third violation of this Section” to warrant the imposition of a Class 4 felony sentence. 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-2) (West 2018).

2021In People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 50 , our supreme court found a forfeited restitution error was a plain error subject to reversal under the second prong because the error “affects the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenges the integrity of the judicial process.” We begin by determining 3 whether the restitution assessment in this case is error.

2021The court recently reaffirmed, in the context of a different second-prong error, that “ ‘an error may involve a[n] *** unimportant matter, but still affect the 15 integrity of the judicial process and the fairness of the proceeding.’ ” People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48 (2009).

2021To satisfy the second prong of the analysis, First Financial must demonstrate that Theresa’s amended counterclaim was filed for the sole purpose of interfering with its constitutional right to participate in government to obtain favorable government action (see Jursich, 2013 IL App (1st) 113279, ¶ 17 ), otherwise, Theresa’s amended counterclaim does not trigger immunity under the Participation Act.

2020See Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters v. Jursich, 2013 IL App (1st) 113279, ¶ 20 .

2021The court recently reaffirmed, in the context of a different second-prong error, that “ ‘an error may involve a[n] *** unimportant matter, but still affect the integrity of the judicial process and the fairness of the proceeding.’ ” People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48 (2009).

2021The court recently reaffirmed, in the context of a different second-prong error, that “ ‘an error may involve a[n] *** unimportant matter, but still affect the 15 integrity of the judicial process and the fairness of the proceeding.’ ” People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48 (2009).

2004Skolnick, 191 Ill.2d at 232 , 246 Ill.Dec. 324 , 730 N.E.2d 4 ; see also Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 8 , 106 S.Ct. at 2740 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 10 (explaining the second prong of this test as "whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question").

2004Ed. 2d at 10 , 106 S. Ct. at 2740 (explaining the second prong of this test as “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question”).

2015The second prong of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for ineffective assistance of counsel required a showing of prejudice.

2015The second prong of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) for ineffective assistance of counsel required a showing of prejudice.

2021As noted above, under the second prong of the doctrine, we may consider a forfeited - 13 - claim when “a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565 . ¶ 45 In response, the State concedes both that (1) the trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay the amount of restitution imposed without any evidentiary basis for it and (2) defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing because of the error.

2011An error is reversible under the plain-error doctrine only where "(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence." People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 565 , 312 Ill.Dec. 338 , 870 N.E.2d 403 (2007). ¶ 31 The supreme

2010“Where it is possible to resolve an ineffective assistance claim on the basis of the second prong of the test — that the [respondent] suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel’s allegedly defective performance — the claim may be decided against the [respondent] without consideration of whether counsel’s performance was actually deficient.” People v. Pulliam, 206 Ill. 2d 218, 249 (2002).

2010"Where it is possible to resolve an ineffective assistance claim on the basis of the second prong of the test—that the [respondent] suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's allegedly defective performance—the claim may be decided against the [respondent] without consideration of whether counsel's performance was actually deficient." People v. Pulliam, 206 Ill.2d 218, 249 , 276 Ill.Dec. 319 , 794 N.E.2d 214 (2002).

2022Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 614-15 . ¶ 34 Defendant argues that the outcome of his trial turned on a credibility contest between McGee and the State’s witnesses.

2011See Thompson, 238 Ill.2d at 613 , 345 Ill.Dec. 560 , 939 N.E.2d 403 .

2026“This inquiry ‘is necessarily fact dependent’ [citation]; however, the question of whether an award violates public policy is one of law, which we review de novo.” City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Chapter No. 240, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 20 (quoting AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 311 ). ¶ 31 When, as here, a party asserts that reinstatement of an employee would violate public policy, there must be either “an explicit legal prohibition against the reinstatement” or “some well- defined and dominant policy, not merely a value judgment or notion of the public interest, that impl

2025“This inquiry ‘is necessarily fact dependent’ [citation]; however, the question of whether an award violates public policy is one of law, which we review de novo.” City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Chapter No. 240, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 20 (quoting AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 311 ). ¶ 31 When, as here, a party asserts that reinstatement of an employee would violate public policy, there must be either “an explicit legal prohibition against the reinstatement” or “some well- defined and dominant policy, not merely a value judgment or notion of the public interest, that impl

2026“This inquiry ‘is necessarily fact dependent’ [citation]; however, the question of whether an award violates public policy is one of law, which we review de novo.” City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Chapter No. 240, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 20 (quoting AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 311 ). ¶ 31 When, as here, a party asserts that reinstatement of an employee would violate public policy, there must be either “an explicit legal prohibition against the reinstatement” or “some well- defined and dominant policy, not merely a value judgment or notion of the public interest, that impl

2026Instead, Charles underscores the fact that our analysis under the second prong is “necessarily fact dependent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See Des Plaines, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957 , ¶ 20. ¶ 38 We turn next to the Illinois Police Training Act (Act) (50 ILCS 705/1 et seq.

2025Id. ¶ 44 If the trial court determines that the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, it proceeds to the second prong of the inquiry.

2023Id. ¶ 32 If the trial court determines, however, that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the trial court then moves on to the second prong of the analysis.

2024“This second prong of the rule, i.e., the substantial rights prong, ‘guards against errors that erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant’s trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186 ).

2022People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445 , ¶ 50.

2011Id.

2011Id.

2004The presumption of access can be rebutted by demonstrating that suppression “is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 , 78 L.

2004The presumption of access can be rebutted by demonstrating that suppression “is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 , 78 L.

2026Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶ 21 .

2013See generally Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶¶ 20-21 (discussing Sandholm).

2025Second-prong error is equated with “ ‘structural error.’ ” People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009)).

2025Second-prong error, in turn, “requires a reversal regardless of the effect of the error on the outcome of the trial.” Moon, 2022 IL 125959 , ¶ 74 ¶ 22 Thus, pursuant to binding supreme court precedent, we have no choice but to reverse defendant’s convictions and remand to permit a new trial. ¶ 23 In the case at bar, defendant does not argue that retrial is barred by double jeopardy, nor could he.

2025Second-prong error is equated with “ ‘structural error.’ ” People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009)).

2025The Illinois Supreme Court explained that, “In defining structural errors, the United States Supreme Court has explained that most constitutional errors can be harmless; if a defendant is represented by counsel and tried by an impartial adjudicator ‘ “there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999), quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)).

2024Under the second-prong analysis, “[p]rejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved, ‘regardless of the strength of the evidence.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005) (quoting People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138 (2000)).

2004In People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 , 724 N.E.2d 920 (2000), the court noted: “ ‘A criminal defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial’ conducted according to law.” Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138 , 724 N.E.2d at 941 , quoting People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 , 705 N.E.2d 824 (1998).