second prong test in Texas

2005In other words, the second prong of the test requires us to ask: Is there some evidence in the record that would permit a jury “to rationally find that if appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense[?]” Campbell, 149 S.W.3d at 152 (citing Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672-73 ; Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981)).

2005Lesser Included Offense In issue one, appellant argues the trial court erred in charging the jury on the lesser included offense of Class B misdemeanor theft because the instruction does not meet the second prong of the test established in Rousseau v. State , 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim.

2008Therefore, we address only the second prong of the test set out in Hall v. State , 225 S.W.3d 524, 535-36 (Tex. Crim.

2008Therefore, we address only the second prong of the test set out in Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535-36 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) — whether there was some evidence adduced at trial to support an instruction that appellant was guilty only of misdemeanor forgery.

2018See Guzman, 188 S.W.3d at 188-89 .

2012The second prong of the test is satisfied if there is some evidence in the record that would permit a rational jury to find that “if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense.” Guzman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex. Crim.

2008In Arevalo v. State, 943 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), we explained why the evidence raising a lesser-included offense must provide a viable and rational alternative to the greater offense: The second prong of the test preserves the integrity of the jury as the factfinder by ensuring that the jury is instructed as to a lesser included offense only when that offense constitutes a valid, rational alternative to the charged offense.

2008In Arevalo v. State, 943 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), we explained why the evidence raising a lesser-included offense must provide a viable and rational alternative to the greater offense: The second prong of the test preserves the integrity of the jury as the factfinder by ensuring that the jury is instructed as to a lesser included offense only when that offense constitutes a valid, rational alternative to the charged offense.

2011See Arevalo v. State, 970 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2011See Arevalo v. State, 970 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2026To meet the second prong of the test, Stubblefield must demonstrate “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 3 the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 .

2015The second prong of the test “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id.

2015See Moody, 991 S.W.2d at 857–58.

2007See Ex parte Moody , 991 S.W.2d 856, 857-58 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 232 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 232 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) (applying second prong analysis).

2012We thus turn to the second prong inquiry of whether an assertion of jurisdiction over Appellants comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 ; BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 .

2010Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).

2001The court of appeals believed this evidence of appellant's conduct was subject to different interpretations and, therefore, satisfied the second prong of the test, relying on our decision in Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

2001The court of appeals believed this evidence of appellant’s conduct was subject to different interpretations and, therefore, satisfied the second prong of the test, relying on our decision in Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

2024See Cavazos 382 S.W.3d at 382 (describing first prong as “threshold” and directing courts to address second prong only “if this threshold is met”).

2014This second prong of our inquiry is a question of fact, and a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense “if some evidence from any source raises a fact issue on *191 whether he is guilty of only the lesser, regardless of whether the evidence is weak, impeached, or contradicted.” Id.

2011Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.Crim.

2003In order for appellant to meet the second prong of the test, there must be some evidence that any bodily injury he inflicted was not A serious bodily injury. @ See id.

2024See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 447-48 ; Anderson, 122 S.W.3d at 385 .

2017See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. , 852 S.W.2d at 447-48 ; Anderson , 122 S.W.3d at 385 .

2015"The second prong of the test then requires an evaluation to determine whether some evidence exists that would permit a jury to rationally find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense." McKinney v. State, 207 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. Crim.

2015“The second prong of the test then requires an evaluation to determine whether some evidence exists that would permit a jury to rationally find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense.” McKinney v. State, 207 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. Crim.

2015Korthauer, 21 S.W.3d at 578 ; see Goswami, 751 S.W.2d at 490 .

2015See Goswami, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490-91 ; Korthauer, 21 S.W.3d at 578 .

2009In the Royster-Rousseau line of cases, we established a two-pronged test for determining when a trial judge should submit to the jury a lesser-included offense that is requested by the defendant.1 Under the second prong of the test, “some evidence must exist in the record that would permit a jury rationally to find that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense.”2 1 See Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Crim.

2005In other words, the second prong of the test requires us to ask: Is there some evidence in the record that would permit a jury “to rationally find that if appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense[?]” Campbell, 149 S.W.3d at 152 (citing Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672-73 ; Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981)).

2017Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536 ; Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim.

2013Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536 ; Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex.Crim.

2016See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ; Ex parte Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. Crim.

2014Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Ex parte Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. Crim.

2015“Because disclosure forms the second prong of the test to rebut the presumption of enforceability, lack of disclosure is material only if the premarital agreement is unconscionable.” Id. at 743 ; see also Fazakerly v. Fazakerly, 996 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App.— Eastland 1999, pet. denied) (“The issue of unconscionability must be decided by the trial court as a matter of law before the disclosure questions are addressed.”).

2012"Because disclosure forms the second prong of the test to rebut the presumption of enforceability, lack of disclosure is material only if the premarital agreement is unconscionable." Id. at 743 ; see also Fazakerly v. Fazakerly, 996 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App.–Eastland 1999, pet. denied) ("The issue of unconscionability must be decided by the trial court as a matter of law before the disclosure questions are addressed.").

2025“Because disclosure forms the second prong of the test to rebut 19 the presumption of enforceability, lack of disclosure is material only if the premarital agreement is unconscionable.” Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 734, 743 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (citation omitted); see Tex. Fam.

2023“Because disclosure forms the second prong of the test to rebut the presumption of enforceability, lack of disclosure is material only if the premarital 6 agreement is unconscionable.” Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 743 .

2010The Fifth Circuit, as the court of criminal appeals has explained, “has extended 6 the second prong of the test” to intentional delays by the government “for other impermissible bad- faith purposes.” Id. (citing Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1514 ).

2010The Fifth Circuit, as the court of criminal appeals has explained, "has extended the second prong of the test" to intentional delays by the government "for other impermissible bad-faith purposes." Id . (citing Crouch , 84 F.3d at 1514 ).

2015The court of criminal appeals addressed the second prong of this analysis in a similar case styled Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim.

2015The court of criminal appeals addressed the second prong of this analysis in a similar case styled Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim.

2025See Barley, 906 S.W.2d at 34 .

2023See Barley, 906 S.W.2d at 34 .