second prong test in Oregon

2023“Federal cases teach us that obstacle preemption ques- tions are to be resolved by examining the federal law to ascertain its purposes and intended effects, examining the state statute to determine its effects, and comparing the results to determine whether the latter statute in some way obstructs the accomplishment of the objectives that have been identified with respect to the former statute.” Cite as 328 Or App 686 (2023) 693 Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023“Federal cases teach us that obstacle preemption ques- tions are to be resolved by examining the federal law to ascertain its purposes and intended effects, examining the state statute to determine its effects, and comparing the results to determine whether the latter statute in some way obstructs the accomplishment of the objectives that have been identified with respect to the former statute.” Cite as 328 Or App 686 (2023) 693 Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023Turning, then, to the second prong of the analysis, we must consider whether ORS 166.274 stands “as an obsta- cle to the full accomplishment and exercise of the federal firearms statute’s purpose.” Willis, 350 Or at 311 .

2023Turning, then, to the second prong of the analysis, we must consider whether ORS 166.274 stands “as an obsta- cle to the full accomplishment and exercise of the federal firearms statute’s purpose.” Willis, 350 Or at 311 .

2015In Northern Counties Trust, this court concluded that a bill exacting court fees from parties in litigation was not “a bill [ ] for raising revenue” within the meaning of Article IV, section 18. 30 Or at 403 .

2015In Northern Counties Trust, this court concluded that a bill exacting court fees from parties in litigation was not “a bill[ ] for raising revenue” within the meaning of Article IV, section 18. 30 Or at 403 .

2024“A trial court errs if it gives a jury instruction that is at odds with a general rule of Oregon law or inconsistent with a specific application of that rule in prior Oregon case law.” Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333, 347-48 , 353 P3d 563 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024“A trial court errs if it gives a jury instruction that is at odds with a general rule of Oregon law or inconsistent with a specific application of that rule in prior Oregon case law.” Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333, 347-48 , 353 P3d 563 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2018As noted, the problematic treatment recommendations in Volynets-Vasylchenko were significantly different than those in this case; the evaluating practitioner in Volynets-Vasylchenko had recommended that the victim receive therapy from a therapist "skilled in working with children who have been victims of abuse." 246 Or.

2017A. Scientific Institution The Oregon Supreme Court described scientific organizations in the context of ORS 307.130: “Scientific societies are usually and ordinarily understood to embrace organizations for the promotion of science or the pursuit of scientific studies for the purpose of developing science, rather than as a student in a college or university for his own edification.” Kappa Gamma Rho v. Marion County, 130 Or 165, 176 , 279 P 555 (1929); see also Math Learning Center v. Dept. of Rev., 14 OTR 62, 64 (1996) (applying the definition of “scientific organization” in Kappa Gamma Rho for

2017A. Scientific Institution The Oregon Supreme Court described scientific organizations in the context of ORS 307.130: “Scientific societies are usually and ordinarily understood to embrace organizations for the promotion of science or the pursuit of scientific studies for the purpose of developing science, rather than as a student in a college or university for his own edification.” Kappa Gamma Rho v. Marion County, 130 Or 165, 176 , 279 P 555 (1929); see also Math Learning Center v. Dept. of Rev., 14 OTR 62, 64 (1996) (applying the definition of “scientific organization” in Kappa Gamma Rho for

2016(Id. at 4, ¶ 14.) Not only are the activities of its participants frequently stipulated as being “volunteer community services” or some variation thereof, Tivnu “does not operate for the profit or private advantage of its founders, directors, or officers.” (Id. at 2, ¶ 6.) As noted above in the second- prong analysis, the participants pay tuition to take part in the Gap Year program, but the tuition is heavily subsidized by private donors and charitable organizations to cover the balance of the costs of running the program and to ensure that “[n]o qualifying applicant is denied acceptance to t

2013We decline the state’s invitation to revisit the value of the first prong of the test in a case that does not adequately implicate it. 400 State v. Backstrand unadorned by judicial interpretation based upon specific fact situations” and does not provide “a ready answer for every conceivable” police-citizen encounter that can arise. 311 Or at 410 .

1997Medtronic, 116 S Ct at 2258 .

1986That test requires that such affidavits set forth: “* * * (1) The basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) facts showing the informant’s ‘veracity,’ i.e., that he is credible or that his information is reliable.* * *” State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404 , 409 n 3, 657 P2d 1223 (1983). 2 The trial court held that the second prong of that test was satisfied, but that the first was not.

1986That test requires that such affidavits set forth: “* * * (1) The basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) facts showing the informant’s ‘veracity,’ i.e., that he is credible or that his information is reliable.* * *” State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404 , 409 n 3, 657 P2d 1223 (1983). 2 The trial court held that the second prong of that test was satisfied, but that the first was not.

1984We stated in our discussion of Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or 65 , 439 P2d 601 (1968), “[W]e held that good faith means no more than intent to benefit the [principal] and is not equated with absence of a personal interest in the financial welfare of the [principal].” 296 Or at 215 , 675 P2d at 177 .

1984We stated in our discussion of Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or 65 , 439 P2d 601 (1968), “[W]e held that good faith means no more than intent to benefit the [principal] and is not equated with absence of a personal interest in the financial welfare of the [principal].” 296 Or at 215 , 675 P2d at 177 .

1984We stated in our discussion of Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or 65 , 439 P2d 601 (1968), “[W]e held that good faith means no more than intent to benefit the [principal] and is not equated with absence of a personal interest in the financial welfare of the [principal].” 296 Or at 215 , 675 P2d at 177 .

1984We stated in our discussion of Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or 65 , 439 P2d 601 (1968), “[W]e held that good faith means no more than intent to benefit the [principal] and is not equated with absence of a personal interest in the financial welfare of the [principal].” 296 Or at 215 , 675 P2d at 177 .