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22 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025To satisfy the second prong of the test, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694 . ¶ 13 Defense counsel is not simply “the alter-ego or mouthpiece of the accused, but is a trained advocate charged with representing an accused.” People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 12 (Colo. 1981). 2024See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). ¶ 16 In assessing the first prong of the Strickland test, we must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound 6 trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see also Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1025 (10th Cir. 2002) (“For counsel’s performance to be constitutionally ineffective, it must have b | 2 | 4 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2016See id. at 294 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 ). 2016See id. at 294 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). | 2 | 2 |
Ferrara v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Both sides in this case also draw our attention to Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (ist Cir. 2006), which established that a defendant can show his plea was involuntary under Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L:Ed.2d 747 (1970), if he shows (1) "some egregiously impermissible conduct ... antedated the entry of his plea," and (2) "the misconduct influenced his decision to plead guilty or, put another way, that it was material to that choice." The Ferrara court made clear that the second prong of this test requires the same analysis as ineffective-assistance c 2016The difference now is that things that we did, things that were said, you know things that were between us became not between us and I understand the reasons for that but what’s to stop that from happening in the future[?]” Before hanging up, Corson said “I love you.” 5 Both sides in this case also draw our attention to Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006), which established that a defendant can show his plea was involuntary under Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), if he shows (1) “some egregiously impermissible conduct . . . antedated the entry of his plea,” a | 2 | 2 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Both sides in this case also draw our attention to Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (ist Cir. 2006), which established that a defendant can show his plea was involuntary under Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L:Ed.2d 747 (1970), if he shows (1) "some egregiously impermissible conduct ... antedated the entry of his plea," and (2) "the misconduct influenced his decision to plead guilty or, put another way, that it was material to that choice." The Ferrara court made clear that the second prong of this test requires the same analysis as ineffective-assistance c 2016The difference now is that things that we did, things that were said, you know things that were between us became not between us and I understand the reasons for that but what’s to stop that from happening in the future[?]” Before hanging up, Corson said “I love you.” 5 Both sides in this case also draw our attention to Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006), which established that a defendant can show his plea was involuntary under Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), if he shows (1) “some egregiously impermissible conduct . . . antedated the entry of his plea,” a | 2 | 2 |
Ainscough v. Owensgreen2 sentences2013Moreover, "{dleprivations of many legally created rights, although themselves intangible, are nevertheless injuries-in-fact." Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 , accord Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colo. Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo.1980) ("It is ... well settled that the injury in fact conferring standing may not only be intangible, but may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights the invasion of which creates standing." (internal citations and quotations omitted)). $84 The second prong of the test requires that the plaintiff have a legal interest protecting against the 2011The order of dismissal explicitly refers to and relies upon C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), cites extensively to authorities construing that rule, and makes no mention of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) or the terms "jurisdiction" or "standing." Defendants stress, however, that the order concludes that "there has been no injury to a legally protected interest of Monica's." The district court's language parallels the second prong for the test of standing—whether the plaintiff suffered harm "to a legally protected interest." Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo.2004). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Schultheisgreen1 sentence2025To satisfy the second prong of the test, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694 . ¶ 13 Defense counsel is not simply “the alter-ego or mouthpiece of the accused, but is a trained advocate charged with representing an accused.” People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 12 (Colo. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Hung Thanh Le v. Mullingreen1 sentence2024See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). ¶ 16 In assessing the first prong of the Strickland test, we must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound 6 trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see also Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1025 (10th Cir. 2002) (“For counsel’s performance to be constitutionally ineffective, it must have b | 1 | 1 |
Michel v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2024See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). ¶ 16 In assessing the first prong of the Strickland test, we must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound 6 trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see also Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1025 (10th Cir. 2002) (“For counsel’s performance to be constitutionally ineffective, it must have b | 1 | 1 |
People v. Karpierzgreen1 sentence2024See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). ¶ 16 In assessing the first prong of the Strickland test, we must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound 6 trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see also Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1025 (10th Cir. 2002) (“For counsel’s performance to be constitutionally ineffective, it must have b | 1 | 1 |
Kashiya Nwanguma v. Donald Trumpgreen1 sentence2023Intent to Produce Violent or Lawless Action ¶245 The second prong of the test for incitement is that “the speaker intends that his speech will result in the use of violence or lawless action.” Nwanguma, 903 F.3d at 609. | 1 | 1 |
Counterman v. Coloradogreen1 sentence2023The Supreme Court has interpreted this second prong of the Brandenburg test to require specific intent.21 Counterman, 600 U.S. at 79, 81 (establishing that “when incitement is at issue, we have spoken in terms of specific intent, presumably equivalent to purpose or knowledge,” and defining acting purposely as “‘consciously desir[ing]’ a result”). | 1 | 1 |
Thornton v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2021Only the second prong of this analysis is at issue now. ¶27 A waiver is voluntary if it is "not extracted by threats or violence, promises, or undue influence." Davis , ¶ 18 , 352 P.3d at 955 ( quoting People v. Smith , 716 P.2d 1115, 1118 ( Colo. 1986 ) ) . ¶28 A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the record clearly shows that the defendant understood the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments, the possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in their mitigation, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of t | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen1 sentence2021Only the second prong of this analysis is at issue now. ¶27 A waiver is voluntary if it is "not extracted by threats or violence, promises, or undue influence." Davis , ¶ 18 , 352 P.3d at 955 ( quoting People v. Smith , 716 P.2d 1115, 1118 ( Colo. 1986 ) ) . ¶28 A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the record clearly shows that the defendant understood the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments, the possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in their mitigation, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of t | 1 | 1 |
Quintano v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2014See id. at 219 . "[I]ncidents of sexual assault may be factually distinct if separate criminal acts have occurred at different times and were separated by intervening events." Quintano, 105 P.3d at 591 . ¶ 27 At the resentencing hearing, the postconviction court determined that defendant admitted "to violating [the] victim on at least two occasions in Douglas County, and those are the offenses for which he's being sentenced today." The court found "that there are separate offenses for which [defendant] is being sentenced in this case" because one incident "occurred ... in the living room of [d | 1 | 1 |
Woellhaf v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2014See id. at 219 . "[I]ncidents of sexual assault may be factually distinct if separate criminal acts have occurred at different times and were separated by intervening events." Quintano, 105 P.3d at 591 . ¶ 27 At the resentencing hearing, the postconviction court determined that defendant admitted "to violating [the] victim on at least two occasions in Douglas County, and those are the offenses for which he's being sentenced today." The court found "that there are separate offenses for which [defendant] is being sentenced in this case" because one incident "occurred ... in the living room of [d | 1 | 1 |
Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commissiongreen1 sentence2013Moreover, "{dleprivations of many legally created rights, although themselves intangible, are nevertheless injuries-in-fact." Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 , accord Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colo. Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo.1980) ("It is ... well settled that the injury in fact conferring standing may not only be intangible, but may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights the invasion of which creates standing." (internal citations and quotations omitted)). $84 The second prong of the test requires that the plaintiff have a legal interest protecting against the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maygreen2 sentences2006May, 859 P.2d at 883 . "[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness, both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see May, 859 P.2d at 882 ; Hopkins, 774 P.2d at 851 . 2006May, 859 P.2d at 883 . "[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness, both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see May, 859 P.2d at 882 ; Hopkins, 774 P.2d at 851 . | 1 | 1 |
County Road Users Ass'n v. Board of County Commissionersgreen1 sentence2000See County Road Users Ass'n, 987 P.2d at 864 . | 1 | 1 |
Mass Transit Administration v. Granite Construction Co.green2 sentences1998Co., 57 Md.App. 766 , 471 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1984) (setting forth the second prong of the test as “appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit”); S & M Rotogravure Serv., Inc. v. Baer, 77 Wis.2d 454 , 252 N.W.2d 913, 915-16 (Wis.1977) (equating appreciation with knowledge and finding appreciation where defendant knew of the remodeling work). 1998Co., 57 Md.App. 766 , 471 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1984) (setting forth the second prong of the test as “appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit”); S & M Rotogravure Serv., Inc. v. Baer, 77 Wis.2d 454 , 252 N.W.2d 913, 915-16 (Wis.1977) (equating appreciation with knowledge and finding appreciation where defendant knew of the remodeling work). | 1 | 1 |
S & M Rotogravure Service, Inc. v. Baergreen2 sentences1998Co., 57 Md.App. 766 , 471 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1984) (setting forth the second prong of the test as “appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit”); S & M Rotogravure Serv., Inc. v. Baer, 77 Wis.2d 454 , 252 N.W.2d 913, 915-16 (Wis.1977) (equating appreciation with knowledge and finding appreciation where defendant knew of the remodeling work). 1998Co., 57 Md.App. 766 , 471 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1984) (setting forth the second prong of the test as “appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit”); S & M Rotogravure Serv., Inc. v. Baer, 77 Wis.2d 454 , 252 N.W.2d 913, 915-16 (Wis.1977) (equating appreciation with knowledge and finding appreciation where defendant knew of the remodeling work). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences1974The majority opinion holds that the second prong of the test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), is satisfied by the assertion contained in the affidavit that the affiant received information from “a previously reliable confidential informant whose information has resulted in narcotics arrest and seizures on at least two past occasions.” In my view, to approve this language as competent to demonstrate the reliability of the informer is to permit the Fourth Amendm 1974The majority opinion holds that the second prong of the test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), is satisfied by the assertion contained in the affidavit that the affiant received information from “a previously reliable confidential informant whose information has resulted in narcotics arrest and seizures on at least two past occasions.” In my view, to approve this language as competent to demonstrate the reliability of the informer is to permit the Fourth Amendm | 3 | 1974–1975 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
2 sentences1974The majority opinion holds that the second prong of the test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), is satisfied by the assertion contained in the affidavit that the affiant received information from “a previously reliable confidential informant whose information has resulted in narcotics arrest and seizures on at least two past occasions.” In my view, to approve this language as competent to demonstrate the reliability of the informer is to permit the Fourth Amendm 1974The majority opinion holds that the second prong of the test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), is satisfied by the assertion contained in the affidavit that the affiant received information from “a previously reliable confidential informant whose information has resulted in narcotics arrest and seizures on at least two past occasions.” In my view, to approve this language as competent to demonstrate the reliability of the informer is to permit the Fourth Amendm | 3 | 1974–1975 |
People v. Brethauer
green
2 sentences1975Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 ; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 ; People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 ; People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29 , 482 P.2d 369 . 1975Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 ; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 ; People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 ; People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29 , 482 P.2d 369 . | 2 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Arnold
green
2 sentences1975Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 ; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 ; People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 ; People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29 , 482 P.2d 369 . 1975Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 ; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 ; People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 ; People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29 , 482 P.2d 369 . | 2 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Arguello
green
1 sentence2021Arguello , 772 P.2d at 94 . ¶29 The court must indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a waiver of the right to counsel . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Concerning the Application for Water Rights v. Raftopoulos Bros.
neutral
2 sentences2020P’ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 2013 CO 41, ¶ 32 , 307 P.3d 1056, 1064 . ¶14 To obtain a conditional water right, an applicant must demonstrate that: “(1) it has taken a ‘first step,’ which includes an intent to appropriate the water and an overt act manifesting such intent; (2) its intent is not based on a speculative sale or transfer of the water to be appropriated; and (3) there is a substantial probability that the applicant ‘can and will’ complete the appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time.” Id. at ¶ 33, 307 P.3d at 1064 . ¶15 At issue in this case is whether United’s appl 2020P’ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 2013 CO 41, ¶ 32 , 307 P.3d 1056, 1064 . ¶14 To obtain a conditional water right, an applicant must demonstrate that: “(1) it has taken a ‘first step,’ which includes an intent to appropriate the water and an overt act manifesting such intent; (2) its intent is not based on a speculative sale or transfer of the water to be appropriated; and (3) there is a substantial probability that the applicant ‘can and will’ complete the appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time.” Id. at ¶ 33, 307 P.3d at 1064 . ¶15 At issue in this case is whether United’s appl | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Haralampopoulos ex rel. Haralampopoulos v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2014The second prong requires that "the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis." Kelly, 2011 WL 4908743 at *7 , -- P.3d at --. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Moran v. Burbine
green
2 sentences2006May, 859 P.2d at 883 . "[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness, both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see May, 859 P.2d at 882 ; Hopkins, 774 P.2d at 851 . 2006May, 859 P.2d at 883 . "[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness, both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see May, 859 P.2d at 882 ; Hopkins, 774 P.2d at 851 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Hopkins
green
2 sentences2006May, 859 P.2d at 883 . "[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness, both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see May, 859 P.2d at 882 ; Hopkins, 774 P.2d at 851 . 2006May, 859 P.2d at 883 . “[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness, both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see May, 859 P.2d at 882 ; Hopkins, 774 P.2d at 851 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms
green
2 sentences1987Id. at 365-66 , 104 S.Ct. at 1106-07 . 5 We adopt this same two-pronged test under the Colorado Double Jeopardy Clause. 1987Id. at 365-66 , 104 S.Ct. at 1106-07 . 5 We adopt this same two-pronged test under the Colorado Double Jeopardy Clause. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Wasalco, Inc. v. El Paso County green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Draper v. United States green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| People v. Baird green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.