second prong test in Maine

2023Fahnley v. State, 2018 ME 92, 717 ; Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22, 911 .

2022Fahnley v. State, 2018 ME 92 , if! 7; Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22 , ifl I.

2023Fahnley v. State, 2018 ME 92, 717 ; Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22, 911 .

2022Fahnley v. State, 2018 ME 92 , if! 7; Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22 , ifl I.

2023Philbrook v. State, 2017 ME 162 , { 6, The second prong of the test is also described as whether errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.

2017Fore, 2012 ME 1 , ~ 8, 34 A.3d 1125 .

2017Fore, 2012 ME 1 , ~ 8, 34 A.3d 1125 .

2014Lyons, 666 A.2d at 99 ; see also Richards, 2001 ME 132, ¶ 25 , 780 A.2d 281 .

2010Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [¶ 13] Because Donatelli concedes that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was transporting cocaine, we are tasked with evaluating the second prong of the analysis: whether the action taken by police was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.” Langlois, 2005 ME 3, ¶ 7 , 863 A.2d at 916 .

2010Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [¶ 13] Because Donatelli concedes that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was transporting cocaine, we are tasked with evaluating the second prong of the analysis: whether the action taken by police was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.” Langlois, 2005 ME 3, ¶ 7 , 863 A.2d at 916 .

2010Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [¶ 13] Because Donatelli concedes that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was transporting cocaine, we are tasked with evaluating the second prong of the analysis: whether the action taken by police was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.” Langlois, 2005 ME 3, ¶ 7 , 863 A.2d at 916 .

2010Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [¶ 13] Because Donatelli concedes that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was transporting cocaine, we are tasked with evaluating the second prong of the analysis: whether the action taken by police was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.” Langlois, 2005 ME 3, ¶ 7 , 863 A.2d at 916 .

2006Similarly, in Strickland , the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2006Similarly, in Strickland , the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2005Brewer v. State, 1997 ME 177 { 20, 619 A.2d 1139 , 1144; Pottious v. State, 1997 ME 234 , J 9, 704 A.2d 1221, 1223 .

2005Brewer v. State, 1997 ME 177 { 20, 619 A.2d 1139 , 1144; Pottious v. State, 1997 ME 234 , J 9, 704 A.2d 1221, 1223 .

2005Brewer v. State, 1997 ME 177 { 20, 619 A.2d 1139 , 1144; Pottious v. State, 1997 ME 234 , J 9, 704 A.2d 1221, 1223 .

2002The plaintiff has met this element. (ii) Second Element — Defendants’ Anticipation of Litigation in Maine “The second prong of the analysis requires an assessment of the contacts between the defendant and Maine.” Murphy, 667 A.2d at 594 .

2002“Due process demands that the defendant have sufficient contact with Maine to make it reasonable to require the defendant to defend the particular suit which is brought here.” Id. (quotation and citations omitted).

1995Due process demands that the defendant have sufficient contact with Maine to “make it reasonable ... to require the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought [here].” Interstate Food Processing Corp., 622 A.2d at 1192 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

1995Due process demands that the defendant have sufficient contact with Maine to “make it reasonable ... to require the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought [here].” Interstate Food Processing Corp., 622 A.2d at 1192 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

1995Due process demands that the defendant have sufficient contact with Maine to “make it reasonable ... to require the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought [here].” Interstate Food Processing Corp., 622 A.2d at 1192 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

1994The question is whether the injury “occurs within the period of the employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.” Id. (quoting Fournier’s Case, 120 Me. 236, 240 , 113 A. 270 (1921)).

1994The question is whether the injury “occurs within the period of the employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.” Id. (quoting Fournier’s Case, 120 Me. 236, 240 , 113 A. 270 (1921)).

1990In plaintiffs view, a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), supports Maine’s jurisdiction over defendant in this case.

1990In plaintiffs view, a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), supports Maine’s jurisdiction over defendant in this case.

1990Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir.1986). 2 Such showing “must be based on specific facts set forth in the record,” and the record is to be *832 “construed in plaintiffs favor.” Id. at 8-9 . 3 Plaintiff argues that the motion justice erred by ruling that she failed to satisfy the second prong of the test, namely, that by his conduct defendant should “reasonably have anticipated litigation in [Maine].” Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1036 . 4 Specifically, plaintiff contends that the court’s reliance on Cives Corp. v. American Electric Power Co., Inc., 550 F.Supp. 11

1990Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir.1986). 2 Such showing “must be based on specific facts set forth in the record,” and the record is to be *832 “construed in plaintiffs favor.” Id. at 8-9 . 3 Plaintiff argues that the motion justice erred by ruling that she failed to satisfy the second prong of the test, namely, that by his conduct defendant should “reasonably have anticipated litigation in [Maine].” Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1036 . 4 Specifically, plaintiff contends that the court’s reliance on Cives Corp. v. American Electric Power Co., Inc., 550 F.Supp. 11

1990Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir.1986). 2 Such showing “must be based on specific facts set forth in the record,” and the record is to be *832 “construed in plaintiffs favor.” Id. at 8-9 . 3 Plaintiff argues that the motion justice erred by ruling that she failed to satisfy the second prong of the test, namely, that by his conduct defendant should “reasonably have anticipated litigation in [Maine].” Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1036 . 4 Specifically, plaintiff contends that the court’s reliance on Cives Corp. v. American Electric Power Co., Inc., 550 F.Supp. 11

1978Other Indicia of Reliability We come now to the second prong of the analysis established in Boucher, supra; whether, assuming an unduly suggestive confrontation, the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances.

1978In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), the United States Supreme Court set forth a number of factors which could operate to *1090 salvage a suggestive identification by establishing independent guarantees of reliability.

1978In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), the United States Supreme Court set forth a number of factors which could operate to *1090 salvage a suggestive identification by establishing independent guarantees of reliability.