second prong test in Ohio

2026“In determining the best interest of a child, a juvenile court ‘may apply one of two different tests.’” In re S.C., 2022-Ohio-356, ¶ 38 (10th Dist.), quoting In re J.P., 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). “‘Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court weighs multiple factors . . . to decide whether granting an agency permanent custody of a child is in that child’s best interest.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.

2026“In determining the best interest of a child, a juvenile court ‘may apply one of two different tests.’” In re S.C., 2022-Ohio-356, ¶ 38 (10th Dist.), quoting In re J.P., 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). “‘Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court weighs multiple factors . . . to decide whether granting an agency permanent custody of a child is in that child’s best interest.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.

2026“In determining the best interest of a child, a juvenile court ‘may apply one of two different tests.’” In re S.C., 2022-Ohio-356, ¶ 38 (10th Dist.), quoting In re J.P., 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). “‘Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court weighs multiple factors . . . to decide whether granting an agency permanent custody of a child is in that child’s best interest.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.

2026“In determining the best interest of a child, a juvenile court ‘may apply one of two different tests.’” In re S.C., 2022-Ohio-356, ¶ 38 (10th Dist.), quoting In re J.P., 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). “‘Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court weighs multiple factors . . . to decide whether granting an agency permanent custody of a child is in that child’s best interest.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.

2026As relevant to this case, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides: [T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at a hearing held pursuant to [R.C. 2151.414(A)], by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: ... (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two mont

2025As relevant to this case, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides: [T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at a hearing held pursuant to [R.C. 2151.414(A)], by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: ... (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two mont

2000The holding of the Supreme Court in Lilly requires us to overrule the contrary holding in State v. Gilliam, that a “statement against interest,” under Evid.R. 804(B)(3), falls into the “firmly rooted hearsay exception.” 1 This, however, does not impose a “ ‘blanket ban on the government’s use of [nontestifying] accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant.’” Rather, out-of-court statements made by an accomplice that incriminate the defendant may be admitted as evidence if the statement satisfies the second prong of the test announced in Ohio v. Roberts, supra; Lilly, 527 U.S. at -, 119 S

2000The holding of the Supreme Court in Lilly requires us to overrule the contrary holding in State v. Gilliam, that a “statement against interest,” under Evid.R. 804(B)(3), falls into the “firmly rooted hearsay exception.” 1 This, however, does not impose a “ ‘blanket ban on the government’s use of [nontestifying] accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant.’” Rather, out-of-court statements made by an accomplice that incriminate the defendant may be admitted as evidence if the statement satisfies the second prong of the test announced in Ohio v. Roberts, supra; Lilly, 527 U.S. at -, 119 S

2020The second prong of that analysis requires Crossley to demonstrate that the conduct complained of affected the outcome of the plea process, i.e., “ ‘but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” State v. Romero, 156 Ohio St.3d 468 , 2019-Ohio-1839 , 129 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 16 , quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). {¶ 32} With regard to Crossley’s allegation that trial counsel inaccurately advised him that he would receive no more than seven years in prison if he accepted the State’s plea offer, i

2020The second prong of that analysis requires Crossley to demonstrate that the conduct complained of affected the outcome of the plea process, i.e., “ ‘but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” State v. Romero, 156 Ohio St.3d 468 , 2019-Ohio-1839 , 129 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 16 , quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). {¶ 32} With regard to Crossley’s allegation that trial counsel inaccurately advised him that he would receive no more than seven years in prison if he accepted the State’s plea offer, i

2026“The best interest determination is based on an analysis of R.C. 2151.414(D).” Id. {¶15} “Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the trial court is required to consider all relevant factors listed in that subdivision, as well as any other relevant factors.” Id. -7- Case No. 1-25-40 at ¶ 24, citing In re H.M., 2014-Ohio-755, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).

2025“The best interest determination is based on an analysis of R.C. 2151.414(D).” Id. {¶17} “Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the trial court is required to consider all relevant factors listed in that subdivision, as well as any other relevant factors.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing In re H.M., 2014-Ohio-755, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).

2026As relevant to this case, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides: [T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at a hearing held pursuant to [R.C. 2151.414(A)], by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: ... (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two mont

2025As relevant to this case, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides: [T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at a hearing held pursuant to [R.C. 2151.414(A)], by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: ... (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two mont

2024Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶ 11} In the present case, the trial court found that Todd failed to satisfy the second prong of the analysis that he was entitled to relief on one of the grounds set forth in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5).

2009As the trial court's decision was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, we next review the trial court's sentence under the "abuse-of-discretion standard," the second prong of the standard set forth in Kalish. {¶ 131} "An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 , 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 . {¶ 132} We have already dismissed Caver's claims that the court improperly sentenced him based upon religious precepts and/or an incorrect finding of

2012Roark Co. Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 274 , 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶16} The Ohio Supreme Court clarified the second prong of this analysis.

2012Roark Co. Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 274 , 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶16} The Ohio Supreme Court clarified the second prong of this analysis.

2004Instead, one who seeks "to disregard the corporate entity may present evidence that the shareholders exercised their control over the corporation in such a manner as to commit a fraud, illegal, or other unjust or inequitable act upon the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity in order to satisfy the second prong of the test enunciated in Belvedere. " Id. at 245 ; see also Stypula v. Chandler, 11th Dist.

2004See, also, Wiencek v. Atcole Co., Inc. (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 240 , 245 ("we hold that one seeking to disregard the corporate entity may present evidence that the shareholders exercised their control over the corporation in such a manner as to commit a fraud, illegal, or other unjust or inequitable act upon the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity in order to satisfy the second prong of the test enunciated in Belvedere "); Stypula, supra, ("the corporate veil may be pierced when the acts would lead to unfair or inequitable consequences"). {¶ 39} In the present case, there was suff

2017See Decision, J. & Entry Denying Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea 2, 6-7. {¶ 15} With respect to the second prong of a claim of ineffective assistance, “a defendant may demonstrate prejudice * * * by demonstrating that ‘ “there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty.” ’ ” State v. Cardenas, 2016-Ohio-5537 , 61 N.E.3d 20 , ¶ 41 (2d Dist.) (quoting State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S. Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985))).

2017See Decision, J. & Entry Denying Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea 2, 6-7. {¶ 15} With respect to the second prong of a claim of ineffective assistance, “a defendant may demonstrate prejudice * * * by demonstrating that ‘ “there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty.” ’ ” State v. Cardenas, 2016-Ohio-5537 , 61 N.E.3d 20 , ¶ 41 (2d Dist.) (quoting State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S. Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985))).

2005Id. at paragraph five of the syllabus. {¶ 37} The test was modified in Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115 , where the Court held that the employee must prove: "(1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition within its business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if the employee is subjected by his employment to such dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to the employee will be a substantial certainty; and (3) that the employer, under such circumstances, and with such knowledge

2005Id. at paragraph five of the syllabus. {¶ 37} The test was modified in Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115 , where the Court held that the employee must prove: "(1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition within its business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if the employee is subjected by his employment to such dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to the employee will be a substantial certainty; and (3) that the employer, under such circumstances, and with such knowledge

2007Id.

2007Id. at 638-639 , citing R.C. 2941.25 (B) and State v. Jones , 78 Ohio St.3d 12 , 14 * * * If the crimes were committed separately or with separate animus, the defendant may be convicted and sentenced to each of the multiple offenses.

2022Considering the second prong of that test, this court noted its concern that in previous efforts to cap tort damages, the General Assembly had “imposed the cost of the intended benefit to the public solely upon those most severely injured.” Id. at ¶ 59, citing Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d at 690-691, 576 N.E.2d 765 , and Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 490, 715 N.E.2d 1062 .

2022Considering the second prong of that test, this court noted its concern that in previous efforts to cap tort damages, the General Assembly had “imposed the cost of the intended benefit to the public solely upon those most severely injured.” Id. at ¶ 59, citing Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d at 690-691, 576 N.E.2d 765 , and Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 490, 715 N.E.2d 1062 .