second prong analysis in Wyoming

2011The reasonableness of a traffic stop is determined by applying a two-part analysis: (1) whether the initial stop was justified; and (2) whether the officer's actions during the detention were "reasonably related in scope to the cireum-stances that justified the interference in the first instance." Garvin, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d at 728 -29 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also Wallace, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d at 970 ; Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d at 705 . [¶10] With respect to the second prong of the analysis, this Court has stated: During a routine traffic st

2009Damato, ¶9, 64 P.3d at 705 .

2014Id. at 665-666 . 5 [¶ 18] The court's analysis of the second prong of the test is particularly relevant: The second criterion we examine is the effect of the restriction on the child's right to bring his cause of action.

2012The United States Supreme Court has in some circumstances held that the burden is on the party asserting mootness to "establish that there is no reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated." Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 72 , 104 S.Ct. 373, 375 , 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983); see also Wilkinson v. Forst, 591 F.Supp. 403, 410 (D.Conn.1984) (defendant failed to meet mootness burden in challenge to expired court order requiring weapons search of persons attending KKK rally where defendant failed to show no reasonable likelihood of additional rallies).

2012The United States Supreme Court has in some circumstances held that the burden is on the party asserting mootness to "establish that there is no reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated." Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 72 , 104 S.Ct. 373, 375 , 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983); see also Wilkinson v. Forst, 591 F.Supp. 403, 410 (D.Conn.1984) (defendant failed to meet mootness burden in challenge to expired court order requiring weapons search of persons attending KKK rally where defendant failed to show no reasonable likelihood of additional rallies).

2011The reasonableness of a traffic stop is determined by applying a two-part analysis: (1) whether the initial stop was justified; and (2) whether the officer's actions during the detention were "reasonably related in scope to the cireum-stances that justified the interference in the first instance." Garvin, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d at 728 -29 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also Wallace, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d at 970 ; Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d at 705 . [¶10] With respect to the second prong of the analysis, this Court has stated: During a routine traffic st

2011The reasonableness of a traffic stop is determined by applying a two-part analysis: (1) whether the initial stop was justified; and (2) whether the officer's actions during the detention were "reasonably related in scope to the cireum-stances that justified the interference in the first instance." Garvin, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d at 728 -29 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also Wallace, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d at 970 ; Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d at 705 . [¶10] With respect to the second prong of the analysis, this Court has stated: During a routine traffic st

2011The reasonableness of a traffic stop is determined by applying a two-part analysis: (1) whether the initial stop was justified; and (2) whether the officer's actions during the detention were "reasonably related in scope to the cireum-stances that justified the interference in the first instance." Garvin, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d at 728 -29 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also Wallace, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d at 970 ; Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d at 705 . [¶10] With respect to the second prong of the analysis, this Court has stated: During a routine traffic st

2005In Hanesworth , we treated the issue as follows: *903 The purpose of the actual notice requirement is to satisfy the due process requisite stated in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. [ v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 , 108 S.Ct. 1340 , 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)] and established in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

2005In Hanesworth , we treated the issue as follows: *903 The purpose of the actual notice requirement is to satisfy the due process requisite stated in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. [ v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 , 108 S.Ct. 1340 , 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)] and established in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

2005In Hanesworth , we treated the issue as follows: *903 The purpose of the actual notice requirement is to satisfy the due process requisite stated in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. [ v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 , 108 S.Ct. 1340 , 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)] and established in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

2005In Hanesworth , we treated the issue as follows: *903 The purpose of the actual notice requirement is to satisfy the due process requisite stated in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. [ v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 , 108 S.Ct. 1340 , 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)] and established in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

2003Pole v. Trudeau, 516 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Minn.Ct.App.1994). [¶ 19] In the instant case, Centura, by its own admission, was not a blameless plaintiff, and it is at least questionable whether the ultimate loss, if Centura had purchased the certificate of purchase or redemption rights, would have had a “disastrous effect.” This is especially true since Centura had a potential remedy at law to recoup those funds if, in fact, the mistake was the fault of its attorneys. 'Centura’s negligence also prevents meeting the second prong of the test.

2000This second prong of the analysis depends on the three-party balancing test adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), which focuses on the private and public interests at stake as well as the degree of accuracy-enhancement that additional process would provide under the cireumstances.

2000This second prong of the analysis depends on the three-party balancing test adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), which focuses on the private and public interests at stake as well as the degree of accuracy-enhancement that additional process would provide under the cireumstances.