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14 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. McDonellgreen2 sentences1997See State v. McDonell, 550 N.W.2d 62, 63-64 (N.D.1996); Clinkscales, 536 N.W.2d at 664 ; Tweed, 491 N.W.2d at 415-17 . 1997See State v. McDonell , 550 N.W.2d 62, 63-64 (N.D. 1996); Clinkscales , 536 N.W.2d at 664 ; Tweed , 491 N.W.2d at 415-17 . | 2 | 2 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2008Lange , 522 N.W.2d at 181 .” In the context of guilty pleas, the second prong of the test is satisfied if the defendant shows “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152, ¶ 10 , 683 N.W.2d 891 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). [¶10] Patten contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he asked his trial attorney about raising an insanity defense to the charges, but his attorney talked him out of it. 2008Lange, 522 N.W.2d at 181 .” In the context of guilty pleas, the second prong of the test is satisfied if the defendant shows “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Ernst v. State, 2004 ND 152, ¶ 10 , 683 N.W.2d 891 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)). [¶ 10] Patten contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he asked his trial attorney about raising an insanity defense to the charges, but his attorney talked him out of i | 1 | 3 |
State v. McLaingreen2 sentences1991See State v. McLain, 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland test it is unnecessary to address both elements). 1991See State v. McLain, 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland test it is unnecessary to address both elements). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lindgreen1 sentence1986An arrest without a warrant is valid when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the arrested person committed a felony. § 29-06-15(1-6), N.D.C.C.; State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d 826, 833 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ernst v. State
green
2 sentences2008Lange , 522 N.W.2d at 181 .” In the context of guilty pleas, the second prong of the test is satisfied if the defendant shows “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152, ¶ 10 , 683 N.W.2d 891 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). [¶10] Patten contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he asked his trial attorney about raising an insanity defense to the charges, but his attorney talked him out of it. 2008Lange , 522 N.W.2d at 181 .” In the context of guilty pleas, the second prong of the test is satisfied if the defendant shows “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152, ¶ 10 , 683 N.W.2d 891 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). [¶10] Patten contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he asked his trial attorney about raising an insanity defense to the charges, but his attorney talked him out of it. | 3 | 2008–2018 |
State v. Thieling
green
2 sentences2014My reservation is with the application of the first part of the analysis concluding sufficient information existed for the warrant. [¶42] This Court has explained that conclusory statements are not sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant. “‘[S]ufficient information, rather than “bare bones” information must be presented to the magistrate’; ‘[a]n affidavit expressed in conclusions without detailing underlying information is insufficient for probable cause.’” State v. Thieling , 2000 ND 106, ¶ 11 , 611 N.W.2d 861 (quoting State v. Rangeloff , 1998 ND 135, ¶ 19 , 580 N.W.2d 593 ). [¶43 2014My reservation is with the application of the first part of the analysis concluding sufficient information existed for the warrant. [¶42] This Court has explained that conclusory statements are not sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant. “‘[S]ufficient information, rather than “bare bones” information must be presented to the magistrate’; ‘[a]n affidavit expressed in conclusions without detailing underlying information is insufficient for probable cause.’” State v. Thieling , 2000 ND 106, ¶ 11 , 611 N.W.2d 861 (quoting State v. Rangeloff , 1998 ND 135, ¶ 19 , 580 N.W.2d 593 ). [¶43 | 3 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Rangeloff
green
2 sentences2014My reservation is with the application of the first part of the analysis concluding sufficient information existed for the warrant. [¶42] This Court has explained that conclusory statements are not sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant. “‘[S]ufficient information, rather than “bare bones” information must be presented to the magistrate’; ‘[a]n affidavit expressed in conclusions without detailing underlying information is insufficient for probable cause.’” State v. Thieling , 2000 ND 106, ¶ 11 , 611 N.W.2d 861 (quoting State v. Rangeloff , 1998 ND 135, ¶ 19 , 580 N.W.2d 593 ). [¶43 2014My reservation is with the application of the first part of the analysis concluding sufficient information existed for the warrant. [¶42] This Court has explained that conclusory statements are not sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant. “‘[S]ufficient information, rather than “bare bones” information must be presented to the magistrate’; ‘[a]n affidavit expressed in conclusions without detailing underlying information is insufficient for probable cause.’” State v. Thieling , 2000 ND 106, ¶ 11 , 611 N.W.2d 861 (quoting State v. Rangeloff , 1998 ND 135, ¶ 19 , 580 N.W.2d 593 ). [¶43 | 3 | 2014–2014 |
Lange v. State
green
2 sentences2008Lange , 522 N.W.2d at 181 .” In the context of guilty pleas, the second prong of the test is satisfied if the defendant shows “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152, ¶ 10 , 683 N.W.2d 891 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). [¶10] Patten contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he asked his trial attorney about raising an insanity defense to the charges, but his attorney talked him out of it. 2008Lange, 522 N.W.2d at 181 .” In the context of guilty pleas, the second prong of the test is satisfied if the defendant shows “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Ernst v. State, 2004 ND 152, ¶ 10 , 683 N.W.2d 891 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)). [¶ 10] Patten contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he asked his trial attorney about raising an insanity defense to the charges, but his attorney talked him out of i | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Clinkscales
green
2 sentences1997See State v. McDonell, 550 N.W.2d 62, 63-64 (N.D.1996); Clinkscales, 536 N.W.2d at 664 ; Tweed, 491 N.W.2d at 415-17 . 1997See State v. McDonell , 550 N.W.2d 62, 63-64 (N.D. 1996); Clinkscales , 536 N.W.2d at 664 ; Tweed , 491 N.W.2d at 415-17 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Tweed
green
2 sentences1997See State v. McDonell, 550 N.W.2d 62, 63-64 (N.D.1996); Clinkscales, 536 N.W.2d at 664 ; Tweed, 491 N.W.2d at 415-17 . 1997See State v. McDonell , 550 N.W.2d 62, 63-64 (N.D. 1996); Clinkscales , 536 N.W.2d at 664 ; Tweed , 491 N.W.2d at 415-17 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Dominguez Benitez
green
2 sentences2018Lindsey , at ¶ 19 (relying on Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152 , ¶ 10, 683 N.W.2d 891 (other citations omitted) ). [¶ 30] In Bahtiraj v. State , 2013 ND 240 , ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605 , we stated: "A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74 , 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). 2018Lindsey , at ¶ 19 (relying on Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152 , ¶ 10, 683 N.W.2d 891 (other citations omitted) ). [¶ 30] In Bahtiraj v. State , 2013 ND 240 , ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605 , we stated: "A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74 , 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018Lindsey , at ¶ 19 (relying on Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152 , ¶ 10, 683 N.W.2d 891 (other citations omitted) ). [¶ 30] In Bahtiraj v. State , 2013 ND 240 , ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605 , we stated: "A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74 , 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). 2018Lindsey , at ¶ 19 (relying on Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152 , ¶ 10, 683 N.W.2d 891 (other citations omitted) ). [¶ 30] In Bahtiraj v. State , 2013 ND 240 , ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605 , we stated: "A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74 , 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bahtiraj v. State
green
2 sentences2018Lindsey , at ¶ 19 (relying on Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152 , ¶ 10, 683 N.W.2d 891 (other citations omitted) ). [¶ 30] In Bahtiraj v. State , 2013 ND 240 , ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605 , we stated: "A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74 , 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). 2018Lindsey , at ¶ 19 (relying on Ernst v. State , 2004 ND 152 , ¶ 10, 683 N.W.2d 891 (other citations omitted) ). [¶ 30] In Bahtiraj v. State , 2013 ND 240 , ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605 , we stated: "A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74 , 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Asbach
green
2 sentences2016State v. Asbach , 2015 ND 280, ¶ 16 , 871 N.W.2d 820 . (footnote: 0) [¶14] This Court previously concluded that the second prong of the test was satisfied in this case by holding there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that the evidence would have been discovered without the unlawful activity. 2016State v. Asbach , 2015 ND 280, ¶ 16 , 871 N.W.2d 820 . (footnote: 0) [¶14] This Court previously concluded that the second prong of the test was satisfied in this case by holding there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that the evidence would have been discovered without the unlawful activity. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Abdi v. State
green
2 sentences2004However, to satisfy the second prong of the test, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366 ; Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 29 , 608 N.W.2d 292 . 1. 2004However, to satisfy the second prong of the test, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366 ; Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 29 , 608 N.W.2d 292 . 1. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jaskoviak v. Gruver
green
1 sentence2004The second prong of the test requires a determination of “whether the risk is the type of harm which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding on medical treatment.” Jaskoviak, 2002 ND 1, ¶ 18 , 638 N.W.2d 1 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jaskoviak v. Gruver
green
1 sentence2004The second prong of the test requires a determination of “whether the risk is the type of harm which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding on medical treatment.” Jaskoviak, 2002 ND 1, ¶ 18 , 638 N.W.2d 1 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ceartin v. Ochs
green
2 sentences1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmore Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appe 1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appea | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Otter Tail Power Co. v. Demchuk
green
2 sentences1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmore Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appe 1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appea | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Brown v. Will
green
2 sentences1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmore Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appe 1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appea | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Wells County Water Resource District v. Solberg
green
2 sentences1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmore Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appe 1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appea | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Regstad v. Steffes
green
2 sentences1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmore Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appe 1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appea | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Gissel v. Kenmare Township
green
2 sentences1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmore Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appe 1994Not only do we require Rule 54(b) certification for appeals of orders for partial summary judgment, Ceartin v. Ochs, 479 N.W.2d 863 , 865-66 n. 2 (N.D.1992); Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.1990); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Brown v. Will, 388 N.W.2d 869 (N.D.1986), but traditionally, we have also relied on the second prong of this test when determining the appealability of eminent domain cases after a finding of use and necessity, but prior to a determination of damages, Wells County Water Resource Dist. v. Solberg, 434 N.W.2d 577 (N.D.1989) (dismissed appea | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.