81 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it "weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability." Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State , 678 So.2d 309 , 315 (Fla. 1996) ( Jones I ) ). 2016Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it “weakens the. case against [the .defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.” Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla.1996)). | 7 | 8 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2018In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the trial court must "consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible," and must "evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial." Jones v. State , 591 So.2d 911 , 916 (Fla. 1991). 1999We further find that the PET-scan claim, even if it were not procedurally barred, does not meet the second prong of the test in Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla.1991), for admission of newly discovered evidence. | 5 | 8 |
Heath v. Stategreen2 sentences2018“Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it ‘weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.’ ” Henry v. State, 125 So. 3d 745, 750 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1023-24 (Fla. 2009)). 2018"Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it 'weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.' " Henry v. State , 125 So.3d 745 , 750 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Heath v. State , 3 So.3d 1017 , 1023-24 (Fla. 2009) ). | 5 | 5 |
Henry v. Stategreen2 sentences2018“Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it ‘weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.’ ” Henry v. State, 125 So. 3d 745, 750 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1023-24 (Fla. 2009)). 2018"Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it 'weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.' " Henry v. State , 125 So.3d 745 , 750 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Heath v. State , 3 So.3d 1017 , 1023-24 (Fla. 2009) ). | 3 | 3 |
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenaisgreen2 sentences2024If the complaint contains sufficient allegations to establish that Florida's long- arm statute applies, the court then conducts the second prong of the inquiry, determining whether the defendant has ‘sufficient minimum contacts’ with Florida to satisfy constitutional due process concerns.”); Rebolledo v. Chaffardet, 351 So. 3d 84 , 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“The initial inquiry is whether ‘the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute; and if it does, the next inquiry is whether sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ are demonstrat 2013In its order, the court also found that the plaintiff failed to establish long-arm jurisdiction. 1 In light of our holding that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for torts occurring in Florida, the court should conduct the second prong of the analysis described in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989), if the defendant files an affidavit refuting the complaint’s allegations or raising an issue of minimum contacts. | 2 | 5 |
Swafford v. Stategreen2 sentences2017In determining whether a new trial is warranted, the reviewing court "must consider the effect of the newly discovered evidence, in addition to all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial." Hildwin v. State , 141 So.3d 1178 , 1184 (Fla. 2014) (citing Swafford v. State , 125 So.3d 760 , 775-76 (Fla. 2013) ). 2017In determining whether a new trial is warranted, the reviewing court “must consider the effect of the newly discovered evidence, in addition to all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial.” -7- Hildwin v. State, 141 So. 3d 1178, 1184 (Fla. 2014) (citing Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d 760, 775-76 (Fla. 2013)). | 2 | 2 |
Paul Christopher Hildwin v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2017In determining whether a new trial is warranted, the reviewing court "must consider the effect of the newly discovered evidence, in addition to all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial." Hildwin v. State , 141 So.3d 1178 , 1184 (Fla. 2014) (citing Swafford v. State , 125 So.3d 760 , 775-76 (Fla. 2013) ). 2017In determining whether a new trial is warranted, the reviewing court “must consider the effect of the newly discovered evidence, in addition to all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial.” -7- Hildwin v. State, 141 So. 3d 1178, 1184 (Fla. 2014) (citing Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d 760, 775-76 (Fla. 2013)). | 2 | 2 |
Walton v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Duckett v. State, 148 So.3d 1163, 1167-68 (Fla.2014) (quoting Walton v. State, 3 So.3d 1000, 1008 (Fla.2009)). 2014Walton v. State, 3 So.3d 1000, 1008 (Fla.2009). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Gilberto Redondo-Lemosgreen2 sentences1996See U.S. v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir.1992) (“It is not enough for the court to be convinced that the prosecutor’s enforcement decisions have a discriminatory effect; it must also find that the prosecutor was motivated by a discriminatory purpose in the very case before it.”). 1996See U.S. v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir.1992) ("It is not enough for the court to be convinced that the prosecutor's enforcement decisions have a discriminatory effect; it must also find that the prosecutor was motivated by a discriminatory purpose in the very case before it."). | 2 | 2 |
Minnis v. Jacksongreen2 sentences1993As to the second prong of the test, the information was concealed from counsel, as a result of which counsel lost "the right to make an intelligent judgment as to whether a juror should be challenged...." Minnis v. Jackson, 330 So.2d 847, 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). 1991As to the second prong of the test, the information was concealed from counsel, as a result of which counsel lost "the right to make an intelligent judgment as to whether a juror should be challenged... ." Minnis v. Jackson, 330 So.2d 847, 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt - 11 - as to his culpability.” Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones I, 678 So. 2d at 315). 2018Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it "weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability." Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State , 678 So.2d 309 , 315 (Fla. 1996) ( Jones I ) ). | 1 | 12 |
Rolling v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 287 (Fla. 1997). 2011“The second prong of the analysis requires the trial court to examine the extent of difficulty in actually selecting an impartial jury at voir dire.” Rolling, 695 So.2d at 285 . | 1 | 3 |
Menendez v. Progressive Express Insurance Co.green2 sentences2024See Devon Neighborhood Ass'n, 67 So. 3d at 197 ("Because we have reached this conclusion under prong 1 In Cantens, the Third District mischaracterized Menendez as having concluded that the statute in that case "evinced a clear expression of legislative intent to apply retroactively" "because" the statute at issue "applied to 'any action.' " 388 So. 3d at 244 (citing Menendez, 35 So. 3d at 877 ). 2014Bernard contends that Devon Neighborhood Association supports her argument that the 2010 definition of “covered claim” applies in this case because, in the course of its analysis, the Court cited Menendez v. Progressive Express Insurance Co., 35 So.3d 873 (Fla.2010), for the proposition that “the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.” Devon Neighborhood Association, 67 So.3d at 195 n. 7 (internal quotation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Rimmer v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 316 . 2016Although I conclude that there is no need to reach the second prong of the test for suppression of an out-of-court identification, see Fitzpatrick, 900 So.2d at 518 (“If the procedures used by the police in obtaining the out-of-court identification were not unnecessarily suggestive, however, the court need not consider the second part of the test.” (citing Rimmer, 825 So.2d at 316 )), I would note that the majority’s analysis of this prong relies on several factual inaccuracies. | 1 | 2 |
Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Devon Neighborhood Ass'ngreen2 sentences2024See Devon Neighborhood Ass'n, 67 So. 3d at 197 ("Because we have reached this conclusion under prong 1 In Cantens, the Third District mischaracterized Menendez as having concluded that the statute in that case "evinced a clear expression of legislative intent to apply retroactively" "because" the statute at issue "applied to 'any action.' " 388 So. 3d at 244 (citing Menendez, 35 So. 3d at 877 ). 2014The Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision, “agree[ing] with FIGA ... that the district court misapplied this precedent in analyzing the question of retroactivity based solely on the second prong of the test.” Id. at 194 . | 1 | 2 |
Fitzpatrick v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Although I conclude that there is no need to reach the second prong of the test for suppression of an out-of-court identification, see Fitzpatrick, 900 So. 2d at 518 (“If the procedures used by the police in obtaining the out-of-court identification were not unnecessarily suggestive, however, the court need not consider the second part of the test.” (citing Rimmer, 852 So. 2d at 316)), I would note that the majority’s analysis of this prong relies on several factual inaccuracies. 2016Although I conclude that there is no need to reach the second prong of the test for suppression of an out-of-court identification, see Fitzpatrick, 900 So.2d at 518 (“If the procedures used by the police in obtaining the out-of-court identification were not unnecessarily suggestive, however, the court need not consider the second part of the test.” (citing Rimmer, 825 So.2d at 316 )), I would note that the majority’s analysis of this prong relies on several factual inaccuracies. | 1 | 2 |
Wendel v. Wendelgreen1 sentence2024"Before imputing income, the trial court must consider evidence concerning the party's recent work history, occupational qualifications, and the prevailing earnings in the industry in which the party works." Roth v. Roth, 973 So. 2d 580, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Wendel v. Wendel, 852 So. 2d 277, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Roth v. Rothgreen1 sentence2024"Before imputing income, the trial court must consider evidence concerning the party's recent work history, occupational qualifications, and the prevailing earnings in the industry in which the party works." Roth v. Roth, 973 So. 2d 580, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Wendel v. Wendel, 852 So. 2d 277, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Cabal v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt - 11 - as to his culpability.” Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones I, 678 So. 2d at 315). | 1 | 1 |
| Dixon v. DEPT. OF ADMIN. DIV. OF RETIREMENTgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maas Bros. v. Peogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pridgeon v. STATE DIV. OF RETIREMENTgreen | 1 | 1 |
| James Aren Duckett v. State of Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Floyd v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Provenzano v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hatfield v. AutoNation, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Leonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Banks v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Championgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gorday v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Miami v. Murphygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Friends of Everglades, Inc. v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUNDgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Austin v. Town of Oviedogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stomar, Inc. v. Lucky Seven Riverboat Company, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hartcourt Companies, Inc. v. Hoguegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Regan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reese v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Frazier v. Fraziergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2003Under the second prong of the test, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 2003Under the second prong of the test, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . | 4 | 2000–2003 |
Cruz v. State
green
2 sentences1993Cruz, 465 So.2d at 521-522 . 1988Second, the police "utilize[d] means reasonably tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing criminal activity," Cruz, 465 So.2d at 522 , thereby satisfying the second prong of the test. | 4 | 1986–1993 |
Wiggins v. Sadow
green
2 sentences2018Wiggins v. Sadow , 925 So.2d 1152 , 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). 2018Wiggins v. Sadow , 925 So.2d 1152 , 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. KAW
green
2 sentences2016The second prong of the rule then calls for a determination of whether the matter in which Lima and the Ferraro firm represent the plaintiff in this lawsuit against PM is the “same or substantially related to the matter in which it represented the former client.” K.A.W., 575 So.2d at 633 . 1996NOTES [1] Garner also filed a Petition to Dismiss the Emergency Temporary Guardianship as fraudulent; that action remains pending in the circuit court. [2] At the hearing, the court commented: "I still say I need some testimony to indicate to me what was said...." [3] It is not disputed that the second prong of the test is metthat "the matter in which the law firm subsequently represented the interest adverse to the former client was the same or substantially related to the matter in which it represented the former client." State Farm, 575 So.2d at 633 . | 2 | 1996–2016 |
Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida
green
2 sentences2014However, later in the opinion, the First District noted that in discussing the second prong of the test, the supreme court in Chiles stated that “the legislature must demonstrate that the funds are available from no other possible reasonable source.” Id. at 893 (quoting Chiles, 615 So.2d at 673 ). 2013We recognize that in discussing the second prong of the test set forth above, the Court stated that “the legislature must demonstrate that the funds are available from no other possible reasonable source.” Id. at 673 . | 2 | 2013–2014 |
State v. Parrish
green
2 sentences1996The second prong of the test requires the defendant to “demonstrate discriminatory purpose” by establishing that “(1) he was singled out for prosecution although the government was aware that others had violated the law, and (2) the government had followed unusual discretionary procedures in deciding to prosecute.” Parrish, 567 So.2d at 467 . 1996The second prong of the test requires the defendant to "demonstrate discriminatory purpose" by establishing that "(1) he was singled out for prosecution although the government was aware that others had violated the law, and (2) the government had followed unusual discretionary procedures in deciding to prosecute." Parrish, 567 So.2d at 467 . | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Hill v. Lockhart
green
1 sentence2024The Court then explained that the second prong of the test requires that a defendant show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Manson v. Brathwaite
green
1 sentence2023Fitzpatrick, 900 So. 2d at 518 . - 13 - In sum, an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is impermissibly suggestive if the resulting out-of-court identification is unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. 5 Reliability “is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony . . . .” Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
HALIFAX HOSP. MED. CENT. v. News-Journal
green
1 sentence2018In Halifax, the exemption was overbroad because it created a “categorical exemption,” which was undefined, thus allowing it to include more information than necessary to accomplish the exemption’s purpose. 724 So. 2d at 570 (quoting the lower court’s order). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Chambers v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2018While the first, third, and fourth prongs of the Chambers test seem to favor Payton's position that the statement should have been admitted into evidence, the second prong of the test weighs heavily against its admission. 410 U.S. at 300 -01 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 . 2018While the first, third, and fourth prongs of the Chambers test seem to favor Payton's position that the statement should have been admitted into evidence, the second prong of the test weighs heavily against its admission. 410 U.S. at 300 -01 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lucien D. Dort v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2018Similarly, the fourth prong of the Dort test also militates against the admission of Bicknas' statement. 175 So.3d at 840 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Sandin v. Conner green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Johnston v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Plymel v. Moore green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Williams v. Tucker green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Headley v. City of Miami green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Marek v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Waterhouse v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Foster v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Grosvenor v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Gordon v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Laquila Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Saffor v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Kight v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Kansas v. Hendricks green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| United States v. Ward green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| St. Johns County v. NE Fla. Builders Ass'n, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ritsi v. Ritsi green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Ritsi v. Ritsi neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Stromberg v. California green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Herrera v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Grady v. Corbin red | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Cabell v. Chavez-Salido green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.