second prong test in Pennsylvania

2019Commonwealth v. Collins, 545 A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1988).

2019Commonwealth v. Collins, 545 A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1988).

2018In order to prove the second prong of this test ("the Pierce standard"), the "reasonable basis" prong, a petitioner must prove that "an alternative not ' chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued." Hutchison, 25 A.3d at 285 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa 2006).

2016In order to prove the second prong of this test ("the Pierce standard"), the "reasonable basis" prong, a petitioner must prove that "an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued." Hutchison, 25 A.3d at 285 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006).

2002Id. at 469 , 756 A.2d at 1123 (citations omitted). ¶ 6 If the appellate court agrees with the trial court’s determination that there were no prejudicial mistakes at trial, then a decision by the trial court to deny a new trial must stand and we need not reach the second prong of the analysis.

2002Id. at 469 , 756 A.2d at 1123 (citations omitted). ¶ 6 If the appellate court agrees with the trial court’s determination that there were no prejudicial mistakes at trial, then a decision by the trial court to deny a new trial must stand and we need not reach the second prong of the analysis.

2022Finally, “irreparable loss” for purposes of the third prong is a loss that is not “fully remediable after final judgment.” Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 A.3d 306, 313 (Pa. 2015).

2022Finally, “irreparable loss” for purposes of the third prong is a loss that is not “fully remediable after final judgment.” Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 A.3d 306, 313 (Pa. 2015).

2015Commonwealth v. Zook, 585 Pa. 11, 26 , 887 A.2d 1218, 1227 (2005).

2015Commonwealth v. Zook, 585 Pa. 11, 26 , 887 A.2d 1218, 1227 (2005).

2020With respect to the second prong of the standard, a “serious medical need” exists if a respondent’s act or omission results in “the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).

2017With respect to the second prong of the standard, a “serious medical need” exists if a prison official’s act or omission results in “the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970).

2022The second prong of the doctrine – “the right involved is too important to be denied review" – is satisfied if “the interests that would go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the final order rule.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 782 (Pa. 2014).

2022The second prong of the doctrine – “the right involved is too important to be denied review" – is satisfied if “the interests that would go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the final order rule.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 782 (Pa. 2014).

2023In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).

2012In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super.2010).

2022For the second prong of the standard, a party must demonstrate that counsel’s strategy was “so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen that course of conduct.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 541 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).

2020With respect to the second prong of the standard, a party must demonstrate that counsel's I strategy was "so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen that course of conduct." Common_wealth v. Chmiel. 889 A.2d 501, 541 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).

2020With respect to the second prong of the standard, a “serious medical need” exists if a respondent’s act or omission results in “the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).

2017With respect to the second prong of the standard, a “serious medical need” exists if a prison official’s act or omission results in “the denial of ‘the 4 minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).

2019See Cheyney , 743 A.2d at 413 (noting that a reviewing court only moves on to the second prong of the test "if the issue is embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator"); see also Pa. Tpk.

2007Cheyney University, 743 A.2d at 417-18 (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting).

2015With respect to the second prong of the test, this Court has noted that “[o]ne who is under no legal obligation or liability to pay a debt and who has no interest in, or relation to, the property is a stranger or volunteer with reference to the subject of subrogation.” First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

2015With respect to the second prong of the test, this Court has noted that “[o]ne who is under no legal obligation or liability to pay a debt and who has no interest in, or relation to, the property is a stranger or volunteer with reference to the subject of subrogation,” First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153, 1159 (Pa.Super.2004) (citation omitted).

2015Citing this Court’s decisions in Carr, Heller, and Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 332 (Pa. Super. 1943), Therese contends that BOA failed to satisfy the aforementioned requirements and, as such, the trial court erred in granting equitable subrogation. -6- J-A24038-15 In Crouse, this Court reviewed the claim of a creditor to whom the homeowners had applied for a loan to pay various earlier liens on the property.

2015Citing this Court’s decisions in Carr, Heller, and Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 151 Pa.Super. 259 , 30 A.2d 330, 332 (1943), Therese contends that BOA failed to satisfy the aforementioned requirements and, as such, the trial court erred in granting equitable subrogation.

1982As to the second prong of the test the magistrate must consider four factors: “(1) Did the informant give prior reliable information? (2) Was the informant’s story corroborated by any other source? (3) Were the informant’s statements a declaration against interest? (4) Does the defendant’s reputation support the informant’s tip?” Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa.Super. 381, 386 , 310 A.2d 347, 350 (1973) quoted approvingly in In re Burton, 259 Pa.Super. 20, 23 , 393 A.2d 696 (1978).

1982As to the second prong of the test the magistrate must consider four factors: “(1) Did the informant give prior reliable information? (2) Was the informant’s story corroborated by any other source? (3) Were the informant’s statements a declaration against interest? (4) Does the defendant’s reputation support the informant’s tip?” Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa.Super. 381, 386 , 310 A.2d 347, 350 (1973) quoted approvingly in In re Burton, 259 Pa.Super. 20, 23 , 393 A.2d 696 (1978).

2015If the intent is civil and non- punitive, however, the second prong of the test applies, requiring an examination of “whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the legislature’s] intent to deem it civil.” Perez, 97 A.3d at 751 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 ). 8 The United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), mandated a seven-factor test to be applied in determining whether the effects of a statute are sufficiently punitive to override the legislature's preferred categorization.

2014If the intént is civil and non-punitive the second prong of the test applies, which requires examining “whether the statute is ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [Congress’s] intention to deem it civil.’ ” Id. (quoting Smith, 588 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 ) (alteration in original).

2025Regarding the second prong of the analysis, the Court went on to state that courts must “assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id. at 26 , 142 S.Ct. at 2131 .

2025Regarding the second prong of the analysis, the Court went on to state that courts must “assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id. at 26, 142 S.Ct. at 2131.

2020See id. at 794 (“The relevant word that we must analyze with respect to determining whether [the d]rivers satisfied the second prong of the test is ‘independent.’ … It is the word ‘independently’ that engenders the instant dispute between the parties ...”).

2006The court stressed that “[t]he relevant word that we must analyze with respect to determining whether Drivers satisfied the second prong of the test is ‘independent.’” Viktor, 586 Pa. at 218 , 892 A.2d at 794 .

1993The second prong of the analysis mandates an evaluation of whether the statute is reasonably related to accomplishing the ar ticulated state interest or interests.” 400 Pa. Super. at 30-31 , 582 A.2d at 1328 . (citations omitted; emphasis in original) Applying that analysis to the statute mandating license suspension upon conviction of underage drinking, even though unrelated to motor vehicles, the Superior Court found that there was a sufficient and legitimate state interest in imposing the license suspension as an additional penalty to the conviction for the summary offense.

1993The second prong of the analysis mandates an evaluation of whether the statute is reasonably related to accomplishing the ar ticulated state interest or interests.” 400 Pa. Super. at 30-31 , 582 A.2d at 1328 . (citations omitted; emphasis in original) Applying that analysis to the statute mandating license suspension upon conviction of underage drinking, even though unrelated to motor vehicles, the Superior Court found that there was a sufficient and legitimate state interest in imposing the license suspension as an additional penalty to the conviction for the summary offense.

2011Bd. of Review, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 379 , 631 A.2d 1384, 1388 (1993).

2011Bd. of Review, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 379 , 631 A.2d 1384, 1388 (1993).

1983The second prong of this test pertains to the credibility of the informant or the reliability of the information. 4 In deciding whether this prong has been met, there are four factors to be considered: “(1) Did the informant give prior reliable information? (2) Was the informant’s story corroborated by any other source? (3) Were the informant’s statements a declaration against interest? (4) Does the defendant’s reputation support the informant’s tip?” Commonwealth v. Archer, 238 Pa.Super. 103, 108 , 352 A.2d 483, 486 (1975).

1983The second prong of this test pertains to the credibility of the informant or the reliability of the information. 4 In deciding whether this prong has been met, there are four factors to be considered: “(1) Did the informant give prior reliable information? (2) Was the informant’s story corroborated by any other source? (3) Were the informant’s statements a declaration against interest? (4) Does the defendant’s reputation support the informant’s tip?” Commonwealth v. Archer, 238 Pa.Super. 103, 108 , 352 A.2d 483, 486 (1975).