second prong test in Washington

2021McCarty, 140 Wn.2d at 425 . 6 No. 79348-9-I/7 However, if the required elements cannot be found, or even fairly implied, in the charging document, we do not reach the second prong of the test.

2021McCarty, 140 Wn.2d at 425 . 6 No. 79348-9-I/7 However, if the required elements cannot be found, or even fairly implied, in the charging document, we do not reach the second prong of the test.

1999The second prong of this test is met by showing that there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

1999The second prong of this test is met by showing that there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2001If the first prong is satisfied, the court in applying the second prong of the test "may look beyond the face of the charging document to determine if the accused actually received notice of the charges he or she must have been prepared to defend against." Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 106 , 812 P.2d 86 .

2001If the first prong is satisfied, the court in applying the second prong of the test “may look beyond the face of the charging document to determine if the accused actually received notice of the charges he or she must have been prepared to defend against.” Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 106 .

2016In Wise and [State v.] Paumier[, 176 Wn.2d 29 , 288 P.3d 1126 (2012)], we clearly state that the trial court’s in-chambers questioning of potential jurors is structural error.

2016In Wise and [State v.] Paumier[, 176 Wn.2d 29 , 288 P.3d 1126 (2012)], we clearly state that the trial court’s in-chambers questioning of potential jurors is structural error.

2025State v. Pry, 194 Wn.2d 745 , 753, 452 P.3d 536 (2019).

2025State v. Pry, 194 Wn.2d 745 , 753, 452 P.3d 536 (2019).

2024The second prong of the test requires the defendant to show that “counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the -6- No. 83195-0-I/7 proceeding would have been different.” McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335 .

2021McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 333-34 .

2018“It would be error to give an instruction not supported by the evidence.” State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 546 , 947 P.2d 700 (1997).

1999The first prong of the test is referred to as the “legal prong” and the second prong of the test is referred *887 to as the “factual prong.” Berlin, 133 Wn.2d at 546 .

2015Sansone, 127 Wn.

2015Sansone, 127 Wn.

2014In [State v.] Wise[, 176 Wn.2d 1 , 288 P.3d 1113 (2012)] and [State v.] Paumier, [ 176 Wn.2d 29 , 288 P.3d 1126 (2012),] we clearly state that a trial court’s in-chambers questioning of potential jurors is structural error.

2014In [State v.] Wise[, 176 Wn.2d 1 , 288 P.3d 1113 (2012)] and [State v.] Paumier, [ 176 Wn.2d 29 , 288 P.3d 1126 (2012),] we clearly state that a trial court’s in-chambers questioning of potential jurors is structural error.

2014LaPlant, 157 Wn.

2014LaPlant, 157 Wn.

2014The second prong of the test is the " logic" prong, which requires us to determine "' whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. ' Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 73 ( quoting Press -Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 , 106 S. Ct. 2735 , 92 L.

2014The second prong of the test is the " logic" prong, which requires us to determine "` whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. "' Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 73 ( quoting Press -Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 , 106 S. 5 Although only four justices signed the lead opinion in Sublett, Justice Stephens' s concurrence created amajority who adopted the " experience and logic" test. 176 Wn.2d at 136 ( Stephens, J., concurring).

2010"The burden is on the party challenging the classification to show that it is purely arbitrary." Thorne, 129 Wash.2d at 771 , 921 P.2d 514 . ¶ 11 Langstead's argument is under the second prong of the test.

2010“The burden is on the party challenging the classification to show that it is purely arbitrary.” Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 771 . ¶11 Langstead’s argument is under the second prong of the test.

2010The issue he presents is whether reasonable grounds exist to distinguish between recidivists whose prior convictions are treated as aggravators for purposes of sentencing, and other recidivists for whom a prior conviction is treated as an element of the current offense. ¶ 12 Langstead bases his argument on the facts of State v. Roswell, 165 Wash.2d 186, 192 , 196 P.3d 705 (2008).

2010The issue he presents is whether reasonable grounds exist to distinguish between recidivists whose prior convictions are treated as aggravators for purposes of sentencing, and other recidivists for whom a prior conviction is treated as an element of the current offense. ¶12 Langstead bases his argument on the facts of State v. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d 186, 192 , 196 P.3d 705 (2008).

2010The issue he presents is whether reasonable grounds exist to distinguish between recidivists whose prior convictions are treated as aggravators for purposes of sentencing, and other recidivists for whom a prior conviction is treated as an element of the current offense. ¶ 12 Langstead bases his argument on the facts of State v. Roswell, 165 Wash.2d 186, 192 , 196 P.3d 705 (2008).

2010The issue he presents is whether reasonable grounds exist to distinguish between recidivists whose prior convictions are treated as aggravators for purposes of sentencing, and other recidivists for whom a prior conviction is treated as an element of the current offense. ¶12 Langstead bases his argument on the facts of State v. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d 186, 192 , 196 P.3d 705 (2008).

2009Gardner, 128 Wash.2d at 941 , 913 P.2d 377 .

2009Gardner, 128 Wn.2d at 941 .

2008Jack Oltman did not book the cruise until 13 days before the ship sailed. 14 ¶41 Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 785 , 829 N.E.2d 1171 (2005), on which the Oltmans heavily rely, is distinguishable.

2008Jack Oltman did not book the cruise until 13 days before the ship sailed. 14 ¶41 Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 785 , 829 N.E.2d 1171 (2005), on which the Oltmans heavily rely, is distinguishable.

2008However, "`[w]hen our rulers worry about our health, we should worry about our liberty.'" Joseph Sobran, The Wanderer 5 (June 26, 1997), quoted in Seeley v. State, 132 Wash.2d 776, 814 , 940 P.2d 604 (1997) (Sanders, J., dissenting). ś 121 Under the second prong of the test, we look to the necessity of the action to achieve that legitimate public purpose.

2008However, “ ‘[w]hen our rulers worry about our health, we should worry about our liberty.’ ” Joseph Sobran, The Wanderer 5 (June 26, 1997), quoted in Seeley v. State, 132 Wn.2d 776, 814 , 940 P.2d 604 (1997) (Sanders, J., dissenting). ¶120 Under the second prong of the test, we look to the necessity of the action to achieve that legitimate public purpose.

2008However, "`[w]hen our rulers worry about our health, we should worry about our liberty.'" Joseph Sobran, The Wanderer 5 (June 26, 1997), quoted in Seeley v. State, 132 Wash.2d 776, 814 , 940 P.2d 604 (1997) (Sanders, J., dissenting). ś 121 Under the second prong of the test, we look to the necessity of the action to achieve that legitimate public purpose.

2008However, “ ‘[w]hen our rulers worry about our health, we should worry about our liberty.’ ” Joseph Sobran, The Wanderer 5 (June 26, 1997), quoted in Seeley v. State, 132 Wn.2d 776, 814 , 940 P.2d 604 (1997) (Sanders, J., dissenting). ¶120 Under the second prong of the test, we look to the necessity of the action to achieve that legitimate public purpose.

2007Vallandigham, 154 Wn.2d at 33 . ¶19 In addressing the second prong of the test, the court disapproved of two Court of Appeals cases that considered whether the steps the employer took to prevent injury were reasonable and whether they were effective.

2007Vallandigham, 154 Wash.2d at 33 , 109 P.3d 805 . ¶ 19 In addressing the second prong of the test, the court disapproved of two Court of Appeals cases that considered whether the steps the employer took to prevent injury were reasonable and whether they were effective.

2007Vallandigham, 154 Wn.2d at 35 (citing Hope v. Larry’s Mkts., 108 Wn.

2007Vallandigham, 154 Wash.2d at 35 , 109 P.3d 805 (citing Hope v. Larry's Mkts., 108 Wash.App. 185, 195 , 29 P.3d 1268 (2001); Stenger v. Stanwood Sch.

2006Lavery, 154 Wn.2d at 255-56 ; Morley, 134 Wn.2d at 606 . 2.

2006Lavery, 154 Wash.2d at 255-56 , 111 P.3d 837 ; Morley, 134 Wash.2d at 606 , 952 P.2d 167 . 2.

2006Lavery, 154 Wn.2d at 255-56 ; Morley, 134 Wn.2d at 606 . 2.

2006Lavery, 154 Wash.2d at 255-56 , 111 P.3d 837 ; Morley, 134 Wash.2d at 606 , 952 P.2d 167 . 2.

2006App. 422, 442 , 16 P.3d 664 (2001). ¶54 If the elements of the foreign crime are not substantially similar to the analogous Washington crime, or if the foreign law is broader than Washington’s definition of a particular crime, the sentencing court may also look to factual comparability, the second prong of the test.

2006State v. Russell, 104 Wash.App. 422, 442 , 16 P.3d 664 (2001). ¶ 54 If the elements of the foreign crime are not substantially similar to the analogous Washington crime, or if the foreign law is broader than Washington's definition of a particular crime, the sentencing court may also look to factual comparability, the second prong of the test.

2001But, “[a]pplying the first prong of the Kjorsvik test, the court looks at the face of the document only.” State v. Franks, 105 Wn.

2001But, "[a]pplying the first prong of the Kjorsvik test, the court looks at the face of the document only." State v. Franks, 105 Wash.App. 950, 957 , 22 P.3d 269 (2001).

2000To meet the second prong of the test, the defendant must show that “but for the ineffective assistance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.” Bowerman, 115 Wn.2d at 808 .

2000To meet the second prong of the test, the defendant must show that, "but for the ineffective assistance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different." Bowerman, 115 Wash.2d at 808 , 802 P.2d 116 .

2000In this case, the statute itself is silent as to this point, but this court "can assume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action...." Bennett, 113 Wash.2d at 919 , 784 P.2d 1258 (quoting McNeal, 95 Wash.2d at 274 , 621 P.2d 1285 ).

2000In this case, the statute itself is silent as to this point, but this court “can assume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action . . . .” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 919 (quoting McNeal, 95 Wn.2d at 277 ).

2000In this case, the statute itself is silent as to this point, but this court "can assume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action...." Bennett, 113 Wash.2d at 919 , 784 P.2d 1258 (quoting McNeal, 95 Wash.2d at 274 , 621 P.2d 1285 ).

2000In this case, the statute itself is silent as to this point, but this court “can assume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action . . . .” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 919 (quoting McNeal, 95 Wn.2d at 277 ).