second prong test (New Jersey) · Go Syfert
← New Jersey issues

second prong test in New Jersey

80 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 34 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (24)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Fritzgreen
nj · 1987 · cited in 5 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2002–2024
2 sentences

2024See Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (citation omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 . [Ibid. (citations reformatted).] The Court further observed, [t]he notion that a defendant can enter a plea of guilty, while maintaining his innocence, is foreign to our state jurisprudence.

2009Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced (he defense.*’ [Id. at 52, 519 A.2d 336 (quoting Strickland, supra, 166 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 ).] To satisfy the second prong of the standard, a defendant “must show that there is ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

45
Silver v. Silvergreen
njsuperctappdiv · 2006 · cited in 15 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2020–2026
2 sentences

2026While the second prong inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)][(7)], to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 . "[T]he Legislature did not intend that the commission of one of the enumerated predicate acts of domestic violence automatically mandates the entry of a domestic violence restraining order." Id. at 126-27 .

2026While the second prong inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)][(7)], to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 . "[T]he Legislature did not intend that the commission of one of the enumerated predicate acts of domestic violence automatically mandates the entry of a domestic violence restraining order." Id. at 126-27 .

315
State v. Nashgreen
nj · 2013 · cited in 3 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2021–2022
2 sentences

2021The judge also found that defendant did not satisfy the second prong of the test which requires that "the new evidence must have been discovered after completion of trial and must not have been discoverable earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 550 (2013) (quoting Ways, 180 N.J. at 192 ).

2021The judge also found that defendant did not satisfy the second prong of the test which requires that "the new evidence must have been discovered after completion of trial and must not have been discoverable earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 550 (2013) (quoting Ways, 180 N.J. at 192 ).

33
State v. Williamsgreen
nj · 2007 · cited in 3 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2018–2021
2 sentences

2021Therefore, it "need not receive universal application in Rule 404(b) disputes." State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131 (2007).

2021Rules of Evidence, cmt. 8b on N.J.R.E. 404(b) (2020) (quoting State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131 (2007)).

33
Strickland v. Washingtongreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 6 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2000–2024
2 sentences

2021We see no reason to disturb his conclusions rejecting those arguments, particularly that defendant failed to meet the second prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) by showing the alleged errors A-3814-18 6 would have impacted the outcome of a trial.2 There is insufficient importance to defendant's claims to conclude "there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits." Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 580 .

2018Defendant was asked only twice about her desire not to be present, and the PCR judge found the trial court did not meet its obligation "to question defendants about their understanding of the nature and consequences of their absence from the trial." Ultimately, the PCR judge found although trial counsel's incomplete advice regarding defendant's absence from trial rendered her assistance ineffective, defendant did not satisfy the second prong of the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

26
State v. Osoriogreen
nj · 2009 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025If the party exercising the peremptory strike satisfies its burden under the second prong of the analysis, then the trial court must weigh the prima facie case A-0839-22 16 against the exercising party's rebuttal "to determine whether the [opposing party] has carried the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [striking party] exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionally[] impermissible grounds of presumed group bias." Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 539 ; Osorio, 199 N.J. at 492-93, 506 .

2025If the party exercising the peremptory strike satisfies its burden under the second prong of the analysis, then the trial court must weigh the prima facie case A-0839-22 16 against the exercising party's rebuttal "to determine whether the [opposing party] has carried the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [striking party] exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionally[] impermissible grounds of presumed group bias." Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 539 ; Osorio, 199 N.J. at 492-93, 506 .

22
In Re the Guardianship of K.H.O.green
nj · 1999 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2020–2023
2 sentences

2023Although the relationship with the resource family was only explicitly added to the second prong of the best interests test as codified in statute, the Court explained that it was also relevant under the fourth prong -- N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4) -- in In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 353-55 (1999), and subsequent case law.

2020K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352 .

12
Maryanne Grande v. Saint Clare’s Health System (076606) (Morris County and Statewide)green
nj · 2017 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2019–2021
2 sentences

2021Claire's Health Sys, 230 N.J. 1, 17-18 (2017)).] Here, plaintiff cannot establish the second prong of the test.

2019Our Supreme Court recently held "that the reasonable-accommodation consideration belongs in the second-prong analysis." Grande, 230 N.J. at 21 .

12
State v. Harveygreen
nj · 1997 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2000–2010
2 sentences

2010In the interest of completeness, we also note that the State proved the reliability of the Y-STR DNA technique under the second prong of the test, which allows a proponent to establish general acceptance "by authoritative scientific and legal writings indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises underlying the proffered testimony." Harvey, supra, 151 N.J. at 170 , 699 A. 2d 596 .

2010In the interest of completeness, we also note that the State proved the reliability of the Y-STR DNA technique under the second prong of the test, which allows a proponent to establish general acceptance "by authoritative scientific and legal writings indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises underlying the proffered testimony." Harvey, supra, 151 N.J. at 170 , 699 A. 2d 596 .

12
In re Accutane Litig.green
nj · 2018 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025For expert testimony to be admitted under Rule 702, (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. [In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 349 (2018) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 223 (1984)).] A-3391-21 14 At the time of defendant's trial in February 2022, a proponent of scientific evidence could establish the second prong of the t

11
State v. Chungreen
nj · 2008 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025For expert testimony to be admitted under Rule 702, (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. [In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 349 (2018) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 223 (1984)).] A-3391-21 14 At the time of defendant's trial in February 2022, a proponent of scientific evidence could establish the second prong of the t

11
State v. Kellygreen
nj · 1984 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025For expert testimony to be admitted under Rule 702, (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. [In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 349 (2018) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 223 (1984)).] A-3391-21 14 At the time of defendant's trial in February 2022, a proponent of scientific evidence could establish the second prong of the t

2025For expert testimony to be admitted under Rule 702, (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. [In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 349 (2018) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 223 (1984)).] A-3391-21 14 At the time of defendant's trial in February 2022, a proponent of scientific evidence could establish the second prong of the t

11
State v. Torresgreen
nj · 2005 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Here, we need not even look to other jurisdictions because the Court in Derry, relying on precedent in New Jersey and in other jurisdictions, explained that expert testimony concerning the meanings of coded words or slang used by individuals during the commission of drug and weapons offenses is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the second prong of the standard for admission of expert testimony under N.J.R.E. 702.11 Id. at 633, 635 ; see also Hyman, 451 N.J.

11
In Re the Guardianship of J.C.green
nj · 1992 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023That specific direction was explicitly added to the second prong of the test -- N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) -- via legislative amendment in 1995 following the Court’s recognition of the importance of that evaluation in In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992). (pp. 20-24) 2.

11
State v. Preciosegreen
nj · 1992 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See, e.g., Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462 (explaining an evidentiary hearing is not required where a defendant does not establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also R. 3:22-10(b) (providing in part that "[a] defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of post-conviction relief").

11
State v. Megargelgreen
nj · 1996 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021"While the Code does not define the 'interest of justice,' . . . it is a high bar, requiring 'compelling' reasons for downgrade." Trinidad, 241 N.J. at 454 (citing State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500-02 (1996)).

11
Lepis v. Lepisgreen
nj · 1980 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See generally Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157-59 .

11
Gilchrist v. Division of Employment Securitygreen
njsuperctappdiv · 1957 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
State v. Taccettagreen
nj · 2009 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
In Re Rosemary BROWN, Debtor. FIRST JERSEY NATIONAL BANK v. Rosemary BROWN, Appellantgreen
ca1 · 1991 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
George W. Henglein v. Colt Industries Operating Corporationgreen
ca3 · 2001 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
United States v. Samuel Lee Clarkgreen
ca8 · 1994 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
11
People v. Lessliegreen
coloctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
11
Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Districtgreen
ca3 · 1992 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (51)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Cofield green
nj · 1992
2 sentences

2021The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338 (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumption of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 135 , 160 (1989)).] The second prong of the test is not found in N.J.R.E. 404(b).

2018The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338 (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumption of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 135 , 160 (1989)).] The second prong of the test is not found in N.J.R.E. 404(b).

32014–2021
State v. Gilmore green
nj · 1986
2 sentences

2025If the party exercising the peremptory strike satisfies its burden under the second prong of the analysis, then the trial court must weigh the prima facie case A-0839-22 16 against the exercising party's rebuttal "to determine whether the [opposing party] has carried the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [striking party] exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionally[] impermissible grounds of presumed group bias." Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 539 ; Osorio, 199 N.J. at 492-93, 506 .

2025If the party exercising the peremptory strike satisfies its burden under the second prong of the analysis, then the trial court must weigh the prima facie case A-0839-22 16 against the exercising party's rebuttal "to determine whether the [opposing party] has carried the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [striking party] exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionally[] impermissible grounds of presumed group bias." Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 539 ; Osorio, 199 N.J. at 492-93, 506 .

22025–2025
State v. Clark green
njsuperctappdiv · 1998
2 sentences

2025Courts should look to "whether the [exercising party] has applied the proffered reasons . . . even-handedly to all prospective jurors;" "the overall pattern of the [exercising party]'s use of its peremptory challenges," examining whether a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges were used on a cognizable group; and "the composition of the jury ultimately selected to try the case." Osorio, 199 N.J. at 506 (quoting Clark, 316 N.J.

2025Courts should look to "whether the [exercising party] has applied the proffered reasons . . . even-handedly to all prospective jurors;" "the overall pattern of the [exercising party]'s use of its peremptory challenges," examining whether a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges were used on a cognizable group; and "the composition of the jury ultimately selected to try the case." Osorio, 199 N.J. at 506 (quoting Clark, 316 N.J.

22025–2025
State v. Ways green
nj · 2004
2 sentences

2021The judge also found that defendant did not satisfy the second prong of the test which requires that "the new evidence must have been discovered after completion of trial and must not have been discoverable earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 550 (2013) (quoting Ways, 180 N.J. at 192 ).

2021The judge also found that defendant did not satisfy the second prong of the test which requires that "the new evidence must have been discovered after completion of trial and must not have been discoverable earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 550 (2013) (quoting Ways, 180 N.J. at 192 ).

22021–2021
State v. Garron green
nj · 2003
2 sentences

2012The "probative value" of evidence is "its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove." Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A. 2d 243 (citing State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13 , 637 A. 2d 1237 (1994)).

2012The "probative value" of evidence is "its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove." Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A. 2d 243 (citing State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13 , 637 A. 2d 1237 (1994)).

22012–2012
State v. Wilson green
nj · 1994
2 sentences

2012The "probative value" of evidence is "its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove." Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A. 2d 243 (citing State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13 , 637 A. 2d 1237 (1994)).

2012The "probative value" of evidence is "its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove." Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A. 2d 243 (citing State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13 , 637 A. 2d 1237 (1994)).

22012–2012
Florida House of Representatives, Honorable T.K. Wetherell, Speaker, Cross-Appellant v. United States Department of Commerce, Cross-Appellee green
ca11 · 1992
2 sentences

2009Different tests have emerged concerning what is and is not “deliberation,” and “deliberative” material, when facts infiltrate the documents in issue, clouding the line between “opinion” and “fact.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit formulated its test for determining the breadth of “deliberation” in Florida House of Representatives v. Dep’t of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941 (11th Cir.1992).

2009Different tests have emerged concerning what is and is not "deliberation," and "deliberative" material, when facts infiltrate the documents in issue, clouding the line between "opinion" and "fact." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit formulated its test for determining the breadth of "deliberation" in Florida House of Representatives v. Dep't of Commerce, 961 F. 2d 941 (11th Cir.1992).

22009–2009
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz green
scotus · 1985
2 sentences

2005It was this second prong which led to the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim against their Virginia attorney in Washington, supra. A party who seeks to defeat forum jurisdiction in the light of having purposefully directed activities at forum residents “must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 477 , 105 S.Ct. at 2185 , 85 L.

2005It was this second prong which led to the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim against their Virginia attorney in Washington, supra. A party who seeks to defeat forum jurisdiction in the light of having purposefully directed activities at forum residents “must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 477 , 105 S.Ct. at 2185 , 85 L.

21991–2005
Cesare v. Cesare green
nj · 1998
1 sentence

2026While the second prong inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the [applicable] factors . . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).

12026–2026
In Re Contest of November 8, 2011 General Election of Office of New Jersey General Assembly, Fourth Legislative District green
nj · 2012
1 sentence

2024Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 350 .

12024–2024
In Re the Guardianship of J.N.H. green
nj · 2002
2 sentences

2024In A-0360-23 12 considering the second prong of the test, a court must "weigh[] . . . the effects setting aside the judgment may have on the child's stability and permanency." Ibid. "[T]he primary issue is . . . what effect the grant of the motion would have on the child." Ibid. (omission in original) (quoting J.N.H., 172 N.J. at 475 ).

2024In that regard, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized "that the passage of time in a parental termination case, especially where a child has successfully adjusted to a long-term placement, is of much greater significance than it would be in practically any other context." J.N.H., 172 N.J. at 475 .

12024–2024
State v. Carter green
nj · 1982
1 sentence

2022The judge concluded the bite mark evidence qualified as "newly discovered" under the second prong of the test articulated in State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982) because the scientific studies challenging such evidence were not available at the time of defendant's trial.

12022–2022
Sarzillo v. Turner Construction Co. green
nj · 1985
1 sentence

2021The second prong of the test set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 requires a court to determine whether the social or recreational activity “produce[d] a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale.” Sarzillo, 101 N.J. at 115 (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:15-7).

12021–2021
State v. Mitchell green
nj · 1992
12021–2021
New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. E.P. green
nj · 2008
12019–2019
Aaron Bruce Gregory v. United States Government green
ca10 · 1961
12019–2019
New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. G.L. green
nj · 2007
12019–2019
Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church green
nj · 2003
12019–2019
Sam Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC (072742) green
nj · 2015
12019–2019
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst (076184) (Bergen County and Statewide) green
nj · 2017
12018–2018
State v. Smith green
nj · 2001
12018–2018
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
12018–2018
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst green
njsuperctappdiv · 2015
12018–2018
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. green
scotus · 1993
12017–2017
State v. Madison green
nj · 1988
12017–2017
Manson v. Brathwaite green
scotus · 1977
12017–2017
Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enterprises green
njsuperctappdiv · 1993
12017–2017
ELC v. Doe green
nj · 2009
12010–2010
Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc. green
nj · 1989
12006–2006
Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equipment Corp. green
nj · 1986
12006–2006
Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc. green
nj · 2005
12005–2005
Spadoro v. Whitman green
nj · 1997
12002–2002
Oswin v. Shaw red
nj · 1992
12001–2001
Oswin v. Shaw green
njsuperctappdiv · 1991
12001–2001
JC v. Mendham Tp. Bd. of Educ. green
njd · 1998
12001–2001
Schlumberger Industries, Inc. v. Borough of Avalon green
njsuperctappdiv · 1991
12000–2000
Gaglioti Contracting, Inc. v. City of Hoboken green
njsuperctappdiv · 1997
12000–2000
Stano v. Soldo Constr. Co. green
njsuperctappdiv · 1983
12000–2000
State v. Alston green
nj · 1981
12000–2000
Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island Heights green
nj · 1994
12000–2000

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:25-19 (16) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:25-29 (16) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:25-17 (14) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:12-1 (12) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:43-7.2 (11) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-4 (9) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:44-1 (9) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:39-4 (8) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:39-5 (7) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:29-3 (6) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:15-1 (5) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:5-1 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 385 (1976–2026) CA 223 (1972–2026) IL 201 (1979–2026) OH 176 (1980–2026) PA 152 (1974–2026) GA 148 (1980–2026) NY 109 (1970–2026) CT 109 (1983–2026) FL 81 (1981–2024) NJ 80 (1979–2026) WA 72 (1982–2025) MS 58 (1984–2022) IN 50 (1989–2020) MO 48 (1984–2022) MI 41 (1982–2025) NC 40 (1975–2024) TN 39 (1980–2024) LA 37 (1981–2025) AR 36 (1979–2022) IA 34 (1979–2024) MN 34 (1977–2026) KS 33 (1989–2024) MD 32 (1980–2025) MT 31 (1978–2025) AL 31 (1989–2023) WI 29 (1991–2026) MA 29 (1996–2025) UT 26 (1982–2025) ID 26 (1991–2024) VA 25 (1974–2025) CO 22 (1971–2025) NM 22 (1980–2025) DC 19 (1972–2023) VT 19 (1988–2024) ME 18 (1978–2023) RI 17 (1984–2019) OR 17 (1984–2024) KY 16 (1991–2024) HI 15 (1994–2024) SD 15 (1985–2023) ND 14 (1986–2018) WV 12 (1991–2025) WY 12 (1991–2025) AZ 11 (1976–2026) SC 10 (1992–2023) DE 10 (1976–2023) NE 10 (1984–2025) NH 8 (1993–2020) OK 7 (2002–2025) NV 7 (1998–2023) AK 4 (1982–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check