substantive due process violation in New Jersey

2024A-3778-22 15 "Rather, substantive due process is reserved for the most egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that 'shock the conscience or otherwise offend . . . judicial notions of fairness . . . [and that are] offensive to human dignity.'" Ibid. (quoting Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989)). "[T]he denial of a property right in the context of municipal governance rarely will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation." Rivkin, 143 N.J. at 366 .8 Here, plaintiffs contend they "have a property interest in obtaining a valid and le

2024In Rivkin, 143 N.J. at 366 , our Supreme Court found that "the denial of a property right in the context of municipal governance rarely will rise to the level A-1489-21 33 of a substantive due process violation." Ordinarily, "when property rights are denied in the course of conventional municipal decisionmaking," there is no such violation.

2024A-3778-22 15 "Rather, substantive due process is reserved for the most egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that 'shock the conscience or otherwise offend . . . judicial notions of fairness . . . [and that are] offensive to human dignity.'" Ibid. (quoting Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989)). "[T]he denial of a property right in the context of municipal governance rarely will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation." Rivkin, 143 N.J. at 366 .8 Here, plaintiffs contend they "have a property interest in obtaining a valid and le

1996The substantive due process doctrine “does not protect individuals from all governmental actions that infringe liberty or injure property in violation of some law.” PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir.) (quotation and citations omitted), cert. granted, 502 U.S. 956 , 112 S.Ct. 414 , 116 L.Ed.2d 435 (1991), and cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 257 , 112 S.Ct. 1151 , 117 L.Ed.2d 400 (1992).

1996Rochin v. California, 342 *365 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1951), is a noted example of a substantive due process violation in the pre-incorporation era.

1996Rochin v. California, 342 *365 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1951), is a noted example of a substantive due process violation in the pre-incorporation era.

2024"The elements of a substantive due process claim under the [NJCRA] are the same as those [for a federal CRA claim] under § 1983." Filgueiras, 426 N.J.

2020Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2012). "[T]he first task" in evaluating a substantive due process claim "is to identify the state actor, the person acting under color of law, that has caused the alleged deprivation." Ibid. (quoting Rivkin v. Dover Twp.

2020Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J.

2019Super. at 468 (citing Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J.

2020See ibid. (recalling that Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1951), equated substantive due process violations with abuses by government that "are . . . too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation").

2020See ibid. (recalling that Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1951), equated substantive due process violations with abuses by government that "are . . . too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation").

2025DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1995).

2024Cir. 1986); and variances were wrongfully denied, DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 1995); to support their contention that "if a wrongfully denied use variance constitutes a sufficient property interest for substantive due process purposes, then a 8 Plaintiffs have not briefed the judge's conclusion that Ferguson, Laskey and M.

2024A-3778-22 15 "Rather, substantive due process is reserved for the most egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that 'shock the conscience or otherwise offend . . . judicial notions of fairness . . . [and that are] offensive to human dignity.'" Ibid. (quoting Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989)). "[T]he denial of a property right in the context of municipal governance rarely will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation." Rivkin, 143 N.J. at 366 .8 Here, plaintiffs contend they "have a property interest in obtaining a valid and le

1996Rather, substantive due process is reserved for the most egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that “shock the conscience or otherwise offend ... judicial notions of fairness ... [and that are] offensive to human dignity.” Weimer v. Amen, 870 F. 2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir.1989) (quotations omitted).

2018"To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove the particular interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process 12 A-0190-16T3 clause and the government's deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience." Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008).

2012Accord Chainey v. Street, 523 F. 3d 200, 219 (3d Cir.2008) ("To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove the particular interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause and the government's deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.").

2011In affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs § 1983 claim of civil rights violation by the board, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: We hold that, absent egregious misconduct that shocks the conscience in the sense of violating the civilized norms of governance, or invidious discrimination on the part of a board member or board, so long as the State provides a plain, adequate and timely remedy to redress irregularities in the proceedings, a party aggrieved by the determinations of a municipal rent leveling board does not have a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . [Id. at 358, 671 A.2d 567

2011In affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs § 1983 claim of civil rights violation by the board, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: We hold that, absent egregious misconduct that shocks the conscience in the sense of violating the civilized norms of governance, or invidious discrimination on the part of a board member or board, so long as the State provides a plain, adequate and timely remedy to redress irregularities in the proceedings, a party aggrieved by the determinations of a municipal rent leveling board does not have a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . [Id. at 358, 671 A.2d 567

2000American Reliance, supra, 251 N.J.Super. at 552 , 598 A. 2d 1219 , citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, supra at 563, 494 A.2d 294 ; Ocean Pines Ltd. v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 112 N.J. 1, 10 , 547 A. 2d 691 (1988); Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Township v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6 , 364 A. 2d 1016 (1976), appeal dism'd sub.nom.

1991Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. at 563 , 494 A. 2d 294 ; see also Ocean Pines, Ltd. v. Borough of Pt.

2011The Court stated: In .the substantive due process analysis, it is the [s]tate’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the “deprivation of liberty” triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means. [Id. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 262 .] The Court did not, however, completely reject all causes of action based upon a claim that a state a

2011The Court stated: In .the substantive due process analysis, it is the [s]tate’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the “deprivation of liberty” triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means. [Id. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 262 .] The Court did not, however, completely reject all causes of action based upon a claim that a state a

2025See, e.g., Orange Taxpayers Council, Inc. v. City of Orange, 83 N.J. 246, 356 (1980) (deferring to the judgement of the Legislature in review of a substantive due process challenge).

2021Judge Butehorn explained that as to the second element, "plaintiff cannot identify a specific constitutional violation for the Officer's decision to frisk her rather than [conduct] another form of search." As to the manner in which the frisk was conducted, the judge explained that such a claim was one "for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution" and was "properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonable' standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard." See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that

2021Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352, 366 (1996) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).] The federal court in Johnson rejected appellants' due process arguments, explaining that "'[i]t is elementary that procedural due process is implicated only where someone has claimed that there has been a taking or deprivation of a legally protected liberty or property interest,' and that 'possessory interests in property invoke procedural due process protections.'" Johnson, 2021 WL 1085744 , at *30 (quoting Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1998)).

2021Applying that standard, Judge Butehorn determined that "the frisk was objectively reasonable." In support, the judge noted that "plaintiff made no complaints of the force or discomfort at the time of the frisk," and there was "a lack of any evidence causally relating any medical care or treatment to the frisk." See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding "the facts alleged constitute[d] insufficient evidence as a matter of law for excessive force by handcuffing" to sustain a civil rights action for damages under § 1983 based on the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate or expre

2020Dept't of Health & Sr. Servs., 416 N.J.

2020As Judge Jacobson noted when citing to Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., 163 N.J. 473, 478 (2000) (citation omitted), it is "a harsh response to a problem serious enough to justify its harshness." The judge recognized defendant's forfeiture of his pension benefits was a consequence contemplated by the Legislature, since he used his status as a A-5118-18T1 7 police officer for approximately four years to obtain security work from the JCHA and engineered receipt of over $30,000 in unearned payments.

2018In dismissing count two, Judge Massi relied on Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 144 (3d Cir. 2000), and Filgueiras v. Newark Pub.

2018See Gormley, 218 N.J. at 112 (applying the "conscious shocking" test to a state- created danger claim asserted by plaintiff alleging a substantive due process violation).

2014In a Section 1983 state-created-danger cause of action, a plaintiff must present evidence to satisfy the following four-prong test: (1) “the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct”; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that “the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts,” or “a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s actions,” as opposed to a member of the public in general; and (4) a state

2014In a Section 1983 state-created-danger cause of action, a plaintiff must present evidence to satisfy the following four-prong test: 9 See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98 , 107–10 (2d Cir. 2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.