102 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bateson v. Geissegreen2 sentences1998Second, the majority opinion cites Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1988), as support for the proposition that city council members who interfere with the proper issuance of permits “deprive the permit applicant of his property absent that process which is due.” Majority op. at 965. 1998Second, the majority opinion cites Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.1988), as support for the proposition that city council members who interfere with the proper issuance of permits "deprive the permit applicant of his property absent that process which is due." Majority op. at 258. | 4 | 4 |
Christianson v. Snohomish Health Districtgreen2 sentences2010“Clear authority provides that in a substantive due process challenge the person challenging the regulation has the burden of proof.” Christianson, 133 Wn.2d at 659, 661 (holding that a party challenging a county resolution as applied to his or her property has the burden of proving that the resolution violates substantive due process). 1998See generally id. at 667 (Talmadge, J., concurring); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 646 , 747 P.2d 1062 (noting, without approval, that “commentators have also pointed out that the regulatory takings doctrine and the longstanding substantive due process test seem analytically identical”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). | 3 | 3 |
Coniston Corporation v. Village of Hoffman Estatesgreen2 sentences1997In Sintra v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 1, 23 , 829 P.2d 765 (1992), published the same day as Lutheran Day Care, we said, "Arbitrary, irrational action on the part of regulators is sufficient to sustain a substantive due process claim under § 1983,” citing Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988), but also said there must be either animus or a " 'deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights,’ ” quoting Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. 1997In Sintra v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 1, 23 , 829 P.2d 765 (1992), published the same day as Lutheran Day Care , we said, "Arbitrary, irrational action on the part of regulators is sufficient to sustain a substantive due process claim under § 1983," citing Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir.1988), but also said there must be either animus or a "`deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights,'" quoting Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C.Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 956 , 109 S.Ct. 394 , 102 L.Ed.2d 383 (1 | 3 | 3 |
County of Sacramento v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., plurality at 26-27, 30. “ '[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’ ” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 , 118 S. Ct. 1708 , 140 L. 2006See, e.g., plurality at 26-27, 30. “ '[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’ ” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 , 118 S. Ct. 1708 , 140 L. | 2 | 8 |
Margola Associates v. City of Seattlegreen2 sentences1997See Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wn.2d 625, 649 , 854 P.2d 23 (1993). 1997See Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wn.2d 625, 649 , 854 P.2d 23 (1993). | 2 | 4 |
Halverson v. Skagit Countygreen2 sentences2016Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994). ¶45 When all inferences are drawn in the Emersons’ favor, the county’s actions in reprocessing the Emersons’ application do not amount to a substantive due process violation. 2002Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 , 110 S.Ct. 975 , 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (section 1983); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 338 , 106 S.Ct. 677 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (same); Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir.1994) (same); see also Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash.2d 947, 964-65 , 954 P.2d 250 (1998); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 1 , 21 n. 11, 829 P.2d 765 (1992) ("[A]n action for a violation of substantive due process is ripe immediately ... because the harm occurs at the time of the violation."). | 2 | 2 |
Lawrence v. Texasgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., plurality at 977-978, 979. "`[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.'" Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 (alteration in original) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 2006See, e.g., plurality at 26-27, 30. “ '[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’ ” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 , 118 S. Ct. 1708 , 140 L. | 2 | 2 |
| cluster 560582green | 2 | 2 |
| Robert I. Silverman v. Marion Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbiagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Rri Realty Corp. v. Village Of Southamptongreen | 2 | 2 |
Amunrud v. Board of Appealsgreen2 sentences2019See Amunrud , 158 Wash.2d at 222 , 143 P.3d 571 . 2015To survive rational basis review, the City’s action must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.7 Amunrud, 158 Wn.2d at 222 . 7 We acknowledge that there appears to be some confusion over the proper test to apply to a substantive due process challenge of this nature. | 1 | 8 |
Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattlegreen2 sentences1997In Sintra v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 1, 23 , 829 P.2d 765 (1992), published the same day as Lutheran Day Care , we said, "Arbitrary, irrational action on the part of regulators is sufficient to sustain a substantive due process claim under § 1983," citing Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir.1988), but also said there must be either animus or a "`deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights,'" quoting Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C.Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 956 , 109 S.Ct. 394 , 102 L.Ed.2d 383 (1 1997In Sintra v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 1, 23 , 829 P.2d 765 (1992), published the same day as Lutheran Day Care , we said, "Arbitrary, irrational action on the part of regulators is sufficient to sustain a substantive due process claim under § 1983," citing Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir.1988), but also said there must be either animus or a "`deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights,'" quoting Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C.Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 956 , 109 S.Ct. 394 , 102 L.Ed.2d 383 (1 | 1 | 4 |
State Of Washington v. Michael Christopher Sheltongreen2 sentences2017This court held that the defendant's claim was not ripe until the State sought to 57 Shelton, 194 Wn. 2017This court held that the defendant's claim was not ripe until the State sought to enforce collection or sanctioned the defendant for failing to pay.40 This court also held the defendant lacked standing because he could not show harm until the State sought to enforce the fee.41 As in Shelton, nothing in the record here indicates that the State has attempted to collect either fee or that it has imposed sanctions for failure to pay.42 Thus, Abdi's as- applied substantive due process challenge is also not ripe for review. 2d 569 (2015), where the United States Supreme Court held that an increased | 1 | 2 |
| Eastern Enterprises v. Apfelgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Guimont v. City of Seattlegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Herrington v. County of Sonomagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Kennedy v. City of Ridgefieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Amunrud v. Board of Appealsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shanks v. Dresselgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gray v. University of Colorado Hospital Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Blankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Blankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Matthew Henry Webergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Presbytery of Seattle v. King County
green
2 sentences2019King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 337 , 787 P.2d 907 (1990) (court concluded exhaustion of administrative remedies was necessary to evaluate the challenge and the record must include all the facts needed to apply the three-prong test before a substantive due process claim is ripe).5 The Klineburgers request attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 4.84.370. 2019King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 337 , 787 P.2d 907 (1990) (court concluded exhaustion of administrative remedies was necessary to evaluate the challenge and the record must include all the facts needed to apply the three-prong test before a substantive due process claim is ripe).5 The Klineburgers request attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 4.84.370. | 16 | 1992–2019 |
Guimont v. Clarke
green
2 sentences2018No taking has occurred. 25Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 594-95 . 26Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 595 . 27 Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 595 . 28 See RCW 86.16.010; Maple Leaf Inv'rs, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 730 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). -9- No. 76458-6-I! 10 Substantive Due Process We next consider the Klineburgers' substantive due process claim. 2018No taking has occurred. 25Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 594-95 . 26Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 595 . 27 Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 595 . 28 See RCW 86.16.010; Maple Leaf Inv'rs, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 730 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). -9- No. 76458-6-I! 10 Substantive Due Process We next consider the Klineburgers' substantive due process claim. | 6 | 1995–2024 |
Matter of Personal Restraint of Young
red
2 sentences2012In In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 39 , 857 P.2d 989 (1993) ( Young I), we considered and rejected a substantive due process challenge to our SVP commitment scheme, holding that the procedural safeguards at the initial commitment hearing and the procedures for periodic review under former RCW 71.09.090 were sufficient to ensure that "the commitment is tailored to the nature and duration of the mental illness." See also In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wash.2d 70, 81 , 980 P.2d 1204 (1999) (Petersen I) ("Our sexually violent predator statute unequivocally contemplates an indefinite 2012In In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 39 , 857 P.2d 989 (1993) ( Young I), we considered and rejected a substantive due process challenge to our SVP commitment scheme, holding that the procedural safeguards at the initial commitment hearing and the procedures for periodic review under former RCW 71.09.090 were sufficient to ensure that "the commitment is tailored to the nature and duration of the mental illness." See also In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wash.2d 70, 81 , 980 P.2d 1204 (1999) (Petersen I) ("Our sexually violent predator statute unequivocally contemplates an indefinite | 5 | 2012–2016 |
Robinson v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences1997A plaintiff who makes a substantive due process claim must plead and prove that the challenged government action is "wholly arbitrary and capricious or irrational, or utterly fails to serve a legitimate purpose.” Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34, 61 , 830 P.2d 318 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028 (1992). 1997A plaintiff who makes a substantive due process claim must plead and prove that the challenged government action is "wholly arbitrary and capricious or irrational, or utterly fails to serve a legitimate purpose.” Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34, 61 , 830 P.2d 318 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028 (1992). | 5 | 1992–1997 |
North Suburban Sanitary Sewer District v. Water Pollution Control Commission
neutral
2 sentences1996We likewise find no guidance in North Suburban Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Control Comm’n, 281 Minn. 524 , 162 N.W.2d 249 , A.L.R.3d 199 (1968), which does not involve a substantive due process challenge and makes no mention of the burden of proof. 1996We likewise find no guidance in North Suburban Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Control Comm'n, 281 Minn. 524 , 162 N.W.2d 249 (1968), which does not involve a substantive due process challenge and makes no mention of the burden of proof. | 4 | 1996–1997 |
North Suburban San. S. Dist. v. WATER POL. CON. COM'N
neutral
2 sentences1996We likewise find no guidance in North Suburban Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Control Comm’n, 281 Minn. 524 , 162 N.W.2d 249 , A.L.R.3d 199 (1968), which does not involve a substantive due process challenge and makes no mention of the burden of proof. 1996We likewise find no guidance in North Suburban Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Control Comm'n, 281 Minn. 524 , 162 N.W.2d 249 (1968), which does not involve a substantive due process challenge and makes no mention of the burden of proof. | 4 | 1996–1997 |
Daniels v. Williams
green
2 sentences2008The substantive component of the due process clause protects against certain government actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S. Ct. 662 , 88 L. 2008The substantive component of the due process clause protects against certain government actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S. Ct. 662 , 88 L. | 3 | 2002–2008 |
Lochner v. New York
red
2 sentences2000“It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and which equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 , 25 S. Ct. 539 , 49 L. 2000“It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and which equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 , 25 S. Ct. 539 , 49 L. | 3 | 1998–2000 |
Orion Corporation v. State
green
2 sentences1998See generally id. at 667 (Talmadge, J., concurring); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 646 , 747 P.2d 1062 (noting, without approval, that “commentators have also pointed out that the regulatory takings doctrine and the longstanding substantive due process test seem analytically identical”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). 1998See generally id. at 667 (Talmadge, J., concurring); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 646 , 747 P.2d 1062 (noting, without approval, that “commentators have also pointed out that the regulatory takings doctrine and the longstanding substantive due process test seem analytically identical”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). | 2 | 1998–2024 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2024Although 6 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S. Ct. 893 , 47 L. 2017Fields's complaint about the lack of an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances about her conviction and her subsequent rehabilitation goes to the substance of DEL's rule, which we have addressed as a substantive due process claim. 54 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S. Ct. 1187 , 14 L. | 2 | 2017–2024 |
Nelson v. Colorado
green
2 sentences2024But Nelson performed a procedural due process analysis, so its reasoning does not support a substantive due process claim. 581 U.S. at 133-34 . 2024But Nelson v. Colorado performed a procedural due process analysis, so its reasoning does not support a substantive due process claim. 581 U.S. at 134-35 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
In re the Detention of Morgan
green
2 sentences2016When the Washington Supreme Court “upheld the SVP civil commitment scheme against a substantive due process challenge,” it noted the legislature’s “‘honest recognition of the difficulties inherent in treating those afflicted with the mental abnormalities causing the sex predator condition.’” Morgan, 180 Wn.2d at 319 (quoting In re Pers. 2016RCW 71.09.050. ¶17 When the Washington Supreme Court “upheld the SVP civil commitment scheme against a substantive due process challenge,” it noted the legislature’s “ ‘honest recognition of the difficulties inherent in treating those afflicted with the mental abnormalities causing the sex predator condition.’ ” Morgan, 180 Wn.2d at 319 (quoting In re Pers. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State of Washington v. Gary Lyle Stoddard
green
2 sentences2016E.g., State v. Stoddard, 192 Wn. 2016E.g., State v. Stoddard, 192 Wn. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Nielsen v. Department of Licensing
green
2 sentences2016Nielsen v. Dep'to/Licensing, 177 Wn. 2016Nielsen v. Dep'to/Licensing, 177 Wn. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Beaver
green
2 sentences2016State v. Beaver, 184 Wn. 2016State v. Beaver, 184 Wn. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Smith v. Stillwell-Smith
green
2 sentences2004The court held that the third party (a great-grandmother who had been residing with the child) was entitled to a hearing on her objection. 8 The trial court found the third party notification requirement unconstitutional, but the appellate court reversed, stating: Rather than contravening the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of the child, as did the statutes at issue in Troxel and [In re Custody ofi Smith, [ 137 Wn.2d 1, 20 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998), aff’d sub nom. 2004The court held that the third party (a great-grandmother who had been residing with the child) was entitled to a hearing on her objection. [8] The trial court found the third party *956 notification requirement unconstitutional, but the appellate court reversed, stating: Rather than contravening the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of the child, as did the statutes at issue in Troxel and [ In re Custody of ] Smith, [ 137 Wash.2d 1, 20 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998), aff'd sub nom Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)], the reloc | 2 | 2004–2004 |
In Re Custody of Smith
green
2 sentences2004The court held that the third party (a great-grandmother who had been residing with the child) was entitled to a hearing on her objection. 8 The trial court found the third party notification requirement unconstitutional, but the appellate court reversed, stating: Rather than contravening the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of the child, as did the statutes at issue in Troxel and [In re Custody ofi Smith, [ 137 Wn.2d 1, 20 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998), aff’d sub nom. 2004The court held that the third party (a great-grandmother who had been residing with the child) was entitled to a hearing on her objection. [8] The trial court found the third party *956 notification requirement unconstitutional, but the appellate court reversed, stating: Rather than contravening the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of the child, as did the statutes at issue in Troxel and [ In re Custody of ] Smith, [ 137 Wash.2d 1, 20 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998), aff'd sub nom Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)], the reloc | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeo
green
2 sentences2004Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 , 102 S. Ct. 2452 , 73 L. 2004Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 , 102 S. Ct. 2452 , 73 L. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Washington v. Glucksberg
green
2 sentences2003Cf. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (death of a motorcycle passenger not a substantive due process violation under the circumstances); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-21 . 2003Cf. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (death of a motorcycle passenger not a substantive due process violation under the circumstances); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-21 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Schall v. Martin
green
2 sentences2003Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 , 104 S. Ct. 2403 , 81 L. 2003Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 , 104 S. Ct. 2403 , 81 L. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| Zinermon v. Burch green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| cluster 712220 green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| cluster 527890 green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| Norquest/RCA-W Bitter Lake Partnership v. City of Seattle green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| R/L ASSOCIATES, INC. v. City of Seattle green | 2 | 1992–1997 |
| Moreland v. United States green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Bryson v. City of DeRidder green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Clyde v. Nevada green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Marker v. Rieschel green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| MCI Communications Corp. v. United States green | 2 | 1996–1996 |
| Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead green | 2 | 1987–1994 |
| Hass v. City of Kirkland green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Johnson v. Department of Fish & Wildlife neutral | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Ingraham v. Wright green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Lambert v. California green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Durland v. San Juan County green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Miller v. Alabama green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.