24 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nicks v. Stategreen2 sentences2010(Pet. at para. 59, 61-62, 67-68) This claim is addressed as follows: "(a) This claim is procedurally barred from this Court's review, under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and Rule 32.2(a)(5) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it could have been but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. *1249 Nicks v. State , 783 So.2d 895 , 906-07 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ; Medina v. Singletary , 59 F.3d 1095 , 1106 (11th Cir.1995) ('A Pate claim "can and must be raised on direct appeal" ') (quoting James v. Singletary , 957 F.2d 1562 , 1572 (11th Cir.1992) ). "(b) It does not appear that Scott raises a su 2010To the extent Scott does raise a substantive due process claim, however, it is summarily denied pursuant to Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.7(d) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the facts alleged do not demonstrate his incompetence. '[A] petitioner raising a substantive claim of incompetency is entitled to no presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his or her incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.' Nicks , 783 So.2d at 908 -09 (quoting Medina , 59 F.3d at 1106 ). | 3 | 5 |
Gideon v. ALABAMA STATE ETHICS COM'Ngreen2 sentences2015Gideon, 379 So.2d at 574 . 2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng | 2 | 8 |
Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdorygreen2 sentences2011This is so, because “it is the recognized duty of the court to sustain the act unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law.” 246 Ala. at 9 , 18 So.2d at 815 (emphasis added [in Mclnnish ]).’ “Moreover, the rational-basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive-due-process challenge or an equal-protection challenge when neither *25 a suspect class nor a fundamental right is involved. 2011This is so, because “it is the recognized duty of the court to sustain the act unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law.” 246 Ala. at 9 , 18 So.2d at 815 (emphasis added [in Mclnnish ]).’ “Moreover, the rational-basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive-due-process challenge or an equal-protection challenge when neither *25 a suspect class nor a fundamental right is involved. | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Janezicgreen1 sentence2025App. 2019) ("It is well settled that '[t]rial of a person who is incompetent violates the due process guarantees,' Ex parte Janezic, 723 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1997), and a claim that a Rule 32 petitioner 'was tried and convicted while he was mentally incompetent' is a substantive due-process claim that is jurisdictional and not subject to the preclusions in Rule 32. | 1 | 1 |
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolakgreen1 sentence2024But as Justice Alito has observed: "Language in Jacobson must be read in context, and it is important to keep in mind 79 SC-2023-0601 that Jacobson primarily involved a substantive due process challenge to a local ordinance requiring residents to be vaccinated for small pox." Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 591 U.S. ___ , ___, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2608 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organizationgreen1 sentence2024In contrast, Meyer and its progeny address the doctrine of substantive due process,1 which requires a court to identify the 1I share Justice Clarence Thomas's view that "substantive due process" is an "oxymoron." Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 331 (2022) (Thomas, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Bowman v. STATE DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCESgreen1 sentence2014“The right to maintain family integrity is a fundamental right protected by the due process requirements of the Constitution.” Bowman v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 534 So.2d 304, 305 (Ala.Civ.App.1988) (citing Hamilton v. State, 410 So.2d 64 (Ala.Civ.App.1982), citing in turn May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 , 73 S.Ct. 840 , 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953)). “ ‘[T]he liberty interest protected by the substantive due process clause was [not] intended to protect every conceivable family relationship from governmental interference, no matter how far removed....’ Pittsley [ v. Warish ], 927 F.2d [3,] 9 [ (1st C | 1 | 1 |
Nicks v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Nicks v. State, 783 So.2d 895, 908 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), cert. quashed, 783 So.2d 926 (Ala.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Larry Norman Waddell v. Erik S. Hermersen, Gary Leonard Wheeler, Jr.green2 sentences2004"Substantive due process" analysis forces courts to step beyond merely assuring, regardless of the outcome, that a state actor fairly followed a particular procedure (procedural due process) and to examine whether the particular outcome was itself "fair" or whether it was impermissibly "arbitrary or conscience shocking." Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff's Office , 329 F.3d 1300 , 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) ("conduct by a government actor will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation only if the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense"); 2004"Substantive due process" analysis forces courts to step beyond merely assuring, regardless of the outcome, that a state actor fairly followed a particular procedure (procedural due process) and to examine whether the particular outcome was itself "fair" or whether it was impermissibly "arbitrary or conscience shocking." Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff's Office , 329 F.3d 1300 , 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) ("conduct by a government actor will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation only if the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense"); | 1 | 1 |
C.B. v. Bobogreen2 sentences2004"Substantive due process" analysis forces courts to step beyond merely assuring, regardless of the outcome, that a state actor fairly followed a particular procedure (procedural due process) and to examine whether the particular outcome was itself "fair" or whether it was impermissibly "arbitrary or conscience shocking." Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff's Office , 329 F.3d 1300 , 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) ("conduct by a government actor will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation only if the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense"); 2004"Substantive due process" analysis forces courts to step beyond merely assuring, regardless of the outcome, that a state actor fairly followed a particular procedure (procedural due process) and to examine whether the particular outcome was itself "fair" or whether it was impermissibly "arbitrary or conscience shocking." Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff's Office , 329 F.3d 1300 , 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) ("conduct by a government actor will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation only if the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense"); | 1 | 1 |
Ramonita Santiago De Castro v. Victor Morales Medinagreen1 sentence2004Cir. 1970) (discussing, in the context of review of economic regulation, the danger of judicial second-guessing "inherent in the concept of `substantive due process'"); Santiago de Castro v. Morales Medina , 943 F.2d 129 , 130 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The history of the substantive due process doctrine indicates that it is to be applied with `caution and restraint.'"); see *Page 345 generally Thomas Sowell, The Quest for Cosmic Justice (Free Press 1999) (discussing the dangers inherent in the concept of substantive, as opposed to procedural, due process). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Rhodes
green
2 sentences2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng 2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng | 3 | 1980–2011 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng 2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng | 3 | 1980–2011 |
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng 2011The Court has recognized as fundamental, the right to vote and to associate freely, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 89 S.Ct. 5 , 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and those familial rights referred to supra which fall within a recognized ‘zone of privacy.’ [When the] case involves neither a ‘suspect class’ nor a ‘fundamental right,’ the rational basis test is the proper test to apply to either a substantive due process challeng | 3 | 1980–2011 |
Pedro Medina v. Harry K. Singletary, Florida Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2010(Pet. at para. 59, 61-62, 67-68) This claim is addressed as follows: "(a) This claim is procedurally barred from this Court's review, under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and Rule 32.2(a)(5) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it could have been but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. *1249 Nicks v. State , 783 So.2d 895 , 906-07 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ; Medina v. Singletary , 59 F.3d 1095 , 1106 (11th Cir.1995) ('A Pate claim "can and must be raised on direct appeal" ') (quoting James v. Singletary , 957 F.2d 1562 , 1572 (11th Cir.1992) ). "(b) It does not appear that Scott raises a su 2010To the extent Scott does raise a substantive due process claim, however, it is summarily denied pursuant to Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.7(d) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the facts alleged do not demonstrate his incompetence. '[A] petitioner raising a substantive claim of incompetency is entitled to no presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his or her incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.' Nicks , 783 So.2d at 908 -09 (quoting Medina , 59 F.3d at 1106 ). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Davidson J. James v. Harry K. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2010(Pet. at para. 59, 61-62, 67-68) This claim is addressed as follows: "(a) This claim is procedurally barred from this Court's review, under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and Rule 32.2(a)(5) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it could have been but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. *1249 Nicks v. State , 783 So.2d 895 , 906-07 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ; Medina v. Singletary , 59 F.3d 1095 , 1106 (11th Cir.1995) ('A Pate claim "can and must be raised on direct appeal" ') (quoting James v. Singletary , 957 F.2d 1562 , 1572 (11th Cir.1992) ). "(b) It does not appear that Scott raises a su 2010(Pet. at para. 59, 61-62, 67-68) This claim is addressed as follows: "(a) This claim is procedurally barred from this Court's review, under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and Rule 32.2(a)(5) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it could have been but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. *1249 Nicks v. State , 783 So.2d 895 , 906-07 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ; Medina v. Singletary , 59 F.3d 1095 , 1106 (11th Cir.1995) ('A Pate claim "can and must be raised on direct appeal" ') (quoting James v. Singletary , 957 F.2d 1562 , 1572 (11th Cir.1992) ). "(b) It does not appear that Scott raises a su | 2 | 2010–2010 |
May v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2014“The right to maintain family integrity is a fundamental right protected by the due process requirements of the Constitution.” Bowman v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 534 So.2d 304, 305 (Ala.Civ.App.1988) (citing Hamilton v. State, 410 So.2d 64 (Ala.Civ.App.1982), citing in turn May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 , 73 S.Ct. 840 , 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953)). “ ‘[T]he liberty interest protected by the substantive due process clause was [not] intended to protect every conceivable family relationship from governmental interference, no matter how far removed....’ Pittsley [ v. Warish ], 927 F.2d [3,] 9 [ (1st C 2014“The right to maintain family integrity is a fundamental right protected by the due process requirements of the Constitution.” Bowman v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 534 So.2d 304, 305 (Ala.Civ.App.1988) (citing Hamilton v. State, 410 So.2d 64 (Ala.Civ.App.1982), citing in turn May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 , 73 S.Ct. 840 , 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953)). “ ‘[T]he liberty interest protected by the substantive due process clause was [not] intended to protect every conceivable family relationship from governmental interference, no matter how far removed....’ Pittsley [ v. Warish ], 927 F.2d [3,] 9 [ (1st C | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hamilton v. State
green
1 sentence2014“The right to maintain family integrity is a fundamental right protected by the due process requirements of the Constitution.” Bowman v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 534 So.2d 304, 305 (Ala.Civ.App.1988) (citing Hamilton v. State, 410 So.2d 64 (Ala.Civ.App.1982), citing in turn May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 , 73 S.Ct. 840 , 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953)). “ ‘[T]he liberty interest protected by the substantive due process clause was [not] intended to protect every conceivable family relationship from governmental interference, no matter how far removed....’ Pittsley [ v. Warish ], 927 F.2d [3,] 9 [ (1st C | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Reno v. Flores
green
1 sentence2011Flores, 507 U.S. at 302 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Northington v. Alabama Department of Conservation & Natural Resources
green
1 sentence2011Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm’n, 379 So.2d 570 (Ala.1980). ‘Under the rational basis test the Court asks: (a) Whether the classification furthers a proper governmental purpose, and (b) whether the classification is rationally related to that purpose.’ 379 So.2d at 574 .” 33 So.3d at 564 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Strandberg v. City Of Helena
green
1 sentence2006Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 748 and note 1. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Pamela Barfield
green
1 sentence2005However, we need not decide this issue because Barfield's due process claim fails even under the less stringent Shields/Piper standard." 396 F.3d at 1149 n. 8. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
County of Sacramento v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2005As the Supreme Court has explained, to establish a substantive due process violation in cases involving executive action, the plaintiff must prove the challenged conduct is so egregious that it `shocks the conscience.' County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 , 846-47 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 1716-17 n. 8, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). 2005As the Supreme Court has explained, to establish a substantive due process violation in cases involving executive action, the plaintiff must prove the challenged conduct is so egregious that it `shocks the conscience.' County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 , 846-47 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 1716-17 n. 8, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Jane Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, Mike Caplinger in His Official Capacities and Eddy Lankford in His Official and Individual Capacities
green
1 sentence2004School Dist. , 15 F.3d 443 , 450-52 (5th Cir. 1994), quoting in turn Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115 , 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Collins v. City of Harker Heights
green
2 sentences2004School Dist. , 15 F.3d 443 , 450-52 (5th Cir. 1994), quoting in turn Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115 , 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)). 2004School Dist. , 15 F.3d 443 , 450-52 (5th Cir. 1994), quoting in turn Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115 , 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Spurlock
green
1 sentence2002Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Commission , 379 So.2d 570 , 574 (Ala. 1980). "`Under the rational basis test the Court asks: (a) Whether the classification furthers a proper governmental purpose and (b) whether the classification is rationally related to that purpose.' Gideon , [3]79 So.2d at 574." 393 So.2d at 1055-56 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Whitsel v. Hundley
green
1 sentence1999To the extent, however, that Nicks's claim raises a substantive due process claim — i.e., that he was tried and convicted while he was mentally incompetent — the claim is not subject to procedural bars. 5 See Nguyen v. Reynolds , 131 F.3d 1340 , 1346 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 852 , 119 S.Ct. 128 , 142 L.Ed.2d 103 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Reynolds
green
1 sentence1999To the extent, however, that Nicks's claim raises a substantive due process claim — i.e., that he was tried and convicted while he was mentally incompetent — the claim is not subject to procedural bars. 5 See Nguyen v. Reynolds , 131 F.3d 1340 , 1346 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 852 , 119 S.Ct. 128 , 142 L.Ed.2d 103 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Anderson v. Alabama
green
1 sentence1999To the extent, however, that Nicks's claim raises a substantive due process claim — i.e., that he was tried and convicted while he was mentally incompetent — the claim is not subject to procedural bars. 5 See Nguyen v. Reynolds , 131 F.3d 1340 , 1346 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 852 , 119 S.Ct. 128 , 142 L.Ed.2d 103 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
United States v. Carolene Products Co.
green
1 sentence1999Therefore, we reject the means-end relationship test of Lochner and its progeny, in favor of the more deferential articulation of the substantive-due-process test enunciated in Carolene Products , 304 U.S. at 152 -54 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Nguyen v. Reynolds green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Underwood v. Barbour County Bd. of Ed. neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.