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11 Oklahoma opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blevins v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2007See In the Matter of Blevins, 1984 OK CIV APP 41 , 695 P.2d 556 . ¶ 42 The ultimate goal of § 7006-1.1(A)(5) is to protect children from harm suffered by either neglect or the intentional actions of their parents. 2007See In the Matter of Blevins, 1984 OK CIV APP 41 , 695 P.2d 556 . 1 42 The ultimate goal of § 7006-1.1(A)(5) is to protect children from harm suffered by either neglect or the intentional actions of their parents. | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Adoption of Blevinsgreen2 sentences2007See In the Matter of Blevins, 1984 OK CIV APP 41 , 695 P.2d 556 . ¶ 42 The ultimate goal of § 7006-1.1(A)(5) is to protect children from harm suffered by either neglect or the intentional actions of their parents. 2007See In the Matter of Blevins, 1984 OK CIV APP 41 , 695 P.2d 556 . 1 42 The ultimate goal of § 7006-1.1(A)(5) is to protect children from harm suffered by either neglect or the intentional actions of their parents. | 2 | 2 |
Melanie Lydia Dacosta v. Stanislaus Nwachukwagreen1 sentence2011In instances where other rights are created by state law, such as an intentional tort, conduct by a government actor that would amount to an intentional tort under state law would only rise to the level of a substantive due process violation if it 'shocks the conscience' or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'-in other words, only if it affects individual rights guaranteed, explicitly or implicitly, by the Constitution itself" Dacosto v, Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1048 (11th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Larry T. Wilson, Cross-Appellant v. Thomas L. Beebe, Cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences1989Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480 , 486-87 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). 1989Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480 , 486-87 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Gilmere v. City Of Atlantagreen2 sentences1989Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480 , 486-87 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). 1989Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480 , 486-87 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of JNM
green
2 sentences1985The Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained a substantive due process challenge to a statute permitting termination of parental rights, as applied, to a mentally ill parent "in the absence of a demonstration of a compelling state interest in the form of specific findings of existing or threaten harm to the child." Matter of J.N.M., 655 P.2d 1032 (Okl. 1982). 1984The Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained a substantive due process challenge to a statute permitting termination of parental rights, as applied, to a mentally ill parent “in the absence of a demonstration of a compelling state interest in the form of specific findings of existing or threaten harm to the child.” Matter of J.N.M., 655 P.2d 1032 (Okl.1982). | 2 | 1984–1985 |
BRAITSCH v. CITY OF TULSA
green
2 sentences2022Ct. , 2015 OK 24 348 P.3d 1080 Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100 436 P.3d 14 ¶28 In an effort to demonstrate a substantive due process violation, Employer asserts that a lack of a more specific finding regarding the nature and extent of the injury, either in the present case or, presumably, in any case before the Commission involving a compensable injury, prevents Employer from "be[ing] able to assert a valid § 50(A) defense to . . . recommended medical treatment." One problem with Employer's argument is that, as discussed in the preceding section, "[a]dministrative law judges are requir 2022Ct. , 2015 OK 24 348 P.3d 1080 Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100 436 P.3d 14 ¶28 In an effort to demonstrate a substantive due process violation, Employer asserts that a lack of a more specific finding regarding the nature and extent of the injury, either in the present case or, presumably, in any case before the Commission involving a compensable injury, prevents Employer from "be[ing] able to assert a valid § 50(A) defense to . . . recommended medical treatment." One problem with Employer's argument is that, as discussed in the preceding section, "[a]dministrative law judges are requir | 1 | 2022–2022 |
BABY F. v. OKLAHOMA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
green
2 sentences2022Ct. , 2015 OK 24 348 P.3d 1080 Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100 436 P.3d 14 ¶28 In an effort to demonstrate a substantive due process violation, Employer asserts that a lack of a more specific finding regarding the nature and extent of the injury, either in the present case or, presumably, in any case before the Commission involving a compensable injury, prevents Employer from "be[ing] able to assert a valid § 50(A) defense to . . . recommended medical treatment." One problem with Employer's argument is that, as discussed in the preceding section, "[a]dministrative law judges are requir 2022Ct. , 2015 OK 24 348 P.3d 1080 Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100 436 P.3d 14 ¶28 In an effort to demonstrate a substantive due process violation, Employer asserts that a lack of a more specific finding regarding the nature and extent of the injury, either in the present case or, presumably, in any case before the Commission involving a compensable injury, prevents Employer from "be[ing] able to assert a valid § 50(A) defense to . . . recommended medical treatment." One problem with Employer's argument is that, as discussed in the preceding section, "[a]dministrative law judges are requir | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Gray v. University of Colorado Hospital Authority
green
2 sentences2016The Gray Court explained that “the danger creation theory must ultimately rest on the specifics of a substantive due process claim—i.e. a claim predicated on reckless or intentionally injury-causing state action which ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” Id. at 917 . 2016Importantly, the due process clause is not triggered unless the state has “place[d] the child ‘at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm,’ ” and “the threat of harm must be of ‘limited range and duration,’ rather than generally applicable to a broader populace”; that is, “the conduct should be directed at a discrete plaintiff rather than at the public at large[.]” Gray, 672 F.3d at 920 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
green
2 sentences2006In this case, Kruzhkov was not in custody and, therefore, could not maintain a substantive due process claim under § 1983. 1 ¶ 14 The issue of whether such a claim could be sustained under procedural due Process was decided last year in Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 , 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005). 2006In this case, Kruzhkov was not in custody and, therefore, could not maintain a substantive due process claim under § 1983. 1 ¶ 14 The issue of whether such a claim could be sustained under procedural due Process was decided last year in Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 , 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeo
green
2 sentences2005Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 , 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2460 , 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). ¶ 13 The mother in the instant matter seems to argue that there are no limitations on the parenting coordinator. 2005Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 , 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2460 , 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). ¶ 13 The mother in the instant matter seems to argue that there are no limitations on the parenting coordinator. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Robert Estabrook
green
1 sentence1999A substantive due process violation, however, might be raised if the complainant shows "fundamental procedural irregularity, racial animus, or the like." Creative Environments v. Estabrook, 680 F. 2d 822 , 833 (1st Cir. 1982). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Betty J. Archie, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Rena M. Delacy, Deceased v. City of Racine, Ronald W. Chiapete, and George W. Giese
green
2 sentences1989Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480 , 486-87 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). 1989Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480 , 486-87 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Ingraham v. Wright
green
2 sentences1989Although a claim based on deprivation of procedural due process will properly be dismissed if adequate *1370 and meaningful state remedies exist, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), the availability of a comparable state remedy is not considered a basis for dismissing a substantive due process claim. 1989Although a claim based on deprivation of procedural due process will properly be dismissed if adequate *1370 and meaningful state remedies exist, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), the availability of a comparable state remedy is not considered a basis for dismissing a substantive due process claim. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Parratt v. Taylor
red
2 sentences1989Although a claim based on deprivation of procedural due process will properly be dismissed if adequate *1370 and meaningful state remedies exist, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), the availability of a comparable state remedy is not considered a basis for dismissing a substantive due process claim. 1989Although a claim based on deprivation of procedural due process will properly be dismissed if adequate *1370 and meaningful state remedies exist, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), the availability of a comparable state remedy is not considered a basis for dismissing a substantive due process claim. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Sampson v. Gilmere
green
2 sentences1989Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480 , 486-87 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). 1989Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480 , 486-87 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 , 106 S.Ct. 1993 , 90 L.Ed.2d 673 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.