substantive due process violation in Alaska

2025Auth. v. Mael, 507 P.3d 963 , 981 (Alaska 2022). 49 Doe, 444 P.3d at 125 (emphasis in original). 50 Id. -14- 2074 achieving it.” 51 This is called “intermediate scrutiny.” 52 “The most lenient level of scrutiny is rational basis review, under which ‘the party claiming a substantive due process violation has the burden of showing that there is no rational basis for the challenged legislation.’ ” 53 “This burden is a heavy one, for if any conceivable legitimate public policy for the enactment is apparent on its face or is offered by those defending the enactment, the opponents of the measure mus

2025Auth. v. Mael, 507 P.3d 963 , 981 (Alaska 2022). 49 Doe, 444 P.3d at 125 (emphasis in original). 50 Id. -14- 2074 achieving it.” 51 This is called “intermediate scrutiny.” 52 “The most lenient level of scrutiny is rational basis review, under which ‘the party claiming a substantive due process violation has the burden of showing that there is no rational basis for the challenged legislation.’ ” 53 “This burden is a heavy one, for if any conceivable legitimate public policy for the enactment is apparent on its face or is offered by those defending the enactment, the opponents of the measure mus

2025Res., 123 P.3d 948, 952 (Alaska 2005) (“Review of an agency’s application of its own regulation to the facts is limited to whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion.”). 18 See Church v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999) (holding that substantive due process claim will “only stand if the state’s actions ‘are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lacking in fairness, as to shock the universal sense of justice’ ” (quoting In re Obermeyer, 717 P.2d 382, 386-87 (Alaska 1986))). 19 The superior court here indicated that, “[w]hen determi

1999A due process claim will only stand if the state’s actions “are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lacking in fairness, as to shock the universal sense of justice.” Application of Obermeyer, 717 P.2d 382, 386-87 (Alaska 1986) (citation omitted).

2025Res., 123 P.3d 948, 952 (Alaska 2005) (“Review of an agency’s application of its own regulation to the facts is limited to whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion.”). 18 See Church v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999) (holding that substantive due process claim will “only stand if the state’s actions ‘are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lacking in fairness, as to shock the universal sense of justice’ ” (quoting In re Obermeyer, 717 P.2d 382, 386-87 (Alaska 1986))). 19 The superior court here indicated that, “[w]hen determi

2021Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 125 (Alaska 2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Church v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999)). -16- 7564 decided payment of funeral expenses as the sole workers’ compensation remedy did not violate equal protection.56 The State contends that the Estate’s substantive due process claim is controlled by Schiel.

2025We have held that “ ‘asserting’ a constitutional right for purposes of AS 09.60.010(c) means making a claim on the basis of that right in a complaint or other claim for relief.”15 Donkel and Cade expressly stated in their administrative appeal briefing that “this is not a substantive due process case.” While they appeared to raise a substantive due process argument in their motion for attorney’s fees, they had not “assert[ed]” that constitutional right for the purposes 13 See AS 31.05.035(c) (giving DNR discretion to keep information confidential for “reasonable time after the disposition of a

2025We have held that “ ‘asserting’ a constitutional right for purposes of AS 09.60.010(c) means making a claim on the basis of that right in a complaint or other claim for relief.”15 Donkel and Cade expressly stated in their administrative appeal briefing that “this is not a substantive due process case.” While they appeared to raise a substantive due process argument in their motion for attorney’s fees, they had not “assert[ed]” that constitutional right for the purposes 13 See AS 31.05.035(c) (giving DNR discretion to keep information confidential for “reasonable time after the disposition of a

2025In Walker v. State, Department of Corrections, we concluded that inmates who fail to raise constitutional claims during their disciplinary proceedings “do not necessarily forfeit those claims” on appeal. 38 In that case an inmate sought the presence of several witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, but the hearing officer denied his request without explanation. 39 The inmate did not challenge this decision during his administrative proceedings, but he argued on appeal to the superior court that denying him the opportunity to call witnesses violated his right to due process. 40 The superior cou

2025In Walker v. State, Department of Corrections, we concluded that inmates who fail to raise constitutional claims during their disciplinary proceedings “do not necessarily forfeit those claims” on appeal. 38 In that case an inmate sought the presence of several witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, but the hearing officer denied his request without explanation. 39 The inmate did not challenge this decision during his administrative proceedings, but he argued on appeal to the superior court that denying him the opportunity to call witnesses violated his right to due process. 40 The superior cou

2025In Walker v. State, Department of Corrections, we concluded that inmates who fail to raise constitutional claims during their disciplinary proceedings “do not necessarily forfeit those claims” on appeal. 38 In that case an inmate sought the presence of several witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, but the hearing officer denied his request without explanation. 39 The inmate did not challenge this decision during his administrative proceedings, but he argued on appeal to the superior court that denying him the opportunity to call witnesses violated his right to due process. 40 The superior cou

2025In Walker v. State, Department of Corrections, we concluded that inmates who fail to raise constitutional claims during their disciplinary proceedings “do not necessarily forfeit those claims” on appeal. 38 In that case an inmate sought the presence of several witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, but the hearing officer denied his request without explanation. 39 The inmate did not challenge this decision during his administrative proceedings, but he argued on appeal to the superior court that denying him the opportunity to call witnesses violated his right to due process. 40 The superior cou

2025In Walker v. State, Department of Corrections, we concluded that inmates who fail to raise constitutional claims during their disciplinary proceedings “do not necessarily forfeit those claims” on appeal. 38 In that case an inmate sought the presence of several witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, but the hearing officer denied his request without explanation. 39 The inmate did not challenge this decision during his administrative proceedings, but he argued on appeal to the superior court that denying him the opportunity to call witnesses violated his right to due process. 40 The superior cou

2025Res., 123 P.3d 948, 952 (Alaska 2005) (“Review of an agency’s application of its own regulation to the facts is limited to whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion.”). 18 See Church v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999) (holding that substantive due process claim will “only stand if the state’s actions ‘are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lacking in fairness, as to shock the universal sense of justice’ ” (quoting In re Obermeyer, 717 P.2d 382, 386-87 (Alaska 1986))). 19 The superior court here indicated that, “[w]hen determi

2025According to the Assembly Memorandum, the purpose of AS 29.35.125 is to “make the owner of residential property bear the cost of excessive police responses to the property, and to provide an incentive to the owner to correct the cause of the excessive responses.” 56 The ordinance does so by allowing the Municipality to fine property owners and tenants if police go to the property for qualifying reasons an excessive number of times.57 It is rational to believe that fining property owners for police responses will incentivize them to correct the circumstances on their property leading 51 Id. at

2025According to the Assembly Memorandum, the purpose of AS 29.35.125 is to “make the owner of residential property bear the cost of excessive police responses to the property, and to provide an incentive to the owner to correct the cause of the excessive responses.” 56 The ordinance does so by allowing the Municipality to fine property owners and tenants if police go to the property for qualifying reasons an excessive number of times.57 It is rational to believe that fining property owners for police responses will incentivize them to correct the circumstances on their property leading 51 Id. at

2023Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003))). -10- 1969 A. Aiden’s Procedural Due Process Rights To analyze whether state action has violated an individual’s procedural due process rights, we weigh three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used; and (3) the State’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional procedural requirements.”25 Aiden argues that the superior court made an obvious mistake when it did not, on its own, fi

2023In In re Gabriel C. we recognized that the mental commitment statutes evince a legislative intent for immediate transport to an evaluation facility once an emergency mental health evaluation is ordered.19 We further held in In re Mabel B. that a pre-evaluation detention of 15 days at a hospital due to “lack of capacity” at the evaluation facility was a substantive due process violation.20 This is because prolonged detention due to lack of space at an evaluation facility is not reasonably related to the purpose of “immediate delivery” to the evaluation facility.21 And in In re Vern H. we held t

2023In In re Gabriel C. we recognized that the mental commitment statutes evince a legislative intent for immediate transport to an evaluation facility once an emergency mental health evaluation is ordered.19 We further held in In re Mabel B. that a pre-evaluation detention of 15 days at a hospital due to “lack of capacity” at the evaluation facility was a substantive due process violation.20 This is because prolonged detention due to lack of space at an evaluation facility is not reasonably related to the purpose of “immediate delivery” to the evaluation facility.21 And in In re Vern H. we held t

2023In In re Gabriel C. we recognized that the mental commitment statutes evince a legislative intent for immediate transport to an evaluation facility once an emergency mental health evaluation is ordered.19 We further held in In re Mabel B. that a pre-evaluation detention of 15 days at a hospital due to “lack of capacity” at the evaluation facility was a substantive due process violation.20 This is because prolonged detention due to lack of space at an evaluation facility is not reasonably related to the purpose of “immediate delivery” to the evaluation facility.21 And in In re Vern H. we held t

2023In In re Gabriel C. we recognized that the mental commitment statutes evince a legislative intent for immediate transport to an evaluation facility once an emergency mental health evaluation is ordered.19 We further held in In re Mabel B. that a pre-evaluation detention of 15 days at a hospital due to “lack of capacity” at the evaluation facility was a substantive due process violation.20 This is because prolonged detention due to lack of space at an evaluation facility is not reasonably related to the purpose of “immediate delivery” to the evaluation facility.21 And in In re Vern H. we held t

2022The superior court addressed this concern, noting that a 106 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. -34- 7609 “government’s tax structure must be objective, not subjective” and that if the statute used an effective tax rate, “Alaska’s use of the foreign country’s tax rate as an identification tool for tax haven countries would be thwarted because the inquiry would become corporation specific, requiring tax officials to analyze each and every corporate structure to determine whether the affiliated gro

2022The superior court addressed this concern, noting that a 106 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. -34- 7609 “government’s tax structure must be objective, not subjective” and that if the statute used an effective tax rate, “Alaska’s use of the foreign country’s tax rate as an identification tool for tax haven countries would be thwarted because the inquiry would become corporation specific, requiring tax officials to analyze each and every corporate structure to determine whether the affiliated gro

2021Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269, 280 (Alaska 2001) (“A party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.”). 17 See Schiel, 219 P.3d at 1035 (holding that claimant “still has a substantial and efficient remedy available”). -5- 7564 concerning other responsible tortfeasors.” The Estate also contended the 2004 amendments undercut the policy we recognized in Parker Drilling Co. v. O’Neill favoring workplace safety.18 Alaska USA responded that the Estate was raising a substantive due process challenge rather than a procedural due process challenge and that there was no substantive due process vi

2021Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269, 280 (Alaska 2001) (“A party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.”). 17 See Schiel, 219 P.3d at 1035 (holding that claimant “still has a substantial and efficient remedy available”). -5- 7564 concerning other responsible tortfeasors.” The Estate also contended the 2004 amendments undercut the policy we recognized in Parker Drilling Co. v. O’Neill favoring workplace safety.18 Alaska USA responded that the Estate was raising a substantive due process challenge rather than a procedural due process challenge and that there was no substantive due process vi

2021Relying on our precedent, Alaska USA asserts that the Estate received a substantial remedy because Raven paid funeral expenses and that in a similar case we 54 See C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 151 P.3d 373, 381 (Alaska 2006) (“Workers whose wages are low, who have been the victims of blatantly negligent conduct, or who suffer exceptional noneconomic injuries bear the brunt of a system that may benefit their co-workers or employers but certainly does not benefit them.”). 55 Doe v. State, Dep’t of Pub.

2019Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 427 P.3d 771, 778 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 6 See, e.g., Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 161 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility, 53 P.3d 1105, 1112 (Alaska 2002)). 7 Squires v. Alaska Bd. of Architects, Eng’rs & Land Surveyors, 205 P.3d 326, 340 (Alaska 2009) (omission in original) (quoting Treacy v. Muni. of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 268 (Alaska 2004)). -6- 1745 case, a substantive due process claim “ ‘will only stand if the state’s actions are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lackin

2019Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 427 P.3d 771, 778 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 6 See, e.g., Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 161 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility, 53 P.3d 1105, 1112 (Alaska 2002)). 7 Squires v. Alaska Bd. of Architects, Eng’rs & Land Surveyors, 205 P.3d 326, 340 (Alaska 2009) (omission in original) (quoting Treacy v. Muni. of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 268 (Alaska 2004)). -6- 1745 case, a substantive due process claim “ ‘will only stand if the state’s actions are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lackin

2019Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 427 P.3d 771, 778 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 6 See, e.g., Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 161 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility, 53 P.3d 1105, 1112 (Alaska 2002)). 7 Squires v. Alaska Bd. of Architects, Eng’rs & Land Surveyors, 205 P.3d 326, 340 (Alaska 2009) (omission in original) (quoting Treacy v. Muni. of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 268 (Alaska 2004)). -6- 1745 case, a substantive due process claim “ ‘will only stand if the state’s actions are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lackin

2019Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 427 P.3d 771, 778 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 6 See, e.g., Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 161 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility, 53 P.3d 1105, 1112 (Alaska 2002)). 7 Squires v. Alaska Bd. of Architects, Eng’rs & Land Surveyors, 205 P.3d 326, 340 (Alaska 2009) (omission in original) (quoting Treacy v. Muni. of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 268 (Alaska 2004)). -6- 1745 case, a substantive due process claim “ ‘will only stand if the state’s actions are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lackin

2019Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 427 P.3d 771, 778 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 6 See, e.g., Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 161 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility, 53 P.3d 1105, 1112 (Alaska 2002)). 7 Squires v. Alaska Bd. of Architects, Eng’rs & Land Surveyors, 205 P.3d 326, 340 (Alaska 2009) (omission in original) (quoting Treacy v. Muni. of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 268 (Alaska 2004)). -6- 1745 case, a substantive due process claim “ ‘will only stand if the state’s actions are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lackin

2019Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 427 P.3d 771, 778 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 6 See, e.g., Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 161 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility, 53 P.3d 1105, 1112 (Alaska 2002)). 7 Squires v. Alaska Bd. of Architects, Eng’rs & Land Surveyors, 205 P.3d 326, 340 (Alaska 2009) (omission in original) (quoting Treacy v. Muni. of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 268 (Alaska 2004)). -6- 1745 case, a substantive due process claim “ ‘will only stand if the state’s actions are so irrational or arbitrary, or so lackin

2010See Crowe, 608 F.3d at 431-32 ; see also McConkie v. Nichols, 446 F.3d 258, 261 (1st Cir.2006) ("Conscience-shocking conduct usually entails physical or psychological abuse, or significant interference with a protected relationship, such as the parent-child relationship."); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1223, 1248-50 (9th Cir.1992) (noting "brutality by police or prison guards is one paradigmatic example of a substantive due process violation, [but] does not exhaust the possibilities" and holding it was conscience-shocking when police tried to extract a confession through "sophisticated psy

2010See Crowe, 608 F.3d at 431-32 ; see also McConkie v. Nichols, 446 F.3d 258, 261 (1st Cir.2006) ("Conscience-shocking conduct usually entails physical or psychological abuse, or significant interference with a protected relationship, such as the parent-child relationship."); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1223, 1248-50 (9th Cir.1992) (noting "brutality by police or prison guards is one paradigmatic example of a substantive due process violation, [but] does not exhaust the possibilities" and holding it was conscience-shocking when police tried to extract a confession through "sophisticated psy