Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lane v. State Committee of Psychologistsgreen2 sentences2014“To assert a substantive due process claim[,] one must establish that the government action complained of is ‘truly irrational,’ more than arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.” Id. at 24-25 . 2000Reviewing his claim ex gratia, this court notes that the doctrine of substantive due process “requires the state action which deprives one of life, liberty or property, be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Lane v. State Committee of Psychologists, 954 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Mo.App.1997). | 2 | 3 |
Bromwell v. Nixongreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, Callaway has not shown that the State’s continued prosecution of him is inherently factually inconsistent with Merlenbach’s guilty plea.7 Finally, other than merely reciting the general requirements for a substantive due process violation, Callaway has failed to support this argument with any applicable authority in the motion, at the motion hearing, or on appeal.8 In this regard, Missouri courts recognize the following general rule: To establish a violation of an individual’s substantive due process rights, the “plaintiff must demonstrate both that the official’s conduct was cons 2013See Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Mo. banc 2012). “[T]he doctrine of substantive due process ‘requires the state action which deprives one of life, liberty or property, be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” Roy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 23 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Mo.App. | 2 | 2 |
Chesterfield Development Corp. v. City of Chesterfieldgreen2 sentences2016Corp., 963 F.2d at 1105) (noting “[e]ven a bad faith violation of state law does not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation”; affirming dismissal of petition alleging city refused to issue license to flea market out of retaliation toward plaintiff for unrelated action). 1995Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102 , 1104 (8th Cir.1992)). | 2 | 2 |
James R. Anderson, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Douglas County Dennis Nagle, Appellees/cross-Appellantsgreen2 sentences2000To assert a valid substantive due process claim, a plaintiff “ ‘must establish that the government action complained of is ‘truly irrational’, that is, something more than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.’ ” Frison v. City of Pagedale, 897 S.W.2d 129 , 132 (Mo.App.1995) (quoting Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1993)) (citation omitted). 1995In order to assert a substantive due process claim, plaintiffs “must establish that the government action complained of is ‘truly irrational’, that is, ‘something more than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.’ ” Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting Chesterfield Dev. | 2 | 2 |
Michael H. v. Gerald D.green2 sentences1997Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 , 109 S.Ct. at 2346 (holding that child's "claim is the obverse of [putative father’s] and fails for the same reasons”). . 706 S.W.2d at 12 n. 9. . 1997Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 , 109 S.Ct. at 2346 (holding that child's "claim is the obverse of [putative father’s] and fails for the same reasons”). . 706 S.W.2d at 12 n. 9. . | 2 | 2 |
Frison v. City of Pagedalegreen2 sentences2016Indeed, “[e]ven a bad faith violation of state law does not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.” Frison v. City of Pagedale, 897 S.W.2d 129 , 132 (Mo.App.E.D.1995). 2016Indeed, “[e]ven a bad faith violation of state law does not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.” Frison v. City of Pagedale, 897 S.W.2d 129 , 132 (Mo.App.E.D.1995). | 1 | 3 |
John H. Peer, Jr., R.Ph. v. Missouri Board of Pharmacygreen1 sentence2015See Peer v. Mo. Bd. of Pharmacy, 453 S.W.3d 798, 811 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014); Indep. | 1 | 1 |
Roy v. Missouri Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2013See Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Mo. banc 2012). “[T]he doctrine of substantive due process ‘requires the state action which deprives one of life, liberty or property, be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” Roy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 23 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Mo.App. 2013See Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Mo. banc 2012). “[T]he doctrine of substantive due process ‘requires the state action which deprives one of life, liberty or property, be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” Roy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 23 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc.green1 sentence1997Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 , 109 S.Ct. at 2346 (holding that child's "claim is the obverse of [putative father's] and fails for the same reasons"). [23] 706 S.W.2d at 12 n. 9. [24] See, e.g., Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, 821 S.W.2d 822, 834 (Mo. banc 1991) (noting that due process examination of a statute of repose "is largely repetitious" of open courts analysis). [25] Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1158-59 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). [26] Magee v. Blue Ridge Prof'l Bldg. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strahler v. St. Luke's Hospital
green
2 sentences1997Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 , 109 S.Ct. at 2346 (holding that child's "claim is the obverse of [putative father's] and fails for the same reasons"). [23] 706 S.W.2d at 12 n. 9. [24] See, e.g., Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, 821 S.W.2d 822, 834 (Mo. banc 1991) (noting that due process examination of a statute of repose "is largely repetitious" of open courts analysis). [25] Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1158-59 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). [26] Magee v. Blue Ridge Prof'l Bldg. 1997Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 , 109 S.Ct. at 2346 (holding that child's "claim is the obverse of [putative father’s] and fails for the same reasons”). . 706 S.W.2d at 12 n. 9. . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Michael Slusarchuk v. Jon Hoff
green
1 sentence2023Accordingly, Callaway has not shown that the State’s continued prosecution of him is inherently factually inconsistent with Merlenbach’s guilty plea.7 Finally, other than merely reciting the general requirements for a substantive due process violation, Callaway has failed to support this argument with any applicable authority in the motion, at the motion hearing, or on appeal.8 In this regard, Missouri courts recognize the following general rule: To establish a violation of an individual’s substantive due process rights, the “plaintiff must demonstrate both that the official’s conduct was cons | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Terry Creason v. City Of Washington
green
1 sentence2016Even assuming that C.S. has preserved a substantive due process claim by identifying a fundamental right of which he was deprived, in order to meet the second element, C.S. “‘must demonstrate that the government action complained of is truly irrational, that is something more than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.’ ” Creason, 435 F.3d at 824 (quoting Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705 , 710 (8th Cir.1999)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Reynold D. Klein v. Patrick D. McGowan
green
1 sentence2016Even assuming that C.S. has preserved a substantive due process claim by identifying a fundamental right of which he was deprived, in order to meet the second element, C.S. “‘must demonstrate that the government action complained of is truly irrational, that is something more than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.’ ” Creason, 435 F.3d at 824 (quoting Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705 , 710 (8th Cir.1999)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
green
2 sentences1997Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 , 109 S.Ct. at 2346 (holding that child's "claim is the obverse of [putative father's] and fails for the same reasons"). [23] 706 S.W.2d at 12 n. 9. [24] See, e.g., Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, 821 S.W.2d 822, 834 (Mo. banc 1991) (noting that due process examination of a statute of repose "is largely repetitious" of open courts analysis). [25] Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1158-59 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). [26] Magee v. Blue Ridge Prof'l Bldg. 1997Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 , 109 S.Ct. at 2346 (holding that child's "claim is the obverse of [putative father's] and fails for the same reasons"). [23] 706 S.W.2d at 12 n. 9. [24] See, e.g., Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, 821 S.W.2d 822, 834 (Mo. banc 1991) (noting that due process examination of a statute of repose "is largely repetitious" of open courts analysis). [25] Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1158-59 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). [26] Magee v. Blue Ridge Prof'l Bldg. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State ex rel. Barber & Sons Tobacco Co. v. Jackson County
green
1 sentence1996This case could be interpreted as also espousing the much-maligned doctrine of substantive due process when it says, "[E]ven when zoning does substantially relate to the public welfare, a reviewing court ... may find the zoning to be unconstitutionally unreasonable if its detriment to private interests outweighs the public benefit.” Barber & Sons, supra. We do not interpret this statement as articulating a substantive due process standard. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
green
2 sentences1996The Court answered the argument saying that “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf— through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty— which is the ‘deprivation of liberty triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interest against harms inflicted by other means.” Id. at 200 , 109 S.Ct. at 1006 . 1996The Court answered the argument saying that “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf— through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty— which is the ‘deprivation of liberty triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interest against harms inflicted by other means.” Id. at 200 , 109 S.Ct. at 1006 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Alsager v. District Court of Polk Cty., Iowa
green
1 sentence1989Id. at 23 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.