substantive due process challenge (Oregon) · Go Syfert
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substantive due process challenge in Oregon

6 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Parkway Garage, Inc. v. The City Of Philadelphiagreen
ca3 · 1993 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999See Begnini v. City of Hemet, 879 F2d 473 (9th Cir 1988) (owner of bar alleged that police harassment caused him to sell his bar at a loss); Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F3d 685, 692 (3d Cir 1993) (substantive due process violation proven if government’s actions were, in fact, motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

2011We further explained that, following the Lochner era, the Court’s substantive due process analysis in the context of economic regulation had been framed in terms of “rationality”: “Beginning with West Coast Hotel Co., and for the past three-quarters of a century, the Court’s substantive due process analysis in the area of economic legislation has been framed in terms of rationality rather than in terms of *76 ‘vested rights.’ Indeed, by the mid-1970s, it was ‘well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of const

2011We further explained that, following the Lochner era, the Court’s substantive due process analysis in the context of economic regulation had been framed in terms of “rationality”: “Beginning with West Coast Hotel Co., and for the past three-quarters of a century, the Court’s substantive due process analysis in the area of economic legislation has been framed in terms of rationality rather than in terms of *76 ‘vested rights.’ Indeed, by the mid-1970s, it was ‘well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of const

22010–2011
Andrews v. Fairley green
scotus · 2010
1 sentence

2011Further and significantly, in Powell and in Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F3d 1126 (9th Cir 2009), cert den,_US_, 130 S Ct 3320 (2010), we and the Ninth Circuit applied those principles under circumstances in which legislation retroactively extinguished pending claims, which is analogous to the effect of the retroactive repose period in HB 3166.

12011–2011
Ileto v. Glock, Inc. green
ca9 · 2009
1 sentence

2011Further and significantly, in Powell and in Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F3d 1126 (9th Cir 2009), cert den,_US_, 130 S Ct 3320 (2010), we and the Ninth Circuit applied those principles under circumstances in which legislation retroactively extinguished pending claims, which is analogous to the effect of the retroactive repose period in HB 3166.

12011–2011
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission green
orctapp · 1973
2 sentences

2010As we stated over 35 years ago in American Can Co. v. OLCC, 15 Or App 618, 644 , 517 P2d 691 (1973), a majority of the United States Supreme Court has not invalidated economic legislation on the basis of a substantive due process challenge — whether that challenge be “facial” or “as-applied” — since the Depression. 9 In the absence of any violation of federal law, the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees under 42 USC section 1988 for causing plaintiff to be subjected to the deprivation of rights secured by the constitution. 10 Plaintiff also cross-appeals on the ground that the court er

2010As we stated over 35 years ago in American Can Co. v. OLCC, 15 Or App 618, 644 , 517 P2d 691 (1973), a majority of the United States Supreme Court has not invalidated economic legislation on the basis of a substantive due process challenge — whether that challenge be “facial” or “as-applied” — since the Depression. 9 In the absence of any violation of federal law, the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees under 42 USC section 1988 for causing plaintiff to be subjected to the deprivation of rights secured by the constitution. 10 Plaintiff also cross-appeals on the ground that the court er

12010–2010
Honeywell, Inc. v. Minnesota Life And Health Insurance Guaranty Association green
ca1 · 1997
1 sentence

2010Guaranty Ass’n, 110 F3d 547 (8th Cir), cert den, 522 US 858 (1997) (similarly declining to use a “vested rights” approach when analyzing a substantive due process challenge to retroactive economic legislation). 4 *688 Evaluated under the more modem substantive due process framework — that is, whether the statute and its retroactive application have a “legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means” — Measure 49 plainly passes muster.

12010–2010
Honeywell, Inc. v. Minnesota Life & Health Insurance Guaranty Ass'n green
scotus · 1997
1 sentence

2010Guaranty Ass’n, 110 F3d 547 (8th Cir), cert den, 522 US 858 (1997) (similarly declining to use a “vested rights” approach when analyzing a substantive due process challenge to retroactive economic legislation). 4 *688 Evaluated under the more modem substantive due process framework — that is, whether the statute and its retroactive application have a “legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means” — Measure 49 plainly passes muster.

12010–2010
Wedges/ledges of California, Inc. A California Corporation v. City of Phoenix, Arizona, a Municipality green
ca9 · 1994
2 sentences

1999The plaintiffs brought an action alleging, inter alia, a substantive due process violation of their right to pursue the occupation of their choice. 24 F3d at 65 .

1999The Ninth Circuit noted that, in addition to showing that the governmental action lacked a rational basis, the plaintiffs must establish that they were deprived of the right to pursue their business, id., and that they failed to do so: “As an initial matter, we note that the fact that the City temporarily banned one particular type of amusement game does not in itself establish that the City unduly interfered with either the game operators’ or manufacturer’s ability to pursue their livelihood in the amusement game industry.” Id. (emphasis added).

11999–1999
Albright v. Oliver green
scotus · 1994
2 sentences

1999In so holding, the court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Albright v. Oliver, 510 US 266, 273-74 , 114 S Ct 807 , 127 L Ed 2d 114 (1994), that, where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that amendment and not the more generalized notion of substantive due process must be the guide for analyzing the plaintiffs claims.

1999In so holding, the court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Albright v. Oliver, 510 US 266, 273-74 , 114 S Ct 807 , 127 L Ed 2d 114 (1994), that, where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that amendment and not the more generalized notion of substantive due process must be the guide for analyzing the plaintiffs claims.

11999–1999
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. green
scotus · 1978
2 sentences

1995Study Group, 438 US 59 , 98 S Ct 2620 , 57 L Ed 2d 595 (1978), the Supreme Court of the United States rejected a substantive due process challenge to a federal statute that imposed a limitation on liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation of federally licensed private nuclear power plants.

1995Study Group, 438 US 59 , 98 S Ct 2620 , 57 L Ed 2d 595 (1978), the Supreme Court of the United States rejected a substantive due process challenge to a federal statute that imposed a limitation on liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation of federally licensed private nuclear power plants.

11995–1995
Nebbia v. New York green
scotus · 1934
2 sentences

1974Nebbia v. New York, 291 US 502 , 54 S Ct 505 , 78 L Ed 940 (1934).

1974Nebbia v. New York, 291 US 502 , 54 S Ct 505 , 78 L Ed 940 (1934).

11974–1974

Where else courts name it

CA 114 (1981–2026) IL 110 (1980–2026) TX 110 (1987–2025) PA 103 (1973–2026) WA 102 (1987–2024) IA 60 (1983–2024) MI 57 (1986–2025) WI 49 (1989–2024) NY 43 (1975–2026) NJ 38 (1970–2025) FL 34 (1974–2025) CT 31 (1991–2020) MN 30 (1986–2024) OH 28 (1989–2025) MA 25 (1975–2025) AL 24 (1980–2025) RI 23 (1991–2020) CO 22 (1960–2026) MD 21 (1985–2024) ND 21 (1978–2025) ME 20 (1981–2022) MS 18 (1991–2022) AZ 18 (1991–2023) WV 18 (1977–2025) UT 16 (1989–2026) SC 15 (1993–2025) MO 14 (1989–2023) KS 14 (1968–2025) GA 13 (1983–2021) TN 13 (1993–2018) AK 13 (1995–2025) NM 12 (1989–2025) NC 12 (1976–2021) VA 11 (1989–2025) OK 11 (1984–2022) DC 10 (1987–2023) NH 10 (1993–2015) MT 9 (1981–2025) LA 9 (1997–2024) ID 9 (1986–2023) IN 8 (1994–2024) SD 8 (1996–2024) WY 8 (1989–2026) DE 8 (1989–2025) NV 8 (1980–2025) AR 7 (2004–2023) OR 6 (1974–2011) KY 3 (2003–2025) HI 3 (1992–2018) NE 3 (1994–2025) VI 2 (2011–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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