21 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Graham v. Connorgreen2 sentences2024As explained in Graham v. Connor, “claim[s] that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of [the] person . . . are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.” 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 2024In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989), the Supreme Court of the United States held that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a citizen “are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.” In Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998), the Supreme Court explained that if a constitutional claim is covered by a more specific constitutional provision the claim must be analyzed under the standard for that pro | 3 | 4 |
Pearson v. Callahangreen2 sentences2024See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 , 231–32, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“[Q]ualified immunity . . . is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial[,] . . . [and] we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 6 existed in light of the “clearly established law” at that time. 11 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 , 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015). 2024See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 , 231–32, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“[Q]ualified immunity . . . is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial[,] . . . [and] we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 6 existed in light of the “clearly established law” at that time. 11 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 , 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015). | 3 | 3 |
County of Sacramento v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2024In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989), the Supreme Court of the United States held that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a citizen “are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.” In Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998), the Supreme Court explained that if a constitutional claim is covered by a more specific constitutional provision the claim must be analyzed under the standard for that pro 2024In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989), the Supreme Court of the United States held that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a citizen “are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.” In Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998), the Supreme Court explained that if a constitutional claim is covered by a more specific constitutional provision the claim must be analyzed under the standard for that pro | 3 | 3 |
Loving v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 , 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1967) (holding that a statute barring interracial marriage “deprive[s] . . . [one] of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 2024See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 , 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1967) (holding that a statute barring interracial marriage “deprive[s] . . . [one] of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). | 3 | 3 |
Rucker v. Harford Countygreen2 sentences2024Even if Kodi had only pled a substantive due process claim based solely on excessive force being used in the seizure of Ms. Gaines (which, the complaint demonstrates, was not his sole substantive due process claim claim), the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly “conclude[d] that [] the due process clause provides substantive protection to [] a bystander against the infliction of personal injury by police conduct sufficiently outrageous to constitute completely arbitrary state action[.]” Rucker v. Harford Cnty., Md., 946 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1991). 2024Kodi asserted that he had “consistently maintained that [he] can proceed and was proceeding on his § 1983 claims under the Fourteenth Amendment as an independent basis from the Fourth Amendment at the time of trial.” Kodi further argued that under the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991), an innocent bystander can bring a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment if the person was physically injured, regardless of whether the injury was intended. | 3 | 3 |
Mullenix v. Lunagreen2 sentences2024See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 , 231–32, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“[Q]ualified immunity . . . is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial[,] . . . [and] we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 6 existed in light of the “clearly established law” at that time. 11 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 , 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015). 2024See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 , 231–32, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“[Q]ualified immunity . . . is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial[,] . . . [and] we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 6 existed in light of the “clearly established law” at that time. 11 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 , 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015). | 3 | 3 |
Daniels v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024As to the words from Magna [Carta], . . . after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at last settled down to this: that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice. 12 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec 2024As to the words from Magna [Carta], . . . after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at last settled down to this: that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice. 12 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec | 3 | 3 |
Samuels v. Tschechtelingreen2 sentences2013In Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md.App. 483, 523 , 763 A.2d 209 (2000), we identified four categories of due process claims: a procedural due process claim premised on the deprivation of a property interest; a procedural due process claim premised on the deprivation of a liberty interest; a substantive due process claim premised on the deprivation of a property interest; and a substantive due process claim premised on the deprivation of a liberty interest. 2013In Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md.App. 483, 523 , 763 A.2d 209 (2000), we identified four categories of due process claims: a procedural due process claim premised on the deprivation of a property interest; a procedural due process claim premised on the deprivation of a liberty interest; a substantive due process claim premised on the deprivation of a property interest; and a substantive due process claim premised on the deprivation of a liberty interest. | 1 | 5 |
Chaney v. Stategreen1 sentence2022We exercised our discretion to address an unpreserved argument in Allmond, noting that “[d]eciding the facial constitutionality of [a statute] against a substantive due process challenge[ ]” was a “rare instance” in which said discretion was warranted “because none of the considerations recited above weigh[ed] against addressing the constitutional issue in th[at] case.” Id. at 606, 607 . | 1 | 1 |
Rochin v. Californiagreen2 sentences2010See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). 2010See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). | 1 | 1 |
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doegreen2 sentences2009See Connecticut DPS, supra, 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 1160 . 2009See Connecticut DPS, supra, 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 1160 . | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. Texasgreen2 sentences2007As the Court noted, ‘times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper only served to oppress.’ As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom” (Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 ; see also id. at 572 , 539 U.S. 558 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 [‘(h)istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry....’]; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2 2007As the Court noted, ‘times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper only served to oppress.’ As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom” (Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 ; see also id. at 572 , 539 U.S. 558 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 [‘(h)istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry....’]; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2 | 1 | 1 |
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences2007Noting that “the harms [the child] suffered occurred not while he was in the State’s custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 , 109 S.Ct. at 1006 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 262 , it explained: “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not i 2007Noting that “the harms [the child] suffered occurred not while he was in the State’s custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 , 109 S.Ct. at 1006 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 262 , it explained: “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not i | 1 | 1 |
Cruzan Ex Rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Healthgreen2 sentences2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir 2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage Casesgreen2 sentences2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir 2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 ("[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation `must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for `[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.'") (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 ("[W]e have require | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir 2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir | 1 | 1 |
Washington v. Glucksberggreen2 sentences2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir 2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir | 1 | 1 |
Estelle v. Gamblegreen2 sentences2007Noting that “the harms [the child] suffered occurred not while he was in the State’s custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 , 109 S.Ct. at 1006 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 262 , it explained: “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not i 2007Noting that “the harms [the child] suffered occurred not while he was in the State’s custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 , 109 S.Ct. at 1006 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 262 , it explained: “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not i | 1 | 1 |
Superior Court of California Ex Rel. Jones v. Rickettsgreen2 sentences2007In general, there are four “categories” of due process actions: “(1) a procedural due process claim premised on the deprivation of a property interest; (2) a procedural due process claim premised on the deprivation of a liberty interest; (3) a substantive due process claim premised on the deprivation of a property interest; and (4) a substantive due process claim premised on the deprivation of a liberty interest.” Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md.App. 483, 523 , 763 A.2d 209 (2000); see Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus v. Ricketts, 153 Md.App. 281, 336 , 836 A.2d 707 (2003). 2007In general, there are four “categories” of due process actions: “(1) a procedural due process claim premised on the deprivation of a property interest; (2) a procedural due process claim premised on the deprivation of a liberty interest; (3) a substantive due process claim premised on the deprivation of a property interest; and (4) a substantive due process claim premised on the deprivation of a liberty interest.” Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md.App. 483, 523 , 763 A.2d 209 (2000); see Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus v. Ricketts, 153 Md.App. 281, 336 , 836 A.2d 707 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeogreen2 sentences2007Noting that “the harms [the child] suffered occurred not while he was in the State’s custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 , 109 S.Ct. at 1006 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 262 , it explained: “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not i 2007Noting that “the harms [the child] suffered occurred not while he was in the State’s custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 , 109 S.Ct. at 1006 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 262 , it explained: “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not i | 1 | 1 |
| Zablocki v. Redhailgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. City of Harker Heights
green
2 sentences2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir 2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir | 3 | 2000–2007 |
Reno v. Flores
green
2 sentences2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir 2007Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 537 , 763 A.2d at 238 (“[A]nalysis of an alleged substantive due process violation ‘must begin with careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (in turn quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. at 2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (“[W]e have requir | 3 | 2000–2007 |
Koshko v. Haining
green
2 sentences2010Id. [3] The need to rely on a "prerequisite" determination was necessary in order to give a judicial gloss to the statute, under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, so that the statute could be sustained in the face of a substantive due process challenge. 2010Id. 3 The need to rely on a “prerequisite” determination was necessary in order to give a judicial gloss to the statute, under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, so that the statute could be sustained in the face of a substantive due process challenge. | 2 | 2008–2010 |
Troxel v. Granville
green
2 sentences2009Id. 2008The constitutionality of the GVS was called into question by the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), which struck down a Washington State third party visitation statute under the federal Due Process Clause, in part because it failed to recognize a presumption that fit parents will act in their child’s best interest. | 2 | 2008–2009 |
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
green
2 sentences2016However, one year later, the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), in which the Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to a zoning ordinance. 6 In 1927, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 705 of the Laws of 1927, which added Article 66B to the Maryland Code. 2016However, one year later, the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), in which the Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to a zoning ordinance. 6 In 1927, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 705 of the Laws of 1927, which added Article 66B to the Maryland Code. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
R. B. Construction Co. v. Jackson
neutral
2 sentences2016Construction Co. v. Jackson, 152 Md. 671, 678 , 137 A. 278 (1927), and relying on Village of Euclid , the Court upheld these regulations against a substantive due process challenge. 2016Construction Co. v. Jackson, 152 Md. 671, 678 , 137 A. 278 (1927), and relying on Village of Euclid , the Court upheld these regulations against a substantive due process challenge. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Riggins v. Nevada
green
2 sentences2016First, reiterating the holding of Harper , which it articulated as “forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness,” the Supreme Court added that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons the State detains for trial.” 504 U.S. at 135 , 112 S.Ct. 1810 . 2016First, reiterating the holding of Harper , which it articulated as “forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness,” the Supreme Court added that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons the State detains for trial.” 504 U.S. at 135 , 112 S.Ct. 1810 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007As the Court noted, ‘times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper only served to oppress.’ As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom” (Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 ; see also id. at 572 , 539 U.S. 558 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 [‘(h)istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry....’]; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2 2007As the Court noted, ‘times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper only served to oppress.’ As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom” (Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 ; see also id. at 572 , 539 U.S. 558 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 [‘(h)istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry....’]; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2003“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions [that] deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 2003“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions [that] deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Attorney General v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1985See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 , 98 S.Ct. 673, 681 , 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 711 , 426 A.2d 929 (1981); Attorney General v. Johnson, supra, 282 Md. at 310 , 385 A.2d 57 . 1985See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 , 98 S.Ct. 673, 681 , 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 711 , 426 A.2d 929 (1981); Attorney General v. Johnson, supra, 282 Md. at 310 , 385 A.2d 57 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Attorney General of Maryland v. Waldron green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.