substantive due process clause in South Carolina

15 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
In Re the Treatment & Care of Luckabaughgreen sc · 2002 · cited in 3 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2006 2 sentences 2006"The purpose of the substantive due process clause is to prohibit government from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful acts regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 140 , 568 S.E.2d 338, 347 (2002) (internal quotes omitted). 2006"The purpose of the substantive due process clause is to prohibit government from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful acts regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 140 , 568 S.E.2d 338, 347 (2002) (internal quotes omitted).	2	3
Ex Parte Chamberlaingreen texapp · 2009 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. 10 Cf. Millard, 971 F.3d at 1185 & n.13 (rejecting a substantive due process claim that Colorado's SORA (CSORA) created a presumption that a registered sex offender would reoffend, and explaining "CSORA easily passes th[e rational basis] test because . . . there is a rational connection between it and the government's interest in public safety"; "In the district court's words, 'there is a rational relationship between the registration requirements and the legislative purpose of giving members of the public the opportunity to protect the	1	1
Ex Parte Chamberlaingreen texcrimapp · 2011 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. 10 Cf. Millard, 971 F.3d at 1185 & n.13 (rejecting a substantive due process claim that Colorado's SORA (CSORA) created a presumption that a registered sex offender would reoffend, and explaining "CSORA easily passes th[e rational basis] test because . . . there is a rational connection between it and the government's interest in public safety"; "In the district court's words, 'there is a rational relationship between the registration requirements and the legislative purpose of giving members of the public the opportunity to protect the	1	1
BOARD OF SUP'RS OF FAIRFAX CTY. v. Williamsgreen va · 1975 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”); Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir.1991) (“Irrationality and arbitrariness imply a most stringent standard against which state action is to be measured in assessing a substantive due process claim.”); Bd. of Sup’rs of Fairfax Cnty. v. Pyles, 224 Va. 629 , 300 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1983) (“Fixing the specific location of boundaries between zoning 2013Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”); Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir.1991) (“Irrationality and arbitrariness imply a most stringent standard against which state action is to be measured in assessing a substantive due process claim.”); Bd. of Sup’rs of Fairfax Cnty. v. Pyles, 224 Va. 629 , 300 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1983) (“Fixing the specific location of boundaries between zoning	1	1
Rucker v. Harford Countygreen ca4 · 1991 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 1 sentence 2013Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”); Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir.1991) (“Irrationality and arbitrariness imply a most stringent standard against which state action is to be measured in assessing a substantive due process claim.”); Bd. of Sup’rs of Fairfax Cnty. v. Pyles, 224 Va. 629 , 300 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1983) (“Fixing the specific location of boundaries between zoning	1	1
Board of Sup'rs of Fairfax County v. Pylesgreen va · 1983 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”); Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir.1991) (“Irrationality and arbitrariness imply a most stringent standard against which state action is to be measured in assessing a substantive due process claim.”); Bd. of Sup’rs of Fairfax Cnty. v. Pyles, 224 Va. 629 , 300 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1983) (“Fixing the specific location of boundaries between zoning 2013Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”); Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir.1991) (“Irrationality and arbitrariness imply a most stringent standard against which state action is to be measured in assessing a substantive due process claim.”); Bd. of Sup’rs of Fairfax Cnty. v. Pyles, 224 Va. 629 , 300 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1983) (“Fixing the specific location of boundaries between zoning	1	1
Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beachgreen sc · 2004 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009See Sunset, 357 S.C. at 430 , 593 S.E.2d at 470 (stating that the standard of review for all substantive due process challenges to state statutes, including municipal ordinances, is whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to any legitimate interest of government). 2009See Sunset, 357 S.C. at 430 , 593 S.E.2d at 470 (stating that the standard of review for all substantive due process challenges to state statutes, including municipal ordinances, is whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to any legitimate interest of government).	1	1
Sloan v. South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy Examinersgreen sc · 2006 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009To prove a denial of substantive due process, the plaintiff must also show “he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a cognizable property interest rooted in state law.” Sloan v. South Carolina Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam’rs, 370 S.C. 452, 483 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006). 2009To prove a denial of substantive due process, the plaintiff must also show “he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a cognizable property interest rooted in state law.” Sloan v. South Carolina Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam’rs, 370 S.C. 452, 483 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006).	1	1
Seabrook v. Knoxgreen sc · 2006 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009“To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must show he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest that was deprived by state action so far beyond the limits of legitimate governmental action, no process could cure the deficiency.” Seabrook v. Knox, 369 S.C. 191, 198 , 631 S.E.2d 907, 911 (2006). 2009“To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must show he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest that was deprived by state action so far beyond the limits of legitimate governmental action, no process could cure the deficiency.” Seabrook v. Knox, 369 S.C. 191, 198 , 631 S.E.2d 907, 911 (2006).	1	1
Brower Ex Rel. Estate of Caldwell v. County of Inyogreen scotus · 1989 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004A “seizure” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, “by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, n. 16 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 , 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381 , 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). 2004A “seizure” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, “by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, n. 16 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 , 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381 , 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989).	1	1
Terry v. Ohiogreen scotus · 1968 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004A “seizure” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, “by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, n. 16 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 , 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381 , 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). 2004A “seizure” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, “by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, n. 16 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 , 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381 , 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989).	1	1
State v. Hornsbygreen sc · 1997 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002When an act is challenged under the due process clause, this “Court only requires the act to be reasonably designed to accomplish its purposes, unless some fundamental right or suspect class is implicated.” State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 125-26 , 484 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1997). 2002When an act is challenged under the due process clause, this “Court only requires the act to be reasonably designed to accomplish its purposes, unless some fundamental right or suspect class is implicated.” State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 125-26 , 484 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1997).	1	1
Zinermon v. Burchgreen scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002The purpose of the substantive due process clause is to prohibit government from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful acts “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 , 110 S.Ct. 975, 983 , 108 L.Ed.2d 100, 113 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662, 665 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662, 668 (1986)). 2002The purpose of the substantive due process clause is to prohibit government from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful acts “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 , 110 S.Ct. 975, 983 , 108 L.Ed.2d 100, 113 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662, 665 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662, 668 (1986)).	1	1
Daniels v. Williamsgreen scotus · 1986 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002The purpose of the substantive due process clause is to prohibit government from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful acts “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 , 110 S.Ct. 975, 983 , 108 L.Ed.2d 100, 113 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662, 665 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662, 668 (1986)). 2002The purpose of the substantive due process clause is to prohibit government from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful acts “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 , 110 S.Ct. 975, 983 , 108 L.Ed.2d 100, 113 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662, 665 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662, 668 (1986)).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
Poe v. Ullman green scotus · 1961 2 sentences 2013Id. at 543 , 81 S.Ct. 1752 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 11 As the Supreme Court later noted, these words “eloquently” describe our role in the substantive due process inquiry. 2013Id. at 543 , 81 S.Ct. 1752 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 11 As the Supreme Court later noted, these words “eloquently” describe our role in the substantive due process inquiry.	2	2012–2013
Moore v. City of East Cleveland green scotus · 1977 2 sentences 2013Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 . 2013Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 .	2	2012–2013
Worsley Companies v. Town of Mount Pleasant green sc · 2000 2 sentences 2008To support a substantive due process violation, a party must 438 show “he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a cognizable property interest rooted in state law.” Id. 2003*Thus, to state a substantive due process claim, [a] plaintiff must show that he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a cognizable property interest rooted in state law). Id.	2	2003–2008
Millard v. Rankin green ca10 · 2020 1 sentence 2025Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. 10 Cf. Millard, 971 F.3d at 1185 & n.13 (rejecting a substantive due process claim that Colorado's SORA (CSORA) created a presumption that a registered sex offender would reoffend, and explaining "CSORA easily passes th[e rational basis] test because . . . there is a rational connection between it and the government's interest in public safety"; "In the district court's words, 'there is a rational relationship between the registration requirements and the legislative purpose of giving members of the public the opportunity to protect the	1	2025–2025
Ex Parte Chamberlain green texapp · 2011 1 sentence 2025App. 2011) (noting that an intervening change in the law "altered the legal landscape" and, therefore, a remand was required to consider the impact of the change on the appeal), reaff'd, 352 S.W.3d 121 , 123–24 (Tex. App. 2011) (reaffirming and readopting the rationale in the initial opinion, and additionally noting, "The fact that [the sex offender] is not eligible at this time to pursue deregistration . . . does not create a violation of [his] substantive due process rights; it simply means that the legislature, . . . in consideration of the category of offense committed by [him], has determ	1	2025–2025
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. green scotus · 2005 2 sentences 2013Twenty-five years later, in Lingle , the Supreme Court “corrected] course” and clarified that “the ‘substantially advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings precedents.” 544 U.S. at 540 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 (noting that “a municipal zoning ordinance would survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare’ ”) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)). 2013Twenty-five years later, in Lingle , the Supreme Court “corrected] course” and clarified that “the ‘substantially advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings precedents.” 544 U.S. at 540 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 (noting that “a municipal zoning ordinance would survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare’ ”) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)).	1	2013–2013
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. green scotus · 1926 2 sentences 2013Twenty-five years later, in Lingle , the Supreme Court “corrected] course” and clarified that “the ‘substantially advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings precedents.” 544 U.S. at 540 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 (noting that “a municipal zoning ordinance would survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare’ ”) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)). 2013Twenty-five years later, in Lingle , the Supreme Court “corrected] course” and clarified that “the ‘substantially advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings precedents.” 544 U.S. at 540 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 (noting that “a municipal zoning ordinance would survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare’ ”) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)).	1	2013–2013
A HELPING HAND, LLC v. Baltimore County, MD green ca4 · 2008 1 sentence 2013The developers’ confusion is further highlighted by the fact that they quote due process law in support of their equal protection argument, including A Helping Hand, L.L.C. v. Baltimore, 515 F.3d 356 (4th Cir.2008) (discussing the factors to be considered for a substantive due process claim).	1	2013–2013
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City green scotus · 1978 1 sentence 2013Noting that these constitutional challenges present “essentially ad hoc” inquiries which are largely dependent on the particular circumstances of each case, Penn Central identifies the appropriate factors to consider in determining whether a taking has occurred: the character of the government action, the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations. 438 U.S. at 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 .	1	2013–2013
Washington v. Harper green scotus · 1990 1 sentence 1993Id.	1	1993–1993

Statutes the citing opinions construe

SC § S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-400 (3) SC § S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-460 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 114 (1981–2026) IL 110 (1980–2026) TX 110 (1987–2025) PA 103 (1973–2026) WA 102 (1987–2024) IA 60 (1983–2024) MI 57 (1986–2025) WI 49 (1989–2024) NY 43 (1975–2026) NJ 38 (1970–2025) FL 34 (1974–2025) CT 31 (1991–2020) MN 30 (1986–2024) OH 28 (1989–2025) MA 25 (1975–2025) AL 24 (1980–2025) RI 23 (1991–2020) CO 22 (1960–2026) MD 21 (1985–2024) ND 21 (1978–2025) ME 20 (1981–2022) MS 18 (1991–2022) AZ 18 (1991–2023) WV 18 (1977–2025) UT 16 (1989–2026) SC 15 (1993–2025) MO 14 (1989–2023) KS 14 (1968–2025) GA 13 (1983–2021) TN 13 (1993–2018) AK 13 (1995–2025) NM 12 (1989–2025) NC 12 (1976–2021) VA 11 (1989–2025) OK 11 (1984–2022) DC 10 (1987–2023) NH 10 (1993–2015) MT 9 (1981–2025) LA 9 (1997–2024) ID 9 (1986–2023) IN 8 (1994–2024) SD 8 (1996–2024) WY 8 (1989–2026) DE 8 (1989–2025) NV 8 (1980–2025) AR 7 (2004–2023) OR 6 (1974–2011) KY 3 (2003–2025) HI 3 (1992–2018) NE 3 (1994–2025) VI 2 (2011–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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