12 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toomer v. Garrettgreen2 sentences2016In making this argument, the Town fails to recognize that Genesis brought an "as applied" claim rather than attacking the facial validity of the Ordinance. " 'In general, substantive due process protects the public from government action that [1] unreasonably deprives them of [2] a liberty or property interest.' " Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C.App. 38 , 63, 698 S.E.2d 404 , 422 (2010) (quoting *347 Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C.App. 462 , 469, 574 S.E.2d 76 , 84 (2002) ), aff'd per curiam, 365 N.C. 305 , 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011). "[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasona 2016In making this argument, the Town fails to recognize that Genesis brought an "as applied" claim rather than attacking the facial validity of the Ordinance. " 'In general, substantive due process protects the public from government action that [1] unreasonably deprives them of [2] a liberty or property interest.' " Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C.App. 38 , 63, 698 S.E.2d 404 , 422 (2010) (quoting *347 Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C.App. 462 , 469, 574 S.E.2d 76 , 84 (2002) ), aff'd per curiam, 365 N.C. 305 , 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011). "[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasona | 3 | 3 |
Darr v. Town of Telluride, Colo.green2 sentences2021See, e.g., Darr v. Town of Telluride, Colo, 495 F.3d 1243, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (observing Wieman did not address at-will employment and holding a town could terminate a marshal, even for allegedly arbitrary and capricious reasons, because “[t]he substantive- due-process clause does not forbid a public employer from terminating its at-will employees without cause”); Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419 , 423-24 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he defendants’ alleged arbitrary and capricious firing of Officer Singleton, an at-will employee[,] . . . did not violate his substantive due process rights.”). 2021See, e.g., Darr v. Town of Telluride, Colo, 495 F.3d 1243, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (observing Wieman did not address at-will employment and holding a town could terminate a marshal, even for allegedly arbitrary and capricious reasons, because “[t]he substantive- due-process clause does not forbid a public employer from terminating its at-will employees without cause”); Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he defendants’ alleged arbitrary and capricious firing of Officer Singleton, an at-will employee[,] . . . did not violate his substantive due process rights.”). | 2 | 2 |
Singleton v. Cecilgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Darr v. Town of Telluride, Colo, 495 F.3d 1243, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (observing Wieman did not address at-will employment and holding a town could terminate a marshal, even for allegedly arbitrary and capricious reasons, because “[t]he substantive- due-process clause does not forbid a public employer from terminating its at-will employees without cause”); Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419 , 423-24 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he defendants’ alleged arbitrary and capricious firing of Officer Singleton, an at-will employee[,] . . . did not violate his substantive due process rights.”). 2021See, e.g., Darr v. Town of Telluride, Colo, 495 F.3d 1243, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (observing Wieman did not address at-will employment and holding a town could terminate a marshal, even for allegedly arbitrary and capricious reasons, because “[t]he substantive- due-process clause does not forbid a public employer from terminating its at-will employees without cause”); Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he defendants’ alleged arbitrary and capricious firing of Officer Singleton, an at-will employee[,] . . . did not violate his substantive due process rights.”). | 2 | 2 |
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commissiongreen2 sentences2016Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 , 652, 114 S.Ct. 2445 , 2464, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (stating that a Court will generally concern itself with some "alleged illicit legislative motive" where there is otherwise a conceivable rational motive), and the law is rationally applied to the lot in question, see WMX Techs., supra. 10 In sum, the Ordinance on its face is not arbitrary in a constitutional sense, notwithstanding evidence that the Town drafted the Ordinance with Genesis in mind. 2016Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 , 652, 114 S.Ct. 2445 , 2464, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (stating that a Court will generally concern itself with some "alleged illicit legislative motive" where there is otherwise a conceivable rational motive), and the law is rationally applied to the lot in question, see WMX Techs., supra. 10 In sum, the Ordinance on its face is not arbitrary in a constitutional sense, notwithstanding evidence that the Town drafted the Ordinance with Genesis in mind. | 2 | 2 |
In Re: Joseph Lee Mooregreen2 sentences2000“The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective.” Moore, 289 N.C. at 101 , 221 S.E.2d at 311 . 2000“The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective.” Moore, 289 N.C. at 101 , 221 S.E.2d at 311 . | 1 | 3 |
Beneficial North Carolina, Inc. v. State Ex Rel. North Carolina State Banking Commissiongreen2 sentences2010"The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). "`Substantive due process' protection prevents the government from engaging in conduct that `shocks the conscience,' or interferes with rights `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491 , 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998) (citations omitted). 2010“The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). “ ‘Substantive due process’ protection prevents the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the con science,’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491 , 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Joynergreen2 sentences2010"Substantive due process is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained." State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 371 , 211 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1975). 2010"Substantive due process is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained." State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 371 , 211 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1975). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2010"The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). "`Substantive due process' protection prevents the government from engaging in conduct that `shocks the conscience,' or interferes with rights `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491 , 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998) (citations omitted). 2010"The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). "`Substantive due process' protection prevents the government from engaging in conduct that `shocks the conscience,' or interferes with rights `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491 , 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Rothgreen2 sentences2009App. 462, 469 , 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (2002)). "[I]n order for plaintiff to make a substantive due process claim, [he] must allege that [he] had a protected property interest and the government's action depriving [him] of it was without rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest." Id. "[Plaintiff] must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property interest." Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 33 L. 2009App. 462, 469 , 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (2002)). "[I]n order for plaintiff to make a substantive due process claim, [he] must allege that [he] had a protected property interest and the government's action depriving [him] of it was without rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest." Id. "[Plaintiff] must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property interest." Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 33 L. | 1 | 1 |
Lowe v. Tarblegreen2 sentences2000Substantive due process, therefore, provides “a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained.” Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 461 , 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985) (citing State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366 , 211 S.E.2d 320 (1975)); see State v. Killian, 37 N.C. 2000Substantive due process, therefore, provides “a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained.” Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 461 , 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985) (citing State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366 , 211 S.E.2d 320 (1975)); see State v. Killian, 37 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Killiangreen1 sentence2000Substantive due process, therefore, provides “a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained.” Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 461 , 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985) (citing State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366 , 211 S.E.2d 320 (1975)); see State v. Killian, 37 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Petition of Smithgreen2 sentences1997BNCI further contends the Commission’s decision violated its substantive due process rights because there is no reasonable relationship between the decision and the legislative intent expressed in G.S. section 53-172. “[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasonableness and limits a state’s exercise of its police power .... ‘The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective.’ ” In re Petition of Kermit Smith, 82 N.C. 1997App. 107, 111 , 345 S.E.2d 423, 425-26 (1986) (quoting In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 101 , 221 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1976)). *128 We first note the cases cited by BNCI apply this traditional substantive due process test to statutes and agency rules. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Browning-Ferris Industries of South Atlantic, Inc. v. Wake County
green
2 sentences2016Such improper motives were the basis for the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff's substantive due process claim in Browning-Ferris, 905 F.Supp. at 321 . 2016Opinion of the Court improper motives were the basis for the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim in Browning-Ferris, 905 F. Supp. at 321 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary
green
2 sentences2016In making this argument, the Town fails to recognize that Genesis brought an "as applied" claim rather than attacking the facial validity of the Ordinance. " 'In general, substantive due process protects the public from government action that [1] unreasonably deprives them of [2] a liberty or property interest.' " Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C.App. 38 , 63, 698 S.E.2d 404 , 422 (2010) (quoting *347 Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C.App. 462 , 469, 574 S.E.2d 76 , 84 (2002) ), aff'd per curiam, 365 N.C. 305 , 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011). "[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasona 2016App. 462, 469 , 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (2002)), aff’d per curiam, 365 N.C. 305 , 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011). “[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasonableness and limits a state’s exercise of its police power. . . . ‘The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective.’ ” Beneficial N.C., Inc. v. State ex rel. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary
green
2 sentences2016In making this argument, the Town fails to recognize that Genesis brought an "as applied" claim rather than attacking the facial validity of the Ordinance. " 'In general, substantive due process protects the public from government action that [1] unreasonably deprives them of [2] a liberty or property interest.' " Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C.App. 38 , 63, 698 S.E.2d 404 , 422 (2010) (quoting *347 Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C.App. 462 , 469, 574 S.E.2d 76 , 84 (2002) ), aff'd per curiam, 365 N.C. 305 , 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011). "[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasona 2016App. 462, 469 , 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (2002)), aff’d per curiam, 365 N.C. 305 , 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011). “[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasonableness and limits a state’s exercise of its police power. . . . ‘The traditional substantive due process test has been that a statute must have a rational relation to a valid state objective.’ ” Beneficial N.C., Inc. v. State ex rel. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Wmx Technologies, Inc. v. Gasconade County
green
1 sentence2016Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 , 652, 114 S.Ct. 2445 , 2464, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (stating that a Court will generally concern itself with some "alleged illicit legislative motive" where there is otherwise a conceivable rational motive), and the law is rationally applied to the lot in question, see WMX Techs., supra. 10 In sum, the Ordinance on its face is not arbitrary in a constitutional sense, notwithstanding evidence that the Town drafted the Ordinance with Genesis in mind. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary
green
2 sentences2016In making this argument, the Town fails to recognize that Genesis brought an "as applied" claim rather than attacking the facial validity of the Ordinance. " 'In general, substantive due process protects the public from government action that [1] unreasonably deprives them of [2] a liberty or property interest.' " Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C.App. 38 , 63, 698 S.E.2d 404 , 422 (2010) (quoting *347 Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C.App. 462 , 469, 574 S.E.2d 76 , 84 (2002) ), aff'd per curiam, 365 N.C. 305 , 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011). "[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasona 2016In making this argument, the Town fails to recognize that Genesis brought an "as applied" claim rather than attacking the facial validity of the Ordinance. " 'In general, substantive due process protects the public from government action that [1] unreasonably deprives them of [2] a liberty or property interest.' " Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C.App. 38 , 63, 698 S.E.2d 404 , 422 (2010) (quoting *347 Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C.App. 462 , 469, 574 S.E.2d 76 , 84 (2002) ), aff'd per curiam, 365 N.C. 305 , 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011). "[S]ubstantive due process denotes a standard of reasona | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Wolff v. McDonnell
green
2 sentences1986Minimum procedural due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings were delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 41 L.Ed. 2d 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974). 1986Minimum procedural due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings were delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 41 L.Ed. 2d 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Moore v. City of East Cleveland
green
2 sentences1979E.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 531 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 (1977). 1979E.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 531 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 (1977). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Loving v. Virginia
green
2 sentences1976In a growing series of decisions, the United States Supreme *102 Court has recognized a right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights that includes the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); certain marital activities, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1964); and procreation, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 349 , 92 S.Ct 1976In a growing series of decisions, the United States Supreme *102 Court has recognized a right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights that includes the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); certain marital activities, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1964); and procreation, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 349 , 92 S.Ct | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Griswold v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1976In a growing series of decisions, the United States Supreme *102 Court has recognized a right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights that includes the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); certain marital activities, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1964); and procreation, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 349 , 92 S.Ct 1976In a growing series of decisions, the United States Supreme *102 Court has recognized a right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights that includes the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); certain marital activities, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1964); and procreation, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 349 , 92 S.Ct | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Eisenstadt v. Baird
green
2 sentences1976In a growing series of decisions, the United States Supreme *102 Court has recognized a right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights that includes the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); certain marital activities, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1964); and procreation, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 349 , 92 S.Ct 1976In a growing series of decisions, the United States Supreme *102 Court has recognized a right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights that includes the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); certain marital activities, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1964); and procreation, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 349 , 92 S.Ct | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Roe v. Wade
red
2 sentences1976In a growing series of decisions, the United States Supreme *102 Court has recognized a right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights that includes the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); certain marital activities, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1964); and procreation, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 349 , 92 S.Ct 1976In a growing series of decisions, the United States Supreme *102 Court has recognized a right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights that includes the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); certain marital activities, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1964); and procreation, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 349 , 92 S.Ct | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.