substantive due process claim in Massachusetts

2008See Amsden v. Moran, supra (“a substantive due process claim implicates the essence of state action rather than its modalities; such a claim rests not on perceived procedural deficiencies but on the idea that the government’s conduct, regardless of procedural swaddling, was in itself impermissible”).

1994Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1990).

2025The department employees argue that the "deliberate indifference" standard set forth in Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851-852 , governs in the foster care context.[10] The plaintiffs, however, reject this approach, contending the Youngberg "professional judgment" standard should apply.

2018See County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833 , 836, 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (arbitrary conduct that shocks conscience violates substantive due process).

2013That statute, like ours, required findings of prior sexual offenses, future sexual dangerousness, and a link between those findings and “the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 .

2010See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352 (quoting Kansas’s definition of “sexually violent predator” and “mental abnormality”); see also Bruno , 432 Mass, at 499 (in Hendricks , Supreme Court “upheld as constitutional the Sexually Violent Predator Act . . . which contains many provisions similar to those in c. 123A”).

2009In those cases we explained that where the right involved “is ‘fundamental,’ we ‘ “must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).’ Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993).

2005L. c. 276, § 58, third par., we explained: “Although the public may benefit indirectly from the detention of a defendant whose bail is revoked pursuant to the third paragraph of § 58 because he may be dangerous, the purpose of § 58 is not ‘calculated to protect the public’ from a dangerous person, Aime v. Commonwealth, [ 414 Mass. 667, 675 (1993)], but to assure compliance with its laws and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process by exacting obedience with its lawful orders.” Paquette v. Commonwealth, supra at 129.

2025In J.R., 593 F.3d at 76, 79 , the mother of twin boys in foster care brought a substantive due process claim against a social worker and her supervisor, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of sexual abuse.

2025Id. at 80 .

2024Moreover, to establish a substantive due process violation, the father must show that the governmental conduct at issue was "so egregious as to shock the conscience." Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir. 2006).

2024The record does not reveal any conduct that plausibly rises to this level. 7 erroneous or where there is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion." Id.

2024See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972) ("denial of due process inherent in holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over the head of one who will never have a chance to prove his innocence").9 Three main factors render the charges against the juvenile indefinite.

2022The plaintiff's claim of denial of access to the courts fails because he does not allege that the "deficiencies [in his access to the courts] hindered his efforts to present a nonfrivolous legal claim." Puleio v. Commissioner of Correction, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 311 (2001), citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-353 (1996).

2022The plaintiff's substantive due process claim fails because he does not allege any government action that "'shocks the conscience,' . . . or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Josh J. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 716, 721 (2018), quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937).

2022The plaintiff's substantive due process claim fails because he does not allege any government action that "'shocks the conscience,' . . . or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Josh J. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 716, 721 (2018), quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937).

2022The plaintiff's substantive due process claim fails because he does not allege any government action that "'shocks the conscience,' . . . or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Josh J. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 716, 721 (2018), quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937).

2022The plaintiff's claim of denial of access to the courts fails because he does not allege that the "deficiencies [in his access to the courts] hindered his efforts to present a nonfrivolous legal claim." Puleio v. Commissioner of Correction, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 311 (2001), citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-353 (1996).

2018See Will , 491 U.S. at 67 , 70 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 ; Laubinger v. Department of Revenue , 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598 , 601-602, 672 N.E.2d 554 (1996). 12 In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also assert a substantive due process violation under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

2018See Will , 491 U.S. at 67 , 70 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 ; Laubinger v. Department of Revenue , 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598 , 601-602, 672 N.E.2d 554 (1996). 12 In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also assert a substantive due process violation under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

2016See also Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. East Providence, 970 F.2d 996 , 1000 n.8 (1st Cir. 1992) (“A complaint pleads a substantive due process violation by a local administrative agency only if the facts alleged are shocking or violative of universal standards of decency” [quotation and citation omitted]).

2013See Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9 , 10 n.2 (2002) (“We have not differentiated the substantive due process standard of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights from that of the Federal Constitution in cases involving substantive due process challenges to G.

2013See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (“It is not the role of the . . . courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking basis in wisdom or compassion”).

2009Where the fundamental right at stake is liberty, the substantive due process analysis undertaken by this court in Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 124-125 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004) (pretrial detention after bail revocation), and Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489 (2000) (commitment of allegedly sexual dangerous persons), is comparable to the equal protection analysis the court employs in this case.

2009See Commonwealth v. Bruno, supra. Applying a substantive due process analysis based to the loss of liberty, I would hold that the ordinance’s civil penalties “represent ... a permissible, narrowly tailored response to Lowell’s compelling interest in preventing crime by, and against, minors.” Ante at 41.

2009Furthermore, “[t]he right to substantive due process under the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable governmental interference with fundamental rights.” Kenniston v. Department of Youth Servs., supra at 183, and cases cited.

2009Where the fundamental right at stake is liberty, the substantive due process analysis undertaken by this court in Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 124-125 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004) (pretrial detention after bail revocation), and Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489 (2000) (commitment of allegedly sexual dangerous persons), is comparable to the equal protection analysis the court employs in this case.

2009In those cases we explained that where the right involved “is ‘fundamental,’ we ‘ “must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).’ Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993).

2004An individual arrested for operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor has no constitutional right to refuse a breath test. 10 See Commonwealth v. Davidson, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 846, 848 (1990).