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18 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thorne v. Roushgreen2 sentences2020The circuit court reasoned that, “[i]n order for a statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the substantive due process standard, it must appear that the means chosen by the Legislature to achieve a proper legislative purpose bear a rational relationship to that purpose and are not arbitrary or discriminatory.” Thorne v. Roush, 164 W. 2020The circuit court reasoned that, “[i]n order for a statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the substantive due process standard, it must appear that the means chosen by the Legislature to achieve a proper legislative purpose bear a rational relationship to that purpose and are not arbitrary or discriminatory.” Thorne v. Roush, 164 W. | 3 | 5 |
State Ex Rel . Harris v. Calendinegreen2 sentences1984Harris v. Calendine, 160 W.Va. 172, 179 , 233 S.E.2d 318, 324 (1977), this Court stated that “Inherent in the due process clause of the State Constitution are both the concept of substantive due process and the concept of equal protection of the laws.” Later, in Thorne v. Roush, 164 W.Va. 165 , 261 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1979), we stated that “In order for a statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the substantive due process standard, it must appear that the means chosen by the Legislature to achieve a proper legislative purpose bear a rational relationship to that purpose and are not arbit 1984Harris v. Calendine, 160 W.Va. 172, 179 , 233 S.E.2d 318, 324 (1977), this Court stated that “Inherent in the due process clause of the State Constitution are both the concept of substantive due process and the concept of equal protection of the laws.” Later, in Thorne v. Roush, 164 W.Va. 165 , 261 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1979), we stated that “In order for a statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the substantive due process standard, it must appear that the means chosen by the Legislature to achieve a proper legislative purpose bear a rational relationship to that purpose and are not arbit | 3 | 5 |
Lockyer v. Andradegreen2 sentences2004As this Court noted in Haislop v. Edgell, 215 W.Va. 88, 99 , 593 S.E.2d 839, 850 [2003] (upholding sex offender registration statute): Additionally, we are not unmindful that the concurring opinion of Justices Souter and Ginsburg in Connecticut Department of Public Safety noted that they "agree with the observation that today's holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut's dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle[J” Id. 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 1165, 155 L.Ed.2d at 106, and that "the Court's rejection of respondents' procedural due p 2004As this Court noted in Haislop v. Edgell, 215 W.Va. 88, 99 , 593 S.E.2d 839, 850 [2003] (upholding sex offender registration statute): Additionally, we are not unmindful that the concurring opinion of Justices Souter and Ginsburg in Connecticut Department of Public Safety noted that they "agree with the observation that today's holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut's dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle[,]" Id. 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 1165, 155 L.Ed.2d at 106, and that "the Court's rejection of respondents' procedural due | 2 | 2 |
DeCoals, Inc. v. BD. OF ZONING APPEALS, ETC.green2 sentences1985The substantive due process standard that we apply to legislative enactments is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Wender, 149 W.Va. 413 , 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538 , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984): “The legislature is vested with a wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires, the wisdom of which may not be inquired into by the courts; however, to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, legislative acts must bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purp 1985The substantive due process standard that we apply to legislative enactments is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Wender, 149 W.Va. 413 , 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538 , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984): “The legislature is vested with a wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires, the wisdom of which may not be inquired into by the courts; however, to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, legislative acts must bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purp | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Steven Greengreen1 sentence2025Me. 2009) (citation omitted) (“[T]he vindictive prosecution doctrine imposes critical ‘constitutional limits’ upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”). 15 For example, in United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1063 (7th Cir. 1992), the court of appeals explained, “[a]rbitrariness—that is, unjustified disparities in the treatment of similarly situated persons—is not among the grounds on which to contest an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” See United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 653 (6th Cir. 2011) (observing that Smith stands “for the proposition that an exercise of prosecutoria | 1 | 1 |
Oyler v. Bolesgreen1 sentence2025Indeed, the United States Supreme Court found in Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) that “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement [of a recidivist statute] is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” What does constitute a constitutional violation is the selective exercise of prosecutorial discretion in violation of equal protection. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jeffrey C. Smithgreen1 sentence2025Me. 2009) (citation omitted) (“[T]he vindictive prosecution doctrine imposes critical ‘constitutional limits’ upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”). 15 For example, in United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1063 (7th Cir. 1992), the court of appeals explained, “[a]rbitrariness—that is, unjustified disparities in the treatment of similarly situated persons—is not among the grounds on which to contest an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” See United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 653 (6th Cir. 2011) (observing that Smith stands “for the proposition that an exercise of prosecutoria | 1 | 1 |
Par Mar v. City of Parkersburggreen1 sentence2020See id. | 1 | 1 |
Haislop v. Edgellgreen2 sentences2004As this Court noted in Haislop v. Edgell, 215 W.Va. 88, 99 , 593 S.E.2d 839, 850 [2003] (upholding sex offender registration statute): Additionally, we are not unmindful that the concurring opinion of Justices Souter and Ginsburg in Connecticut Department of Public Safety noted that they "agree with the observation that today's holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut's dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle[,]" Id. 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 1165, 155 L.Ed.2d at 106, and that "the Court's rejection of respondents' procedural due 2004As this Court noted in Haislop v. Edgell, 215 W.Va. 88, 99 , 593 S.E.2d 839, 850 [2003] (upholding sex offender registration statute): Additionally, we are not unmindful that the concurring opinion of Justices Souter and Ginsburg in Connecticut Department of Public Safety noted that they "agree with the observation that today's holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut's dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle[,]" Id. 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 1165, 155 L.Ed.2d at 106, and that "the Court's rejection of respondents' procedural due | 1 | 1 |
Ingraham v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1982See Note 12, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 659 , 97 S.Ct. at 1406 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 723 . 1982See Note 12, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 659 , 97 S.Ct. at 1406 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 723 . | 1 | 1 |
In re Ellery C.green1 sentence1977Chief Judge Fuld noted “as might be expected, the practice [of confining PINS with juvenile delinquents] has been severely condemned.” Id. at 425. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
green
2 sentences2016The Supreme Court has made clear that property interests are not created by the constitution, itself, but rather by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 2 In the instant proceeding, Pioneer Pipe was granted a statutory right that protected its property from being arbitrarily and capriciously taken by the Insurance Commissioner. 2016The Supreme Court has made clear that property interests are not created by the constitution, itself, but rather by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 2 In the instant proceeding, Pioneer Pipe was granted a statutory right that protected its property from being arbitrarily and capriciously taken by the Insurance Commissioner. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
County Concrete Corporation v. Township Of Roxbury
green
2 sentences2016Moreover, in order “[t]o prevail on a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an arbitrary and capricious act deprived them of a protected property interest.” County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159 , 165 (3d Cir. 2006). 2016Moreover, in order “[t]o prevail on a substantive due process claim, .a plaintiff must demonstrate that an arbitrary and capricious act deprived them of a protected property interest.” County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159 , 165 (3d Cir. 2006). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
O'NEIL v. City of Parkersburg
green
2 sentences1985The substantive due process standard that we apply to legislative enactments is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Wender, 149 W.Va. 413 , 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538 , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984): “The legislature is vested with a wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires, the wisdom of which may not be inquired into by the courts; however, to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, legislative acts must bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purp 1985The substantive due process standard that we apply to legislative enactments is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Wender, 149 W.Va. 413 , 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538 , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984): “The legislature is vested with a wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires, the wisdom of which may not be inquired into by the courts; however, to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, legislative acts must bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purp | 2 | 1984–1985 |
State v. Wender
green
2 sentences1985The substantive due process standard that we apply to legislative enactments is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Wender, 149 W.Va. 413 , 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538 , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984): “The legislature is vested with a wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires, the wisdom of which may not be inquired into by the courts; however, to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, legislative acts must bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purp 1985The substantive due process standard that we apply to legislative enactments is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Wender, 149 W.Va. 413 , 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538 , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984): “The legislature is vested with a wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires, the wisdom of which may not be inquired into by the courts; however, to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, legislative acts must bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purp | 2 | 1984–1985 |
State v. Lilly
green
2 sentences2020However, petitioners have not squarely addressed a substantive due process issue and “‘[w]e have noted on many occasions that “casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.’ State v. Lilly, 194 W.Va. 595 , 605 n. 16, 461 S.E.2d 101 , 111 n. 16 (1995).” State v. Lambert, 236 W. 2020However, petitioners have not squarely addressed a substantive due process issue and “‘[w]e have noted on many occasions that “casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.’ State v. Lilly, 194 W.Va. 595 , 605 n. 16, 461 S.E.2d 101 , 111 n. 16 (1995).” State v. Lambert, 236 W. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State of West Virginia v. Jeremy Lambert
green
1 sentence2020However, petitioners have not squarely addressed a substantive due process issue and “‘[w]e have noted on many occasions that “casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.’ State v. Lilly, 194 W.Va. 595 , 605 n. 16, 461 S.E.2d 101 , 111 n. 16 (1995).” State v. Lambert, 236 W. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Whalen
green
2 sentences2003Additionally, we are not unmindful that the concurring opinion of Justices Souter and Ginsburg in Connecticut Department of Public Safety noted that they "agree with the observation that today's holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut's dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle[,]" Id. 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 1165, 155 L.Ed.2d at 106, and that "the Court's rejection of respondents' procedural due process claim does not immunize publication schemes like Connecticut's from an equal protection challenge." Id. 538 U.S. at 10, 123 S.C 2003Additionally, we are not unmindful that the concurring opinion of Justices Souter and Ginsburg in Connecticut Department of Public Safety noted that they “agree with the observation that today’s holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut’s dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle!!,]” Id. 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 1165, 155 L.Ed.2d at 106, and that “the Court’s rejection of respondents’ procedural due process claim does not immunize publication schemes like Connecticut’s from an equal protection challenge.” Id. 538 U.S. at 10, 123 S. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corporation
green
1 sentence1992We, therefore, find ourselves in much the same position as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did in Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d at 282 , when confronted with the same substantive due process argument: “In more recent encounters with the issue, we have concluded that the substantive due process claim was neither adequately raised, Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d [393] 398 [(2d Cir.1989)], nor factually supported in the district court, Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d [1281] 1288 [(2d Cir.1990)]; Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d at 398. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co.
green
2 sentences1985The substantive due process standard that we apply to legislative enactments is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Wender, 149 W.Va. 413 , 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538 , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984): “The legislature is vested with a wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires, the wisdom of which may not be inquired into by the courts; however, to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, legislative acts must bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purp 1985The substantive due process standard that we apply to legislative enactments is summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Wender, 149 W.Va. 413 , 141 S.E.2d 359 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538 , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984): “The legislature is vested with a wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires, the wisdom of which may not be inquired into by the courts; however, to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, legislative acts must bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purp | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Wyatt v. Stickney
green
1 sentence1977The Court said at 202 S.E.2d 120 : “The theoretical beneficence of the State with regard to its citizens has been used in justification of state custody or guardianship from the medieval period to our own day, although the disparity between the theory of beneficence and the practice of cruelty and inhumanity has often been the subject of literature (see, Dickens, Oliver Twist; Bronte, Jane Eyre.) There is persuasive evidence that the alleged improvement in treatment in modern state facilities from medieval times to our own is more myth than reality, see, Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (D. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.