9 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.green1 sentence2024See, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) (As regards procedural due process, when legislation is at issue, “the legislative determination provides all the process that is due.”); Messina v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson Cityred2 sentences2012In Standard Materials, Inc., 700 So.2d at 983 , the court, in reliance on Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194 , 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116, 3120 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), suggested that a substantive due process claim might not be ripe until the governmental entity charged with implementing the challenged regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. 2012In Standard Materials, Inc., 700 So.2d at 983 , the court, in reliance on Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194 , 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116, 3120 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), suggested that a substantive due process claim might not be ripe until the governmental entity charged with implementing the challenged regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. | 1 | 1 |
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewinggreen2 sentences2004See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 , 106 S.Ct. 507 , 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); and Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 , 98 S.Ct. 948 , 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978). 2004See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 , 106 S.Ct. 507 , 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); and Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 , 98 S.Ct. 948 , 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Washington v. Glucksberggreen2 sentences2000See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997) (finding that total ban, rather than regulation, was rationally related to state's legitimate interest in preserving life). 2000See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997) (finding that total ban, rather than regulation, was rationally related to state's legitimate interest in preserving life). | 1 | 1 |
Triomphe Investors v. City Of Northwoodgreen1 sentence1997See Triomphe Investors v. City of Northwood, 49 F.3d at 202 . | 1 | 1 |
Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartzgreen2 sentences1997Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d at 97 ; Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 , 725-726 n. 16 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 , 111 S.Ct. 1073 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991). [9] As explained by the Landmark court, "Before a... court may step in and ascertain whether a local planning authority has taken property arbitrarily, however, it must allow the local authority a chance to take final action. 1997The first prong of this ripeness requirement has also been applied to a substantive due process claim wherein governmental zoning actions are challenged as arbitrary and capricious. [8] Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717 , 722 (10th Cir.1989); [9] see also Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96-97 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied sub. nom., Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Individual Members of Vermont Environmental Board, 507 U.S. 987 , 113 S.Ct. 1586 , 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Babineaux v. Judiciary Commissiongreen1 sentence1997The essence of substantive due process is protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action." Babineaux v. Judiciary Commission, 341 So.2d 396, 400 (La.1976). [15] In the section of the reasons for judgment where the trial court discusses the substantive due process claim, mention is made of Standard's right to "notice and an opportunity to be heard;" however, this discussion is inapposite because notice and an opportunity to be heard are components of a procedural due process claim, rather than a substantive due process claim. [16] We note that the property interest at issue in Standard's tak | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Standard Materials, Inc. v. City of Slidell
green
2 sentences2012In Standard Materials, Inc., 700 So.2d at 983 , the court, in reliance on Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194 , 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116, 3120 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), suggested that a substantive due process claim might not be ripe until the governmental entity charged with implementing the challenged regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. 2012However, the court then discussed the merits of the substantive due process claim "in the event that this determination regarding ripeness is erroneous.” Standard Materials, Inc., 700 So.2d at 983 . | 3 | 2000–2012 |
Campbell v. Holt
green
2 sentences2024As aptly explained by Justice Bradley over a century ago in his dissenting opinion in Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631 , 6 S. Ct. 209, 215 , 29 L. 2024As aptly explained by Justice Bradley over a century ago in his dissenting opinion in Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631 , 6 S. Ct. 209, 215 , 29 L. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish Government
green
2 sentences2024Id., 07-2432 at 23, 982 So.2d at 811-12 . (“[A] review of this court’s decisions in Austin, Bourgeois II, and the cases they rely on, indicates that consideration of whether a legislative enactment qualifies as a legitimate exercise of police power is not one of the factors considered by this court in cases involving the retroactive application of newly adopted statutes to divest plaintiffs of vested rights. ... 2024Id., 07-2432 at 23, 982 So.2d at 811-12 . (“[A] review of this court’s decisions in Austin, Bourgeois II, and the cases they rely on, indicates that consideration of whether a legislative enactment qualifies as a legitimate exercise of police power is not one of the factors considered by this court in cases involving the retroactive application of newly adopted statutes to divest plaintiffs of vested rights. ... | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz
green
2 sentences2004See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 , 106 S.Ct. 507 , 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); and Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 , 98 S.Ct. 948 , 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978). 2004See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 , 106 S.Ct. 507 , 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); and Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 , 98 S.Ct. 948 , 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
La. Seafood Management Council v. La. Wildlife and Fisheries Com'n
green
2 sentences1998Likewise, our Supreme Court's determinations that the restrictions of use of plaintiffs' gear and capital investments do not constitute a "taking," Louisiana Seafood Management Council , 97-1367 at pp. 8-9; 715 So.2d at 392-93 , and that plaintiffs lack a property interest in the "right to fish," Louisiana Seafood Management Council , 97-1367 at pp. 9-13; 715 So.2d at 392-95 , constrain this court to find that plaintiffs have failed to establish the "property interest" requirement of a substantive due process claim. 1998Likewise, our Supreme Court's determinations that the restrictions of use of plaintiffs' gear and capital investments do not constitute a "taking," Louisiana Seafood Management Council , 97-1367 at pp. 8-9; 715 So.2d at 392-93 , and that plaintiffs lack a property interest in the "right to fish," Louisiana Seafood Management Council , 97-1367 at pp. 9-13; 715 So.2d at 392-95 , constrain this court to find that plaintiffs have failed to establish the "property interest" requirement of a substantive due process claim. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Landmark Land Company Of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Buchanan
green
1 sentence1997The first prong of this ripeness requirement has also been applied to a substantive due process claim wherein governmental zoning actions are challenged as arbitrary and capricious. [8] Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717 , 722 (10th Cir.1989); [9] see also Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96-97 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied sub. nom., Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Individual Members of Vermont Environmental Board, 507 U.S. 987 , 113 S.Ct. 1586 , 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Elling O. Eide v. Sarasota County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida
green
1 sentence1997Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d at 97 ; Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 , 725-726 n. 16 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 , 111 S.Ct. 1073 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991). [9] As explained by the Landmark court, "Before a... court may step in and ascertain whether a local planning authority has taken property arbitrarily, however, it must allow the local authority a chance to take final action. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Laughlin v. Internal Revenue Service
green
1 sentence1997Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d at 97 ; Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 , 725-726 n. 16 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 , 111 S.Ct. 1073 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991). [9] As explained by the Landmark court, "Before a... court may step in and ascertain whether a local planning authority has taken property arbitrarily, however, it must allow the local authority a chance to take final action. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority
green
1 sentence1997Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d at 97 ; Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 , 725-726 n. 16 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 , 111 S.Ct. 1073 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991). [9] As explained by the Landmark court, "Before a... court may step in and ascertain whether a local planning authority has taken property arbitrarily, however, it must allow the local authority a chance to take final action. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ketchel v. Bainbridge Township
green
1 sentence1997Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d at 97 ; Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 , 725-726 n. 16 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 , 111 S.Ct. 1073 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991). [9] As explained by the Landmark court, "Before a... court may step in and ascertain whether a local planning authority has taken property arbitrarily, however, it must allow the local authority a chance to take final action. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Insurance
green
1 sentence1997The first prong of this ripeness requirement has also been applied to a substantive due process claim wherein governmental zoning actions are challenged as arbitrary and capricious. [8] Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717 , 722 (10th Cir.1989); [9] see also Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96-97 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied sub. nom., Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Individual Members of Vermont Environmental Board, 507 U.S. 987 , 113 S.Ct. 1586 , 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jit Kim Lim v. Central DuPage Hospital
green
1 sentence1997The first prong of this ripeness requirement has also been applied to a substantive due process claim wherein governmental zoning actions are challenged as arbitrary and capricious. [8] Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717 , 722 (10th Cir.1989); [9] see also Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96-97 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied sub. nom., Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Individual Members of Vermont Environmental Board, 507 U.S. 987 , 113 S.Ct. 1586 , 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Individual Members of the Vermont Environmental Board
green
1 sentence1997The first prong of this ripeness requirement has also been applied to a substantive due process claim wherein governmental zoning actions are challenged as arbitrary and capricious. [8] Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717 , 722 (10th Cir.1989); [9] see also Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96-97 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied sub. nom., Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Individual Members of Vermont Environmental Board, 507 U.S. 987 , 113 S.Ct. 1586 , 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.