10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doegreen2 sentences2004See Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 1160 (“Because the question is not properly before us, we express no opinion as to whether Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates principles of substantive due process.”); see also id. at 9 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut’s dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle.”). 2004See Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 1160 (“Because the question is not properly before us, we express no opinion as to whether Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates principles of substantive due process.”); see also id. at 9 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecticut’s dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due process principle.”). | 2 | 2 |
Palko v. Connecticutred2 sentences2004At a minimum, they must show that SORA impinges on rights and liberties that are “fundamental” 21 — a test that is not easy to meet, as the Supreme Court has explained it: [T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” [citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion)]; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranke 2004At a minimum, they must show that SORA impinges on rights and liberties that are “fundamental” 21 — a test that is not easy to meet, as the Supreme Court has explained it: [T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” [citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion)]; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranke | 2 | 2 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2004At a minimum, they must show that SORA impinges on rights and liberties that are “fundamental” 21 — a test that is not easy to meet, as the Supreme Court has explained it: [T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” [citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion)]; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranke 2004At a minimum, they must show that SORA impinges on rights and liberties that are “fundamental” 21 — a test that is not easy to meet, as the Supreme Court has explained it: [T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” [citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion)]; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranke | 2 | 2 |
John Doe, I Jane Doe John Doe, II v. Bill Tandeske Gregg D. Renkesgreen2 sentences2004Most recently, for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a substantive due process attack on Alaska’s law (on remand from the Supreme Court after Smith) in Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir.2004) (per curiam). 2004Most recently, for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a substantive due process attack on Alaska's law (on remand from the Supreme Court after Smith ) in Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir.2004) (per curiam). | 2 | 2 |
Richard Fields v. City of Philadelphiagreen1 sentence2023Id. at 1525 & n.4. 32 Yehia, 38 F.4th 1282, 1291 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355-56, 360 (3d Cir. 2017)), which negates officers’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their interactions with the public and thus is incompatible with the “fundamental” informational privacy right for officers that FOP posits. | 1 | 1 |
Irizarry v. Yehiagreen1 sentence2023Id. at 1525 & n.4. 32 Yehia, 38 F.4th 1282, 1291 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355-56, 360 (3d Cir. 2017)), which negates officers’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their interactions with the public and thus is incompatible with the “fundamental” informational privacy right for officers that FOP posits. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Campbellgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Baker, 177 F.3d at 158 (two years); Campbell, 985 F. Supp. at 159 (eighteen months). | 1 | 1 |
James Baker v. James F. Barbo Attorney General of the State of New Jerseygreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Baker, 177 F.3d at 158 (two years); Campbell, 985 F. Supp. at 159 (eighteen months). | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020See Wells v. United States, 802 A.2d 352, 354-55 (D.C. 2002) (finding that appellant’s re-incarceration following erroneous release from confinement through administrative error did not qualify as “extreme circumstances” justifying a finding of a due process violation). | 1 | 1 |
Charles A. Johnson v. J. Williford, Warden, Metropolitan Correctional Center United States Parole Commission and United States of Americagreen1 sentence2002First, nothing in the record implies that the failure of the District parole officials to lodge the parole warrant as a detainer— or, as the case may be, the failure of Virginia officials to maintain a record of the lodged detainer — was “more than sim-pie neglect.” Merritt, supra. Second, the “unfairness” of re-arresting Wells does not rise to the level shown in cases where rearrest has been deemed unfair, such as Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 870, 872 (9th Cir.1982) (parole authority incorrectly calculated prisoner’s sentence on eight separate occasions, and prisoner was living with hi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Merrittgreen2 sentences2002But we emphasized that “[o]nly the most egregious case, involving for example governmental culpability and unusual prejudice to the affected prisoner, would support a substantive due process claim.” Id.; see also Merritt, 478 F.Supp. at 806-07 (before relief will be granted for “ministerial” error regarding sentence execution, “the result must not be attributable to the defendant himself; the action of the authorities must amount to more than simple neglect; and the situation brought about by defendant’s release and reincar-ceration must be unequivocally inconsistent with fundamental principle 2002First, nothing in the record implies that the failure of the District parole officials to lodge the parole warrant as a detainer— or, as the case may be, the failure of Virginia officials to maintain a record of the lodged detainer — was “more than sim-pie neglect.” Merritt, supra. Second, the “unfairness” of re-arresting Wells does not rise to the level shown in cases where rearrest has been deemed unfair, such as Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 870, 872 (9th Cir.1982) (parole authority incorrectly calculated prisoner’s sentence on eight separate occasions, and prisoner was living with hi | 1 | 1 |
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences1993In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the deprivation of liberty triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means. 489 U.S. at 199-200 , 109 S.Ct. at 1005-06 (emphasis added; citations, footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 1993In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the deprivation of liberty triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means. 489 U.S. at 199-200 , 109 S.Ct. at 1005-06 (emphasis added; citations, footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Robinsonred2 sentences1991See Part III infra. Such claims are not encompassed by the procedures of the condemnation statute, as was the case in Smith v. Robinson. 14 Furthermore, Robinson’s overarching rationale was, in accord with Golden State, supra, simply that “§ 1983 is a statutory remedy and Congress retains the authority to repeal it or replace it with an alternative remedy.” 468 U.S. at 1012 , 104 S.Ct. at 3468 . 1991See Part III infra. Such claims are not encompassed by the procedures of the condemnation statute, as was the case in Smith v. Robinson. 14 Furthermore, Robinson’s overarching rationale was, in accord with Golden State, supra, simply that “§ 1983 is a statutory remedy and Congress retains the authority to repeal it or replace it with an alternative remedy.” 468 U.S. at 1012 , 104 S.Ct. at 3468 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
County of Sacramento v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2020In explaining the principles of common law 9 In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for whether executive action amounts to a substantive due process violation: a court must determine first “whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience,” and, if so, it must then proceed to determine whether the Glucksberg features are satisfied. 523 U.S. 833 , 847 n.8 (1998). 2004“History and tradition are the starting point,” though “not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 , 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 , 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 22 If the rights or liberties that SORA affects are not “fundamental” ones, the law need bear only “a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest” to be constitutional). | 3 | 2004–2020 |
Hernandez Ex Rel. Hernandez v. Foster
green
2 sentences2018Hernandez , supra , 657 F.3d at 474 . 2018Hernandez , supra , 657 F.3d at 474 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Lawrence v. Texas
green
2 sentences2004“History and tradition are the starting point,” though “not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 , 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 , 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 22 If the rights or liberties that SORA affects are not “fundamental” ones, the law need bear only “a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest” to be constitutional). 2004“History and tradition are the starting point,” though “not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 , 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 , 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 22 If the rights or liberties that SORA affects are not “fundamental” ones, the law need bear only “a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest” to be constitutional). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Washington v. Glucksberg
green
2 sentences2004Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 . 2004Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Moore v. City of East Cleveland
green
2 sentences2004At a minimum, they must show that SORA impinges on rights and liberties that are “fundamental” 21 — a test that is not easy to meet, as the Supreme Court has explained it: [T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” [citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion)]; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranke 2004At a minimum, they must show that SORA impinges on rights and liberties that are “fundamental” 21 — a test that is not easy to meet, as the Supreme Court has explained it: [T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” [citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion)]; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranke | 2 | 2004–2004 |
No. 92-1068
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 1525 & n.4. 32 Yehia, 38 F.4th 1282, 1291 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355-56, 360 (3d Cir. 2017)), which negates officers’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their interactions with the public and thus is incompatible with the “fundamental” informational privacy right for officers that FOP posits. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Irving Houston Hawkins v. Franklin Freeman
green
1 sentence2020On this basis, we distinguish Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), in which the Fourth Circuit refused to find a substantive due process violation when the defendant was mistakenly granted parole and re-incarcerated twenty months later. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Millard v. Roach
green
1 sentence2002But we emphasized that “[o]nly the most egregious case, involving for example governmental culpability and unusual prejudice to the affected prisoner, would support a substantive due process claim.” Id.; see also Merritt, 478 F.Supp. at 806-07 (before relief will be granted for “ministerial” error regarding sentence execution, “the result must not be attributable to the defendant himself; the action of the authorities must amount to more than simple neglect; and the situation brought about by defendant’s release and reincar-ceration must be unequivocally inconsistent with fundamental principle | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.
green
2 sentences1987A substantive due process challenge to § 22-3831(c) as arbitrary and capricious would readily fail because the statute is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 , 75 S.Ct. 461 , 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), and the legislative history reveals that the D.C. 1987A substantive due process challenge to § 22-3831(c) as arbitrary and capricious would readily fail because the statute is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 , 75 S.Ct. 461 , 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), and the legislative history reveals that the D.C. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.