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20 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
County of Sacramento v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2019In addition, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 , 743-45 (6th Cir. 1999), a waiver ofjurisdiction theory based on gross negligence is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rulings that a substantive due process violation requires arbitrary and oppressive conduct which is so egregious that it "shocks the conscience." See County ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998); Collins v. City ofHarker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). 2017County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 849 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 ; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). [¶ 39] As the trial court found, the schedule changes implemented by Judge Nadeau were “[i]n large part .,. intended to get back at the County Commissioners who had rejected Judge Nadeau’s request for an increase in salary and court time.” Given Judge Nadeau’s conduct and-underlying motivation, the court did not rule out the possibility that his “actions met the high standard of outrageousness necessary for a substantive due process violation.” Nonet | 2 | 4 |
Collins v. City of Harker Heightsgreen2 sentences2021Collins v. Harlier Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (held that plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process complaint was properly dismissed 23 as it did not allege conduct that could "properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense"); Valez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005) (for a substantive due process claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must allege governmental conduct that is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience"). 17 Plaintiffs other claims are also insufficient to support a 2019In addition, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 , 743-45 (6th Cir. 1999), a waiver ofjurisdiction theory based on gross negligence is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rulings that a substantive due process violation requires arbitrary and oppressive conduct which is so egregious that it "shocks the conscience." See County ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998); Collins v. City ofHarker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). | 2 | 3 |
Fichter v. Board of Environmental Protectiongreen2 sentences2016Prat., 604 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1992). 4 Under the exclusivity doctrine, "when ... a municipality or agency's decision is r:eviewable pursuant to M.R. 2002Substantive Due Process A substantive due process claim is generally grounded in the property interest as a result of arbitrary and capricious state conduct that "shocks the conscience." Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 622 (1st Cir. 2000); Licari v Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1994) (substantive due process claim requires proof that state action was "in and of itself. . . egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking’) (citations omitted); Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753-54 (1st Cir. 1990) (substantive due process ensures that state action is not arbitrar | 2 | 2 |
No. 99-1675green2 sentences2002Super. 2002), (citing Central Maine Power Co. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 281 A.2d 233, 242 (Me.1971)). ® A substantive due process claim requires proof that the state action was “in and of itself... egregiously unacceptable, outrageous and conscious shocking.” Id (citing Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montantez, 212 F.3d 617, 622 (1* Cir. 2000). 2002Substantive Due Process A substantive due process claim is generally grounded in the property interest as a result of arbitrary and capricious state conduct that "shocks the conscience." Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 622 (1st Cir. 2000); Licari v Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1994) (substantive due process claim requires proof that state action was "in and of itself. . . egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking’) (citations omitted); Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753-54 (1st Cir. 1990) (substantive due process ensures that state action is not arbitrar | 2 | 2 |
John Doe I v. Robert Williamsgreen2 sentences2016See Doe I v. Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶¶ 65-66 , 61 A.3d 718 (“A substantive due process analysis turns on whether the challenged state action implicates a fundamental right.... 2016See Doe I v. Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶¶ 65-66 , 61 A.3d 718 (“A substantive due process analysis turns on whether the challenged state action implicates a fundamental right.... | 1 | 3 |
Rivera v. Rhode Islandgreen1 sentence2021Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
J.R. v. Gloriagreen1 sentence2021"The burden to show governmental conduct that 'shocks the conscience' is extremely high, requiring 'stunning' evidence of 'arbitrariness and caprice' that extends beyond '[m]ere violations of state law, even violations resulting from 'bad faith' to 'something more egregious and more extreme."' J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 93 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[f]or a substantive due process claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, it must allege governmental conduct that is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the con | 1 | 1 |
Velez v. Levygreen2 sentences2021"The burden to show governmental conduct that 'shocks the conscience' is extremely high, requiring 'stunning' evidence of 'arbitrariness and caprice' that extends beyond '[m]ere violations of state law, even violations resulting from 'bad faith' to 'something more egregious and more extreme."' J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 93 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[f]or a substantive due process claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, it must allege governmental conduct that is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the con 2021Collins v. Harlier Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (held that plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process complaint was properly dismissed 23 as it did not allege conduct that could "properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense"); Valez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005) (for a substantive due process claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must allege governmental conduct that is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience"). 17 Plaintiffs other claims are also insufficient to support a | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2017County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 849 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 ; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). [¶ 39] As the trial court found, the schedule changes implemented by Judge Nadeau were “[i]n large part .,. intended to get back at the County Commissioners who had rejected Judge Nadeau’s request for an increase in salary and court time.” Given Judge Nadeau’s conduct and-underlying motivation, the court did not rule out the possibility that his “actions met the high standard of outrageousness necessary for a substantive due process violation.” Nonet 2017County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 849 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 ; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). [¶ 39] As the trial court found, the schedule changes implemented by Judge Nadeau were “[i]n large part .,. intended to get back at the County Commissioners who had rejected Judge Nadeau’s request for an increase in salary and court time.” Given Judge Nadeau’s conduct and-underlying motivation, the court did not rule out the possibility that his “actions met the high standard of outrageousness necessary for a substantive due process violation.” Nonet | 1 | 1 |
Bowen v. Gilliardgreen1 sentence2016Courts applying the rational basis standard will not set aside even a discriminatory statutory scheme if "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it" Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600-01 (198'7) (internal citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
John Doe v. James T. Mooregreen1 sentence2006The court should "analyze a substantive due process claim by first crafting a careful description ofthe asserted right." Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Reno v. Floresgreen1 sentence2006"Second, [the court] must determine whether the asserted right is "one of those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' !d. (quoting Williams v. Attorney Gen. ofAlabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Williams v. Kin!{, [ 543 U.S. 1152 ] (2005)). '"Substantive due process' analysis must begin with a careful description ofthe asserted right, for 'the doctrine of judicial self-restr | 1 | 1 |
Pfz Properties, Inc. v. Rene Alberto Rodriguez, Etc.green1 sentence2006Rather, substantive due process prevents 'governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression,' or 'abuse of government power that shocks the conscience,' or 'action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests."' PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Committee of US. | 1 | 1 |
Licari v. Ferruzzigreen1 sentence2002Substantive Due Process A substantive due process claim is generally grounded in the property interest as a result of arbitrary and capricious state conduct that "shocks the conscience." Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 622 (1st Cir. 2000); Licari v Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1994) (substantive due process claim requires proof that state action was "in and of itself. . . egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking’) (citations omitted); Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753-54 (1st Cir. 1990) (substantive due process ensures that state action is not arbitrar | 1 | 1 |
Henry H. Amsden v. Thomas F. Moran, Etc.green1 sentence2002Substantive Due Process A substantive due process claim is generally grounded in the property interest as a result of arbitrary and capricious state conduct that "shocks the conscience." Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 622 (1st Cir. 2000); Licari v Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1994) (substantive due process claim requires proof that state action was "in and of itself. . . egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking’) (citations omitted); Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753-54 (1st Cir. 1990) (substantive due process ensures that state action is not arbitrar | 1 | 1 |
Cline v. MAINE COAST NORDICgreen2 sentences2002Cline v. Maine Coast Nordic, 1999 ME 72 , 2 9, 728 A.2d 686, 688 (Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents relitigation of identical issues already determined by prior final judgment, if party estopped had fair opportunity and incentive to litigate issues in prior 5Under M.R. 2002Cline v. Maine Coast Nordic, 1999 ME 72 , 2 9, 728 A.2d 686, 688 (Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents relitigation of identical issues already determined by prior final judgment, if party estopped had fair opportunity and incentive to litigate issues in prior 5Under M.R. | 1 | 1 |
Central Maine Power Co. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authoritygreen1 sentence2002Super. 2002), (citing Central Maine Power Co. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 281 A.2d 233, 242 (Me.1971)). ® A substantive due process claim requires proof that the state action was “in and of itself... egregiously unacceptable, outrageous and conscious shocking.” Id (citing Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montantez, 212 F.3d 617, 622 (1* Cir. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rushgreen1 sentence1998“A substantive due process analysis focuses on the rationality of the enactment, that is, on whether the regulation at issue is in the interest of the public welfare and whether the methods used bear a rational relationship to its intended goals.” Daley v. Commissioner, Dept. of Marine Resources, 1997 ME 183 , ¶ 7 n. 7, 698 A.2d 1053, 1056 ; see also Rush, 324 A2d at 752-54 (state action does not violate substantive due process where it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest). | 1 | 1 |
| National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc. v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Renee Legrand v. York County Judge of Probate
green
2 sentences2021A person's right to substantive due process is violated when the government engages in "conduct that shocks the conscience and violates the decencies of civilized conduct." LeGrand, 2017 :ME 167, ,r 12, 168 A.3d 783 . "[C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest" would likely support a substantive due process claim." Id. 2021A person's right to substantive due process is violated when the government engages in "conduct that shocks the conscience and violates the decencies of civilized conduct." LeGrand, 2017 :ME 167, ,r 12, 168 A.3d 783 . "[C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest" would likely support a substantive due process claim." Id. | 4 | 2019–2022 |
Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicine
green
2 sentences2019"In the context of executive action, only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense"; for instance, conduct that is "intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest would likely support a substantive due process claim." Id. (quotation marks omitted). 3 Procedural due process "requires fundamental fairness, which involves consideration of three factors to assess whether the State has violated an individual's right to due process: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 2019"In the context of executive action, only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense"; for instance, conduct that is "intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest would likely support a substantive due process claim." Id. (quotation marks omitted). 3 Procedural due process "requires fundamental fairness, which involves consideration of three factors to assess whether the State has violated an individual's right to due process: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Irving Houston Hawkins v. Franklin Freeman
green
1 sentence2019In addition, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 , 743-45 (6th Cir. 1999), a waiver ofjurisdiction theory based on gross negligence is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rulings that a substantive due process violation requires arbitrary and oppressive conduct which is so egregious that it "shocks the conscience." See County ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998); Collins v. City ofHarker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Kristy Y.
green
2 sentences2019"In the context of executive action, only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense"; for instance, conduct that is "intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest would likely support a substantive due process claim." Id. (quotation marks omitted). 3 Procedural due process "requires fundamental fairness, which involves consideration of three factors to assess whether the State has violated an individual's right to due process: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 2019"In the context of executive action, only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense"; for instance, conduct that is "intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest would likely support a substantive due process claim." Id. (quotation marks omitted). 3 Procedural due process "requires fundamental fairness, which involves consideration of three factors to assess whether the State has violated an individual's right to due process: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Capodilupo v. Town of Bristol
green
2 sentences2017In the circumstances of this case, the court’s exercise of restraint was not an abuse of discretion, see Capodilupo, 1999 ME 96, ¶ 3 , 730 A.2d 1257 , making it unnecessary for the court — or us — to break new ground and determine if Judge Nadeau’s scheduling decisions violated the class members’ right of substantive due process. [ÍÍ 40] The Declaratory Judgment Act expressly provides that a court “may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment ... where such judgment ... would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” 14 M.R.S. § 5958 (2016). 2017In the circumstances of this case, the court’s exercise of restraint was not an abuse of discretion, see Capodilupo, 1999 ME 96, ¶ 3 , 730 A.2d 1257 , making it unnecessary for the court — or us — to break new ground and determine if Judge Nadeau’s scheduling decisions violated the class members’ right of substantive due process. [ÍÍ 40] The Declaratory Judgment Act expressly provides that a court “may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment ... where such judgment ... would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” 14 M.R.S. § 5958 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Nugent v. Town of Camden
green
1 sentence2016"A substantive due process analysis focuses on the rationality of the enactment, that is, on whether the regulation at issue is in the interest of the public welfare and whether the methods used bear a rational relationship to its intended goals." Nugent v. Toum efCamden, 710 A.2d 245, 249 (Me. 1998). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
González-Droz v. González-Colón
green
1 sentence2016Gonzalez-Droz v. Gonzalez-Colon, 660 F.3d 1, 16 , (1st Cir. 2011); see also Farris v. Poore, 841 Supp. 2d 436, 441-42 (D. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sherri Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama
green
1 sentence2006"Second, [the court] must determine whether the asserted right is "one of those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' !d. (quoting Williams v. Attorney Gen. ofAlabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Williams v. Kin!{, [ 543 U.S. 1152 ] (2005)). '"Substantive due process' analysis must begin with a careful description ofthe asserted right, for 'the doctrine of judicial self-restr | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, Secretary of the Navy
green
1 sentence2006"Second, [the court] must determine whether the asserted right is "one of those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' !d. (quoting Williams v. Attorney Gen. ofAlabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Williams v. Kin!{, [ 543 U.S. 1152 ] (2005)). '"Substantive due process' analysis must begin with a careful description ofthe asserted right, for 'the doctrine of judicial self-restr | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Rideout v. Riendeau
green
2 sentences2006Id. ¶ 34, 761 A.2d at 303 . [¶ 10] Justice Saufley’s plurality opinion upheld the Act as applied against the parents’ substantive due process challenge. 2006Id. ¶ 33, 761 A.2d at 303 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Burr v. Town of Rangeley
green
1 sentence2004However, attorney’s fees were awarded to the defendant municipality when a developer’s substantive due process claim was filed reflexively; was a “naked and unsubstantiated allegation” and was “totally lacking in merit.” Burr v. Town of Rangeley, 549 A.2d at 735 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Daley v. COM'R, DEPT. OF MARINE RESOURCES
green
2 sentences1998“A substantive due process analysis focuses on the rationality of the enactment, that is, on whether the regulation at issue is in the interest of the public welfare and whether the methods used bear a rational relationship to its intended goals.” Daley v. Commissioner, Dept. of Marine Resources, 1997 ME 183 , ¶ 7 n. 7, 698 A.2d 1053, 1056 ; see also Rush, 324 A2d at 752-54 (state action does not violate substantive due process where it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest). 1998“A substantive due process analysis focuses on the rationality of the enactment, that is, on whether the regulation at issue is in the interest of the public welfare and whether the methods used bear a rational relationship to its intended goals.” Daley v. Commissioner, Dept. of Marine Resources, 1997 ME 183 , ¶ 7 n. 7, 698 A.2d 1053, 1056 ; see also Rush, 324 A2d at 752-54 (state action does not violate substantive due process where it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Moore v. City of East Cleveland green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.