substantive due process analysis in Montana

9 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Washington v. Glucksberggreen scotus · 1997 · cited in 2 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2025 2 sentences 2025E.g., Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 231 , 142 S. Ct. at 2242 ; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 , 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (when applying a substantive due process analysis to determine if an asserted fundamental right is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, courts ask whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . , and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 2025E.g., Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 231 , 142 S. Ct. at 2242 ; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 , 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (when applying a substantive due process analysis to determine if an asserted fundamental right is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, courts ask whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . , and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).	2	2
Plumb v. Fourth Judicial District Courtred mont · 1996 · cited in 2 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2018 2 sentences 2011Ct., 279 Mont. 363, 372 , 927 P.2d 1011, 1016 (1996). ¶19 FCP objects to Walters’ substantive due process claim on the ground that Walters cannot “meet the threshold showing of a protected property interest.” Relying primarily on Germann v. Stephens, 2006 MT 130 , 332 Mont. 303 , 137 P.3d 545 , FCP argues that it is “beyond dispute” that a substantive due process claim necessitates a threshold showing of a constitutionally protected property interest, and that the District Court properly denied the claim on this basis. 3 ¶20 In Germann, the plaintiff brought procedural and substantive due proc 2011Ct., 279 Mont. 363, 372 , 927 P.2d 1011, 1016 (1996). ¶19 FCP objects to Walters’ substantive due process claim on the ground that Walters cannot “meet the threshold showing of a protected property interest.” Relying primarily on Germann v. Stephens, 2006 MT 130 , 332 Mont. 303 , 137 P.3d 545 , FCP argues that it is “beyond dispute” that a substantive due process claim necessitates a threshold showing of a constitutionally protected property interest, and that the District Court properly denied the claim on this basis. 3 ¶20 In Germann, the plaintiff brought procedural and substantive due proc	1	2
Collins v. City of Harker Heightsgreen scotus · 1992 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 2 sentences 2016A substantive due process analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for the “doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires that we exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992). 2016A substantive due process analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for the “doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires that we exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992).	1	1
Ross v. Moffittgreen scotus · 1974 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 2 sentences 2016Equal protection “emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable,” while due process “emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated.” Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405 , 105 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 , 94 S. Ct. 2437, 2443 (1974)). 2016Equal protection “emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable,” while due process “emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated.” Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405 , 105 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 , 94 S. Ct. 2437, 2443 (1974)).	1	1
Evitts v. Luceygreen scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 2 sentences 2016Substantive Due Process ¶19 Although there is considerable overlap between an equal protection analysis and a substantive due process analysis, “each Clause triggers a distinct inquiry.” Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 , 105 S. Ct. 830, 841 (1985). 2016Substantive Due Process ¶19 Although there is considerable overlap between an equal protection analysis and a substantive due process analysis, “each Clause triggers a distinct inquiry.” Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 , 105 S. Ct. 830, 841 (1985).	1	1
Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Countygreen mont · 1996 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Walters’ fairness arguments are overlapping, and she offers that “workers compensation quid pro quo is a due process analysis ....” We considered quid pro quo as part of a substantive due process analysis in Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 2009 MT 368 , ¶¶ 36-39, 353 Mont. 265 , 222 P.3d 566 , but independent of substantive due process in Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (Stratemeyer II), 276 Mont. 67, 74-79 , 915 P.2d 175, 179-82 (1996). 2011Walters’ fairness arguments are overlapping, and she offers that “workers compensation quid pro quo is a due process analysis ....” We considered quid pro quo as part of a substantive due process analysis in Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 2009 MT 368 , ¶¶ 36-39, 353 Mont. 265 , 222 P.3d 566 , but independent of substantive due process in Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (Stratemeyer II), 276 Mont. 67, 74-79 , 915 P.2d 175, 179-82 (1996).	1	1
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbellgreen scotus · 2003 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416-17 , 123 S.Ct. at 1519-20 (the Due Process Clause “prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor”; “This constitutional concern, itself harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of arbitrary coercion.”) (emphases added) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶157 Seltzer cites no authority directly holding that punitive damages insurance coverage renders the due process analysis inapplic 2007See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416-17 , 123 S.Ct. at 1519-20 (the Due Process Clause “prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor”; “This constitutional concern, itself harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of arbitrary coercion.”) (emphases added) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶157 Seltzer cites no authority directly holding that punitive damages insurance coverage renders the due process analysis inapplic	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization green scotus · 2022 2 sentences 2025E.g., Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 231 , 142 S. Ct. at 2242 ; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 , 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (when applying a substantive due process analysis to determine if an asserted fundamental right is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, courts ask whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . , and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 2025E.g., Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 231 , 142 S. Ct. at 2242 ; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 , 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (when applying a substantive due process analysis to determine if an asserted fundamental right is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, courts ask whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . , and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).	1	2025–2025
Germann v. Stephens green mont · 2006 2 sentences 2011Ct., 279 Mont. 363, 372 , 927 P.2d 1011, 1016 (1996). ¶19 FCP objects to Walters’ substantive due process claim on the ground that Walters cannot “meet the threshold showing of a protected property interest.” Relying primarily on Germann v. Stephens, 2006 MT 130 , 332 Mont. 303 , 137 P.3d 545 , FCP argues that it is “beyond dispute” that a substantive due process claim necessitates a threshold showing of a constitutionally protected property interest, and that the District Court properly denied the claim on this basis. 3 ¶20 In Germann, the plaintiff brought procedural and substantive due proc 2011Ct., 279 Mont. 363, 372 , 927 P.2d 1011, 1016 (1996). ¶19 FCP objects to Walters’ substantive due process claim on the ground that Walters cannot “meet the threshold showing of a protected property interest.” Relying primarily on Germann v. Stephens, 2006 MT 130 , 332 Mont. 303 , 137 P.3d 545 , FCP argues that it is “beyond dispute” that a substantive due process claim necessitates a threshold showing of a constitutionally protected property interest, and that the District Court properly denied the claim on this basis. 3 ¶20 In Germann, the plaintiff brought procedural and substantive due proc	1	2011–2011
Satterlee v. LUMBERMAN'S MUT. CAS. CO. green mont · 2009 2 sentences 2011Walters’ fairness arguments are overlapping, and she offers that “workers compensation quid pro quo is a due process analysis ....” We considered quid pro quo as part of a substantive due process analysis in Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 2009 MT 368 , ¶¶ 36-39, 353 Mont. 265 , 222 P.3d 566 , but independent of substantive due process in Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (Stratemeyer II), 276 Mont. 67, 74-79 , 915 P.2d 175, 179-82 (1996). 2011Walters’ fairness arguments are overlapping, and she offers that “workers compensation quid pro quo is a due process analysis ....” We considered quid pro quo as part of a substantive due process analysis in Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 2009 MT 368 , ¶¶ 36-39, 353 Mont. 265 , 222 P.3d 566 , but independent of substantive due process in Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (Stratemeyer II), 276 Mont. 67, 74-79 , 915 P.2d 175, 179-82 (1996).	1	2011–2011
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. green scotus · 1993 2 sentences 2007TXO, 509 U.S. at 446 , 113 S.Ct. at 2714 . 2007TXO, 509 U.S. at 446 , 113 S.Ct. at 2714 .	1	2007–2007
Raisler v. Burlington Northern Railroad green mont · 1985 2 sentences 2003Co. (1985), 219 Mont. 254, 263 , 717 P.2d 535, 541 , this Court set forth the following analysis for evaluating a substantive due process claim: A substantive due process analysis requires a test of reasonableness of a statute in relation to the State’s power to enact such legislation. ‘The essence of substantive due process is that the State cannot use its police power to take unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious action against an individual.’... 2003Co. (1985), 219 Mont. 254, 263 , 717 P.2d 535, 541 , this Court set forth the following analysis for evaluating a substantive due process claim: A substantive due process analysis requires a test of reasonableness of a statute in relation to the State’s power to enact such legislation. ‘The essence of substantive due process is that the State cannot use its police power to take unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious action against an individual.’...	1	2003–2003
Linder v. Smith green mont · 1981 2 sentences 1994In addressing a substantive due process challenge in Harrison v. Chance (1990), 244 Mont. 215, 225 , 797 P.2d 200, 206 , we referred to our analysis in Linder v. Smith (1981), 193 Mont. 20, 28-29 , 629 P.2d 1187, 1192 , stating: “The legislature is free to impose reasonable procedural requirements on the available remedies so long as those requirements have a rational basis.” Although the Linder Court held there was no substantive due process violation on the basis of the 250 issues as raised by the parties, it did excise a portion of the statute on substantive due process grounds, stating: W 1994In addressing a substantive due process challenge in Harrison v. Chance (1990), 244 Mont. 215, 225 , 797 P.2d 200, 206 , we referred to our analysis in Linder v. Smith (1981), 193 Mont. 20, 28-29 , 629 P.2d 1187, 1192 , stating: “The legislature is free to impose reasonable procedural requirements on the available remedies so long as those requirements have a rational basis.” Although the Linder Court held there was no substantive due process violation on the basis of the 250 issues as raised by the parties, it did excise a portion of the statute on substantive due process grounds, stating: W	1	1994–1994
Harrison v. Chance green mont · 1990 2 sentences 1994In addressing a substantive due process challenge in Harrison v. Chance (1990), 244 Mont. 215, 225 , 797 P.2d 200, 206 , we referred to our analysis in Linder v. Smith (1981), 193 Mont. 20, 28-29 , 629 P.2d 1187, 1192 , stating: “The legislature is free to impose reasonable procedural requirements on the available remedies so long as those requirements have a rational basis.” Although the Linder Court held there was no substantive due process violation on the basis of the 250 issues as raised by the parties, it did excise a portion of the statute on substantive due process grounds, stating: W 1994In addressing a substantive due process challenge in Harrison v. Chance (1990), 244 Mont. 215, 225 , 797 P.2d 200, 206 , we referred to our analysis in Linder v. Smith (1981), 193 Mont. 20, 28-29 , 629 P.2d 1187, 1192 , stating: “The legislature is free to impose reasonable procedural requirements on the available remedies so long as those requirements have a rational basis.” Although the Linder Court held there was no substantive due process violation on the basis of the 250 issues as raised by the parties, it did excise a portion of the statute on substantive due process grounds, stating: W	1	1994–1994
In re C.H. green mont · 1984 1 sentence 1990In re C.H. (1984), 210 Mont. 184, 194 , 683 P.2d 931, 936 .	1	1990–1990
Matter of CH green mont · 1984 1 sentence 1990In re C.H. (1984), 210 Mont. 184, 194 , 683 P.2d 931, 936 .	1	1990–1990
Nebbia v. New York green scotus · 1934 2 sentences 1981Woods, supra, 591 F.2d at 1176 ; Nebbia v. New York (1934), 291 29 U.S. 502, 536-537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 515-516 , 78 L.Ed. 940, 956-957 . 1981Woods, supra, 591 F.2d at 1176 ; Nebbia v. New York (1934), 291 29 U.S. 502, 536-537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 515-516 , 78 L.Ed. 940, 956-957 .	1	1981–1981
Nellie Woods, as Personal Representative of the Estate of John N. Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital green ca5 · 1979 1 sentence 1981Woods, supra, 591 F.2d at 1176 ; Nebbia v. New York (1934), 291 *29 U.S. 502, 536-537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 515-516 , 78 L.Ed. 940, 956-957 .	1	1981–1981

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MT § Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-105 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 114 (1981–2026) IL 110 (1980–2026) TX 110 (1987–2025) PA 103 (1973–2026) WA 102 (1987–2024) IA 60 (1983–2024) MI 57 (1986–2025) WI 49 (1989–2024) NY 43 (1975–2026) NJ 38 (1970–2025) FL 34 (1974–2025) CT 31 (1991–2020) MN 30 (1986–2024) OH 28 (1989–2025) MA 25 (1975–2025) AL 24 (1980–2025) RI 23 (1991–2020) CO 22 (1960–2026) MD 21 (1985–2024) ND 21 (1978–2025) ME 20 (1981–2022) MS 18 (1991–2022) AZ 18 (1991–2023) WV 18 (1977–2025) UT 16 (1989–2026) SC 15 (1993–2025) MO 14 (1989–2023) KS 14 (1968–2025) GA 13 (1983–2021) TN 13 (1993–2018) AK 13 (1995–2025) NM 12 (1989–2025) NC 12 (1976–2021) VA 11 (1989–2025) OK 11 (1984–2022) DC 10 (1987–2023) NH 10 (1993–2015) MT 9 (1981–2025) LA 9 (1997–2024) ID 9 (1986–2023) IN 8 (1994–2024) SD 8 (1996–2024) WY 8 (1989–2026) DE 8 (1989–2025) NV 8 (1980–2025) AR 7 (2004–2023) OR 6 (1974–2011) KY 3 (2003–2025) HI 3 (1992–2018) NE 3 (1994–2025) VI 2 (2011–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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