substantive due process challenge in Iowa

2019Citing King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 32 (Iowa 2012), the court noted that typically the rational basis test for equal protection is also applied with respect to a substantive due process analysis.

2019Citing King v. State , 818 N.W.2d 1 , 32 (Iowa 2012), the court noted that typically the rational basis test for equal protection is also applied *541 with respect to a substantive due process analysis.

2024Trs. v. City of West Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 265 (Iowa 2001).

2010Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 265 (Iowa 2001) (noting it “is not easy to prove” a substantive due process violation because “ ‘substantive due process is reserved for the most egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights’ ” (quoting Rivkin v. Dover Twp.

2024When a party raises a substantive due process challenge to a statute, “[t]he first step [in the legal analysis] is to ‘identify the nature of the individual right involved’ and determine whether that right is fundamental.” State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 2007) (quoting In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Iowa 2003)).

2024When a party raises a substantive due process challenge to a statute, “[t]he first step [in the legal analysis] is to ‘identify the nature of the individual right involved’ and determine whether that right is fundamental.” State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 2007) (quoting In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Iowa 2003)).

2024When a party raises a substantive due process challenge to a statute, “[t]he first step [in the legal analysis] is to ‘identify the nature of the individual right involved’ and determine whether that right is fundamental.” State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 2007) (quoting In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Iowa 2003)).

2024When a party raises a substantive due process challenge to a statute, “[t]he first step [in the legal analysis] is to ‘identify the nature of the individual right involved’ and determine whether that right is fundamental.” State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 2007) (quoting In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Iowa 2003)).

2019See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 , 26, 112 S.Ct. 2326 , 2340, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hughes, 840 F.3d at 991 ; McIntosh v. Partridge , 540 F.3d 315 , 323-24 (5th Cir. 2008) ; Stern v. Tarrant Cty.

2019See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 , 26, 112 S.Ct. 2326 , 2340, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hughes, 840 F.3d at 991 ; McIntosh v. Partridge , 540 F.3d 315 , 323-24 (5th Cir. 2008) ; Stern v. Tarrant Cty.

2017State v. Massengale, 745 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Iowa 2008).

2017State v. Massengale, 745 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Iowa 2008).

2010When ... a fundamental right is not involved, the Due Process Clause “demands no more than a ‘reasonable fit’ between government[al] purpose ... and the means chosen to advance that purpose.” Smokers Warehouse Corp., 737 N.W.2d at 111 (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1448-49 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1, 18 (1993)).

2010When . . . a fundamental right is not involved, the Due Process Clause “demands no more than a ‘reasonable fit’ between government[al] purpose . . . and the means chosen to advance that purpose.” Smokers Warehouse Corp., 737 N.W.2d at 111 (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 , 113 S. Ct. 1439 , 1448–49, 123 L.

2009See People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 134 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (discussing a substantive due process challenge to Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998, which requires imposition of indefinite sentence upon sex offender, and rejecting a strict scrutiny analysis because “[a]n adult offender has no fundamental liberty interest in freedom from incarceration”).

2009See People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 134 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (discussing a substantive due process challenge to Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998, which requires imposition of indefinite sentence upon sex offender, and rejecting a strict scrutiny analysis because “[a]n adult offender has no fundamental liberty interest in freedom from incarceration”).

2017The court held, “allowing a fact finder to presume negligence and causation based on the happening of an ‘occurrence,’ 18 of 22 19 rather than finding negligence and causation based on the facts, is arbitrary and irrational in light of the multiple factors that can cause the ‘occurrence,’ as defined by the statute.” Id. at 588 ; see also City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d 335, 341 (Iowa 2015) (“In Hensler, we considered a substantive due process challenge to an ordinance that imposed a rebuttable presumption that a parent failed to exercise control over a minor child when that child en

2016The court held, “allowing a fact finder to presume negligence and causation based on the happening of an ‘occurrence,’ 19 rather than finding negligence and causation based on the facts, is arbitrary and irrational in light of the multiple factors that can cause the ‘occurrence,’ as defined by the statute.” Id. at 588 ; see also City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d 335, 341 (Iowa 2015) (“In Hensler, we considered a substantive due process challenge to an ordinance that imposed a rebuttable presumption that a parent failed to exercise control over a minor child when that child engaged in

2000The United States Supreme Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 360 , 117 S.Ct. at 2081 , 138 L.Ed.2d at 514 .

2000The United States Supreme Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 360 , 117 S.Ct. at 2081 , 138 L.Ed.2d at 514 .

2005However, “[o]nly fundamental rights and liberties which are ‘ “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” ’ and ‘ “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” ’ qualify for such protection.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 775 , 123 S.Ct. at 2005 , 155 L.Ed.2d at 999 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 , 2268 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787-88 (1997)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 , 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 , 156 L.Ed.2d 508, 521 (2003) (“ ‘History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquir

2005However, “[o]nly fundamental rights and liberties which are ‘ “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” ’ and ‘ “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” ’ qualify for such protection.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 775 , 123 S.Ct. at 2005 , 155 L.Ed.2d at 999 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 , 2268 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787-88 (1997)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 , 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 , 156 L.Ed.2d 508, 521 (2003) (“ ‘History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquir

2017The court held, “allowing a fact finder to presume negligence and causation based on the happening of an ‘occurrence,’ 18 of 22 19 rather than finding negligence and causation based on the facts, is arbitrary and irrational in light of the multiple factors that can cause the ‘occurrence,’ as defined by the statute.” Id. at 588 ; see also City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d 335, 341 (Iowa 2015) (“In Hensler, we considered a substantive due process challenge to an ordinance that imposed a rebuttable presumption that a parent failed to exercise control over a minor child when that child en

2016The court held, “allowing a fact finder to presume negligence and causation based on the happening of an ‘occurrence,’ 19 rather than finding negligence and causation based on the facts, is arbitrary and irrational in light of the multiple factors that can cause the ‘occurrence,’ as defined by the statute.” Id. at 588 ; see also City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d 335, 341 (Iowa 2015) (“In Hensler, we considered a substantive due process challenge to an ordinance that imposed a rebuttable presumption that a parent failed to exercise control over a minor child when that child engaged in

2015See Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 544–45 (recognizing statutory and constitutional issues not presented on appeal, including due process challenges).

2015See Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 544-45 (recognizing statutory and constitutiohal issues not presented on appeal, including due process challenges).

2010When ... a fundamental right is not involved, the Due Process Clause “demands no more than a ‘reasonable fit’ between government[al] purpose ... and the means chosen to advance that purpose.” Smokers Warehouse Corp., 737 N.W.2d at 111 (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1448-49 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1, 18 (1993)).

2010When ... a fundamental right is not involved, the Due Process Clause “demands no more than a ‘reasonable fit’ between government[al] purpose ... and the means chosen to advance that purpose.” Smokers Warehouse Corp., 737 N.W.2d at 111 (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1448-49 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1, 18 (1993)).

2010In considering the plaintiff's substantive due process claim, we noted there must merely be " 'a "reasonable fit” between governmental purpose ... and the means chosen to advance that purpose.’ ” Home Builders Ass’n, 644 N.W.2d at 353 (quoting ACCO Unlimited Corp. v. City of Johnston, 611 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 2000)).

2010In considering the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, we noted there must merely be “ ‘ a “reasonable fit” between governmental purpose . . . and the means chosen to advance that purpose.’ ” Home Builders Ass’n, 644 N.W.2d at 353 (quoting ACCO Unlimited Corp. v. City of Johnston, 611 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 2000)).

2010Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352 , 671 A.2d 567, 574-75 (1996))).

2010Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352 , 671 A.2d 567, 574-75 (1996))).

2005However, “[o]nly fundamental rights and liberties which are ‘ “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” ’ and ‘ “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” ’ qualify for such protection.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 775 , 123 S.Ct. at 2005 , 155 L.Ed.2d at 999 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 , 2268 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787-88 (1997)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 , 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 , 156 L.Ed.2d 508, 521 (2003) (“ ‘History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquir

2005However, “[o]nly fundamental rights and liberties which are ‘ “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” ’ and ‘ “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” ’ qualify for such protection.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 775 , 123 S.Ct. at 2005 , 155 L.Ed.2d at 999 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 , 2268 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787-88 (1997)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 , 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 , 156 L.Ed.2d 508, 521 (2003) (“ ‘History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquir

2001The applicable test for a substantive due process claim in the context of land use regulation is twofold: “First, it must be determined whether there has been a deprivation of a federally constitutionally protected interest, and secondly, whether the deprivation, if any, is the result of an abuse of government power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort to the stature of a constitutional violation.” Bakken, 470 N.W.2d at 38 (quoting Rymer v. Douglas County, 764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir.1985)).

1996Bakken, 470 N.W.2d at 38 (quoting Rymer v. Douglas County, 764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir.1985)).

2009Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662 .

2009Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662 .

2023See Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 2008) (requiring a litigant to “(1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected” to have standing to challenge a statute); cf. McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 833 (Iowa 2015) (requiring the party asserting a substantive due process claim to “establish that the 14 fundamental right asserted . . . has been implicated by the particular government action at issue”).

2017“We have adopted a two-step analysis when presented with a substantive due process claim.” McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 832 .

2023See Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 2008) (requiring a litigant to “(1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected” to have standing to challenge a statute); cf. McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 833 (Iowa 2015) (requiring the party asserting a substantive due process claim to “establish that the 14 fundamental right asserted . . . has been implicated by the particular government action at issue”).