substantive due process doctrine in South Dakota

8 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
In re R.A.green nh · 2005 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “numerous courts . . . have found Troxel does not apply to custody disputes between natural parents”); Enrique M. v. Angelina V., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2009) (holding that “Troxel . . . does not compel courts to apply a substantive due process analysis in resolving custody or custody -12- #30644 related disputes between parents”); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564, 576 (N.H. 2005) (noting that “strict scrutiny need not be applied [when] balancing the rights of two fit parents, both of whom have the same constitutional right to custody of their children	1	1
In Re Parentage of LBgreen wash · 2005 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “numerous courts . . . have found Troxel does not apply to custody disputes between natural parents”); Enrique M. v. Angelina V., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2009) (holding that “Troxel . . . does not compel courts to apply a substantive due process analysis in resolving custody or custody -12- #30644 related disputes between parents”); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564, 576 (N.H. 2005) (noting that “strict scrutiny need not be applied [when] balancing the rights of two fit parents, both of whom have the same constitutional right to custody of their children	1	1
In RE MARRIAGE OF ARNOLD v. Arnoldgreen wisctapp · 2004 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024Rather, in Washington, courts attempt to discern the best interests of the child.”); Marriage of Arnold v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Wis. 2004) (distinguishing Troxel and rejecting a parent’s substantive due process argument raised against the other parent); McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 771, 808 (Md. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he best interests of the child standard is, axiomatically, of a different nature than a parent’s fundamental constitutional right[,]” and that “the most important application of the [best interests] standard[] is in disputes between fit natural parents [who s	1	1
Enrique M. v. Angelina V.green calctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “numerous courts . . . have found Troxel does not apply to custody disputes between natural parents”); Enrique M. v. Angelina V., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2009) (holding that “Troxel . . . does not compel courts to apply a substantive due process analysis in resolving custody or custody -12- #30644 related disputes between parents”); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564, 576 (N.H. 2005) (noting that “strict scrutiny need not be applied [when] balancing the rights of two fit parents, both of whom have the same constitutional right to custody of their children	1	1
McDermott v. Doughertygreen md · 2005 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024Rather, in Washington, courts attempt to discern the best interests of the child.”); Marriage of Arnold v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Wis. 2004) (distinguishing Troxel and rejecting a parent’s substantive due process argument raised against the other parent); McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 771, 808 (Md. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he best interests of the child standard is, axiomatically, of a different nature than a parent’s fundamental constitutional right[,]” and that “the most important application of the [best interests] standard[] is in disputes between fit natural parents [who s	1	1
Osloond v. Farriergreen sd · 2003 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016“To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has a protected property or liberty interest at stake and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.” Osloond v. Farrier, 2003 S.D. 28 , ¶ 16, 659 N.W.2d 20, 24 (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968 , 975 (8th Cir.1999)). “[T]he individual must be deprived of this right by a state actor.” Id. [¶ 16.] Plaintiffs invite us to weigh the public policy of peer review confidentiality against their need for evidence and of revealing instances of bad faith peer review.	1	1
Lemke v. Cass Countygreen ca8 · 1987 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002In Lemke, the petitioners alleged that the county zoning board’s refusal to change the zoning ordinance to allow for solid waste disposal, in light of the county commission’s previous approval, was a violation of substantive due process because the decision was based on public opposition. 846 F.2d at 470. 2002In Lemke, the petitioners alleged that the county zoning board's refusal to change the zoning ordinance to allow for solid waste disposal, in light of the county commission's previous approval, was a violation of substantive due process because the decision was based on public opposition. 846 F.2d at 470.	1	1
Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, Minnesotagreen ca8 · 1997 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002Thus, as in Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068,1071 (8th Cir.1997), I conclude that this allegation is far too insubstantial to support a substantive due process claim. 2002Thus, as in Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir.1997), I conclude that this allegation is far too insubstantial to support a substantive due process claim.	1	1
cluster 712220green ca9 · 1996 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v. 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v.	1	1
Albright v. Olivergreen scotus · 1994 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000Throughout the history of the doctrine of substantive due process, the United States Supreme Court “ ‘has always been reluctant to expand the concept ... because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’ ” See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 , 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 228 , 242 (1996) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272 , 114 S.Ct. 807, 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 122 (1994)). 2000Throughout the history of the doctrine of substantive due process, the United States Supreme Court “ ‘has always been reluctant to expand the concept ... because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’ ” See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 , 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 228 , 242 (1996) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272 , 114 S.Ct. 807, 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 122 (1994)).	1	1
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Robert Estabrookgreen ca1 · 1982 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v. 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v.	1	1
Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Ronald Wilson Reagan, President of the United Statesgreen cadc · 1988 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000Rather, substantive due process prevents ‘governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression,’ or ‘abuse of government power that shocks the conscience,’ or ‘action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests.’ ” PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (lstCir.1991) (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 943 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citations omitted)) (emphasis added). 2000Rather, substantive due process prevents `governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression,' or `abuse of government power that shocks the conscience,' or `action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests.'" PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1stCir.1991) (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 943 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citations omitted)) (emphasis added).	1	1
Pfz Properties, Inc. v. Rene Alberto Rodriguez, Etc.green ca1 · 1991 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000Rather, substantive due process prevents ‘governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression,’ or ‘abuse of government power that shocks the conscience,’ or ‘action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests.’ ” PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (lstCir.1991) (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 943 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citations omitted)) (emphasis added). 2000Rather, substantive due process prevents `governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression,' or `abuse of government power that shocks the conscience,' or `action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests.'" PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1stCir.1991) (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 943 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citations omitted)) (emphasis added).	1	1
Matter of Certif. of Questions of Lawgreen sd · 1996 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999 2 sentences 1999Knowles, 1996 SD 10 at ¶ 73, 544 N.W.2d at 199 . 1999Knowles, 1996 SD 10 at ¶ 73, 544 N.W.2d at 199 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Katz v. BD. OF MED. & OSTEOPATHIC EXAM. green sd · 1988 2 sentences 1996Katz v. Bd. of Medical & Osteopathic Examiners, 432 N.W.2d 274 , 278 n6 (SD 1988); Crowley, 268 N.W.2d at 619; Nuss, 114 N.W.2d at 636. 1996Katz v. Bd. of Medical & Osteopathic Examiners, 432 N.W.2d 274 , 278 n6 (SD 1988); Crowley, 268 N.W.2d at 619; Nuss, 114 N.W.2d at 636.	2	1996–1996
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council green scotus · 1992 2 sentences 2022Ed. 2d 868 (1982), where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property”; 2) “a per se total regulatory taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 , 112 S. Ct. 2886 , 120 L. 2022Ed. 2d 868 (1982), where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property”; 2) “a per se total regulatory taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 , 112 S. Ct. 2886 , 120 L.	1	2022–2022
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. green scotus · 1982 1 sentence 2022Here, however, the Intervenors do not allege a substantive due process violation and have presented a more direct takings argument, which we address on the merits. -18- #29610 3164, 73 L.	1	2022–2022
cluster 767166 green ca8 · 2000 2 sentences 2016“To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has a protected property or liberty interest at stake and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.” Osloond v. Farrier, 2003 S.D. 28 , ¶ 16, 659 N.W.2d 20, 24 (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968 , 975 (8th Cir.1999)). “[T]he individual must be deprived of this right by a state actor.” Id. [¶ 16.] Plaintiffs invite us to weigh the public policy of peer review confidentiality against their need for evidence and of revealing instances of bad faith peer review. 2016“To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has a protected property or liberty interest at stake and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.” Osloond v. Farrier, 2003 S.D. 28 , ¶ 16, 659 N.W.2d 20, 24 (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968 , 975 (8th Cir.1999)). “[T]he individual must be deprived of this right by a state actor.” Id. [¶ 16.] Plaintiffs invite us to weigh the public policy of peer review confidentiality against their need for evidence and of revealing instances of bad faith peer review.	1	2016–2016
Dover Elevator Company v. Arkansas State University green ca8 · 1995 2 sentences 2002State Univ., 64 F.3d 442 , 444-46 (8th Cir.1995)). 2002State Univ., 64 F.3d 442 , 444-46 (8th Cir.1995)).	1	2002–2002
Young v. City Of St. Charles green ca8 · 2001 2 sentences 2002Whether Landfill possesses a protected property interest in the approved permit. [¶ 13.] Analysis of a substantive due process claim “must begin with an examination of the interest allegedly violated.” Young, 244 F.3d at 627 (citing Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. 2002Whether Landfill possesses a protected property interest in the approved permit. [¶ 13.] Analysis of a substantive due process claim "must begin with an *152 examination of the interest allegedly violated." Young, 244 F.3d at 627 (citing Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark.	1	2002–2002
Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach green calctapp · 1996 1 sentence 2000Throughout the history of the doctrine of substantive due process, the United States Supreme Court “ ‘has always been reluctant to expand the concept ... because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’ ” See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 , 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 228 , 242 (1996) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272 , 114 S.Ct. 807, 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 122 (1994)).	1	2000–2000
Calvo v. Los Angeles Unified School District green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v. 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v.	1	2000–2000
Faulkner v. California green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v. 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v.	1	2000–2000
United Steelworkers v. Erkins green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v. 2000These protections under the substantive due process doctrine “ ‘have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’ ” Id. at 242 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 , 114 S.Ct. at 812 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 122 ). [¶ 15.] The reluctance by many courts to expand the doctrine of substantive due process under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has been grounded on the principle that “ 'the violation of a state statute does not automatically give rise to a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.’ ” See Creative Env’ts, Inc. v.	1	2000–2000
Green v. Siegel, Barnett & Schutz green sd · 1996 2 sentences 1999Green, 1996 SD 146 at ¶ 19 , 557 N.W.2d at 402 . [6] South Dakota Constitutional Debates of 1885 and South Dakota Constitutional Debates of 1889. [7] We did, however, strike down SDCL 21-3-11 as in violation of the substantive due process clause of the South Dakota Constitution. 1999Green, 1996 SD 146 at ¶ 19 , 557 N.W.2d at 402 . [6] South Dakota Constitutional Debates of 1885 and South Dakota Constitutional Debates of 1889. [7] We did, however, strike down SDCL 21-3-11 as in violation of the substantive due process clause of the South Dakota Constitution.	1	1999–1999

Statutes the citing opinions construe

SD § S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-1 (3) SD § S.D. Codified Laws § 21-3-11 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 114 (1981–2026) IL 110 (1980–2026) TX 110 (1987–2025) PA 103 (1973–2026) WA 102 (1987–2024) IA 60 (1983–2024) MI 57 (1986–2025) WI 49 (1989–2024) NY 43 (1975–2026) NJ 38 (1970–2025) FL 34 (1974–2025) CT 31 (1991–2020) MN 30 (1986–2024) OH 28 (1989–2025) MA 25 (1975–2025) AL 24 (1980–2025) RI 23 (1991–2020) CO 22 (1960–2026) MD 21 (1985–2024) ND 21 (1978–2025) ME 20 (1981–2022) MS 18 (1991–2022) AZ 18 (1991–2023) WV 18 (1977–2025) UT 16 (1989–2026) SC 15 (1993–2025) MO 14 (1989–2023) KS 14 (1968–2025) GA 13 (1983–2021) TN 13 (1993–2018) AK 13 (1995–2025) NM 12 (1989–2025) NC 12 (1976–2021) VA 11 (1989–2025) OK 11 (1984–2022) DC 10 (1987–2023) NH 10 (1993–2015) MT 9 (1981–2025) LA 9 (1997–2024) ID 9 (1986–2023) IN 8 (1994–2024) SD 8 (1996–2024) WY 8 (1989–2026) DE 8 (1989–2025) NV 8 (1980–2025) AR 7 (2004–2023) OR 6 (1974–2011) KY 3 (2003–2025) HI 3 (1992–2018) NE 3 (1994–2025) VI 2 (2011–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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