substantive due process violation in California

1992Subdivision (f) of section 27803 provides: “In enacting this section, it is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that all persons are provided with an additional safety benefit while operating or riding a motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, or motorized bicycle.” In reviewing the validity of legislation such as this, our Supreme Court has set forth the appropriate test. “ ‘In passing upon [a substantive due process challenge to a legislative police power measure], we exercise an extraordinary power over a coordinate branch of government and perform a corresponding narrow function: we simply det

1992Subdivision (f) of section 27803 provides: “In enacting this section, it is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that all persons are provided with an additional safety benefit while operating or riding a motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, or motorized bicycle.” In reviewing the validity of legislation such as this, our Supreme Court has set forth the appropriate test. “ ‘In passing upon [a substantive due process challenge to a legislative police power measure], we exercise an extraordinary power over a coordinate branch of government and perform a corresponding narrow function: we simply det

2024“Typical land use disputes involving alleged procedural irregularities, violations of state law, and unfairness ordinarily do not implicate substantive due process,” thus “some form of outrageous or egregious conduct constituting ‘a true abuse of power’ is required to establish a substantive due process violation.” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 856 ; see also Galland v. City of Clovis (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1003, 1034 [“‘To succeed in a § 1983 suit for damages for a substantive due process . . . violation, a plaintiff must at least show that state offic

2023This is best understood as a claimed violation of substantive due process.” (Ibid.) The Galland court reviewed Lewis and other cases involving substantive due process claims, all of which “have affirmed in a variety of contexts, using a variety of 22 verbal formulations, the principle that the arbitrary government conduct that triggers a substantive due process violation is not ordinary government error but conduct that is in some sense outrageous or egregious—a true abuse of power.” (Galland, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1032 .) The court observed that the shocks the conscience standard “seems esp

2022Rather, substantive due process prevents ‘governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression,’ or ‘abuse of governmental power that shocks the conscience, or ‘action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (Stubblefield Construction Co. v. City of San Bernardino (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 687 , 709–710 (Stubblefield).) Thus, to satisfy the second prong of a substantive due process claim, the challenged government action must amount to “some form of outrageous or egregious conduct constituting ‘a true abuse of p

2022(Clark, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185 .) Instead, “ ‘the plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking.’ ” (Ibid.) In Stubblefield, our colleagues in Division Two of the Fourth District held that a city council’s decision to block a development project on facts similar to those here did not support a substantive due process claim. ( Stubblefield, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 708–712.) In that case, a developer sought to build an apartment complex on 600 acres of land.

2015(Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 302 .) A substantive due process analysis “must begin with a careful description of the asserted right.” (Ibid.) 3 A prisoner has no right to a parole.

2009His substantive due process argument fails.” (Arnold, supra, 679 N.W.2d at p. 299 .) We agree with the Arnold court that Troxel , which involved nonparental visitation, does not compel courts to apply a substantive due process analysis in resolving custody or custody related disputes between parents. ( Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 100-101 (cone. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [“In short, a fit parent’s right vis-á-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-a-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.”]; accord, Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 303-304 [ 123 L.Ed.2d 1 , 113 S.C

2026(See Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 141 [rejecting plaintiff’s description of his “so-called unconstitutional deprivation of liberty as ‘incarceration absent a criminal conviction’ … an issue-begging generalization that [was] far too broadly stated”].) And third, “ ‘under the more-specific-provision rule of Graham v. Connor [(1989) 490 U.S. 386 ,] 395, [a] defendant may not assert a substantive due process claim if there is a particular amendment providing ‘constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior.’ ” (Uribe, supra, 199 Cal.App.4

2019Munoz did not have a fundamental right to an involuntary manslaughter instruction " ' "Unless application of a statute impinges upon 'fundamental rights,' " ' " it survives a substantive due process challenge so long as " ' "the application is procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal." ' " ( Barnes v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 631 , 641, fn. 7, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 621 ( Barnes ).) A right is "fundamental" if it is " ' "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," ... and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor j

2022(Clark, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184 .) It is well-established that “ ‘[r]ejections of development projects and refusals to issue building permits do not ordinarily implicate substantive due process.’ ” (Clark, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184 , quoting PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez (1st Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 28, 31 ; see also Las Lomas, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 856 [“Typical land use disputes involving alleged procedural irregularities, violations of state law, and 28 unfairness ordinarily do not implicate substantive due process.”].) “ ‘The doctrine of substantive due process “does

2022(Clark, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184 .) It is well-established that “ ‘[r]ejections of development projects and refusals to issue building permits do not ordinarily implicate substantive due process.’ ” (Clark, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184 , quoting PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez (1st Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 28, 31 ; see also Las Lomas, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 856 [“Typical land use disputes involving alleged procedural irregularities, violations of state law, and 28 unfairness ordinarily do not implicate substantive due process.”].) “ ‘The doctrine of substantive due process “does

2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive

2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive

1998The term “substantive due process” refers to a line of disparate cases which generally concludes that the guaranty of due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments includes a “substantive” component that restricts infringement upon certain fundamental “liberty interests.” (See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, supra, 507 U.S. 292, 301 [ 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 ].) The substantive due process doctrine thus acts as a limitation on unreasonable and arbitrary legislation. (7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, § 481, p. 668; People v. Kilborn (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1328 [ 49

1998The term “substantive due process” refers to a line of disparate cases which generally concludes that the guaranty of due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments includes a “substantive” component that restricts infringement upon certain fundamental “liberty interests.” (See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, supra, 507 U.S. 292, 301 [ 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 ].) The substantive due process doctrine thus acts as a limitation on unreasonable and arbitrary legislation. (7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, § 481, p. 668; People v. Kilborn (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1328 [ 49

1987(Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 78 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ].) In Hernandez , the Supreme Court considered a substantive due process challenge to the penalty of license suspension for a refusal to take a chemical test for intoxication.

1987(Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 78 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ].) In Hernandez , the Supreme Court considered a substantive due process challenge to the penalty of license suspension for a refusal to take a chemical test for intoxication.

2026“Parents whose children are subjects of a dependency proceeding have constitutionally protected interests in a continued relationship with their children.” (In re Alexandria P. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1341 [“Children also have a fundamental interest in stability and permanency deserving of constitutional protection.”]; see Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 306 [“A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights.”]; In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 419 .) “[C]hildren have a fundament

2017(Cf. In re Alexandria P. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1342 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 468 ] [de facto parents lacked standing to raise constitutional challenges to the ICWA on minor’s behalf where the minor’s counsel and guardian ad litem “sought an outcome consistent with the ICWA’s requirements”].) We therefore proceed to the merits of M.C.’s constitutional claims. b.

2026A substantive due process violation requires some form of outrageous or egregious conduct constituting ‘a true abuse of power.’ ” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837 , 855–856.) “ ‘ “The doctrine of substantive due process ‘does not protect individuals from all [governmental] actions that infringe liberty or injure property in violation of some law.

2026A substantive due process violation requires some form of outrageous or egregious conduct constituting ‘a true abuse of power.’ ” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837 , 855–856.) “ ‘ “The doctrine of substantive due process ‘does not protect individuals from all [governmental] actions that infringe liberty or injure property in violation of some law.

2023(Id. at p. 839.) The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that substantive due process is violated by executive action “only when it ‘can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.’ ” (Id. at p. 847.) The United States Supreme Court explained: “It should not be surprising that the constitutional concept of conscience-shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, but rather points clearly away from liability, 41 [recognizing that “the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the communit

2021(County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) 523 U.S. 833, 845 , abrogated on other grounds by Saucier v. Katz (2001) 533 U.S. 194 .) A substantive due process violation requires some form of outrageous or egregious conduct constituting “a true abuse of power.” (Galland v. City of Clovis (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1003, 1032 .) Inherently, if a governmental actor is engaged in some form of 11. outrageous or egregious conduct constituting a “true abuse of power,” such conduct would be in excess of the scope of that governmental actor’s legitimate powers.

2016We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field’ . . . .” (Washington v. Glucksberg, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 720 ; see District Attorney’s Off. v. Osborne (2009) 14 557 U.S. 52, 72 ; People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 863 ; Jimenez v. County of L.A. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 141 .) When considering a substantive due process claim based on an asserted fundamental liberty interest the United States Supreme Court has “formulated the interest” purportedly subject to constitutional protection with specificity.

2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive

2024At this late stage in the process the evidence of detriment is already so clear and convincing that more cannot be required without prejudice to the interests of the adoptable child, with which the state must now align itself.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 256 .) Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th 295 , addressed a substantive due process challenge to section 366.26.

2024At this late stage in the process the evidence of detriment is already so clear and convincing that more cannot be required without prejudice to the interests of the adoptable child, with which the state must now align itself.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 256 .) Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th 295 , addressed a substantive due process challenge to section 366.26.

2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive

2010B Defendant’s assertion of a substantive due process violation asks this court to give immutable constitutional status to the proposition that a convicted sex offender has a right to privacy that the Legislature may not infringe upon by enacting a sex offender registration requirement. *1079 In evaluating defendant’s argument, we heed the admonition that “[d]ue to the inherently subjective factors that define substantive due process rights and the lack of precise 1 “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area,” ’ courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive

2001(See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland (3d Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 1296 , 1306 [“shock the conscience” standard used for police pursuit, “deliberate indifference” standard for those in custody]; Natale v. Town of Ridgefield (2d Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 258, 263 [rejecting substantive due process claim regarding issuance of building and zoning permits and affirming that “[s]ubstantive due process standards are violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority”]; Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook (1st Cir. 1982) 680 F.2d 822, 832-833

2001(See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland (3d Cir.1994) 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 ["shock the conscience" standard used for police pursuit, "deliberate indifference" standard for those in custody]; Natale v. Town of Ridgefield (2d Cir.1999) 170 F.3d 258, 263 [rejecting substantive due process claim regarding issuance of building and zoning permits and affirming that "[s]ubstantive due process standards are violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority"]; Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook (1st Cir.1982) 680 F.2d 822, 832-833 [ord

2001(See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland (3d Cir.1994) 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 ["shock the conscience" standard used for police pursuit, "deliberate indifference" standard for those in custody]; Natale v. Town of Ridgefield (2d Cir.1999) 170 F.3d 258, 263 [rejecting substantive due process claim regarding issuance of building and zoning permits and affirming that "[s]ubstantive due process standards are violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority"]; Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook (1st Cir.1982) 680 F.2d 822, 832-833 [ord

2001The court reaffirmed the rule it had stated in Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, supra, 680 F.2d 822 , that ordinary state law error does not amount to a substantive due process violation.

2026(See Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 141 [rejecting plaintiff’s description of his “so-called unconstitutional deprivation of liberty as ‘incarceration absent a criminal conviction’ … an issue-begging generalization that [was] far too broadly stated”].) And third, “ ‘under the more-specific-provision rule of Graham v. Connor [(1989) 490 U.S. 386 ,] 395, [a] defendant may not assert a substantive due process claim if there is a particular amendment providing ‘constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior.’ ” (Uribe, supra, 199 Cal.App.4

2012Before addressing those authorities, however, we pause to examine the “constitutional standard [that] governs a free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person.” (Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 388 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 450 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 ].) In Graham , the United States Supreme Court explained that “such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.” (Ibid.) As the court ex

2026Rather, substantive due process prevents “governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression,” or “abuse of governmental power that shocks the conscience,” or “action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests.” ’ ” ’ ” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 856 ; accord, Stubblefield Construction Co. v. City of San Bernardino (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 687 , 709–710; see Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 166, 184 .) In considering this latter consideration, i.e., the

2022The point is that their elected representative decided to oppose the project, and did so vigorously.” ( Stubblefield, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 710–711.) In Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 166 , the reviewing court held that allegations that city council members acted out of personal animosity toward a developer when they blocked a proposed project were insufficient to support a substantive due process claim.

2001(See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane (1998) 134 Wash.2d 947 , 954 P.2d 250 ( Mission Springs ); Bateson v. Geisse (9th Cir.1988) 857 F.2d 1300, 1303-1305 ; Bello v. Walker (3d Cir.1988) 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 ; Scott v. Greenville County (4th Cir.1983) 716 F.2d 1409, 1419 .) For example, in Mission Springs, supra, 134 Wash.2d 947 , 954 P.2d 250 , a developer that had run the entire gauntlet of zoning and planning requirements was denied building permits by the city council, even though it was clear from applicable statutes and ordinances, and *736 from the advice of the city attorney, th

1995The court held that as to the substantive due process claim the builder was not required to seek “just compensation” pursuant to state procedures before filing his federal civil rights action. (857 F.2d at p. 1303.) In both of these cases the court was referring to state postdeprivation remedies providing damages or compensation.

2026(See Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 141 [rejecting plaintiff’s description of his “so-called unconstitutional deprivation of liberty as ‘incarceration absent a criminal conviction’ … an issue-begging generalization that [was] far too broadly stated”].) And third, “ ‘under the more-specific-provision rule of Graham v. Connor [(1989) 490 U.S. 386 ,] 395, [a] defendant may not assert a substantive due process claim if there is a particular amendment providing ‘constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior.’ ” (Uribe, supra, 199 Cal.App.4

2016We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field’ . . . .” (Washington v. Glucksberg, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 720 ; see District Attorney’s Off. v. Osborne (2009) 14 557 U.S. 52, 72 ; People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 863 ; Jimenez v. County of L.A. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 141 .) When considering a substantive due process claim based on an asserted fundamental liberty interest the United States Supreme Court has “formulated the interest” purportedly subject to constitutional protection with specificity.

2023I, §§ 7, 15; U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.)” (Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 771 .) The substantive aspect of this guarantee “protects against arbitrary government action.” (Las Lomas, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 .) A substantive due process violation requires “some form of outrageous or egregious conduct constituting ‘a true abuse of power,’ ” not just “ ‘ordinary government error.’ ” (Id. at pp. 855–856, quoting Galland v. City of Clovis (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1003, 1032 .) The Bruzzones argue that they “have a protected property right in . . . a . . . [land-use] designation that complies

2011Substantive Due Process Substantive due process “prevents government from enacting legislation that is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘discriminatory’ or lacks ‘a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose.’ ” (Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 771 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ], quoting Nebbia v. New York (1934) 291 U.S. 502, 537 [ 78 L.Ed. 940 , 54 S.Ct. 505 ].) “To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, show a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” (Nunez v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1998) 147 F.3

2022(See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [hypothetical situations are insufficient to establish a statute is facially unconstitutional].) A law may not be held unconstitutional on its face “simply because those challenging the law may be able to hypothesize some instances in which application of the law might be unconstitutional.” (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 347 (plur. opn. of George C., J.).) To establish facial unconstitutionality, a petitioner must demonstrate an act’s 41. provisions “ ‘inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflic

2021(Stuard v. Stuard (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 768, 781 .) When considering a claim that a facially valid statute has been applied in a constitutionally impermissible manner, “the court evaluates the propriety of the application on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to relieve the defendant of the sanction.” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 .) A substantive due process violation “requires more than ‘ordinary government error,’ and the ‘ “ ‘arbitrary and capricious’ ” ’ standard applicable in other contexts is a lower threshold than that required to establish a substantiv

2022(See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [hypothetical situations are insufficient to establish a statute is facially unconstitutional].) A law may not be held unconstitutional on its face “simply because those challenging the law may be able to hypothesize some instances in which application of the law might be unconstitutional.” (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 347 (plur. opn. of George C., J.).) To establish facial unconstitutionality, a petitioner must demonstrate an act’s 41. provisions “ ‘inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflic

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon