felony-murder rule in Nevada

2019"The original purpose of the felony-murder rule was to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for the killings that are the result of a felony or an attempted one." Payne v. State, 81 Nev. 503, 506 , 406 P.2d 922, 924 (1965).

2019"The original purpose of the felony-murder rule was to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for the killings that are the result of a felony or an attempted one." Payne v. State, 81 Nev. 503, 506 , 406 P.2d 922, 924 (1965).

2019Lastly, she claims that the fact an enumerated felony was committed does not mean the felony-murder rule automatically applies, pointing to this court's decision in Nay v. State, 123 Nev. 326 , 167 P.3d 430 (2007) (holding that an afterthought felony, committed subsequent to a murder, could not support a felony-murder conviction).

2019Lastly, she claims that the fact an enumerated felony was committed does not mean the felony-murder rule automatically applies, pointing to this court's decision in Nay v. State, 123 Nev. 326 , 167 P.3d 430 (2007) (holding that an afterthought felony, committed subsequent to a murder, could not support a felony-murder conviction).

2019"The felony-murder rule makes a killing committed in the course of certain felonies murder, without requiring the State to present additional evidence as to the defendant's mental state." Rose v. State, 127 Nev. 494, 500 , 255 P.3d 291, 295 (2011).

2019"The felony-murder rule makes a killing committed in the course of certain felonies murder, without requiring the State to present additional evidence as to the defendant's mental state." Rose v. State, 127 Nev. 494, 500 , 255 P.3d 291, 295 (2011).

2011To maintain the narrow confines of second-degree felony murder, wherein the felonies that can be used to support a conviction are not statutorily enumerated and the use of the felony-murder rule has “the potential for untoward prosecutions,” Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 118 , 659 P.2d 852, 859 (1983), we hold that assaultive-type felonies that involve a threat of immediate violent injury merge with a charged homicide for purposes of second-degree felony murder and therefore cannot be used as the basis for a second-degree felony-murder conviction.

2011To maintain the narrow confines of second-degree felony murder, wherein the felonies that can be used to support a conviction are not statutorily enumerated and the use of the felony-murder rule has “the potential for untoward prosecutions,” Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 118 , 659 P.2d 852, 859 (1983), we hold that assaultive-type felonies that involve a threat of immediate violent injury merge with a charged homicide for purposes of second-degree felony murder and therefore cannot be used as the basis for a second-degree felony-murder conviction.

2019The Legislature has specified certain, enumerated 2 To the extent appellant argues that the test for competency to stand trial is different than the test for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, Justice Scalia noted that "[it was never the rule at common law that a defendant could be competent to stand trial and yet incompetent to either exercise or give up some of the rights provided for his defense," Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 184 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that the Court had previously "rejected the invitation to craft a higher co

2019The Legislature has specified certain, enumerated 2 To the extent appellant argues that the test for competency to stand trial is different than the test for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, Justice Scalia noted that "[it was never the rule at common law that a defendant could be competent to stand trial and yet incompetent to either exercise or give up some of the rights provided for his defense," Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 184 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that the Court had previously "rejected the invitation to craft a higher co

2016SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 (0) 1947A e for the felony-murder rule and the felony aggravating circumstance are not the same The felony-murder rule's purpose is "to deter dangerous conduct by punishing as a first degree murder a homicide resulting from dangerous conduct in the perpetration of a felony." Id. at 332 , 167 P.3d at 434 (quoting State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724, 729 (M.D.

2014The felony-murder rule exists "to deter dangerous conduct by punishing as a first degree murder a homicide resulting from dangerous conduct in the perpetration of a felony, even if the defendant did not intend to kill." Nay v. State, 123 Nev. 326, 332, 167 P.3d 430, 434 (2007) (quoting State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724, 729 (Md. 2005)).

2014Fourth, Walker contends that the application of the felony- murder rule in this case constituted impermissible bootstrapping and produced an absurd result; therefore, he urges this court to revisit its holding in State v. Contreras, 118 Nev. 332, 337 , 46 P.3d 661, 664 (2002) (rejecting defendant's argument regarding felony murder where the underlying felony is burglary with the intent to commit battery).

2014Fourth, Walker contends that the application of the felony- murder rule in this case constituted impermissible bootstrapping and produced an absurd result; therefore, he urges this court to revisit its holding in State v. Contreras, 118 Nev. 332, 337 , 46 P.3d 661, 664 (2002) (rejecting defendant's argument regarding felony murder where the underlying felony is burglary with the intent to commit battery).

2011See Sarun Chun, 203 P.3d at 435 ; Ireland, 450 P.2d at 590 ; accord Moran, 158 N.E. at 36 (addressing felony-murder rule and holding that felonious assault that culminated in homicide could not be used to apply the felony-murder rule because the result would be that almost every homicide would be committed in the course of a felony so that no further evidence of intent would ever be required for a murder conviction; therefore, the felony “must be one that is independent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein” (emphasis added)).

2002Simpson, Annotation, Application of Felony-Murder Doctrine Where the Felony Relied upon Is an Includible Offense with the Homicide, 40 A.L.R.3d 1341 , 1345-46 (1971 & Supp.2001). [10] See People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100 , 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927). [11] 32 N.Y.2d 157 , 344 N.Y.S.2d 342 , 297 N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (1973). [12] Id. at 87. [13] Id. at 87-89 (footnote and citations omitted). [14] Cf. Barton v. State, 117 Nev. ___ , 30 P.3d 1103 (2001). [15] See, e.g., Talancon v. State, 102 Nev. 294 , 721 P.2d 764 (1986); Koza v. State, 100 Nev. 245 , 681 P.2d 44 (1984); Brimmage v. State, 93 Nev. 434 , 567

2002Simpson, Annotation, Application of Felony-Murder Doctrine Where the Felony Relied upon Is an Includible Offense with the Homicide, 40 A.L.R.3d 1341 , 1345-46 (1971 & Supp.2001). [10] See People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100 , 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927). [11] 32 N.Y.2d 157 , 344 N.Y.S.2d 342 , 297 N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (1973). [12] Id. at 87. [13] Id. at 87-89 (footnote and citations omitted). [14] Cf. Barton v. State, 117 Nev. ___ , 30 P.3d 1103 (2001). [15] See, e.g., Talancon v. State, 102 Nev. 294 , 721 P.2d 764 (1986); Koza v. State, 100 Nev. 245 , 681 P.2d 44 (1984); Brimmage v. State, 93 Nev. 434 , 567

2002Simpson, Annotation, Application of Felony-Murder Doctrine Where the Felony Relied upon Is an Includible Offense with the Homicide, 40 A.L.R.3d 1341 , 1345-46 (1971 & Supp.2001). [10] See People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100 , 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927). [11] 32 N.Y.2d 157 , 344 N.Y.S.2d 342 , 297 N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (1973). [12] Id. at 87. [13] Id. at 87-89 (footnote and citations omitted). [14] Cf. Barton v. State, 117 Nev. ___ , 30 P.3d 1103 (2001). [15] See, e.g., Talancon v. State, 102 Nev. 294 , 721 P.2d 764 (1986); Koza v. State, 100 Nev. 245 , 681 P.2d 44 (1984); Brimmage v. State, 93 Nev. 434 , 567

2000See id. at 214 , 660 P.2d at 995 .

1986One of these classes of murder is murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of robbery. ...” This court held, “The instruction in question merely states the law of the felony murder doctrine rather than instructs the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused.” 99 Nev. at 215, 660 P.2d at 995 .

2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A when the murder is committed in the perpetration of a robbery); NRS 195.020 (providing principal liability for "[e]very person concerned in the commission of a felony . . . whether the person directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission"); see also Garner v. State, 116 Nev. 770 , 782, 6 P.3d 1013, 1021 (2000) (recognizing that under the felony-murder rule, a defendant who did not shoot the victim may be guilty of first-degree murder by conspiring to commit the robbery during which the murder was committed), overruled

2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A when the murder is committed in the perpetration of a robbery); NRS 195.020 (providing principal liability for "[e]very person concerned in the commission of a felony . . . whether the person directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission"); see also Garner v. State, 116 Nev. 770 , 782, 6 P.3d 1013, 1021 (2000) (recognizing that under the felony-murder rule, a defendant who did not shoot the victim may be guilty of first-degree murder by conspiring to commit the robbery during which the murder was committed), overruled

2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A when the murder is committed in the perpetration of a robbery); NRS 195.020 (providing principal liability for "[e]very person concerned in the commission of a felony . . . whether the person directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission"); see also Garner v. State, 116 Nev. 770 , 782, 6 P.3d 1013, 1021 (2000) (recognizing that under the felony-murder rule, a defendant who did not shoot the victim may be guilty of first-degree murder by conspiring to commit the robbery during which the murder was committed), overruled

2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A when the murder is committed in the perpetration of a robbery); NRS 195.020 (providing principal liability for "[e]very person concerned in the commission of a felony . . . whether the person directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission"); see also Garner v. State, 116 Nev. 770 , 782, 6 P.3d 1013, 1021 (2000) (recognizing that under the felony-murder rule, a defendant who did not shoot the victim may be guilty of first-degree murder by conspiring to commit the robbery during which the murder was committed), overruled

2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A when the murder is committed in the perpetration of a robbery); NRS 195.020 (providing principal liability for "[e]very person concerned in the commission of a felony . . . whether the person directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission"); see also Garner v. State, 116 Nev. 770 , 782, 6 P.3d 1013, 1021 (2000) (recognizing that under the felony-murder rule, a defendant who did not shoot the victim may be guilty of first-degree murder by conspiring to commit the robbery during which the murder was committed), overruled

2018State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. 739, 750 , 312 P.3d 467, 474 (2013) (explaining that "[s]tare decisis plays a critical role in our jurisprudence . . . but when governing decisions prove to be unworkable or are badly reasoned, they should be overruled" (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2018State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. 739, 750 , 312 P.3d 467, 474 (2013) (explaining that "[s]tare decisis plays a critical role in our jurisprudence . . . but when governing decisions prove to be unworkable or are badly reasoned, they should be overruled" (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2018See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673 , 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) ("It is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this court.").

2018See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673 , 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) ("It is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this court.").

2014See, e.g., State v. Hardy, 283 P.3d 12, 18-19 (Ariz. 2012) (en banc) (upholding felony-murder conviction where a felony occurred before a fatal shooting); Yates v. State, 55 A.3d 25, 34 (Md. 2012) (holding that "the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction").

2014See, e.g., State v. Hardy, 283 P.3d 12, 18-19 (Ariz. 2012) (en banc) (upholding felony-murder conviction where a felony occurred before a fatal shooting); Yates v. State, 55 A.3d 25, 34 (Md. 2012) (holding that "the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction").

2014State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 529-30, 221 P.2d 404, 417 (1950); Walker, 982 N.E.2d at 275) (discussing pattern jury instructions); People v. Huynh, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170, 191 (Ct. App. 2012) ("the felony-murder rule imposes a type of strict liability on the perpetrator .. .").

2014State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 529-30, 221 P.2d 404, 417 (1950); Walker, 982 N.E.2d at 275) (discussing pattern jury instructions); People v. Huynh, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170, 191 (Ct. App. 2012) ("the felony-murder rule imposes a type of strict liability on the perpetrator .. .").

2014See State v. Williams, 28 Nev. 395 , 82 P. 353 (1905).

2014See State v. Williams, 28 Nev. 395, 82 P. 353 (1905).

2014State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 529-30 , 221 P.2d 404, 417 (1950); Walker, 982 N.E.2d at 275) (discussing pattern jury instructions); People v. Huynh, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170, 191 (Ct. App. 2012) ("the felony-murder rule imposes a type of strict liability on the perpetrator .. .").

2014State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 529-30, 221 P.2d 404, 417 (1950); Walker, 982 N.E.2d at 275) (discussing pattern jury instructions); People v. Huynh, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170, 191 (Ct. App. 2012) ("the felony-murder rule imposes a type of strict liability on the perpetrator .. .").

2014Bissot, 53 Ind. at 412 ; see also Pratt, 873 P.2d at 811-12 (to say felony murder predicated upon burglary cannot obtain once the burglary is complete would restrict the felony-murder rule to cases where "the burglar had one leg over the windowsill or one foot across the threshold" and defeat the purpose of the felony-murder statute (internal quotations omitted)). 3.

2014Bissot, 53 Ind. at 412; see also Pratt, 873 P.2d at 811-12 (to say felony murder predicated upon burglary cannot obtain once the burglary is complete would restrict the felony-murder rule to cases where "the burglar had one leg over the windowsill or one foot across the threshold" and defeat the purpose of the felony-murder statute (internal quotations omitted)). 3.

2014See, e.g., State v. Hardy, 283 P.3d 12, 18-19 (Ariz. 2012) (en banc) (upholding felony-murder conviction where a felony occurred before a fatal shooting); Yates v. State, 55 A.3d 25, 34 (Md. 2012) (holding that "the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction").

2014See, e.g., State v. Hardy, 283 P.3d 12, 18-19 (Ariz. 2012) (en banc) (upholding felony-murder conviction where a felony occurred before a fatal shooting); Yates v. State, 55 A.3d 25, 34 (Md. 2012) (holding that "the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction").

2014Bissot, 53 Ind. at 412 ; see also Pratt, 873 P.2d at 811-12 (to say felony murder predicated upon burglary cannot obtain once the burglary is complete would restrict the felony-murder rule to cases where "the burglar had one leg over the windowsill or one foot across the threshold" and defeat the purpose of the felony-murder statute (internal quotations omitted)). 3.

2014Bissot, 53 Ind. at 412; see also Pratt, 873 P.2d at 811-12 (to say felony murder predicated upon burglary cannot obtain once the burglary is complete would restrict the felony-murder rule to cases where "the burglar had one leg over the windowsill or one foot across the threshold" and defeat the purpose of the felony-murder statute (internal quotations omitted)). 3.

2014Because the felony-murder rule seeks to make punishment more certain, "[it was not intended to relieve the wrong-doer from any. . . consequences of his act." People v. Boss, 290 P. 881, 884 (Cal. 1930).

2014Because the felony-murder rule seeks to make punishment more certain, "[it was not intended to relieve the wrong-doer from any. . . consequences of his act." People v. Boss, 290 P. 881, 884 (Cal. 1930).

2011See, e.g., State v. Goodman, 257 S.E.2d 569, 584-85 (N.C. 1979) (explaining that prior decision allows use of felony aggravator only when defendant is convicted for first-degree murder upon theory of premeditation and deliberation and holding that felony aggravator was properly submitted to jury when defendant found guilty upon theory of premeditation and deliberation “as well as by virtue of the felony murder rule”).

2011See Sarun Chun, 203 P.3d at 435 ; Ireland, 450 P.2d at 590 ; accord Moran, 158 N.E. at 36 (addressing felony-murder rule and holding that felonious assault that culminated in homicide could not be used to apply the felony-murder rule because the result would be that almost every homicide would be committed in the course of a felony so that no further evidence of intent would ever be required for a murder conviction; therefore, the felony “must be one that is independent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein” (emphasis added)).

2011People v. Sarun Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 434 (Cal. 2009).

2009Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748 , 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). “[T]he defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case if it finds support in the evidence.” Vincent v. State, 97 Nev. 169, 170 , 625 P.2d 1172, 1173 (1981).

2009Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748 , 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). “[T]he defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case if it finds support in the evidence.” Vincent v. State, 97 Nev. 169, 170 , 625 P.2d 1172, 1173 (1981).