62 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Heemstragreen2 sentences2021While the direct appeal was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided State v. Heemstra, wherein the court overruled existing precedent relating to the felony-murder rule. 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006). 2020Cf. Phuoc Thanh Nguyen, 829 N.W.2d at 188 (discussing the felony-murder rule as law at the time of the defendant’s conviction and our decision in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006) was not 8 “simply a ‘clarification of the law’ or ‘an application of preexisting law’ ” but an express overruling of prior law (quoting Perez v. State, 829 N.W.2d 354 , 360–61 (Iowa 2012))). | 22 | 29 |
State v. Beemangreen2 sentences2016The underlying predicate felony was terrorism. 1 The use of an assaultive predicate felony was supported by a line of cases starting with State v. Beeman, which found willful injury to be a proper predicate felony for a felony-murder instruction. 315 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Iowa 1982). 2016In Beeman, the court held that Iowa’s first-degree murder statute made willful injury a proper predicate felony for a felony- murder instruction. 315 N.W.2d at 776 . | 8 | 8 |
State v. Raglandgreen2 sentences2018We came to a similar conclusion in State v. Ragland , 420 N.W.2d 791 , 794 (Iowa 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Heemstra , 721 N.W.2d 549 , 558 (Iowa 2006). 1988In State v. Ragland, 420 N.W. 2d 791, 794 (Iowa 1988), we determined that the felony-murder rule does not violate due process when the underlying felony is willful injury under Iowa Code section 708.-4. | 6 | 7 |
State Of Iowa Vs. Stanley Alan Tribblegreen2 sentences2024The Iowa Code defines murder as killing “another person with malice aforethought either express or implied.” Iowa Code § 707.1 . “[A] person commits murder in the first degree under the felony-murder rule in Iowa when the person kills another person (with expressed or implied malice aforethought) while participating in a nonexempt forcible felony.” State v. Tribble, 790 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Iowa 2010); see also Iowa Code §§ 707.1 , .2(1)(b). 2020The felony-murder rule developed from a common-law doctrine “that any death resulting from the commission or attempted commission of a felony constitutes murder.” State v. Tribble, 790 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Iowa 2010). | 5 | 6 |
State of Iowa v. Keyon Harrisongreen2 sentences2022“The felony-murder rule aims to deter people from committing those felonies the legislature has deemed inherently dangerous to the life of others.” State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 191 (Iowa 2018). 2021See State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 196 (Iowa 2018) (“Further, Harrison misrepresents the felony-murder rule in his argument that it is premised on the ability to foresee danger. | 3 | 4 |
State of Iowa v. Jeffrey K. Raglandgreen2 sentences2018See State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Iowa 2017); State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016); State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590, 603 (Iowa 2015); State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555-58 (Iowa 2015); Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 400-04 ; State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74-75 (Iowa 2013); State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 95-98 (Iowa 2013); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121-22 (Iowa 2013); see also State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 188-202 (Iowa 2018) (discussing in depth the state and federal sentencing landscape for juvenile offenders, application of the felony-murder rule to juvenile offenders 2018In Ragland , a child knowingly participated in a fight with a rival group of children. 836 N.W.2d 107 , 110 (Iowa 2013). | 3 | 3 |
Conner v. Stategreen2 sentences2018In Conner, we departed from the transferred-intent model of analysis, which would have exposed the felony-murder rule to due process attack, and instead declared that elimination of the mens rea requirement 53 was not an irrebuttable presumption but instead “a matter of substantive law that places responsibility on a wrongdoer for the direct and indirect consequences of his joint criminal conduct with another.” Id. at 456. 2018In Conner , we departed from the transferred-intent model of analysis, which would have exposed the felony-murder rule to due process attack, and instead declared that elimination of the mens rea requirement was not an irrebuttable presumption *213 but instead "a matter of substantive law that places responsibility on a wrongdoer for the direct and indirect consequences of his joint criminal conduct with another." Id. at 456 . | 3 | 3 |
Phuoc Thanh Nguyen v. State of Iowagreen2 sentences2020Cf. Phuoc Thanh Nguyen, 829 N.W.2d at 188 (discussing the felony-murder rule as law at the time of the defendant’s conviction and our decision in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006) was not 8 “simply a ‘clarification of the law’ or ‘an application of preexisting law’ ” but an express overruling of prior law (quoting Perez v. State, 829 N.W.2d 354 , 360–61 (Iowa 2012))). 2016See Nguyen, 829 N.W.2d at 186 (noting Nguyen filed his PCR action within three years of State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006), the case that changed the law with respect to the felony-murder rule). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Camposgreen2 sentences2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre 2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre | 2 | 2 |
Roper v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2018An overview of these changes is necessary to provide background for our analysis of Harrison’s constitutional challenge to the felony-murder rule and his sentence of life imprisonment with immediate parole eligibility. 9 First, in Roper, the Supreme Court held that imposing capital punishment on juvenile offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 543 U.S. at 568 , 126 S. Ct. at 1194. 2018An overview of these changes is necessary to provide background for our analysis of Harrison’s constitutional challenge to the felony-murder rule and his sentence of life imprisonment with immediate parole eligibility. 9 First, in Roper, the Supreme Court held that imposing capital punishment on juvenile offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 543 U.S. at 568 , 126 S. Ct. at 1194. | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Aarongreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Wanrowred2 sentences2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony." (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift , 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668-69 (1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke , 261 S.C. 308 , 199 S.E.2d 755 , 757 (1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Claus 2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony." (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift , 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668-69 (1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke , 261 S.C. 308 , 199 S.E.2d 755 , 757 (1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Claus | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Phillipsgreen | 2 | 2 |
Gore v. Leekegreen2 sentences2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony." (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift , 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668-69 (1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke , 261 S.C. 308 , 199 S.E.2d 755 , 757 (1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Claus 2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony." (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift , 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668-69 (1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke , 261 S.C. 308 , 199 S.E.2d 755 , 757 (1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Claus | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Watkinsgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2 |
State v. Goodsealgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Smith v. Myersgreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Herrera, Jr.green2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Taylorgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Jeffersongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State of Iowa v. Sayvon Andre Proppsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Rhodegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Goosman v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Olivergreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Mayberrygreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Buggsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Commonwealth v. Claudiogreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Connergreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Nowlingreen2 sentences2018Nowlin , 244 N.W.2d at 604 -05 . 2012See State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 605 (Iowa 1976) (finding the felony murder rule constitutional because the State must still prove every element, including the element of intent in the underlying crime, to enhance the degree of murder). | 1 | 3 |
Schrier v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Thus, in State v. Taylor, 287 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1980), we again stated that malice may be shown by the commission of a felony, and in Schrier v. State, 347 N.W.2d 657 , 666–67 (Iowa 1984), we held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a felony-murder instruction that allowed the state to prove malice simply by proving an underlying felony. 2018Thus, in State v. Taylor , 287 N.W.2d 576 , 578 (Iowa 1980), we again stated that malice may be shown by the commission of a felony, and in Schrier v. State , 347 N.W.2d 657 , 666-67 (Iowa 1984), we held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a felony-murder instruction that allowed the state to prove malice simply by proving an underlying felony. | 1 | 3 |
Enmund v. Floridagreen2 sentences2018As was powerfully pointed out in Enmund , it is hard to understand how the felony-murder rule deters when the defendant has no intention to commit the crime. 458 U.S. at 798 -99 , 102 S.Ct. at 3377 . 2018As was powerfully pointed out in Enmund , it is hard to understand how the felony-murder rule deters when the defendant has no intention to commit the crime. 458 U.S. at 798 -99 , 102 S.Ct. at 3377 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Ortegagreen2 sentences2018Id. at 1205 . 2018Id. at 1205. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Dillongreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Nay v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Irelandgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Snethen v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Iowa v. Denem Anthony Nullgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Iowa v. Desirae Monique Pearsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lyle
green
2 sentences2018Specifically, Harrison alleges the felony-murder rule is premised on the assumption that juvenile offenders who participate in a forcible felony can appreciate the potential consequences of their participation even though juvenile offenders are "not developed enough to appreciate not only the assumption, but the natural consequence of the [forcible felony] (i.e. the murder)." Harrison relies primarily on our state and federal juvenile sentencing jurisprudence which recognizes that there is a "fundamental and virtually inexorable difference between juveniles and adults for the purposes of punis 2018Rather, he largely repeats the same argument he made with regard to banning the application of the felony-murder rule to juveniles-namely, that "juveniles lack the ability to form the proper foreseeability, lack the appreciation of consequences, and are highly impulsive." However, we held in Propps that "[t]he constitutional analysis is not about excusing juvenile behavior, but imposing punishment in a way that is consistent with our understanding of humanity today." Propps , 897 N.W.2d at 102 (alteration in original) (quoting Lyle , 854 N.W.2d at 398 ). | 3 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Tucker
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 522 . 2016Tucker, 810 N.W.2d at 522 . | 3 | 2015–2017 |
| Graham v. Florida green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Swift
green
2 sentences2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony." (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift , 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668-69 (1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke , 261 S.C. 308 , 199 S.E.2d 755 , 757 (1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Claus 2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony." (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift , 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668-69 (1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke , 261 S.C. 308 , 199 S.E.2d 755 , 757 (1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Claus | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Burkhart green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State of Iowa v. Charles James David Oliver
green
2 sentences2018Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 600 . “[W]e owe substantial deference to the penalties the legislature has established for various crimes.” Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650 . 2018Louisell , 865 N.W.2d at 600 . "[W]e owe substantial deference to the penalties the legislature has established for various crimes." Oliver , 812 N.W.2d at 650 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2018Va. 1977) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the felony-murder rule under the Due Process Clauses because the felony-murder rule does not require a showing of malice and therefore does not create a presumption that defendant committed the killing with malice). 20 132 S. Ct. at 2464 ), for sentencing purposes due to “the features of youthful behavior, such as ‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.’ ” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 , 132 S. Ct. at 2468 ). 2018Va. 1977) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the felony-murder rule under the Due Process Clauses because the felony-murder rule does not require a showing of malice and therefore does not create a presumption that defendant committed the killing with malice). 20 132 S. Ct. at 2464 ), for sentencing purposes due to “the features of youthful behavior, such as ‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.’ ” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 , 132 S. Ct. at 2468 ). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Underwood
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre 2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Flood
green
2 sentences2018As noted by one court, "the felony murder doctrine expresses a highly artificial concept that deserves no extension beyond its required application." People v. Phillips , 64 Cal.2d 574 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 , 360 (1966) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood , 18 Cal.4th 470 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 , 882 n.12 (1998). 2018As noted by one court, "the felony murder doctrine expresses a highly artificial concept that deserves no extension beyond its required application." People v. Phillips , 64 Cal.2d 574 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 , 360 (1966) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood , 18 Cal.4th 470 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 , 882 n.12 (1998). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| In Re Personal Restraint of Andress red | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Evans v. State green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Tison v. Arizona green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State of Minnesota v. Mahdi Hassan Ali
green
2 sentences2018Ct. App. 2012) (declining to adopt a categorical rule prohibiting the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted under the felony-murder rule); State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235 , 258–59 (Minn. 25 national consensus remains in favor of subjecting juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule—regardless of whether an offender was aiding and abetting or the principal actor—to the same sentencing options as juvenile offenders convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. 8 2014) (noting the constitutionality of l 2018Ct. App. 2012) (declining to adopt a categorical rule prohibiting the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted under the felony-murder rule); State v. Ali , 855 N.W.2d 235 , 258-59 (Minn. 2014) (noting the constitutionality of life sentences for juveniles convicted of felony murder); cf. Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 700-01, 727 (holding a seventeen year-old's sentence of life imprisonment for felony murder was unconstitutional as applied where the offender fatally shot his victim out of fear for his life in the course of tryin | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Brian K. Allison v. State of iowa green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State Ex Rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In re the Personal Restraint of Andress red | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Bruegger green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Mullaney v. Wilbur green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Varnum v. Brien green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Schuler green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Amos Branch green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.