felony-murder doctrine in Maryland

2022See Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438 , 451–52, 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (1982) (“[U]nder the felony-murder doctrine, criminal culpability shall continue to be imposed for all lethal acts committed by a felon or an accomplice acting in furtherance of a common design.”).

2022See Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438 , 451–52, 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (1982) (“[U]nder the felony-murder doctrine, criminal culpability shall continue to be imposed for all lethal acts committed by a felon or an accomplice acting in furtherance of a common design.”).

2019In Johnson, supra, 442 Md. at 220 , the Court of Appeals stated that it had previously held (in Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 265 (1977)): “Applying the required evidence test, it would seem clear that the felony murder and the 19 underlying felony must be deemed the same for double jeopardy purposes.” The Court of Appeals in Johnson, 442 Md. at 220 , quoted with approval this explanation from Newton, 280 Md. at 269 , as to why the conviction for the underlying felony merges into a conviction of felony murder: Therefore, to secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder do

2019In Johnson, supra, 442 Md. at 220 , the Court of Appeals stated that it had previously held (in Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 265 (1977)): “Applying the required evidence test, it would seem clear that the felony murder and the 19 underlying felony must be deemed the same for double jeopardy purposes.” The Court of Appeals in Johnson, 442 Md. at 220 , quoted with approval this explanation from Newton, 280 Md. at 269 , as to why the conviction for the underlying felony merges into a conviction of felony murder: Therefore, to secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder do

2000That limitation was also noted in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A.2d 472 (1958), where, applying the agency theory, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: “The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine. ‘It is necessary ... to show that the conduct causing death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.’ [I]n order to convict for felony-murder, the killing must have been done by the defendant or by an accomplice or *270 confederate or by one acting in furtherance of the felonious undertaking.”

2000That limitation was also noted in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A.2d 472 (1958), where, applying the agency theory, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: “The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine. ‘It is necessary ... to show that the conduct causing death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.’ [I]n order to convict for felony-murder, the killing must have been done by the defendant or by an accomplice or *270 confederate or by one acting in furtherance of the felonious undertaking.”

2005Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218 , 261 A.2d 550, 555 (1970) (observing that “we do want to make clear how shaky are the basic premises on which [the felony-murder rule] rests.

2005Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218 , 261 A.2d 550, 555 (1970) (observing that “we do want to make clear how shaky are the basic premises on which [the felony-murder rule] rests.

2012Likewise, in Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576 , 755 A.2d 1088 (2000), we noted (but did not have cause in that case to embrace) that, at least when the intent to commit the felony preceded a killing, “the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction, closely related in point of time, place and causal connection.” Id. at 629 , 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Montague v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 187 , 522 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1999), aff'd, 260 Va. 697 , 536 S.E.2d 910 (2000)).

2012Likewise, in Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576 , 755 A.2d 1088 (2000), we noted (but did not have cause in that case to embrace) that, at least when the intent to commit the felony preceded a killing, “the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction, closely related in point of time, place and causal connection.” Id. at 629 , 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Montague v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 187 , 522 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1999), aff'd, 260 Va. 697 , 536 S.E.2d 910 (2000)).

1995To invoke the felony-murder doctrine to imply malice in such a case is unnecessary and overlooks the principles of criminal liability that should govern the responsibility of one person for a killing committed by another.” 44 Cal.Rptr. at 445-46 , 402 P.2d at 133-34 (footnote and citations omitted).

1995To invoke the felony-murder doctrine to imply malice in such a case is unnecessary and overlooks the principles of criminal liability that should govern the responsibility of one person for a killing committed by another.” 44 Cal.Rptr. at 445-46 , 402 P.2d at 133-34 (footnote and citations omitted).

2022App. 640, 700 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff’d, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976)). 22 This determination is aligned with the particular policy judgments that lie behind the felony murder rule.

2008See Fisher, 367 Md. at 251 , 786 A.2d 706 (“It is only ... after the felony-murder rule has already operated, that [the first degree murder statute] come[s] into play to provide further that in the case of certain designated felonies, the already established murder shall be punished as murder in the first degree.”) (quoting Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640 , 686 n. 23, 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976)).

2011The trial court instructed that the difference between the two degrees was whether "the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death or of serious physical injury likely to result in death." Citing Fisher, 367 Md. at 250 , 786 A.2d at 706 , the Court of Special Appeals explained that the instruction was improper because a reasonably foreseeable risk of death is required for the felony murder doctrine to be applicable in the first place and thus has "no bearing on the degree of punishment." Goldsberry, 182 Md.

2011The trial court instructed that the difference between the two degrees was whether "the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death or of serious physical injury likely to result in death." Citing Fisher, 367 Md. at 250 , 786 A.2d at 706 , the Court of Special Appeals explained that the instruction was improper because a reasonably foreseeable risk of death is required for the felony murder doctrine to be applicable in the first place and thus has "no bearing on the degree of punishment." Goldsberry, 182 Md.

2021In State v. Allen, the Court of Appeals established the afterthought felony exception to the felony-murder rule. 387 Md. 389 .

2021The Court of Appeals has explained that, under the felony-murder rule, “the malice involved in the underlying felony is permitted to stand in the place of the malice that would otherwise be required with respect to the killing.” Allen, 387 Md. at 402 .

2019Mere coincidence between the underlying felony and the killing is not enough; the conduct causing death must be in furtherance of the design to commit the felony." Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258 , 272, 744 A.2d 1 , 8-9 (2000). 1 There is a causal relationship between a felony and a death when the two are part of a "continuous transaction" and "the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction and are closely related in point of time, place, and causal connection." See Yates v. State , 429 Md. 112 , 127, 55 A.3d 25 , 34 (2012) (footnote o

2019Mere coincidence between the underlying felony and the killing is not enough; the conduct causing death must be in furtherance of the design to commit the felony." Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258 , 272, 744 A.2d 1 , 8-9 (2000). 1 There is a causal relationship between a felony and a death when the two are part of a "continuous transaction" and "the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction and are closely related in point of time, place, and causal connection." See Yates v. State , 429 Md. 112 , 127, 55 A.3d 25 , 34 (2012) (footnote o

2024Id. at 268-69; see also State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 712 (1978) (“This Court in [Newton], held that when a defendant is charged with both murder and a felony arising from the same transaction, and is convicted of murder based upon the felony murder doctrine, the underlying felony merges into the murder conviction.”).

2024Thus, when both Frye and Jones were convicted of first-degree murder and at least one predicate felony 8 that the jury may have relied on to satisfy the felony murder rule, there was “no foundation” in the record “to 7 As was “relevant” to the Court’s analysis, Frye was charged, “[i]n one indictment,” “in the first count with murder and in the second count with using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence (I.e., the murder).” Frye, 283 Md. at 717 .

2006See id. at 450-52 , 444 A.2d at 1041-42 . 7 In the course of explaining our common-law “agency” approach to felony-murder, we relied on the “classic statement of the agency theory” given by the court in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 (1863), quoting from the court’s opinion as follows: “ ‘There can be no doubt of the general rule of law, that a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is legally responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or necessarily flow from it, and that, if he combines and confederates with others to accomplish an illegal purpose, he is li

2000The rationale for that approach was the “agency theory” of felony-murder, a “classic statement” of which appeared in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 (1863).

2017See also Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 451 , 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (1982); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672 , 299 N.W.2d 304, 312 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel.

2017See also Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 451 , 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (1982); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W. 2d 304, 312 (Mich. 1980); Commonwealth ex rel Smith v Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 555 (Pa. 1970).

2005“If the felonious conduct, under all of the circumstances, made death a foreseeable consequence, it is reasonable for the law to infer from the commission of the felony under those circumstances the malice that qualifies the homicide as murder.” Fisher, 367 Md. at 262 , 786 A.2d at 732 . 8 We have repeatedly held that “under the felony-murder doctrine a participating felon is guilty of murder when a homicide has been committed by a co-felon.” Campbell, 293 Md. at 442 , 444 A.2d at 1037 (citing Stevens v. State, 232 Md. 33, 41 , 192 A.2d 73, 78 , cert, denied, 375 U.S. 886 , 84 S.Ct. 160 , 11 L

2005“If the felonious conduct, under all of the circumstances, made death a foreseeable consequence, it is reasonable for the law to infer from the commission of the felony under those circumstances the malice that qualifies the homicide as murder.” Fisher, 367 Md. at 262 , 786 A.2d at 732 . 8 We have repeatedly held that “under the felony-murder doctrine a participating felon is guilty of murder when a homicide has been committed by a co-felon.” Campbell, 293 Md. at 442 , 444 A.2d at 1037 (citing Stevens v. State, 232 Md. 33, 41 , 192 A.2d 73, 78 , cert, denied, 375 U.S. 886 , 84 S.Ct. 160 , 11 L

2001Judge Orth, writing for the Court, said: "[M]alice aforethought is established, inter alia, upon commission of criminal homicide in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, a felony."3 "3 There is suggestion that the common law rule ultimately required that the underlying felony be one `dangerous to human life.' Lindsay v. State, 8 Md.App. 100, 105, n. 6 , 258 A.2d 760 (1969), cert. denied, 257 Md. 734 (1970).

1974App. 166 ; 2. ) that during his explanation of the felony murder rule, the judge stated that if a murder “occurred during the occurrence of a robbery it was automatically first degree murder.” Appellant contends this made it unnecessary for the jury to find “malice.” We have said that under the felony-murder rule “the malice necessary to constitute *165 murder is implied from the fact that the accused was committing or attempting to commit a felony.” Lindsay v. State, 8 Md.

2012Likewise, in Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576 , 755 A.2d 1088 (2000), we noted (but did not have cause in that case to embrace) that, at least when the intent to commit the felony preceded a killing, “the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction, closely related in point of time, place and causal connection.” Id. at 629 , 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Montague v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 187 , 522 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1999), aff'd, 260 Va. 697 , 536 S.E.2d 910 (2000)).

2012Likewise, in Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576 , 755 A.2d 1088 (2000), we noted (but did not have cause in that case to embrace) that, at least when the intent to commit the felony preceded a killing, “the felony murder doctrine applies when the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction, closely related in point of time, place and causal connection.” Id. at 629 , 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Montague v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 187 , 522 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1999), aff'd, 260 Va. 697 , 536 S.E.2d 910 (2000)).

2000We began our analysis by recalling, from Jackson v. State, supra, 286 Md. 430, 435 , 408 A.2d 711, 715 , the basic felony-murder doctrine: “at common law, homicide arising in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony is murder whether death was intended or not, the fact that the person was engaged in such perpetration or attempt being sufficient to supply the element of malice.” Campbell, supra, 293 Md. at 442 , 444 A.2d at 1037 .

2000We began our analysis by recalling, from Jackson v. State, supra, 286 Md. 430, 435 , 408 A.2d 711, 715 , the basic felony-murder doctrine: “at common law, homicide arising in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony is murder whether death was intended or not, the fact that the person was engaged in such perpetration or attempt being sufficient to supply the element of malice.” Campbell, supra, 293 Md. at 442 , 444 A.2d at 1037 .

2022App. 640, 700 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff’d, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976)). 22 This determination is aligned with the particular policy judgments that lie behind the felony murder rule.

2022App. 640, 700 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff’d, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976)). 22 This determination is aligned with the particular policy judgments that lie behind the felony murder rule.

2017Nonetheless, while part of Maryland jurisprudence, and most American jurisdictions, the felony-murder doctrine has been described as “a highly artificial concept that deserves no extension beyond its required application.” People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353, 360 (1966), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 18 Cal.4th 470 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 , 882 n. 12 (1998).

2017Nonetheless, while part of Maryland jurisprudence, and most American jurisdictions, the felony-murder doctrine has been described as “a highly artificial concept that deserves no extension beyond its required application.” People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1966), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869 , 882 n. 12 (Cal. 1998).

2015See, e.g., Ross, 308 Md. at 341-42 , 519 A.2d at 737 (“[A] conviction of first degree murder may be proved ... by showing a homicide committed in the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of one of the enumerated felonies (felony murder).” (Emphasis added)); Newton, 280 Md. at 269 , 373 A.2d at 267 (“[T]o secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder doctrine, the State is required to prove the underlying felony and the death occurring in the perpetration of the felony.” (Emphasis added)).

2015See, e.g., Ross, 308 Md. at 341-42 , 519 A.2d at 737 (“[A] conviction of first degree murder may be proved ... by showing a homicide committed in the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of one of the enumerated felonies (felony murder).” (Emphasis added)); Newton, 280 Md. at 269 , 373 A.2d at 267 (“[T]o secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder doctrine, the State is required to prove the underlying felony and the death occurring in the perpetration of the felony.” (Emphasis added)).

2005Commonwealth v. Legg, 491 Pa. 78 , 417 A.2d 1152 (1980), also reflects the majority, “narrow” view. 3 In that case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated as follows: “When an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact that the actor engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to a standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony.

2005Commonwealth v. Legg, 491 Pa. 78 , 417 A.2d 1152 (1980), also reflects the majority, “narrow” view. 3 In that case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated as follows: “When an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact that the actor engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to a standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony.

2005“The acts which constitute felonious conduct [must] possess a sufficient danger to human life to justify the applica *236 tion of the felony murder doctrine.” Fisher, 367 Md. at 257 , 786 A.2d at 730 (quoting Massachusetts v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 , 436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982)).

2005“The acts which constitute felonious conduct [must] possess a sufficient danger to human life to justify the applica *236 tion of the felony murder doctrine.” Fisher, 367 Md. at 257 , 786 A.2d at 730 (quoting Massachusetts v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 , 436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982)).