107 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2022 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Underwoodgreen2 sentences2022It is the purpose of the felony- murder rule to prevent deaths from these causes."); State v. Underwood, 228 Kan. 294, 305-06 , 615 P.2d 153 (1980) ("[F]iling a charge under the felony murder rule in most, if not all, cases removes any possibility of establishing the defense of self-defense. . . . [T]he defendant when charged with felony murder is not entitled to an instruction on self- defense."). 2022It is the purpose of the felony- murder rule to prevent deaths from these causes."); State v. Underwood, 228 Kan. 294, 305-06 , 615 P.2d 153 (1980) ("[F]iling a charge under the felony murder rule in most, if not all, cases removes any possibility of establishing the defense of self-defense. . . . [T]he defendant when charged with felony murder is not entitled to an instruction on self- defense."). | 5 | 12 |
State v. Sophophonegreen2 sentences2022See also State v. Sophophone, 270 Kan. 703, 706 , 19 P.3d 70 (2001) ("'The purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.'"); State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 383-84 , 573 P.2d 1041 (1978) ("[A]ny participant in a life-endangering felony is guilty of first degree murder when a life is taken in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony, whether the death was intentional or accidental, or whether the participant directly caused it to occur. . . . [D]efendants are subject to the felony murder rule an 2022See also State v. Sophophone, 270 Kan. 703, 706 , 19 P.3d 70 (2001) ("'The purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.'"); State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 383-84 , 573 P.2d 1041 (1978) ("[A]ny participant in a life-endangering felony is guilty of first degree murder when a life is taken in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony, whether the death was intentional or accidental, or whether the participant directly caused it to occur. . . . [D]efendants are subject to the felony murder rule an | 4 | 6 |
State v. Chismgreen2 sentences2022See Mitchell, 262 Kan. at 695 (implicitly recognizing that in Kansas, the governing rule is that "self-defense is not available in felony-murder cases"); State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, 491 , 759 P.2d 105 (1988) ("Self- defense or accident are not defenses to felony murder. 2022See Mitchell, 262 Kan. at 695 (implicitly recognizing that in Kansas, the governing rule is that "self-defense is not available in felony-murder cases"); State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, 491 , 759 P.2d 105 (1988) ("Self- defense or accident are not defenses to felony murder. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1978In State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341 , 552 P.2d 931 (1976), we stated that the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation and malice when the victim's death is caused by the killer while he is committing another felony. 1978In State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341 , 552 P.2d 931 (1976), we stated that the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation and malice when the victim's death is caused by the killer while he is committing another felony. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2022See State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658, 668-69 , 462 S.E.2d 492 (1995) ("[H]ad the jury found that defendant acted in self-defense on the underlying felonies submitted, it could not have found defendant guilty of felony murder. . . . [T]he purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter even accidental killings from occurring during the commission of a dangerous felony. 2022See State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658, 668-69 , 462 S.E.2d 492 (1995) ("[H]ad the jury found that defendant acted in self-defense on the underlying felonies submitted, it could not have found defendant guilty of felony murder. . . . [T]he purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter even accidental killings from occurring during the commission of a dangerous felony. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2022See Mitchell, 262 Kan. at 695 (implicitly recognizing that in Kansas, the governing rule is that "self-defense is not available in felony-murder cases"); State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, 491 , 759 P.2d 105 (1988) ("Self- defense or accident are not defenses to felony murder. 2022See Mitchell, 262 Kan. at 695 (implicitly recognizing that in Kansas, the governing rule is that "self-defense is not available in felony-murder cases"); State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, 491 , 759 P.2d 105 (1988) ("Self- defense or accident are not defenses to felony murder. | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Gaydengreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Beckergreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Goodsealgreen2 sentences2004(State v. Guebara, 220 Kan. 520, 523 , 553 P.2d 296 ; State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 .) A requirement of the felony murder rule is the fact the participants in the felony could reasonably *637 foresee or expect that a life might be taken in the perpetration of such felony. 2004(State v. Guebara, 220 Kan. 520, 523 , 553 P.2d 296 ; State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 .) A requirement of the felony murder rule is the fact the participants in the felony could reasonably *637 foresee or expect that a life might be taken in the perpetration of such felony. | 1 | 12 |
State v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2006Noting that the elements of the underlying felony must be “so distinct from the homicide as to not be an ingredient of the homicide,” the Lucas court concluded that the abuse merged with the homicide, precluding the application of the felony-murder rule. 244 Kan. at 473 . 1997See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462, 466 , 759 P.2d 90 (1988), aff’d on reh. 244 Kan. 193 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989), (“Clearly, all of the crimes specifically designated [in K.S.A. 21-3110(8)] would supply the requisite underlying felony for a felony-murder conviction unless the doctrine of merger applies.”); and State v. Strauch, 239 Kan. 203, 216 , 718 P.2d 613 (1986), where aggravated criminal sodomy was held to be an inherently dangerous felony to support a felony-murder charge (“The underlying felony in the felony-murder rule must be a forcible felony, one inherently dangerous to human l | 1 | 6 |
State v. Guebaragreen2 sentences2004(State v. Guebara, 220 Kan. 520, 523 , 553 P.2d 296 ; State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 .) A requirement of the felony murder rule is the fact the participants in the felony could reasonably *637 foresee or expect that a life might be taken in the perpetration of such felony. 2004(State v. Guebara, 220 Kan. 520, 523 , 553 P.2d 296 ; State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 .) A requirement of the felony murder rule is the fact the participants in the felony could reasonably *637 foresee or expect that a life might be taken in the perpetration of such felony. | 1 | 6 |
State v. Lucasgreen2 sentences1998Lucas, 243 Kan. at 465-66 . *92 Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and, therefore, subject to the felony-murder rule. 1997See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462, 466 , 759 P.2d 90 (1988), aff’d on reh. 244 Kan. 193 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989), (“Clearly, all of the crimes specifically designated [in K.S.A. 21-3110(8)] would supply the requisite underlying felony for a felony-murder conviction unless the doctrine of merger applies.”); and State v. Strauch, 239 Kan. 203, 216 , 718 P.2d 613 (1986), where aggravated criminal sodomy was held to be an inherently dangerous felony to support a felony-murder charge (“The underlying felony in the felony-murder rule must be a forcible felony, one inherently dangerous to human l | 1 | 6 |
State v. Moffittgreen2 sentences1977(See also, State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514 , 431 P. 2d 879 ; State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226 , 243 Pac. 291 .) Defendant argues the merger rule set forth in the foregoing authorities causes the aggravated robbery in this case to merge into the homicide and precludes the use of the felony murder rule. 1977(See also, State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514 , 431 P. 2d 879 ; State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226 , 243 Pac. 291 .) Defendant argues the merger rule set forth in the foregoing authorities causes the aggravated robbery in this case to merge into the homicide and precludes the use of the felony murder rule. | 1 | 6 |
State v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2022State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 377, 393 , 373 P.3d 811 (2016) ("If someone dies in the course of an inherently dangerous felony . . . 'all the participants . . . [are] equally guilty of the felony murder, regardless of who fired the fatal shot.' In short, all participants in a felony murder are principals."); State v. Thomas, 239 Kan. 457, 462 , 720 P.2d 1059 (1986) ("Under the felony-murder rule, an armed principal in an aggravated robbery cannot be an aider and abettor."). 2022State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 377, 393 , 373 P.3d 811 (2016) ("If someone dies in the course of an inherently dangerous felony . . . 'all the participants . . . [are] equally guilty of the felony murder, regardless of who fired the fatal shot.' In short, all participants in a felony murder are principals."); State v. Thomas, 239 Kan. 457, 462 , 720 P.2d 1059 (1986) ("Under the felony-murder rule, an armed principal in an aggravated robbery cannot be an aider and abettor."). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences2020The Young court began its analysis by observing that the felony-murder instruction "was not a correct statement of Kansas law, because felony murder is not a 'lesser offense' of premeditated first-degree murder." 277 Kan. at 593 . 2020It is helpful to note, though, that the Young court did analyze the legal appropriateness of the felony-murder instruction and concluded that "[t]he felony-murder instruction given in Young's case was not a correct statement of Kansas law, because 7 felony murder is not a 'lesser offense' of premeditated first-degree murder." Young, 277 Kan. at 593 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Kaesontaegreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., State v. Kaesontae, 260 Kan. 386 , Syl. ¶ 1, 920 P.2d 959 (1996). “ “Whether the underlying felony had been abandoned or completed prior to the killing so as to remove it from the ambit of the felony-murder rule is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to decide.’ [Citation omitted.]” 260 Kan. at 390 . 2005See, e.g., State v. Kaesontae, 260 Kan. 386 , Syl. ¶ 1, 920 P.2d 959 (1996). “ “Whether the underlying felony had been abandoned or completed prior to the killing so as to remove it from the ambit of the felony-murder rule is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to decide.’ [Citation omitted.]” 260 Kan. at 390 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Murphygreen2 sentences2003Bryant essentially contends that, as a matter of law, the felony-murder rule does not apply to his case because of our holding in State v. Murphy, 270 Kan. 804 , 19 P.3d 80 (2001). 2003Bryant essentially contends that, as a matter of law, the felony-murder rule does not apply to his case because of our holding in State v. Murphy, 270 Kan. 804 , 19 P.3d 80 (2001). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Camerongreen2 sentences2021Yet, as the district court explained, Thomas is mistaken in his assertion that, to qualify as felony murder, the murder had to have resulted from the victim being robbed or resisting a robbery: 7 "The test for determining application of the felony-murder rule is stated in State v. Cameron, 300 Kan. 384, 396-97, 329 [P.3d] 1158 (2014): 'In order to establish felony murder, the State must prove two causation elements. 2015In State v. Cameron, 300 Kan. 384, 396-97 , 329 P.3d 1158 (2014), we stated: “In order to establish felony murder, the State must prove two causation elements. | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Cheevergreen | 1 | 2 |
| Kansas v. Cheevergreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Baileygreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Beachgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Hobbsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Rueckertgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Dupreegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Keelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Larose v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mirelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sanborngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lashley
green
2 sentences1997K.S.A. 21-3436 addressed our concern, expressed in Lashley, 233 Kan. at 631 , that overextension of the felony-murder doctrine had to be guarded against. 1993The legislature, however, did not so limit the scope of 21-3701(c), Nor was such a narrow reading of the statute employed in State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620 , 664 P.2d 1358 (1983), which held that theft by threat was a crime inherently dangerous to human life for purposes of the felony-murder rule. | 9 | 1984–1997 |
State v. Thai Do Hoang
green
2 sentences2022See also State v. Sophophone, 270 Kan. 703, 706 , 19 P.3d 70 (2001) ("'The purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.'"); State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 383-84 , 573 P.2d 1041 (1978) ("[A]ny participant in a life-endangering felony is guilty of first degree murder when a life is taken in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony, whether the death was intentional or accidental, or whether the participant directly caused it to occur. . . . [D]efendants are subject to the felony murder rule an 2022See also State v. Sophophone, 270 Kan. 703, 706 , 19 P.3d 70 (2001) ("'The purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.'"); State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 383-84 , 573 P.2d 1041 (1978) ("[A]ny participant in a life-endangering felony is guilty of first degree murder when a life is taken in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony, whether the death was intentional or accidental, or whether the participant directly caused it to occur. . . . [D]efendants are subject to the felony murder rule an | 8 | 1988–2022 |
State v. Branch and Bussey
green
2 sentences2022See also State v. Sophophone, 270 Kan. 703, 706 , 19 P.3d 70 (2001) ("'The purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.'"); State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 383-84 , 573 P.2d 1041 (1978) ("[A]ny participant in a life-endangering felony is guilty of first degree murder when a life is taken in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony, whether the death was intentional or accidental, or whether the participant directly caused it to occur. . . . [D]efendants are subject to the felony murder rule an 2022See also State v. Sophophone, 270 Kan. 703, 706 , 19 P.3d 70 (2001) ("'The purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.'"); State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 383-84 , 573 P.2d 1041 (1978) ("[A]ny participant in a life-endangering felony is guilty of first degree murder when a life is taken in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony, whether the death was intentional or accidental, or whether the participant directly caused it to occur. . . . [D]efendants are subject to the felony murder rule an | 7 | 1979–2022 |
State v. Hearron
green
2 sentences2003If the instructions properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts of the case, and a jury could not reasonably have been misled by them, the instructions do not constitute reversible error even if they are in some way erroneous. [Citation omitted.]” The district court instructed the jury in instruction No. 14 that “[t]ime, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing was done in the commission of or in flight from the burglary or theft.” (Emphasis added.) Rogers requested an addit 2003If the instructions properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts of the case, and a jury could not reasonably have been misled by them, the instructions do not constitute reversible error even if they are in some way erroneous. [Citation omitted.]” The district court instructed the jury in instruction No. 14 that “[t]ime, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing was done in the commission of or in flight from the burglary or theft.” (Emphasis added.) Rogers requested an addit | 7 | 1983–2003 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences2001(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 (1964)]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)" We have also stated that another purpose for the felony-murder doctrine "is to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation and malice when the victim's death is caused by the killer while he is committing another felony." State v. Clark, 204 Kan. 38, 43 , 460 P.2d 586 (1969). 2001(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 (1964)]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)" We have also stated that another purpose for the felony-murder doctrine "is to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation and malice when the victim's death is caused by the killer while he is committing another felony." State v. Clark, 204 Kan. 38, 43 , 460 P.2d 586 (1969). | 7 | 1976–2001 |
State v. Brantley
neutral
2 sentences1989Such a finding is consistent with our public policy underlying the felony-murder rule (to deter all those engaged in felonies *305 from killing negligently or accidentally, State v. Brantley, 236 Kan. 379, 380-81 , 691 P.2d 26 [1984]). 1989Such a finding is consistent with our public policy underlying the felony-murder rule (to deter all those engaged in felonies *305 from killing negligently or accidentally, State v. Brantley, 236 Kan. 379, 380-81 , 691 P.2d 26 [1984]). | 5 | 1988–2001 |
State v. Jacques
green
2 sentences2016Second, the felony and the homicide must have a direct causal connection, which exists unless an extraordinary intervening event supersedes the defendant’s act and becomes the sole legal cause of death.’ “Furthermore, in Jacques [ 270 Kan. 173 , 14 P.3d 409 (2000)], we stated: ‘“When applying the felony-murder rule . . . the felony and the victim’s death do not need to occur simultaneously, nor does the felony need to occur before die deatii. 2016Second, the felony and the homicide must have a direct causal connection, which exists unless an extraordinary intervening event supersedes the defendant’s act and becomes the sole legal cause of death.’ “Furthermore, in Jacques [ 270 Kan. 173 , 14 P.3d 409 (2000)], we stated: ‘“When applying the felony-murder rule . . . the felony and the victim’s death do not need to occur simultaneously, nor does the felony need to occur before die deatii. | 4 | 2003–2021 |
State v. LaMae
green
2 sentences2022Specifically, "[i]t is true that there must be a direct causal connection between the commission of the felony and the homicide to invoke the felony murder rule. 9 However, the general rules of proximate cause used in civil actions do not apply. [Citation omitted.]" State v. LaMae, 268 Kan. 544, 555 , 998 P.2d 106 (2000). 2022Specifically, "[i]t is true that there must be a direct causal connection between the commission of the felony and the homicide to invoke the felony murder rule. 9 However, the general rules of proximate cause used in civil actions do not apply. [Citation omitted.]" State v. LaMae, 268 Kan. 544, 555 , 998 P.2d 106 (2000). | 3 | 2003–2022 |
State v. Berry
green
2 sentences2012This court further observed that K.S.A. 22-3414(3) does not exclude felony murder from its mandate and makes no exception for the felony-murder instruction rule regarding lesser included offense instructions. 292 Kan. 493 , Syl. ¶ 5. 2011This court further observed that K.S.A. 22-3414(3) does not exclude felony murder from its mandate and makes no exception for the felony-murder instruction rule regarding lesser included offense instructions. 292 Kan. 493 , Syl. ¶ 5. | 3 | 2011–2012 |
State v. Rider, Edens & Lemons
green
2 sentences1996In State v. Rider, Edens & Lemons, 229 Kan. 394 , Syl. ¶ 4, 625 P.2d 425 (1981), the court stated: “Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and, therefore, subject to the felony-murder rule. 1996In State v. Rider, Edens & Lemons, 229 Kan. 394 , Syl. ¶ 4, 625 P.2d 425 (1981), the court stated: “Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and, therefore, subject to the felony-murder rule. | 3 | 1985–2001 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences2001(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 (1964)]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)" We have also stated that another purpose for the felony-murder doctrine "is to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation and malice when the victim's death is caused by the killer while he is committing another felony." State v. Clark, 204 Kan. 38, 43 , 460 P.2d 586 (1969). 2001(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 (1964)]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)" We have also stated that another purpose for the felony-murder doctrine "is to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation and malice when the victim's death is caused by the killer while he is committing another felony." State v. Clark, 204 Kan. 38, 43 , 460 P.2d 586 (1969). | 3 | 1967–2001 |
State v. Fisher
green
2 sentences1978In State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226 , 243 Pac. 291 (1926), this court held that an aggravated assault which resulted in a homicide could not be utilized as an independent felony to invoke the felony-murder doctrine. 1978In State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226 , 243 Pac. 291 (1926), this court held that an aggravated assault which resulted in a homicide could not be utilized as an independent felony to invoke the felony-murder doctrine. | 3 | 1976–1978 |
State v. Bryant
green
2 sentences2021Those two cases stand for the legal proposition that "the felony-murder rule does not apply when the lawful acts of either a law enforcement officer or a victim of a crime cause the death of a co-felon." State v. Bryant, 276 Kan. 485, 490 , 78 P.3d 462 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624 , 88 P.3d 218 (2004); see Sophophone, 270 Kan. at 712-13 (law enforcement action causing death); Murphy, 270 Kan. at 809 (victim action causing death). 2021Those two cases stand for the legal proposition that "the felony-murder rule does not apply when the lawful acts of either a law enforcement officer or a victim of a crime cause the death of a co-felon." State v. Bryant, 276 Kan. 485, 490 , 78 P.3d 462 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624 , 88 P.3d 218 (2004); see Sophophone, 270 Kan. at 712-13 (law enforcement action causing death); Murphy, 270 Kan. at 809 (victim action causing death). | 2 | 2017–2021 |
Easterwood v. State
green
2 sentences2019In Easterwood v. State , 273 Kan. 361 , 44 P.3d 1209 , cert. denied *518 537 U.S. 951 , 123 S.Ct. 416 , 154 L.Ed.2d 297 (2002), the movant filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion arguing that his conviction should be overturned due to a then recent change in the felony-murder rule. 2019In Easterwood v. State , 273 Kan. 361 , 44 P.3d 1209 , cert. denied *518 537 U.S. 951 , 123 S.Ct. 416 , 154 L.Ed.2d 297 (2002), the movant filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion arguing that his conviction should be overturned due to a then recent change in the felony-murder rule. | 2 | 2007–2019 |
| State v. Masqua green | 2 | 1976–2011 |
| State v. Holt green | 2 | 2001–2009 |
| State v. Altum green | 2 | 2001–2008 |
| People v. Lowery green | 2 | 2001–2007 |
| State v. Foy green | 2 | 1990–2007 |
| State v. Vontress green | 2 | 1999–2001 |
| State v. Bey green | 2 | 1976–2001 |
| State v. Strauch green | 2 | 1997–2001 |
| State v. Thompkins green | 2 | 1998–2001 |
| State v. Robinson green | 2 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Satchell green | 2 | 1976–1988 |
| State v. Bradford green | 2 | 1976–1983 |
| State v. Smith green | 2 | 1980–1983 |
| State v. Boone green | 2 | 1967–1980 |
| State v. Littlejohn green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Saylor green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Gleason green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Martin green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Nichols green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Burkhart green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Swift green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Wanrow red | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Engelhardt green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Bowie v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Easterwood v. Kansas green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Broxton v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.