felony-murder rule in Massachusetts

2024Although the felony-murder rule was constitutional, Brown, 477 Mass. at 807 , a majority of the court concluded that the doctrine was of "questionable" historical provenance, that developments in our joint venture and constructive malice jurisprudence had undermined the common-law pillars of the doctrine, and that the doctrine "erode[d] 'the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability,'"18 id. at 826-833 (Gants, C.J., concurring), quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 , 503 n.12, 507 (1982).

2017The felony-murder rule “imposes criminal liability for homicide on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.” Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307 , quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 (1982).

2017The felony-murder rule imposes criminal liability "on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that enterprise." Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978). "'The effect of the felony-murder rule,' both for principals and accomplices, 'is to substitute the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice aforethought required for murder.'" Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307 , quoting Matchett, supra. We consistently have rejected the argument that the felony- murder rule is unconstitutional, see Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 649

2017The felony-murder rule imposes criminal liability “on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.” Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978). “ ‘The effect of the fel ony-murder rule,’ both for principals and accomplices, ‘is to substitute the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice aforethought required for murder.’ ” Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307 , quoting Matchett, supra. We consistently have rejected the argument that the felony-murder rule is unconstitutional, see Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 6

2024Such wanton or reckless conduct is "intentional conduct that create[s] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person." Commonwealth v. Pagan, 471 Mass. 537, 547 , cert. denied, 577 10Prior to our decision in Brown, in which we abrogated the felony-murder rule as an independent theory of liability for murder in the first degree, we maintained that "[w]here the felony-murder rule applies, generally the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on manslaughter." Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151 (1983).

2020See Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 831 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018) (Gants, C.J., concurring) (under felony-murder rule "a defendant who participates in an armed robbery is guilty of felony-murder in the first degree if the defendant or an accomplice commits any act that results in death, even if the act is accidental and unintended"); Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144 , 151–152 (1983) ("A defendant who kills a victim in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, while the defendant is armed with a gun, is guilty of murder by application of the felony-murder r

2024Instead, the felony-murder doctrine imposed "criminal liability 'on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.'" Id., at 822 , quoting Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978), 17The defendant does not assert arguments under the Federal Constitution.

2017The felony-murder rule imposes criminal liability “on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.” Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978). “ ‘The effect of the fel ony-murder rule,’ both for principals and accomplices, ‘is to substitute the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice aforethought required for murder.’ ” Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307 , quoting Matchett, supra. We consistently have rejected the argument that the felony-murder rule is unconstitutional, see Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 6

2024Instead, the felony-murder doctrine imposed "criminal liability 'on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.'" Id., at 822 , quoting Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978), 17The defendant does not assert arguments under the Federal Constitution.

2024"Our 'review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, . . . although we have recognized that the Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution.'" Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81 , 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503 , 505 n.5, (2015). 18 S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021). "'The effect of the felony-murder rule,' both for principals and accomplices, '[was] to substitute the intent to commit the underly

2011The “rationale underlying the felony-murder rule” is “to reduce the disproportionate number of accidental homicides which occur during the commission of the enumerated predicate felonies by punishing the party responsible for the homicide not merely for manslaughter, but for murder.” Commonwealth v. Claudio, 418 Mass. 103, 108 (1994), quoting from People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 161 (1973).

2003See Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 505 (1982); Commonwealth v. Claudio, supra. 7 Rather than resting upon inscription in a per se classification, the decision whether a particular felony is inherently dangerous or reflects conscious disregard for the risk to human life so as to justify invocation of the felony-murder doctrine rests upon a case-by-case analysis of the nucleus of facts in which that felony is embedded.

2006Thus, he argues, a conviction on this view of the facts violates the rule of Commonwealth v. Quigley, supra. Alternatively, if the deliberate collision with Langevin’s automobile is not viewed as part of the attempted larceny, then, Wojcik argues, the underlying felony is reduced to a “paperwork” crime that cannot possibly satisfy the requirement that it be committed with “conscious disregard for the risk to human life.” This argument misapprehends the application of the felony-murder doctrine to the evidence in this case.

1994See State v. Branch, 244 Or. 97, 100 (1966), quoted with approval in Commonwealth v. Quigley, supra (“[C]ourts . . . have held that where the only felony committed [apart from the murder itself] was the assault upon the victim which resulted in the death of the victim, the assault merged with the killing and could not be relied upon by the state as an ingredient of a ‘felony murder’ ”). 3 We have not had occasion to consider whether an assault culminating in a homicide, preceded by an illegal breaking and entering into a dwelling in the night time that had as its purpose the commission of an a

1995The defendant argues that the judge’s instruction on conscious disregard impermissibly reduced the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. “[I]n order for [a] case to come within the felony-murder rule, the underlying felony . . . must be inherently dangerous to human life or the crime actually must have been committed with conscious disregard on the part of the defendant for the risk to human life.” Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 466 (1990), denial of habeas corpus aff'd, 19 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 739 (1995).

1995He made the sensible observation that if you kidnap somebody’s wife it is foreseeable that “the husband is going to try to rescue the wife, or at least do something to attempt to stop the kidnapping.” Thus, the judge correctly instructed that the “Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide committed in the course of the felony or attempted felony was the natural and probable consequence of the felonious act.” See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 467 (1990) (for the felony-murder rule to apply “the deaths must have been the natural and probable consequences of the

2017In fact, we have said, "A felony-murder rule that punishes all homicides committed in the perpetration of a felony whether the death is intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the relation of the perpetrator's state of mind to the homicide, violates the most fundamental principle of the criminal law -- 'criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result.'" Matchett, 386 Mass. at 506 - 507, quoting Aaron, 409 Mich. at 708 .

2017In fact, we have said, “A felony-murder rule that punishes all homicides committed in the perpetration of a felony whether the death is intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the relation of the perpetrator’s state of mind to the homicide, violates the most fundamental principle of the criminal law — ‘criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result.’ ” Matchett, 386 Mass. at 506-507 , quoting Aaron, 409 Mich. at 708 .

2024"Our 'review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, . . . although we have recognized that the Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution.'" Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81 , 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503 , 505 n.5, (2015). 18 S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021). "'The effect of the felony-murder rule,' both for principals and accomplices, '[was] to substitute the intent to commit the underly

2017The felony-murder rule “imposes criminal liability for homicide on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.” Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307 , quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 (1982).

2017We have recognized that the application of the felony- murder rule erodes "the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability." Matchett, 386 Mass. at 507 , quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783 (1965).

2017We have recognized that the application of the felony-murder rule erodes “the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability.” Matchett, 386 Mass. at 507 , quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783 (1965).

2000Imposition of liability under the felony-murder rule, when a homicide occurs in the commission of an offense while armed, is justified because a defendant’s willingness to use a weapon demonstrates a conscious disregard for human life, see Commonwealth v. Watson, supra at 543, or malice.” Relying on Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259 (1998), the defendants argue that the court cannot conclude that the underlying felony here was independent of the homicide.

2000In Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147 (1998), we said that, “if the felony-murder rule relieves the prosecution of proving malice, the ‘substitute intent derived from the felony should be clearly distinct from malice and not merely a mental state that is less culpable than malice but is similarly related to or inferred from the act of violence resulting in homicide.’ ” Id. at 152 , quoting Commonwealth v. Gunter, supra at 272 .

2016“Where the felony-murder rule applies, generally the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on manslaughter.” Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151 (1983), citing Commonwealth v. LePage, 352 Mass. 403, 419 (1967).

1983Commonwealth v. LePage, 352 Mass. 403, 419 (1967) (“There was [no necessity for a manslaughter charge] for there was no evidence upon which the jury could find that the [defendant was] not engaged in the commission of a felony when the killing occurred”).

2000See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 466 (1990); Commonwealth v. Carter, 396 Mass. 234, 234-235 (1985); Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 648-651 (1982).

1990Commonwealth v. Carter, 396 Mass. 234, 234-235 (1985).

1997The now well established test that a felony must pass before it can be a predicate offense for felony-murder is that “[t]he felony must either (1) be ‘inherently dangerous’ ... or (2) if not inherently dangerous, be committed in a manner which ‘involved circumstances demonstrating the defendant’s conscious disregard of the risk to human life.’ ” Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 785 (1990), quoting from Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 508 .

1995He made the sensible observation that if you kidnap somebody’s wife it is foreseeable that “the husband is going to try to rescue the wife, or at least do something to attempt to stop the kidnapping.” Thus, the judge correctly instructed that the “Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide committed in the course of the felony or attempted felony was the natural and probable consequence of the felonious act.” See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 467 (1990) (for the felony-murder rule to apply “the deaths must have been the natural and probable consequences of the

1997Noting that the felony-murder rule rests on “the theory that the intent to commit the felony is equivalent to the malice aforethought required for murder,” id. at 507 , the court reasoned in Matchett that “[f]or this theory to be tenable the nature of the felony must be such that an intent to commit that crime exhibits a conscious disregard for human life, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty.” Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 287 (1973) (Nix, J., concurring).

1983In Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 (1982), we observed that the felony-murder rule “is based on the theory that the intent to commit the felony is equivalent to the malice aforethought required for murder. ‘For this theory to be tenable the nature of the felony *785 must be such that an intent to commit that crime exhibits a conscious disregard for human life ....’” Id. at 507 , quoting Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 287 (Nix, J., concurring).

1982See also Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 411-412 (1944).

1982See also Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 411-412 (1944).

2020See Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 831 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018) (Gants, C.J., concurring) (under felony-murder rule "a defendant who participates in an armed robbery is guilty of felony-murder in the first degree if the defendant or an accomplice commits any act that results in death, even if the act is accidental and unintended"); Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144 , 151–152 (1983) ("A defendant who kills a victim in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, while the defendant is armed with a gun, is guilty of murder by application of the felony-murder r

2020The defendant focuses her § 33E argument on the judge's felony-murder instruction and Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 823 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), arguing that the judge's instruction on felony-murder combined with the jury's questions cast doubt on the justice of the verdict.

2017The felony-murder rule imposes criminal liability “on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.” Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978). “ ‘The effect of the fel ony-murder rule,’ both for principals and accomplices, ‘is to substitute the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice aforethought required for murder.’ ” Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307 , quoting Matchett, supra. We consistently have rejected the argument that the felony-murder rule is unconstitutional, see Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 6

1976This standard, which requires that an accomplice intentionally encourage or assist in the commission of a crime and have the requisite mental state, id. at 307 , is operative when determining liability for the felony which serves as the predicate for the application of the felony murder rule.

2003Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 272 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Quigley, 391 Mass. 461, 466 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).

2001While it is true that assaultive acts which cause a victim’s death may not form the basis of a felony-murder conviction, see Commonwealth v. Quigley, 391 Mass. 461, 466 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985), the reasoning behind the merger doctrine is not germane to the present case.

1984Although the felony-murder rule has been much discussed since Parham’s convictions (see Commonwealth v. Currie, 388 Mass. 776 [1983]; Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536 [1983]; Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644 [1982]; Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 [1982]; Commonwealth v. Walker, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 194 [1983]), these cases do not aid him.

1984Although the felony-murder rule has been much discussed since Parham’s convictions (see Commonwealth v. Currie, 388 Mass. 776 [1983]; Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536 [1983]; Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644 [1982]; Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 [1982]; Commonwealth v. Walker, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 194 [1983]), these cases do not aid him.

2018Id . at 833, 81 N.E.3d 1173 (Gants, C.J., concurring), citing Commonwealth v. Tejeda , 473 Mass. 269 , 277 n.9, 41 N.E.3d 721 (2015) (discussing People v. Aaron , 409 Mich. 672 , 727-729, 299 N.W.2d 304 [1980] ).

2017Under the felony-murder rule, ‘“a person who knowingly participates in one crime as part of a joint venture is ‘ipso facto also guilty’ of [murder] committed by an accomplice in furtherance of the joint venture.” Id.

2000In Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147 (1998), we said that, “if the felony-murder rule relieves the prosecution of proving malice, the ‘substitute intent derived from the felony should be clearly distinct from malice and not merely a mental state that is less culpable than malice but is similarly related to or inferred from the act of violence resulting in homicide.’ ” Id. at 152 , quoting Commonwealth v. Gunter, supra at 272 .

2000In Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147 (1998), we said that, “if the felony-murder rule relieves the prosecution of proving malice, the ‘substitute intent derived from the felony should be clearly distinct from malice and not merely a mental state that is less culpable than malice but is similarly related to or inferred from the act of violence resulting in homicide.’ ” Id. at 152 , quoting Commonwealth v. Gunter, supra at 272 .

2017Christian, 430 Mass. at 556 , explained that it is "the stealing or taking of property[] that qualifies them for application of the felony-murder rule." Otherwise put, it is the intent to steal, rather than the intent to assault, which is substituted for malice.

2001Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 556 (2000). b.

2013Commonwealth v. Matchett, supra. See Commonwealth v. Housen, 458 Mass. 702,708 (2011); Commonwealth v. Ambers, supra. Consequently, a defendant may be liable for felony-murder on a theory of joint venture not because he or she shared with the principal the requisite mental state for murder, but because he or she shared with the principal the intent to commit the underlying felony, which satisfies the intent requirement for felony-murder.

1982Commonwealth v. Ambers, 370 Mass. 835, 839 (1976).

1999As we recently stated in a similar context, “[w]here the felony-murder rule applies, generally the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on manslaughter.” Commonwealth v. Selby, 426 Mass. 168, 172 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151 (1983). 4 3.

1999Commonwealth v. Selby, 426 Mass. 168, 172 (1997).

1997The defendant, pointing out that no felony-murder conviction in Massachusetts has been predicated on a pure property crime since Matchett , incorrectly contends that no post- Matchett cases approve the application of the felony-murder rule to “pure property crimes.” In Commonwealth v. Fickett, 403 Mass. 194, 202 (1988), for example, the court stated that “[i]f the evidence at retrial warrants a finding that the defendant was guilty of larceny . . . instructions would be required on both larceny and on felony-murder in the second degree, coupled with the necessary element that the circumstances

1984Although the felony-murder rule has been much discussed since Parham’s convictions (see Commonwealth v. Currie, 388 Mass. 776 [1983]; Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536 [1983]; Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644 [1982]; Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 [1982]; Commonwealth v. Walker, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 194 [1983]), these cases do not aid him.

1982Consistent, then, with the language in Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 395 (1971), and Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 414 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968), we should approve the judge's instructions on the felony-murder rule in this case.

1982Consistent, then, with the language in Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 395 (1971), and Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 414 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968), we should approve the judge’s instructions on the felony-murder rule in this case.

1982See Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 556-567 (1957).

1982See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 566-567 (1957) (homicide must be natural and probable consequence of underlying felony); People v. Aaron, supra at 733 (abrogating the common law felony-murder rule); State v. Montgomery, 191 Neb. 470, 474-475 (1974) (ruling that killing must be used “to effectuate” felony); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100,102 (1927) (underlying felony must be independent of the homicide); State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 211 (1972) (felony underlying homicide must be inherently dangerous); Burton v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. 363,366-367 (1932) (felony must proximate

1980In Osborne v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 104 (1979), the defendant pleaded guilty not only to second degree mur *409 der, but also to two felonies within the felony-murder rule of G.

1980As the defendant admitted sufficient facts to constitute the essential elements of murder in the first degree under the felony-murder rule, “[m]alice aforethought is conclusively established . . . .” Osborne v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 104, 108 (1979).