Account information only. It is never shown to the AI client you connect, and it is kept apart from your research — which is not logged at all.
Your token is the key to the MCP: claude.ai custom connectors and ChatGPT developer mode take it in the URL; Claude Code and the rest take it as a bearer header. It is also in your welcome email. Install instructions.
No token yet. One token per address, shown once and mailed to you with setup steps — claude.ai custom connectors and ChatGPT developer mode need it in the URL; Claude Code and the rest take it as a bearer header. Install instructions.
Your MCP token. Anyone holding it can search on your subscription, so keep it off shared screens.
Header form (recommended) — this endpoint, with
Authorization: Bearer <your token>.
URL form — for claude.ai custom connectors and ChatGPT developer mode, which cannot set a header. The whole credential is in the address:
The dedicated fast index: searches run on a machine nobody else queues for, with full-text highlighted excerpts. Higher MCP limits, and semantic search when it lands.
See ProThank you.
Manage billingDelete my account: email [email protected] and it is done by hand, usually the same day. (Self-serve deletion is not built yet.)
Free, and it takes a minute. Registered visitors skip the Cloudflare checks, and your MCP token for Claude or ChatGPT is issued at the end of this.
Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
Here is your MCP token. It is shown once — it is also in the welcome email we just sent you, with setup steps.
Header form (recommended) — this endpoint, with
Authorization: Bearer <your token>.
URL form — for claude.ai custom connectors and ChatGPT developer mode, which cannot set a header. The whole credential is in the address:
That address already had a token, so we did not issue a second one — two live credentials for one mailbox is how people end up with a working laptop and a broken office machine. Your connector URL is in your inbox under “Your Syfert legal research connector URL”; if it is gone, call 904-383-7448.
11 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rossigreen2 sentences1975The doctrine is a *318 reduced analogue of the felony-murder rule and although we have at various times recognized the felony-murder rule; General Statutes §53a-54c; State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 ; we have never specifically recognized the misdemeanor counterpart, although it exists in a number of jurisdictions. 1975The doctrine is a *318 reduced analogue of the felony-murder rule and although we have at various times recognized the felony-murder rule; General Statutes §53a-54c; State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 ; we have never specifically recognized the misdemeanor counterpart, although it exists in a number of jurisdictions. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Montgomerygreen2 sentences2022General Statutes § 53a-54c; see State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 733 , 759 A.2d 995 (2000) (‘‘[f]elony mur- der occurs when, in the course of and in furtherance of another crime, one of the participants in that crime causes the death of a person who is not a participant in the crime’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2022General Statutes § 53a-54c; see State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 733 , 759 A.2d 995 (2000) (‘‘[f]elony mur- der occurs when, in the course of and in furtherance of another crime, one of the participants in that crime causes the death of a person who is not a participant in the crime’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2022As one court has observed, whether a declarant in such circum- stances would have ‘‘understood that his statement was a confession to murder is not clear.’’ Smith v. State, 746 So. 2d 1162, 1168 (Fla. App. 1999), review denied, 767 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pattersongreen2 sentences2022See People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 621 , 778 P.2d 549 , 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989) (felony murder rule ‘‘incorporates an artificial concept of strict criminal liability that erodes the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2022See People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 621 , 778 P.2d 549 , 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989) (felony murder rule ‘‘incorporates an artificial concept of strict criminal liability that erodes the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Heemstragreen2 sentences2011In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the claim that due process concerns required the retroactive application of the court’s prior decision in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006), which had decided, without analysis, that a new interpretation of the state’s felony murder rule would only apply prospectively. 2011In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the claim that due process concerns required the retroactive application of the court's prior decision in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006), which had decided, without analysis, that a new interpretation of the state's felony murder rule would only apply prospectively. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Arauzgreen2 sentences1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986). 1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1996(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ].) When a burglar kills in the commission of a burglary, he cannot claim self-defense, for this would be fundamentally inconsistent with the very purpose of the felony-murder rule. 1996(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ].) When a burglar kills in the commission of a burglary, he cannot claim self-defense, for this would be fundamentally inconsistent with the very purpose of the felony-murder rule. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tomassigreen2 sentences1992Indeed, we have noted “that crimes against the person like robbery, rape and common-law arson and burglary are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to life in the event of resistance by the victim . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. MacFarlane, 188 Conn. 542, 553 , 450 A.2d 374 (1982); see State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 (1945), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123 , 75 A.2d 67 (1950). 1992Indeed, we have noted “that crimes against the person like robbery, rape and common-law arson and burglary are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to life in the event of resistance by the victim . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. MacFarlane, 188 Conn. 542, 553 , 450 A.2d 374 (1982); see State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 (1945), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123 , 75 A.2d 67 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Woodgreen2 sentences2016The phrase was viewed as incorporating into the New York felony murder provision the previous limitation upon the applicability of the felony murder rule adopted in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48 , [ 167 N.E.2d 736 , 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 ] (1960) [abrogated by People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 624 N.E.2d 661 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1993) ]. 2016The phrase was viewed as incorporating into the New York felony murder provision the previous limitation upon the applicability of the felony murder rule adopted in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48 , [ 167 N.E.2d 736 , 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 ] (1960) [abrogated by People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 624 N.E.2d 661 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1993) ]. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kyles
green
2 sentences2022Rev. 59 , 60 (2004); and its purpose is ‘‘to punish those whose conduct brought about an unintended death in the com- mission or attempted commission of a felony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 667 , 607 A.2d 355 (1992).5 ‘‘The felony murder rule includes accidental, unintended deaths’’; id.; and it makes an accomplice to a felony equally as culpable in the commission of a murder as the person who killed the victim, so long as the victim was killed ‘‘in the course of and in furtherance of’’ the underlying felony. 2022Rev. 59 , 60 (2004); and its purpose is ‘‘to punish those whose conduct brought about an unintended death in the com- mission or attempted commission of a felony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 667 , 607 A.2d 355 (1992).5 ‘‘The felony murder rule includes accidental, unintended deaths’’; id.; and it makes an accomplice to a felony equally as culpable in the commission of a murder as the person who killed the victim, so long as the victim was killed ‘‘in the course of and in furtherance of’’ the underlying felony. | 3 | 2000–2024 |
State v. Hinton
green
1 sentence2025The defendant concedes that ‘‘[t]he June 24, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 18 352 Conn. 183 JUNE, 2025 17 State v. Hinton court correctly recited the [felony murder] statute’’ but contends that the court’s instructions failed to ‘‘explain that the state had to prove that . . . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Dabkowski
green
2 sentences2022The issue is whether a rule that many commentators consider illogical and unprincipled would nonetheless be known to a reasonable nonlawyer declarant in Moye’s circumstances, whose statement identifies an accom- plice as the murderer and, therefore, would qualify as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 6 ‘‘In Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 575 , 114 A. 682 (1921), Chief Justice [George W.] Wheeler said: ‘The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth.’ Wigm- ore, speaking eve 2022The issue is whether a rule that many commentators consider illogical and unprincipled would nonetheless be known to a reasonable nonlawyer declarant in Moye’s circumstances, whose statement identifies an accom- plice as the murderer and, therefore, would qualify as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 6 ‘‘In Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 575 , 114 A. 682 (1921), Chief Justice [George W.] Wheeler said: ‘The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth.’ Wigm- ore, speaking eve | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Bishop v. Copp
green
2 sentences2022The issue is whether a rule that many commentators consider illogical and unprincipled would nonetheless be known to a reasonable nonlawyer declarant in Moye’s circumstances, whose statement identifies an accom- plice as the murderer and, therefore, would qualify as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 6 ‘‘In Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 575 , 114 A. 682 (1921), Chief Justice [George W.] Wheeler said: ‘The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth.’ Wigm- ore, speaking eve 2022The issue is whether a rule that many commentators consider illogical and unprincipled would nonetheless be known to a reasonable nonlawyer declarant in Moye’s circumstances, whose statement identifies an accom- plice as the murderer and, therefore, would qualify as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 6 ‘‘In Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 575 , 114 A. 682 (1921), Chief Justice [George W.] Wheeler said: ‘The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth.’ Wigm- ore, speaking eve | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Rivera
green
1 sentence2022We held in Rivera that, as a result of the felony murder rule, an accomplice’s dual inculpatory hearsay statements2 that minimize the declarant’s participation in the death of a victim none- theless are ‘‘fully and equally’’ inculpatory and, thus, are admissible as statements against penal interest because the minimization is ‘‘limited to one type of murder ver- sus another type of murder.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 368 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Dennis L. STEPHENS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert G. BORG, Warden, Respondent-Appellee
green
1 sentence2018We note that courts of other jurisdictions have explicitly held that "it is not necessary ... to charge a defendant separately with the underlying felony in order for a felony-murder instruction to obtain." See, e.g., Stephens v. Borg, 59 F.3d 932 , 935 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying California law). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Young
green
2 sentences2016We had also included language that further defined 'in furtherance' that was taken from the Supreme Court decision[s] of State v. Allen [ 216 Conn. 367 , 579 A.2d 1066 (1990) ] and State v. Young [ 191 Conn. 636 , 469 A.2d 1189 (1983) ]. 2016We had also included language that further defined 'in furtherance' that was taken from the Supreme Court decision[s] of State v. Allen [ 216 Conn. 367 , 579 A.2d 1066 (1990) ] and State v. Young [ 191 Conn. 636 , 469 A.2d 1189 (1983) ]. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Allen
green
2 sentences2016We had also included language that further defined 'in furtherance' that was taken from the Supreme Court decision[s] of State v. Allen [ 216 Conn. 367 , 579 A.2d 1066 (1990) ] and State v. Young [ 191 Conn. 636 , 469 A.2d 1189 (1983) ]. 2016We had also included language that further defined 'in furtherance' that was taken from the Supreme Court decision[s] of State v. Allen [ 216 Conn. 367 , 579 A.2d 1066 (1990) ] and State v. Young [ 191 Conn. 636 , 469 A.2d 1189 (1983) ]. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2016The phrase was viewed as incorporating into the New York felony murder provision the previous limitation upon the applicability of the felony murder rule adopted in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48 , [ 167 N.E.2d 736 , 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 ] (1960) [abrogated by People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 624 N.E.2d 661 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1993) ]. 2016The phrase was viewed as incorporating into the New York felony murder provision the previous limitation upon the applicability of the felony murder rule adopted in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48 , [ 167 N.E.2d 736 , 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 ] (1960) [abrogated by People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 624 N.E.2d 661 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1993) ]. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Loustaunau
green
2 sentences1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986). 1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Dillon
green
2 sentences1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986). 1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. MacFarlane
green
2 sentences1992Indeed, we have noted “that crimes against the person like robbery, rape and common-law arson and burglary are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to life in the event of resistance by the victim . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. MacFarlane, 188 Conn. 542, 553 , 450 A.2d 374 (1982); see State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 (1945), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123 , 75 A.2d 67 (1950). 1992Indeed, we have noted “that crimes against the person like robbery, rape and common-law arson and burglary are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to life in the event of resistance by the victim . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. MacFarlane, 188 Conn. 542, 553 , 450 A.2d 374 (1982); see State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 (1945), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123 , 75 A.2d 67 (1950). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.