felony-murder rule (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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felony-murder rule in Connecticut

11 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Rossigreen
conn · 1945 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1975–1992
2 sentences

1975The doctrine is a *318 reduced analogue of the felony-murder rule and although we have at various times recognized the felony-murder rule; General Statutes §53a-54c; State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 ; we have never specifically recognized the misdemeanor counterpart, although it exists in a number of jurisdictions.

1975The doctrine is a *318 reduced analogue of the felony-murder rule and although we have at various times recognized the felony-murder rule; General Statutes §53a-54c; State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 ; we have never specifically recognized the misdemeanor counterpart, although it exists in a number of jurisdictions.

12
State v. Montgomerygreen
conn · 2000 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022General Statutes § 53a-54c; see State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 733 , 759 A.2d 995 (2000) (‘‘[f]elony mur- der occurs when, in the course of and in furtherance of another crime, one of the participants in that crime causes the death of a person who is not a participant in the crime’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2022General Statutes § 53a-54c; see State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 733 , 759 A.2d 995 (2000) (‘‘[f]elony mur- der occurs when, in the course of and in furtherance of another crime, one of the participants in that crime causes the death of a person who is not a participant in the crime’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

11
Smith v. Stategreen
fladistctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022As one court has observed, whether a declarant in such circum- stances would have ‘‘understood that his statement was a confession to murder is not clear.’’ Smith v. State, 746 So. 2d 1162, 1168 (Fla. App. 1999), review denied, 767 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 2000).

11
People v. Pattersongreen
cal · 1989 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 621 , 778 P.2d 549 , 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989) (felony murder rule ‘‘incorporates an artificial concept of strict criminal liability that erodes the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2022See People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 621 , 778 P.2d 549 , 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989) (felony murder rule ‘‘incorporates an artificial concept of strict criminal liability that erodes the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

11
State v. Heemstragreen
iowa · 2006 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the claim that due process concerns required the retroactive application of the court’s prior decision in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006), which had decided, without analysis, that a new interpretation of the state’s felony murder rule would only apply prospectively.

2011In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the claim that due process concerns required the retroactive application of the court's prior decision in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006), which had decided, without analysis, that a new interpretation of the state's felony murder rule would only apply prospectively.

11
People v. Arauzgreen
calctapp · 1970 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986).

1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986).

11
People v. Washingtongreen
cal · 1965 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ].) When a burglar kills in the commission of a burglary, he cannot claim self-defense, for this would be fundamentally inconsistent with the very purpose of the felony-murder rule.

1996(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ].) When a burglar kills in the commission of a burglary, he cannot claim self-defense, for this would be fundamentally inconsistent with the very purpose of the felony-murder rule.

11
State v. Tomassigreen
conn · 1950 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992Indeed, we have noted “that crimes against the person like robbery, rape and common-law arson and burglary are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to life in the event of resistance by the victim . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. MacFarlane, 188 Conn. 542, 553 , 450 A.2d 374 (1982); see State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 (1945), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123 , 75 A.2d 67 (1950).

1992Indeed, we have noted “that crimes against the person like robbery, rape and common-law arson and burglary are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to life in the event of resistance by the victim . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. MacFarlane, 188 Conn. 542, 553 , 450 A.2d 374 (1982); see State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 (1945), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123 , 75 A.2d 67 (1950).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
People v. Woodgreen
ny · 1960 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1983–2016
2 sentences

2016The phrase was viewed as incorporating into the New York felony murder provision the previous limitation upon the applicability of the felony murder rule adopted in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48 , [ 167 N.E.2d 736 , 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 ] (1960) [abrogated by People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 624 N.E.2d 661 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1993) ].

2016The phrase was viewed as incorporating into the New York felony murder provision the previous limitation upon the applicability of the felony murder rule adopted in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48 , [ 167 N.E.2d 736 , 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 ] (1960) [abrogated by People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 624 N.E.2d 661 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1993) ].

12

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Kyles green
conn · 1992
2 sentences

2022Rev. 59 , 60 (2004); and its purpose is ‘‘to punish those whose conduct brought about an unintended death in the com- mission or attempted commission of a felony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 667 , 607 A.2d 355 (1992).5 ‘‘The felony murder rule includes accidental, unintended deaths’’; id.; and it makes an accomplice to a felony equally as culpable in the commission of a murder as the person who killed the victim, so long as the victim was killed ‘‘in the course of and in furtherance of’’ the underlying felony.

2022Rev. 59 , 60 (2004); and its purpose is ‘‘to punish those whose conduct brought about an unintended death in the com- mission or attempted commission of a felony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 667 , 607 A.2d 355 (1992).5 ‘‘The felony murder rule includes accidental, unintended deaths’’; id.; and it makes an accomplice to a felony equally as culpable in the commission of a murder as the person who killed the victim, so long as the victim was killed ‘‘in the course of and in furtherance of’’ the underlying felony.

32000–2024
State v. Hinton green
conn · 2025
1 sentence

2025The defendant concedes that ‘‘[t]he June 24, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 18 352 Conn. 183 JUNE, 2025 17 State v. Hinton court correctly recited the [felony murder] statute’’ but contends that the court’s instructions failed to ‘‘explain that the state had to prove that . . .

12025–2025
State v. Dabkowski green
conn · 1986
2 sentences

2022The issue is whether a rule that many commentators consider illogical and unprincipled would nonetheless be known to a reasonable nonlawyer declarant in Moye’s circumstances, whose statement identifies an accom- plice as the murderer and, therefore, would qualify as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 6 ‘‘In Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 575 , 114 A. 682 (1921), Chief Justice [George W.] Wheeler said: ‘The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth.’ Wigm- ore, speaking eve

2022The issue is whether a rule that many commentators consider illogical and unprincipled would nonetheless be known to a reasonable nonlawyer declarant in Moye’s circumstances, whose statement identifies an accom- plice as the murderer and, therefore, would qualify as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 6 ‘‘In Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 575 , 114 A. 682 (1921), Chief Justice [George W.] Wheeler said: ‘The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth.’ Wigm- ore, speaking eve

12022–2022
Bishop v. Copp green
conn · 1921
2 sentences

2022The issue is whether a rule that many commentators consider illogical and unprincipled would nonetheless be known to a reasonable nonlawyer declarant in Moye’s circumstances, whose statement identifies an accom- plice as the murderer and, therefore, would qualify as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 6 ‘‘In Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 575 , 114 A. 682 (1921), Chief Justice [George W.] Wheeler said: ‘The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth.’ Wigm- ore, speaking eve

2022The issue is whether a rule that many commentators consider illogical and unprincipled would nonetheless be known to a reasonable nonlawyer declarant in Moye’s circumstances, whose statement identifies an accom- plice as the murderer and, therefore, would qualify as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 6 ‘‘In Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 575 , 114 A. 682 (1921), Chief Justice [George W.] Wheeler said: ‘The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth.’ Wigm- ore, speaking eve

12022–2022
State v. Rivera green
conn · 2004
1 sentence

2022We held in Rivera that, as a result of the felony murder rule, an accomplice’s dual inculpatory hearsay statements2 that minimize the declarant’s participation in the death of a victim none- theless are ‘‘fully and equally’’ inculpatory and, thus, are admissible as statements against penal interest because the minimization is ‘‘limited to one type of murder ver- sus another type of murder.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 368 .

12022–2022
Dennis L. STEPHENS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert G. BORG, Warden, Respondent-Appellee green
ca9 · 1995
1 sentence

2018We note that courts of other jurisdictions have explicitly held that "it is not necessary ... to charge a defendant separately with the underlying felony in order for a felony-murder instruction to obtain." See, e.g., Stephens v. Borg, 59 F.3d 932 , 935 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying California law).

12018–2018
State v. Young green
conn · 1983
2 sentences

2016We had also included language that further defined 'in furtherance' that was taken from the Supreme Court decision[s] of State v. Allen [ 216 Conn. 367 , 579 A.2d 1066 (1990) ] and State v. Young [ 191 Conn. 636 , 469 A.2d 1189 (1983) ].

2016We had also included language that further defined 'in furtherance' that was taken from the Supreme Court decision[s] of State v. Allen [ 216 Conn. 367 , 579 A.2d 1066 (1990) ] and State v. Young [ 191 Conn. 636 , 469 A.2d 1189 (1983) ].

12016–2016
State v. Allen green
conn · 1990
2 sentences

2016We had also included language that further defined 'in furtherance' that was taken from the Supreme Court decision[s] of State v. Allen [ 216 Conn. 367 , 579 A.2d 1066 (1990) ] and State v. Young [ 191 Conn. 636 , 469 A.2d 1189 (1983) ].

2016We had also included language that further defined 'in furtherance' that was taken from the Supreme Court decision[s] of State v. Allen [ 216 Conn. 367 , 579 A.2d 1066 (1990) ] and State v. Young [ 191 Conn. 636 , 469 A.2d 1189 (1983) ].

12016–2016
People v. Hernandez green
ny · 1993
2 sentences

2016The phrase was viewed as incorporating into the New York felony murder provision the previous limitation upon the applicability of the felony murder rule adopted in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48 , [ 167 N.E.2d 736 , 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 ] (1960) [abrogated by People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 624 N.E.2d 661 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1993) ].

2016The phrase was viewed as incorporating into the New York felony murder provision the previous limitation upon the applicability of the felony murder rule adopted in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48 , [ 167 N.E.2d 736 , 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 ] (1960) [abrogated by People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 , 624 N.E.2d 661 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1993) ].

12016–2016
People v. Loustaunau green
calctapp · 1986
2 sentences

1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986).

1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986).

11996–1996
People v. Dillon green
cal · 1983
2 sentences

1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986).

1996(People v. Arauz, (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 523, 533 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 ]; People v. Dillon, [ 34 Cal. 3d 441 , 484 n.29, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697]).” People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170 , 226 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1986).

11996–1996
State v. MacFarlane green
conn · 1982
2 sentences

1992Indeed, we have noted “that crimes against the person like robbery, rape and common-law arson and burglary are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to life in the event of resistance by the victim . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. MacFarlane, 188 Conn. 542, 553 , 450 A.2d 374 (1982); see State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 (1945), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123 , 75 A.2d 67 (1950).

1992Indeed, we have noted “that crimes against the person like robbery, rape and common-law arson and burglary are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to life in the event of resistance by the victim . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. MacFarlane, 188 Conn. 542, 553 , 450 A.2d 374 (1982); see State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44 , 42 A.2d 354 (1945), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123 , 75 A.2d 67 (1950).

11992–1992

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54c (10) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55 (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-8 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 2762 (1951–2026) NC 247 (1973–2026) IL 148 (1965–2025) KS 107 (1967–2022) PA 89 (1955–2026) FL 86 (1966–2025) MA 85 (1965–2024) TX 77 (1977–2026) AL 74 (1978–2026) MD 65 (1970–2024) IA 62 (1975–2025) TN 61 (1975–2025) MO 53 (1964–2020) AZ 52 (1965–2022) MI 49 (1963–2026) WA 42 (1961–2026) NV 38 (1965–2019) OH 35 (1980–2024) VA 33 (1978–2026) NM 32 (1960–2025) MN 29 (1979–2024) WV 28 (1977–2021) GA 27 (1975–2025) LA 25 (1961–2023) OK 24 (1983–2024) MT 23 (1976–2024) NJ 23 (1969–2022) NY 20 (1960–2019) OR 14 (1969–2026) WY 14 (1978–2025) ID 13 (1976–2024) CO 12 (1966–2025) IN 11 (1973–2019) CT 11 (1975–2025) MS 10 (1977–2013) DC 8 (1976–2020) AR 7 (1976–2025) SC 7 (1975–2018) DE 5 (1968–2022) RI 5 (1980–2023) UT 4 (1992–2003) VT 3 (1983–2017) VI 3 (2008–2017) SD 3 (1980–2002) WI 2 (1988–1994) NE 2 (1991–2019) KY 2 (2000–2001) AK 2 (1995–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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