felony-murder rule in California

2026(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The legislation bars murder convictions premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed by someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically, the Legisla

2026(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The legislation bars murder convictions premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed by someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically, the Legisla

2025Actual killer In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which enacted the predecessor to section 1172.6,2 “the Legislature found it ‘necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830 , 846–847, italics added, abrogated by statute on another point

2024Instead, he was convicted of attempted murder, for which resentencing is available if the conviction was based on the now-proscribed natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§§ 1172.6, subd. (a); 188, subd. (a)(3); see People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 [latter section “amend[ed] the natural and probable consequences doctrine”], abrogated by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839 , 869.) Nothing in these statutory provisions regarding the natural and 8 probable consequences doctrine expresses a similar bar to resentencing relief that sec

2026(People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451 , 458; People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942 , 947; People v. Allison (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 449 , 461, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 718, fn. 3 .) Rather, Senate Bill 1437 was designed to allow defendants to seek relief if the legal basis for their murder conviction was rendered invalid “because of” the changes ushered in by that bill. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) As explained above, those changes related to the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the felony-murder rule, and any other theory of

2026(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The legislation bars murder convictions premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed by someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically, the Legisla

2026First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e) to the Penal Code. [Citation.] Under that provision, ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the

2026(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong).) First, it narrowed the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), to the Penal Code.

2026In this way, the language of section 189, subdivision (e) is “plain and unambiguous.” (Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.).) Second, reading section 189, subdivision (e)(2) in context with the remainder of subdivision (e) reinforces that the provision requires a nonkiller to aid the actual killer in the lethal act itself.4 The fact that the Legislature used the phrase 4 The cases Justice Yegan relies upon for a contrary reading of the statute (e.g., People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 465 ; People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 ) are of little aid bec

2025The phrase “provocative act murder” is “merely shorthand used ‘for that category of intervening-act causation cases in which, during commission of a crime, the intermediary (i.e., a police officer or crime victim) is provoked by the defendant’s conduct into [a response that results] in someone's death.’” (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 663 .) “The classic provocative act scenario occurs when a perpetrator of the underlying crime instigates a gun battle . . . and a police officer . . . responds with privileged lethal force by returning fire and kills . . . an innocent bystander.” (Peop

2025(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile).) First, to amend the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the bill added section 188, subdivision (a)(3), which requires a principal to act with malice aforethought before he or she may be convicted of murder or attempted murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); accord, Gentile, at pp. 842–843.) Second, to amend the felony-murder rule, the bill added section 189, subdivision (e): “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is p

2024(See People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 , 52; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198 , 205; People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666 , 677; People v. Soto, supra, at p. 1055; People v. Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 85 , 92, fn. 5.) The jury here was not instructed on the felony murder rule, natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed-malice liability.

2025Bill 1437) was enacted to “ ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 .) Senate Bill 1437 did this by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder.

2024In a brief filed in anticipation of the hearing, Laso 3 The underlying facts are not relevant to the issue raised on appeal. 4 The Legislature amended sections 188 and 189 to limit “the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony.” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 722-728 .) Subsequent amendments to section 1172.6 clarified that the relief set forth

2025Although Aguero 3 Before Senate Bill 1437 took effect, “ ‘The felony-murder rule impute[d] the requisite malice for a murder conviction to those who commit[ted] a homicide during the perpetration of a felony inherently dangerous to human life.’ ” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 .) 4 The sentencing triad for second degree robbery, in comparison, is two, three, or five years. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) 3 through counsel agreed to accept an 11-year voluntary manslaughter plea bargain, the 11-year resolution was “never consummated[,] [t]he case was . . . set for trial, and the District At

2025(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 .) As amended, section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now bars the imputation of malice to a person who has merely participated in a crime, while section 189, subdivision (e)(3) allows 6 Before Senate Bill No. 1437, the felony-murder rule made “a killing while committing certain felonies murder without the necessity of further examining the defendant’s mental state.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182 .) First degree felony murder was “a killing during the course of a felony specified in section 189, such as rape, burglary, or robbery.” (Ibid.) At

2023(Aug. 4, 2008, C054011, C054462) (nonpub. opn.) (O’Brien).2 On January 31, 2019, defendant sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.63 in light of changes brought about by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which “ ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §

2022That means the jury could have convicted defendant of 5 Johnson’s murder only as a direct aider and abettor,4 and that means he is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief as to his first degree murder conviction as a matter of law. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3); People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320 , 330 [the record of conviction may establish that defendant “is ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he or she was convicted on a ground that remains valid notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to sections 188 and 189”], disapproved on another ground by Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th

2026Prior to Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), “ ‘the only criminal intent required [was] the specific intent to commit the particular felony.’ ” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 475 .) Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule to provide, in relevant part: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but,

2026In this way, the language of section 189, subdivision (e) is “plain and unambiguous.” (Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.).) Second, reading section 189, subdivision (e)(2) in context with the remainder of subdivision (e) reinforces that the provision requires a nonkiller to aid the actual killer in the lethal act itself.4 The fact that the Legislature used the phrase 4 The cases Justice Yegan relies upon for a contrary reading of the statute (e.g., People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 465 ; People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 ) are of little aid bec

2025(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449 ; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164-165 .) In addition to abolishing the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Senate Bill 1437 also amended section 189 to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine, requiring greater personal culpability for a felony-murder defendant to be liable for murder.

2025(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 , 449; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164-165 .) In addition to abolishing the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Senate Bill 1437 also amended section 189 to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine, requiring greater personal culpability for a defendant to be liable under that doctrine.

2025(See People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 539 [“To allow such use of the felony-murder rule [based on felony assault with a deadly weapon] would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault—a category which includes the great majority of all homicides.”].) Accordingly, Nino would not be eligible for relief under section 1172.6 on this theory. 20

2023(Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1182 .) This rule curtails the malice inquiry, obviating the need for the jury to “further examin[e] the defendant’s mental state.” (Ibid.; see People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 [“The felony-murder rule generally acts as a substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense of murder”]; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 43 [describing the rule as a “short-circuit”]; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [“[A] second degree felony-murder instruction” relieves “ ‘the jury of the necessity of finding one of the elements of the

2019Second degree felony murder is 'an unlawful killing in the course of the commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous to human life but is not included among the felonies enumerated in section 189....' [Citation.]" ( People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 1182, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 ( Chun ).) In California, the second degree felony-murder rule "lies imbedded in our law." ( People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 , 582, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 , overruled on another ground by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 , 490, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 .) The Calif

2019Second degree felony murder is 'an unlawful killing in the course of the commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous to human life but is not included among the felonies enumerated in section 189....' [Citation.]" ( People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 1182, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 ( Chun ).) In California, the second degree felony-murder rule "lies imbedded in our law." ( People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 , 582, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 , overruled on another ground by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 , 490, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 .) The Calif

2021(People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 , review granted March 18, 2020, S260598.) 6 The parties agree Contreras made a prima facie showing of eligibility for section 1170.95 relief by alleging an information was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a felony-murder theory; that he pled guilty to second degree murder because he believed he could have been convicted at trial under the felony-murder rule; and that he could no longer be convicted of murder because of changes to section 188 or 189.

2021(See People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154 , 1167–1168 [§ 1170.95 petition properly denied where defendant did not discuss how he could have been convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences doctrine and identified no underlying felony or target offense that would have made either of these theories viable at the time of his conviction and not today but instead used petition to argue there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted murder]; People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 , 1138 [“‘if the petition contains sufficient summary allegations tha

2026(See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 , 986 (Reyes); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 959; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830 , 842–843 (Gentile).) Senate Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3), which provides that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought” and malice “shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” Senate Bill 1437 also amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a participant in the perpetration of qualifying felon

2026(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992.) In 19 other words, “the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life- endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468 .) “Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, as defendant contends was the case here, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice.” (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110 (Nieto Benitez).) Thus, Senate Bill No. 1437 abo

2024(People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197 [ 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281 , 91 P.3d 222 ].) The purpose of the rule is to deter criminals from killing by holding them strictly responsible for deaths that occur during the perpetration (or attempted perpetration) of an inherently dangerous felony, regardless of whether the killing was done by the perpetrator or an accomplice, and regardless of whether the killing was intentional, negligent, or accidental.” (Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 81.) First degree felony murder is a killing committed during a specified felony, such as rape, burglary, or rob

2024(People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197 [ 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281 , 91 P.3d 222 ].) The purpose of the rule is to deter criminals from killing by holding them strictly responsible for deaths that occur during the perpetration (or attempted perpetration) of an inherently dangerous felony, regardless of whether the killing was done by the perpetrator or an accomplice, and regardless of whether the killing was intentional, negligent, or accidental.” (Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 81.) First degree felony murder is a killing committed during a specified felony, such as rape, burglary, or rob

2025Special circumstance liability requires a conviction of first degree murder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).) “Under the felony-murder doctrine, when the defendant or an accomplice kills someone during the commission, or attempted commission, of an inherently dangerous felony, the defendant [may be] liable for either first or second degree murder, depending [in part] on the felony committed.” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654 ; see People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457 , 476 [“The felonies that can support a felony murder … are limited to those that are inherently dangerous”].) If the fel

2025(People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654 ) superseded by statute as stated in People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 , 880.) Or, put differently, malice was imputed to the participant based on their willingness to commit a felony our Legislature deemed “ ‘inherently dangerous to life.’ ” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 .) Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) narrowed the felony murder rule significantly for defendants who were not actual killers and eliminated second degree murder liability based on the natural and probable consequences doc

2026(People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241 , 247-248.) Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which became effective on January 1, 2019, limited the felony murder doctrine to defendants who were either (1) the actual killers, (2) intended to kill, or (3) were major participants in one or more inherently dangerous underlying felonies (which still included carjacking and robbery) and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

2025Senate Bill No. 1437 and Felony Murder Under Current Law “Under the felony-murder rule as it existed prior to Senate Bill [No.] 1437, a defendant who intended to commit a specified felony could be convicted of murder for a killing during a felony . . . without further examination of his or her mental state.” (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241 , 247–248.) Senate Bill No. 1437, which became effective on January 1, 2019, restricted the application of the felony murder rule by amending sections 188 and 189.

2026We have no reservations regarding the quantum of evidence supporting the five murder convictions in this case.” (Palaminos I, supra, F054625.) SENATE BILL 1437’s AMENDMENTS Senate Bill 1437 went into effect on January 1, 2019, and “amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). [Citation.] It provides that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony a

2026(People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 , 52.) Asserting that his conviction for first degree murder may have been based on the felony murder rule, he contends he has made a prima facie case for relief and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

2026Felony Murder “Under the amended felony-murder rule, a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not act with the intent to kill can only be liable for murder if [the defendant] was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Citations.] ‘[T]he standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2[, subdivision] (d), as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, death

2026Felony Murder “Under the amended felony-murder rule, a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not act with the intent to kill can only be liable for murder if [the defendant] was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Citations.] ‘[T]he standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2[, subdivision] (d), as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, death

2026Overview of Sentencing Procedure In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, effective January 1, 2019, “‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) In addition to amending the Penal Code, Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 1170.95 (now 1172.6),

2026First, to amend the felony-murder rule, Senate Bill 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e): ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony an

2026Section 1172.6 Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature “ ‘eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule.’ [Citation.] [It] also added section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, to provide ‘a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.’ ” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719 , 723- 3 724.) Thereafter, Senate Bill No. 775 expanded the path to resentencing under the law “to allow relief for those with ‘attempted murder

2026Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated murder liability “as an aider and abettor solely because the ‘natural and probable consequences’ of [another] crime included a confederate’s commission of murder.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 , 558 (Patton).) The bill also amended the felony-murder rule, limiting murder liability to actual killers, those who aid or abet the actual killer with the intent to kill, and major participants in the underlying felony who act with reckless indifference to human life.

2026“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017– 2018 Reg. Sess.)] ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition to substantively amending sections 188 and 189 . . . , Senate Bill [No.] 1437 added [former] section 1170.95, [now section 1172.6,]

2026“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017– 8 2018 Reg. Sess.)] ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition to substantively amending sections 188 and 189 . . . , Senate Bill [No.] 1437 added [former] section 1170.95, [now section 1172.6

2024(See People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 , 52; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198 , 205; People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666 , 677; People v. Soto, supra, at p. 1055; People v. Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 85 , 92, fn. 5.) The jury here was not instructed on the felony murder rule, natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed-malice liability.

2024(People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043 , 1055; see People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193 , 1200.) Where the record shows that the trial court did not instruct the defendant’s jury as to the felony murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory of imputed malice, he is not entitled to relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.

2026Section 1172.6 Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) “altered the substantive law of murder in two areas.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).) First, the bill “narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule so that a ‘participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs’ can be liable for murder only if ‘[t]he person was the actual killer’; ‘[t]he person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, r

2026Section 1172.6 Procedure Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) “altered the substantive law of murder in two areas.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448 .) First, the bill narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule “so that a ‘participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs’ can be liable for murder only if ‘[t]he person was the actual killer’; ‘[t]he person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, request

2026(People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715 .) Under the felony murder rule, someone who participates in an enumerated felony (including robbery and carjacking) in which a death occurs may be convicted of first degree murder if they were a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (§ 189 (e)(1)–(3).) Section 190.2, subdivision (d), in turn, provides that, “[i]n the case of first degree felony murder, ‘every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a

2026Relevant Murder Liability Principles Under Current Law As noted, although “the new felony-murder rule sets forth three theories of liability,” People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671 , 680, we address only the theory of first degree felony murder for a nonkiller who was “a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”11 (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) Only certain enumerated felonies may serve as a basis of first degree felony murder liability under section 189, subdivision (e): “arson, rape, carjacking,

2025The court further noted that Dominguez “was the sole defendant; he admitted he attempted to murder [V.B.]; he admitted he personally and intentionally used a firearm in committing the crime and admitted he personally inflicted great bodily injury[.]” DISCUSSION Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as related to murder “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying fe

2024Rather, the Attorney General contends that “[e]ven if there were insufficient evidence supporting an aiding and abetting theory of first degree murder, the court’s specific reasoning is not essential to its ultimate decision as there was substantial evidence supporting the denial under a currently valid theory of murder.” The Attorney General further contends “the statutory framework and the applicable standard of review permit this court to hold that substantial evidence supports the denial of the petition on a theory that [Agaton-Hernandez] was guilty of murder under a conspiracy theory” and