felony-murder rule in California

2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[ ] and limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) While the bill narrowed the scope of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine and other forms of imputed malice as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder, “a defendant may s

2026Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Denial of the Petition A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and section 1172.6 Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. ( Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707–708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) It added section 189, subdivision (e), which establishes that “[a] felony-murder conviction may no longer rest on the mere commission of and intent to commit an underlying felony.

2026(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 .) The felony-murder rule was amended to provide that “[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was 4 not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in th

2026Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “ ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that 3 murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § l, subd. (f).)” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 , superseded on other grounds in People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756 , 836.) Senate Bill No. 1437 allowed those conv

2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[ ] and limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) While the bill narrowed the scope of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine and other forms of imputed malice as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder, “a defendant may s

2026Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Denial of the Petition A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and section 1172.6 Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. ( Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707–708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) It added section 189, subdivision (e), which establishes that “[a] felony-murder conviction may no longer rest on the mere commission of and intent to commit an underlying felony.

2026(See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440 .) In particular, Senate Bill 1437 “narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule” and “eliminate[d] liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” ( Curiel, supra, pp. 448, 449 .) “Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief. [Citations.] Under section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition declaring that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murde

2026(See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440 .) In particular, Senate Bill 1437 “narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule” and “eliminate[d] liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” ( Curiel, supra, pp. 448, 449 .) “Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief. [Citations.] Under section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition declaring that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murde

2026In this way, the language of section 189, subdivision (e) is “plain and unambiguous.” (Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.).) Second, reading section 189, subdivision (e)(2) in context with the remainder of subdivision (e) reinforces that the provision requires a nonkiller to aid the actual killer in the lethal act itself.4 The fact that the Legislature used the phrase 4 The cases Justice Yegan relies upon for a contrary reading of the statute (e.g., People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 465 ; People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 ) are of little aid bec

2025(Id. at p. 866; see Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 781 [holding the felony-murder rule is inapplicable to provocative act murder].) We further noted that the trial court had declined to determine whether Taylor was a provocateur in the events leading to the murder, and we therefore 17. considered whether the court’s findings were sufficient to find Taylor guilty as a nonprovocateur accomplice.

2025Bill 1437) was enacted to “ ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 .) Senate Bill 1437 did this by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder.

2024In a brief filed in anticipation of the hearing, Laso 3 The underlying facts are not relevant to the issue raised on appeal. 4 The Legislature amended sections 188 and 189 to limit “the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony.” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 722-728 .) Subsequent amendments to section 1172.6 clarified that the relief set forth

2025Although Aguero 3 Before Senate Bill 1437 took effect, “ ‘The felony-murder rule impute[d] the requisite malice for a murder conviction to those who commit[ted] a homicide during the perpetration of a felony inherently dangerous to human life.’ ” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 .) 4 The sentencing triad for second degree robbery, in comparison, is two, three, or five years. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) 3 through counsel agreed to accept an 11-year voluntary manslaughter plea bargain, the 11-year resolution was “never consummated[,] [t]he case was . . . set for trial, and the District At

2025(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1181 , quoting § 187, subd. (a).) Until 2019, the felony murder rule provided an exception that made “a killing while committing 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1 certain felonies murder without the necessity of further examining the defendant’s mental state.” (Chun, at p. 1182.) Under a separate rule known as the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a person who knowingly aids and abets the criminal conduct of another person is guilty of not only the intended crime but also of any other crime the other person actually c

2026In this way, the language of section 189, subdivision (e) is “plain and unambiguous.” (Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.).) Second, reading section 189, subdivision (e)(2) in context with the remainder of subdivision (e) reinforces that the provision requires a nonkiller to aid the actual killer in the lethal act itself.4 The fact that the Legislature used the phrase 4 The cases Justice Yegan relies upon for a contrary reading of the statute (e.g., People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 465 ; People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 ) are of little aid bec

2026Prior to Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), “ ‘the only criminal intent required [was] the specific intent to commit the particular felony.’ ” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 475 .) Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule to provide, in relevant part: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but,

2025(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449 ; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164-165 .) In addition to abolishing the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Senate Bill No. 1437 also amended section 189 to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine, requiring greater personal culpability for a defendant to be liable under that doctrine.

2025(People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449 ; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164-165 .) In addition to abolishing the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Senate Bill 1437 also amended section 189 to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine, requiring greater personal culpability for a defendant to be liable under that doctrine.

2025(See People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 539 [“To allow such use of the felony-murder rule [based on felony assault with a deadly weapon] would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault—a category which includes the great majority of all homicides.”].) Accordingly, Nino would not be eligible for relief under section 1172.6 on this theory. 20

2023(Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1182 .) This rule curtails the malice inquiry, obviating the need for the jury to “further examin[e] the defendant’s mental state.” (Ibid.; see People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 [“The felony-murder rule generally acts as a substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense of murder”]; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 43 [describing the rule as a “short-circuit”]; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [“[A] second degree felony-murder instruction” relieves “ ‘the jury of the necessity of finding one of the elements of the

2019Second degree felony murder is 'an unlawful killing in the course of the commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous to human life but is not included among the felonies enumerated in section 189....' [Citation.]" ( People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 1182, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 ( Chun ).) In California, the second degree felony-murder rule "lies imbedded in our law." ( People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 , 582, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 , overruled on another ground by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 , 490, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 .) The Calif

2019Second degree felony murder is 'an unlawful killing in the course of the commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous to human life but is not included among the felonies enumerated in section 189....' [Citation.]" ( People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 1182, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 ( Chun ).) In California, the second degree felony-murder rule "lies imbedded in our law." ( People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 , 582, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 , overruled on another ground by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 , 490, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 .) The Calif

2023(Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1182 .) This rule curtails the malice inquiry, obviating the need for the jury to “further examin[e] the defendant’s mental state.” (Ibid.; see People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 [“The felony-murder rule generally acts as a substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense of murder”]; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 43 [describing the rule as a “short-circuit”]; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [“[A] second degree felony-murder instruction” relieves “ ‘the jury of the necessity of finding one of the elements of the

2013If the felony is listed in section 189, the murder is of the first degree; if not, the murder is of the second degree. [Citations.] Felony-murder liability does not require an intent to till, or even implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying felony. [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 893 , 278 P.3d 1242 ], italics omitted; see Chun , at p. 1182.) “The felony-murder doctrine, whose ostensible purpose is to deter those engaged in felonies from tilling negligently or accidentally, operates to posit the existence of that crucial mental

2024(People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197 [ 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281 , 91 P.3d 222 ].) The purpose of the rule is to deter criminals from killing by holding them strictly responsible for deaths that occur during the perpetration (or attempted perpetration) of an inherently dangerous felony, regardless of whether the killing was done by the perpetrator or an accomplice, and regardless of whether the killing was intentional, negligent, or accidental.” (Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 81.) First degree felony murder is a killing committed during a specified felony, such as rape, burglary, or rob

2024(People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197 [ 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281 , 91 P.3d 222 ].) The purpose of the rule is to deter criminals from killing by holding them strictly responsible for deaths that occur during the perpetration (or attempted perpetration) of an inherently dangerous felony, regardless of whether the killing was done by the perpetrator or an accomplice, and regardless of whether the killing was intentional, negligent, or accidental.” (Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 81.) First degree felony murder is a killing committed during a specified felony, such as rape, burglary, or rob

2025According to defendant, the trial court’s prior findings that he was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life are insufficient because, under current law, he cannot be guilty of provocative act murder unless there is a finding that he committed or aided “the commission of a provocative act with malice.” In other words, defendant contends the superior court upheld defendant’s provocative act murder conviction based on the felony-murder doctrine — a doctrine that, as explained ante, cannot support a murder conviction “[w]hen someone other than the def

2025Special circumstance liability requires a conviction of first degree murder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).) “Under the felony-murder doctrine, when the defendant or an accomplice kills someone during the commission, or attempted commission, of an inherently dangerous felony, the defendant [may be] liable for either first or second degree murder, depending [in part] on the felony committed.” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654 ; see People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457 , 476 [“The felonies that can support a felony murder … are limited to those that are inherently dangerous”].) If the fel

2023As the Supreme Court explained, the “net effect” of an argument like Adams’s “would be to eliminate the application of the felony-murder rule to all unlawful killings which were committed by means of a deadly weapon, since in each case the homicide would include in fact assault with a deadly weapon, even if the homicide resulted from the commission of one of the . . . felonies . . . enumerated in section 189,” an outcome the Supreme Court stated was “unwarranted both in logic and in principle.” (People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 386-387.) 2.

2009First, a person who enters a building with the intent to assault, rather than to kill (in which case the felony-murder rule would be unnecessary), may be deterred by the circumstance that if the victim of the assault dies, the burglar “will be deemed guilty of first degree murder.” (People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 388 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ].) Second, the circumstance that the degree to which the peril is heightened may vary, depending upon the particular structure in which the assault occurs, does not negate the purpose of deterring assaults and the heightened risks entailed b

2021Consequently, application of the felony-murder rule to felonious assaults would usurp most of the law of homicide, relieve the prosecution in the great majority of homicide cases of the burden of having to prove malice in order to obtain a murder conviction, and thereby frustrate the Legislature’s intent to punish certain felonious assaults resulting in death (those committed with malice aforethought, and therefore punishable as murder) more harshly than other felonious assaults that happened to result in death (those committed without malice aforethought, and therefore punishable as manslaugh

2021(Wilson, at p. 440; see also ibid. [“Where a person enters a building with an intent to assault his victim with a deadly weapon, he is not deterred by the felony-murder rule”]; but see People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1120 (Farley).) 83 PEOPLE v. BAKER Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C.

1992(See, e.g., People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 622-626 [ 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 ] [furnishing cocaine]; People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 829-833 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ] [practice of medicine without a license]; People v. Henderson (1977) 19 Cal.3d 86, 93-96 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 560 P.2d 1180 ] [aggravated false imprisonment]; People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 582-585 [chiropractor's misrepresentations]; People v. Williams (1965) 63 Cal.2d 452, 458 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ] [conspiracy to possess Methedrine].) "`The purpose of the felo

1992(See, e.g., People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 622-626 [ 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 ] [furnishing cocaine]; People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 829-833 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ] [practice of medicine without a license]; People v. Henderson (1977) 19 Cal.3d 86, 93-96 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 560 P.2d 1180 ] [aggravated false imprisonment]; People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 582-585 [chiropractor's misrepresentations]; People v. Williams (1965) 63 Cal.2d 452, 458 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ] [conspiracy to possess Methedrine].) "`The purpose of the felo

2023Murder is the “unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be either express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) Alternatively, a defendant may be guilty of murder under the felony murder rule, which “generally acts as a substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense of murder.” (People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 , italics omitted.) The felony murder rule “makes

2023Murder is the “unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be either express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) Alternatively, a defendant may be guilty of murder under the felony murder rule, which “generally acts as a substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense of murder.” (People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 , italics omitted.) The felony murder rule “makes

2026Felony Murder “Under the amended felony-murder rule, a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not act with the intent to kill can only be liable for murder if [the defendant] was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Citations.] ‘[T]he standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2[, subdivision] (d), as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, death

2026Felony Murder “Under the amended felony-murder rule, a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not act with the intent to kill can only be liable for murder if [the defendant] was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Citations.] ‘[T]he standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2[, subdivision] (d), as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, death

2021J. that certain felonies “ ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder.” (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1189 ; see also People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442, fn. 5 (Wilson) [“felonies that are an integral part of the homicide are merged in the homicide (italics omitted)”].) “In explaining the basis for the merger doctrine, courts and legal commentators reasoned that, because a homicide generally results from the commission of an assault, every felonious assault ending in death automatically would be elevated to murder in the event a felonious assault could s

2021(See Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 431 .) The prosecution in Wilson “sought to apply the felony-murder rule on the theory that the homicide occurred in the course of a burglary, but the only basis for finding a felonious entry [was] the intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon.” (Id., at p. 440.) We forbade reliance on a felony murder theory when, among other things, “the entry would be nonfelonious but for the intent to commit the assault.” (Ibid.; see also id., at p. 442 [“an instruction on first degree felony murder is improper when the underlying felony is burglary based upon an in

2024Legal Background Section 189 defines first degree murder to include murder that is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, certain crimes, including robbery. (§ 189, subd. (a).) Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate 12 Bill No. 1437), liability under this felony murder rule attached to “any killing in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate [a] robbery” “regardless of whether it was intentional or accidental.” (People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868 ; see generally 1 Witkin et al., Cal. Criminal Law (5th ed. 2024) Crimes Ag

2013(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806 ; People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 412 .) Under the felony murder doctrine, a killing is first degree murder whether or not intentional or premeditated when it is committed in the perpetration of certain enumerated felonies, including sexual penetration by foreign or unknown object. (§ 189; People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868 .) The requisite mental state is the specific intent to commit the underlying felony, not the intent to kill.

2022SENATE BILL NOs. 1437 & 775 The instant appeal is from the denial of appellant’s petition for resentencing that he filed pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), that was effective on January 1, 2019, and amended “ ‘the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]” (

2022SENATE BILL NOS. 1437 & 775 The instant appeal is from the denial of defendant’s petition for resentencing that he filed pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), that was effective on January 1, 2019, and amended “ ‘the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]” (

2026“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017– 2018 Reg. Sess.)] ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition to substantively amending sections 188 and 189 . . . , Senate Bill [No.] 1437 added [former] section 1170.95, [now section 1172.6,]

2026“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017– 8 2018 Reg. Sess.)] ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition to substantively amending sections 188 and 189 . . . , Senate Bill [No.] 1437 added [former] section 1170.95, [now section 1172.6

2024(See, e.g., [People v.] Washington [1965] 62 Cal.2d 777 [robbery victim kills accomplice]; [People v.] Gilbert, supra, [63] Cal.2d 690 [police officer kills accomplice].)” (People v. Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 867 .) In Gilbert, the court recognized “that entirely apart from the felony-murder rule, malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another.” (People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 703 , italics added.) “Such malice is implied under . . . section 188 when the de

2024(See, e.g., [People v.] Washington [1965] 62 Cal.2d 777 [robbery victim kills accomplice]; [People v.] Gilbert, supra, [63] Cal.2d 690 [police officer kills accomplice].)” (People v. Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 867 .) In Gilbert, the court recognized “that entirely apart from the felony-murder rule, malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another.” (People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 703 , italics added.) “Such malice is implied under . . . section 188 when the de

2025The court further noted that Dominguez “was the sole defendant; he admitted he attempted to murder [V.B.]; he admitted he personally and intentionally used a firearm in committing the crime and admitted he personally inflicted great bodily injury[.]” DISCUSSION Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as related to murder “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying fe

2024Rather, the Attorney General contends that “[e]ven if there were insufficient evidence supporting an aiding and abetting theory of first degree murder, the court’s specific reasoning is not essential to its ultimate decision as there was substantial evidence supporting the denial under a currently valid theory of murder.” The Attorney General further contends “the statutory framework and the applicable standard of review permit this court to hold that substantial evidence supports the denial of the petition on a theory that [Agaton-Hernandez] was guilty of murder under a conspiracy theory” and

2026Felony Murder “Under the amended felony-murder rule, a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not act with the intent to kill can only be liable for murder if [the defendant] was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Citations.] ‘[T]he standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2[, subdivision] (d), as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, death

2026(See People v Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 [examining the major participant requirement]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 [examining the reckless indifference requirement]; see also Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 [discussing the constitutional parameters of the felony-murder rule].) As to whether Flores was a member of a conspiracy to commit robbery for purposes of CALCRIM No. 540B, the trial court instructed the 5 jury to refer to its separate instruction on conspiracy, CALCRIM No. 416.

2026(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992.) In 19 other words, “the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life- endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468 .) “Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, as defendant contends was the case here, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice.” (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110 (Nieto Benitez).) Thus, Senate Bill No. 1437 abo

2022(In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141, 144 .) Now, a person generally may be convicted of murder only if he acted with malice aforethought. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 849 .) Thus, section 188 now “bars a 16 conviction for first or second degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory.” (Gentile, at p. 846.) And, while S.B. 1437 didn’t completely abrogate the felony murder rule, that rule applies only if the defendant: (1) was the actual killer; or (2) with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the actual killer’s commission of murder; or (3) acted as