felony-murder rule in Illinois

2023However, our supreme court, back in Lowery, rejected that theory in favor of proximate cause. ¶ 49 The Lowery court began its analysis by stating: “In considering the applicability of the felony-murder rule where the murder is committed by someone resisting the felony, Illinois 20 No. 1-21-0848 follows the ‘proximate cause theory.’ ” Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 465 .

2023The supreme court repeatedly spoke in broad terms about “doctrine,” for example stating that, “[b]ased on the plain language of the felony-murder statute, legislative intent, and public policy, we decline to abandon the proximate cause theory of the felony-murder doctrine.” Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 469 .

2024For example, the dissent of Justice Bilandic in People v. Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d 247, 255-56 (1998) (Bilandic, J., dissenting) described such an application of the doctrine “absurd and unfair”: “I would hold that the felony-murder doctrine does not apply to render a surviving felon guilty of murder where a cofelon is killed by a nonparticipant in the felony.

2024Consistent with the proximate cause theory, liability should lie for any death proximately related to the defendant’s criminal conduct.” Id. at 249-52 . -9- In other words, the Dekens majority held any unfairness in the application of the felony murder doctrine to the deaths of cofelons at the hands of victims or third parties was a problem for the legislature, not the courts.

2017See People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 192 (2003) (observing that the purpose behind the felony murder doctrine is to limit the violence that accompanies the commission of forcible felonies, so that anyone who commits such a violent felony will be automatically subject to a murder charge if someone is killed during the commission of that felony).

2016See People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 192 (2003) (observing that the purpose behind the felony murder doctrine is to limit the violence that accompanies the commission of forcible felonies, so that anyone who commits such a violent felony will be automatically subject to a murder charge if someone is killed during the commission of that felony).

2024Thus, the trial court’s instructions on accountability and felony murder accurately stated the applicable law. ¶ 55 Although the defendant relies on People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87 (1988), to support his position that accountability did not apply to his felony murder charge, we note that Dennis dealt with a specific subset of the felony murder rule, the felony murder escape rule.

2014Just as the felony-murder doctrine "seeks to deter persons from committing forcible felonies by holding them responsible for murder if a death results," the common-design rule "seeks to deter persons from intentionally aiding or encouraging the commission of offenses." People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105 , 692 N.E.2d 325, 335 (1998). ¶ 46 Defendant's argument that the State was required to prove that he shared Grimes's intent to fire the rifle illustrates the erroneous conflation of two distinct bases for proving legal accountability: (1) shared intent (sometimes referred to as "specific int

2002App. 3d 75 , 634 N.E.2d 34 (1994), the court held: “[F]orcible felonies are so inherently dangerous that a resulting homicide, even an accidental one, is strongly probable. [Citation.] Consequently, felons are responsible for those deaths which occur during a felony and which are foreseeable consequences of their initial criminal acts. [Citations.] It is immaterial whether the killing was intentional or accidental or was committed by a confederate without the connivance of the defendant or even by a third party trying to prevent the commission of or resist the felony. [Citation.] A common plan

2002App. 3d 75 , 634 N.E.2d 34 (1994), the court held: “[F]orcible felonies are so inherently dangerous that a resulting homicide, even an accidental one, is strongly probable. [Citation.] Consequently, felons are responsible for those deaths which occur during a felony and which are foreseeable consequences of their initial criminal acts. [Citations.] It is immaterial whether the killing was intentional or accidental or was committed by a confederate without the connivance of the defendant or even by a third party trying to prevent the commission of or resist the felony. [Citation.] A common plan

2014App. 3d 707, 714 (1999), aff’d, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 447-48 (2001) (if, after all the evidence has been presented, and the trial court concludes that the State’s evidence is not sufficient to show an independent underlying felony, then the court should refuse the felony murder instruction); People v. Tamayo, 2012 IL App (3d) 100361, ¶ 26 (in making the determination as to whether mob action may properly serve as a predicate felony for felony murder, the court must consider whether the conduct underlying the felony involves “ ‘an independent felonious purpose’ ” other than the killing (quoting Davi

2013App. 3d 707, 714 (1999), aff'd, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 447-48 (2001) (if, after all the evidence has been presented, and the trial court concludes that the State's evidence is not sufficient to show an independent underlying felony, then the court should refuse the felony murder instruction); People v. Tamayo, 2012 IL App (3d) 100361, ¶ 26 (in making the determination as to whether mob action may properly serve as a predicate felony for felony murder, the court must consider whether the conduct underlying the felony involves "an independent felonious purpose" other than the killing) (quoting Davison

2003Although we find the plain error doctrine not to apply here, we nonetheless address this issue on its merits. "[A] defendant is subject to the felony murder doctrine if the 'decedent's death is the direct and proximate result of the defendant’s felony.' " Toney , 337 Ill.

2003Although we find the plain error doctrine not to apply here, we nonetheless address this issue on its merits. “[A] defendant is subject to the felony murder doctrine if the ‘decedent’s death is the direct and proximate result of the defendant’s felony.’ ” Toney, 337 Ill.

2007"A felon is liable for those deaths which occur during a felony and which are the foreseeable consequence of his initial criminal acts." Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 470 ; see also People v. Nixon, 371 Ill. 318 , 20 N.E.2d 789 (1939) (the supreme court upheld the defendant's felony murder conviction where the victim was killed after the defendant entered her residence to commit a theft). 6 No. 1-05-1470 Illinois courts have held that "[a] killing that occurs during the course of an escape from a forcible felony is within the operation of the felony- murder rule." People v. Klebanowski, 221 Ill. 2d 5

2007"A felon is liable for those deaths which occur during a felony and which are the foreseeable consequence of his initial criminal acts." Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 470 ; see also People v. Nixon, 371 Ill. 318 , 20 N.E.2d 789 (1939) (the supreme court upheld the defendant's felony murder conviction where the victim was killed after the defendant entered her residence to commit a theft). 6 No. 1-05-1470 Illinois courts have held that "[a] killing that occurs during the course of an escape from a forcible felony is within the operation of the felony- murder rule." People v. Klebanowski, 221 Ill. 2d 5

2023App. 3d 1066, 1068-69 (1982) (“For purposes of felony (armed robbery) murder, there is no requirement that the State prove a mental state element for the underlying offense. [Citation.] Thus, no mental state element as such need be proved to obtain 38 No. 1-21-0848 the felony-murder conviction. [Citation.] The defendant is held strictly liable for felony-murder upon proof of the armed robbery.”). ¶ 94 In People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462 (1997), in a unique fact situation involving a death caused by third-party intervener, our supreme court reviewed the felony murder doctrine and affirmed use

2007"A felon is liable for those deaths which occur during a felony and which are the foreseeable consequence of his initial criminal acts." Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 470 ; see also People v. Nixon, 371 Ill. 318 , 20 N.E.2d 789 (1939) (the supreme court upheld the defendant's felony murder conviction where the victim was killed after the defendant entered her residence to commit a theft). 6 No. 1-05-1470 Illinois courts have held that "[a] killing that occurs during the course of an escape from a forcible felony is within the operation of the felony- murder rule." People v. Klebanowski, 221 Ill. 2d 5

2021People v. Davison, 236 Ill. 2d 232, 239 (2010). ¶ 22 The felony-murder doctrine allows for a conviction of first-degree murder even where the State does not prove that the defendant either intended to kill the victim or knew that death would result.

2014People v. Davison, 236 Ill. 2d 232, 239-40 (2010) (“The offense of felony murder is unique because it does not require the State to prove the intent to kill, distinguishing it from other forms of first degree murder when the State must prove either an intentional killing or a knowing killing.”); People v. Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d 247 , -3- 259 (1998) (Heiple, J., dissenting) (“In Illinois, the only type of first degree murder which does not require proof of a specific mens rea, or intent, on the part of the defendant is felony murder. [Citation.] The felony-murder doctrine thus stands as a substitu

2015See also People v. Cervantes, 408 Ill.

2015See also People v. Cervantes, 408 Ill.

1993Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(6)(b); People v. Ramey (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 498, 545 .) The statutory aggravating factor relied on in this case as the basis for imposition of the death penalty is a narrow form of the felony-murder rule.

1993(Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b); People v. Ramey (1992), 151 Ill.2d 498, 545 , 177 Ill.Dec. 449 , 603 N.E.2d 519 .) The statutory aggravating factor relied on in this case as the basis for imposition of the death penalty is a narrow form of the felony-murder rule.

2014App. 3d 707, 714 (1999), aff’d, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 447-48 (2001) (if, after all the evidence has been presented, and the trial court concludes that the State’s evidence is not sufficient to show an independent underlying felony, then the court should refuse the felony murder instruction); People v. Tamayo, 2012 IL App (3d) 100361, ¶ 26 (in making the determination as to whether mob action may properly serve as a predicate felony for felony murder, the court must consider whether the conduct underlying the felony involves “ ‘an independent felonious purpose’ ” other than the killing (quoting Davi

2013App. 3d 707, 714 (1999), aff'd, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 447-48 (2001) (if, after all the evidence has been presented, and the trial court concludes that the State's evidence is not sufficient to show an independent underlying felony, then the court should refuse the felony murder instruction); People v. Tamayo, 2012 IL App (3d) 100361, ¶ 26 (in making the determination as to whether mob action may properly serve as a predicate felony for felony murder, the court must consider whether the conduct underlying the felony involves "an independent felonious purpose" other than the killing) (quoting Davison

2023As our cases make clear, application of the felony-murder doctrine does not depend on the guilt or innocence of the person killed during the felony or on the identity of the person whose act causes the decedent’s death.” Id. at 252 . ¶ 97 In drawing its conclusion, the Dekens court noted the committee comment to section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 that states, “ ‘It is immaterial whether the killing in such a case is intentional or accidental, or is committed by a confederate without the connivance of the defendant *** or even by a third person trying to prevent the commission of the felo

2021It was only in that context that proximate cause, and thus foreseeability, entered the calculus: “In considering the applicability of the felony-murder rule where the murder is committed by someone resisting the felony, Illinois follows the ‘proximate cause theory.’ Under this theory, liability attaches under the felony-murder rule for any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity—notwithstanding the fact that the killing was by one resisting the crime.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 465 . -8- ¶ 51 In other words, the State must prove foreseeability in a felony-murder prosecution only

1994A "distinctive characteristic of felony murder is that it does not require an intention to kill.” (People v. Viser (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 568, 581 .) Under the felony-murder rule a person may be convicted of felony murder even though he had no intent to and even if he did not personally kill the victim.

1994A "distinctive characteristic of felony murder is that it does not require an intention to kill." ( People v. Viser (1975), 62 Ill.2d 568, 581 , 343 N.E.2d 903 .) Under the felony-murder rule a person may be convicted of felony murder even though he had no intent to and even if he did not personally kill the victim.

2018We agree with defendant. ¶ 50 "Illinois adheres to the 'proximate cause' theory of liability for felony murder, meaning 'liability attaches under the felony-murder rule for any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity.' " People v Brown , 2015 IL App (1st) 131552 , ¶ 30, 394 Ill.Dec. 238 , 35 N.E.3d 1207 (quoting People v. Lowery , 178 Ill. 2d 462 , 465, 227 Ill.Dec. 491 , 687 N.E.2d 973 (1997) ); see also Shaw , 186 Ill. 2d at 322 , 239 Ill.Dec. 311 , 713 N.E.2d 1161 ("Felony murder depends solely on a cause and effect relationship between the crime committed and the resulting m

2018We agree with defendant. ¶ 50 "Illinois adheres to the 'proximate cause' theory of liability for felony murder, meaning 'liability attaches under the felony-murder rule for any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity.' " People v Brown , 2015 IL App (1st) 131552 , ¶ 30, 394 Ill.Dec. 238 , 35 N.E.3d 1207 (quoting People v. Lowery , 178 Ill. 2d 462 , 465, 227 Ill.Dec. 491 , 687 N.E.2d 973 (1997) ); see also Shaw , 186 Ill. 2d at 322 , 239 Ill.Dec. 311 , 713 N.E.2d 1161 ("Felony murder depends solely on a cause and effect relationship between the crime committed and the resulting m

2013As our supreme court has made clear, to “be convicted of murder under the felony-murder doctrine, the accused need not have intended to kill. [Citations.] Too, self-defense cannot be used as a defense to a charge of felony murder.” People v. Moore, 95 Ill. 2d 404, 411 (1983). ¶ 40 Moore is strikingly similar to the case at bar.

1992(People v. Moore (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 404, 411 , 447 N.E.2d 1327 .) The jury was properly instructed as to all elements of the crimes charged and the State’s burden of proof as to each, and the evidence is not so closely balanced that the lack of the desired instruction would, in any event, have deprived defendant of a fair trial.